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ABSTRACT 
In the time since UN member states came together in 1948 to adopt the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the crime of genocide 
has been tragically perpetrated multiple times across the globe, often without those 
same member states taking meaningful action to prevent genocide or even categorise 
it as such.  This thesis sets out to interrogate the premise that this failure to respond to 
such violence as it unfolds is simply due to a lack of political will amongst states, and 
to analyse whether it is instead better explained by the indeterminacy of the definition 
and elements of the legal crime of genocide itself. 
To address this contention, the thesis proceeds along three core strands of research 
which illustrate the complexities involved in identifying the crime of genocide in the 
midst of violence utilising case studies of past and present accepted or alleged 
instances of genocide in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, Central African Republic, 
northern Iraq (Islamic State), Burundi, and South Sudan.  The thesis examines firstly 
the contestations around the definition of genocide, due to competing legal and social 
understandings of what genocide entails, and secondly how these understandings 
impact on identifying the crime of genocide in the midst of violence.  These two 
strands raise questions as to the utility of the genocide label as a means of prevention, 
with the nature of the definition of genocide often rendering it indeterminate in times 
of violence.  Given this indeterminacy, the final strand of this thesis contends that, for 
the purposes of prevention, ongoing violence should be assessed under the more 
general rubric of atrocity crimes, and that the term genocide should instead be reserved 
for after a conflict has ended and a clearer analysis can be made by an international 
court or tribunal.  
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CHAPTER ONE: ‘NEVER AGAIN’, YET ALWAYS AGAIN 
1.1 Introduction 
In this introductory chapter, the rationale underlying the basis of this thesis pursuing 
this particular study of the topic of genocide will be presented.  This chapter will 
address why this thesis is necessary to address issues within the current study and 
practice of genocide, in particular complexities related to genocide prevention.  The 
goal of this chapter is to introduce the elements and topics that will be explored and 
analysed so as to provide a brief overview of the research and the direction and 
structure of the following chapters.  This chapter will set out the aims and objectives 
of this thesis, and how they will be examined through a number of research questions 
that will address the different strands of this research topic.  This chapter will explain 
and justify why these research questions and the research methods used to explore the 
topic have been selected and how they will aid this research in presenting vital 
information and evidence that will address the core concerns of this thesis.  In pursuing 
this research the chapter will explore how this thesis fits within the wider body of 
study of genocide, and how the study of genocide presents some interesting areas of 
exploration for this thesis to further analyse which permits this research to proffer a 
contribution to the study of the utility of the genocide label, which will be one of the 
central aims and objectives of this research.  To begin exploring the various elements 
of this research, this chapter will turn to focus on the subject of this thesis, the concept 
of genocide. 
1.2 Confronting the Horror of Genocide 
Humanity witnessed a 20th century that was marked by the massacre and attempted 
extermination of populations across the globe and a 21st century that continues to see 
an array of violent clashes involving significant civilian casualties spanning across the 
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globe.  In amongst the continual bloodshed, one term has become synonymous with 
the most appalling horrors and crimes committed during this time; genocide.  The term 
evokes memories of the death and destruction witnessed in the Holocaust, Rwanda, 
and Srebrenica in the last century and in Darfur, Sinjar, and now in Myanmar in this 
century. 
There are many explanations for the phenomenon of genocide within the substantial 
body of literature on the subject from anthropological, economic, historical, 
philosophical, political, psychological, and social perspectives amongst others.  While 
it may be possible to theorise the reasons why people may commit genocide or the 
conditions that could give rise to the commission of genocide, genocide as a crime 
continues to plague this world with recurring claims or evidence presented of the 
perpetration of genocide across the globe.  Why is it that despite the moral outrage we 
feel, due to the powerful symbolic value of the term by virtue of its association and 
connotation with the Holocaust, when we hear that genocide may have been 
committed in a given situation, the threat of genocide still lingers without being 
adequately addressed more than seventy years after one of the worst genocides in the 
history of mankind?  Is it that genocide as a crime can simply not be prevented or is 
there a flaw in the approach to genocide prevention due to the very concept of 
genocide?  Could it be that genocide is simply a term that cannot be identified in the 
midst of violence due to how it was conceived as a concept and how it is now perceived 
by a variety of actors from different perspectives?  Has the definition of genocide 
rendered the crime of genocide indeterminable in the midst of bloodshed?  If genocide 
as a legal category is too complex to identify in the middle of bloodshed, should 
genocide still be employed as a term to characterise ongoing violence, or should we 
20 
instead utilise another term or terms to describe ongoing violence with the objective 
of preventing and responding to potential genocidal situations? 
The utility of the genocide label as a preventative term is a key theme which will be 
at the foundation of this research.  However it is important to note, before beginning 
to examine the potential flaws apparent in the definition of genocide which could 
conceivably impact on the response to genocide, that the response to genocide was not 
always so hopeless and demoralising.  When the word itself was first crafted it was 
aimed at preventing the recurrence of genocide and protecting the world’s population 
from harm and despair. 
1.3 Criminalising the Act 
The term genocide, while itself an age-old reality, is only a relatively recent word.1  
Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish lawyer who devoted his life’s work to the protection 
of targeted groups, coined the term 'genocide' in 1944.2  The word was inspired not 
only by the massacres of the Holocaust but by earlier atrocities committed against the 
Armenians and the Assyrians which sparked Lemkin’s interest in the destruction of 
groups.3  The word is an amalgamation of the Greek word ‘genos’, meaning race or 
tribe, and the Latin word ‘cide’, meaning killing.4 
                                                 
1 Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (Penguin 1981) 9; Raphael Lemkin, 
‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ in Steven Leonard Jacobs (ed), Lemkin on Genocide (Lexington 
Books 2012) 20. 
2 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1944). 
3 Raphael Lemkin, Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin (Donna-Lee Frieze ed, 
Yale University Press 2013) xi–xii; Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and 
Crimes against Humanity (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2016) 143. 
4 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1944) 79. 
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In Lemkin’s seminal work, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, he defined genocide as ‘the 
destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.’5  Lemkin outlined that genocide is 
‘directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed 
against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national 
group.’6  For Lemkin, genocide is a distinct crime from homicide as the victim of 
genocide is the group itself not the individual, and this is why Lemkin argued for a 
new term to describe this atrocity and for new laws to punish its perpetration.7  To 
address the horror of genocide, Lemkin argued for an international treaty for the 
criminalisation of genocide and the inclusion of the crime in domestic criminal statutes 
of states, so as to cover genocide committed during peace time.8  Lemkin believed that 
genocide was a matter for international powers and that the newly established United 
Nations (hereafter ‘UN’) should focus on the prevention and punishment of the crime 
in its initial work.9 
The concept quickly took root in international circles in the aftermath of World War 
II, as the international community struggled for a term to describe the death and 
destruction of the Holocaust.10  In 1948 the concept received international acceptance 
when the UN adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, which came into effect in 1951.11  The Genocide Convention is ‘the 
                                                 
5 ibid 79. 
6 ibid 79. 
7 ibid 79. 
8 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1944) 90–95.  See also Christian 
J Tams, Lars Berster, and Björn Schiffbauer, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide: A Commentary (CH Beck 2014) 6. 
9 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1944) 90–95.  See also Samantha 
Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 48. 
10 Christian J Tams, Lars Berster, and Björn Schiffbauer, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide: A Commentary (CH Beck 2014) 11. 
11 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, 
entered into force 12 January 1951). 
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foundation of the international law of genocide and a political benchmark for the UN, 
states, NGOs, media and social movements in dealing with genocide.’12  The 
Convention has a dual purpose as set out in its title; the first is to aid states in 
preventing the perpetration of genocide and secondly to criminalise the commission 
of genocide by setting out the definition of genocide and the means of punishing the 
perpetration of crime. 
For such a historic agreement, the Genocide Convention is actually quite brief.  There 
are only nineteen articles, with most provisions only consisting of a few lines.  
Furthermore Articles X to XIX of the Convention concern procedural and technical 
matters, such as the languages of the Convention and process of ratification, which are 
not relevant to punishing or preventing genocide.  Therefore there are only nine 
substantive articles dealing with the crime of genocide.  The focus of this thesis will 
be predominantly on the provisions within Article II of the Convention which lays out 
the definition of the crime of genocide, as an understanding of this article is crucial 
for addressing the difficulties of identifying genocide in the midst of violence which 
could conceivably impact on the response to genocide. 
1.3(i) Defining the Crime 
Article II 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
                                                 
12 Martin Shaw, Genocide and International Relations: Changing Patterns in the Transitions of the 
Late Modern World (Cambridge University Press 2013) 87. 
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(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Under this article, the crime of genocide is made up of the actus reus (physical act) 
and the mens rea (mental element).13  The physical acts are those outlined in 
subsections (a)–(e) while the mental element is the intent to destroy the four 
recognised groups.  This definition of genocide included within the Genocide 
Convention had changed significantly from the concept first proposed by Lemkin, 
however the underlying objective behind the definition and the Convention in general 
remained the same; a desire to protect groups from destruction.  It is this article that is 
central to the application of the Genocide Convention as the failure to have a definition 
of genocide that is identifiable in the midst of violence dooms the Convention to be 
unenforceable and even irrelevant in the prevention of genocide.  This is why this 
article is critical to this research, as an indeterminable definition of genocide raises the 
very question of its long term utility as a preventative mechanism in the midst of 
bloodshed. 
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Furthermore this article underpins the whole Genocide Convention, as a failure to 
possess a definition of genocide that can be applied in the midst of violence jeopardises 
the enforcement of the rest of the provisions within the Convention.  The other eight 
articles within the Genocide Convention, which are important for this study, set out 
the responsibility that states have for preventing and punishing the crime of genocide. 
1.3(ii) Preventing and Punishing Genocide 
Article I 
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in 
time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which 
they undertake to prevent and to punish. 
This article is critical as it sets out the dual purpose of the Genocide Convention, to 
prevent and punish the crime of genocide, and the responsibility that states who ratify 
the Convention have to fulfil this purpose.  This article also sets out that genocide is a 
crime under international law, a principle which recalls Lemkin’s original assertion 
that genocide was a matter of international concern.  Furthermore this provision was 
significant, as it stated the genocide could be committed during peace time as well as 
during times of war.  At that time, war crimes and crimes against humanity could only 
be committed during an international armed conflict.14  This permitted individuals and 
states the recourse to invoke the Genocide Convention in a situation that would not 
fully conform to the definition of an armed conflict. 
Article III 
The criminal acts under the Convention were set out in Article III which states that: 
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The following acts shall be punishable: 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide. 
This article lists the five ‘modes of conduct’ by which an individual ‘incurs criminal 
responsibility’ under the provisions of the Convention.15  Conspiracy, direct and 
public incitement, and attempt to commit genocide are acts which are ‘considered to 
constitute the preliminary stages of genocide’.16  This research is focussed on the 
commission of genocide under subsection (a), and the issue of identifying this crime 
with reference to the provisions of Article II. 
Article IV 
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally 
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. 
This provision is momentous as it ensured individuals, regardless of their standing in 
society, would be held accountable for the commission of genocide.17  Heads of states 
would not be able to claim diplomatic immunity from prosecution and instead would 
be held responsible for their actions.18 
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Article V 
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their 
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the 
provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide 
effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other 
acts enumerated in article III. 
This article sets out that genocide will not only be criminalised under international law 
but also under domestic statutes so as to ensure that states take responsibility for 
punishing genocide within their own jurisdiction.  Requiring states to pass their own 
legislation strengthened the enforcement and effectiveness of the Genocide 
Convention and the responsibility to prevent and punish genocide.19 
Article VI 
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the 
territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting 
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. 
While permitting states to undertake their own trials within their territory, this article 
also provided the basis for the establishment some decades later of the ad hoc tribunals 
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the creation of the International Criminal 
Court which have helped to clarify the terms of the Convention.20  As will be discussed 
later in the research, these institutions and the case law they have produced have been 
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critical in clarifying the terms of the Convention and elucidating the definition and 
understanding of genocide. 
Article VII 
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be 
considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. 
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant 
extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force. 
This article further ensures states act to punish genocide by ensuring their compliance 
with extradition requests.  Excluding genocide as a political crime ensured that 
perpetrators could not portray their acts as political violence as a means of avoiding 
extradition.21 
Article VIII 
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United 
Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression 
of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III. 
This article sets out that the UN is a critical actor in the prevention of genocide, and 
that states have recourse to the UN’s means of responding to situations.  As will be 
seen in following chapters, the UN and its actors and organs have played a key role in 
responding to genocide by establishing legal tribunals, setting up commissions of 
inquiry, and even in some case pronouncing that genocide has been perpetrated.22 
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Article IX 
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those 
relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or any of the other 
acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International 
Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 
This article is significant as it provides states with a recourse to hold another state or 
states responsible for committing an act of genocide.  The designation of the 
International Court of Justice as the organ responsible for interpreting, applying, and 
fulfilling the provisions of the Convention was important for establishing a principal 
organ for adjudicating disputes between states.  The case law of this institution has 
also been vital for clarifying the responsibility of a state under the Genocide 
Convention and how to define the crime itself. 
1.3(iii) The Success of the Convention? 
The adoption of the Genocide Convention was a historic moment in the brief history, 
at that time, of the UN and was meant to be a signal that the UN would respond to 
crimes of this nature.  However the noble intentions of those who drafted the Genocide 
Convention did not initially translate into effective action.23  In fact the Convention 
lay largely dormant for decades after its adoption with little reference made to it in the 
workings of the UN and the international community.24  When political actors did use 
                                                 
23 Paul Wilkinson, International Relations: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2007) 
125. 
24 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (Routledge 2006) xxi–xxii. 
29 
the word genocide, particularly during the Cold War period, it was mainly as a 
rhetorical tool to label the actions of their rival states as genocide.25 
Genocide tragically rose again to prominence in the mid-1990s with the atrocities 
committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  This period witnessed the capacity 
to punish under the Genocide Convention prosper with the creation of international 
legal institutions to address the commission of crimes of international law in these 
respective situations as well as a growing body of case law covering individual and 
state responsibility for the commission of genocide.  While the punishment potential 
of the Convention was gradually realised in the 1990s and 2000s, the other purpose of 
the Convention floundered. 
Despite the lofty promise of the Genocide Convention to prevent the crime of 
genocide, it did not translate into states pursuing meaningful action to respond to 
genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica.  The international community was instead, 
particularly in the case of Rwanda, paralysed in the face of claims of genocide by 
endless debates over how to define genocide and how to apply the definition to 
violence.  Rather than be the focal point in the prevention of genocide, the preventative 
potential of the Genocide Convention became an underutilised and even neglected 
resource in responding to ongoing cases potentially involving genocidal violence. 
In the twenty-first century genocide continues to be a blight across the globe that the 
international community struggles to respond effectively to, from the Sudanese 
government’s actions in Darfur, to the horrific acts of ISIS in the Sinjar Region on the 
border of Iraq and Syria, and to now the continued crimes of the Myanmar government 
in Rakhine State against the Rohingya people.  The continued failure of states and 
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intergovernmental organisations to protect populations at risk of violence has meant 
that the international community's promise in the aftermath of the Holocaust to 'Never 
Again' bear witness to genocide has rung hollow over the last seventy years. 
This failure to convert the obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide into 
an established practice in international law raises the question of the utility of the 
Genocide Convention as an instrument to prevent and respond to ongoing crimes with 
a genocidal dimension.  This is not a novel or ground-breaking point of view; since 
the adoption of the Genocide Convention there have been questions raised amongst 
academics and activists about the effectiveness of the Convention.  The failure to 
meaningfully realise the Convention’s preventative purpose has led to criticism of the 
Convention’s definition of genocide from within the academic and activist 
communities, and various attempts to redefine and reinterpret the crime for a changing 
world.  There is now an ever growing interest into the crime of genocide which has 
expanded into its own field of genocide studies.  The observations of those who have 
contributed to the study of genocide and this field of genocide studies are critical for 
illustrating not only the defects and deficiencies of the concept of genocide but also 
for highlighting further and future areas for exploration and research. 
1.4 The Growth of Genocide Studies and Genocide Activism 
The current state of genocide studies where there are a substantial body of books and 
research articles concentrated on the topic of genocide, a number of journals devoted 
to the study of genocide, a variety of academic conferences spread across the world, 
university degree programmes focussed on genocide, and scholarly institutions and 
organisations dedicated to genocide research is quite different to the original treatment 
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of genocide by the academic community.26  In the aftermath of the adoption of the 
Convention it was only ‘a handful of dedicated liberators, jurists, scholars and 
Holocaust survivors’ that paid any sustained interest to the topic of genocide.27  In fact 
genocide studies developed in the shadows of the study of the Holocaust, which 
dominated the meagre research into genocide.28  This was the state of genocide studies 
for much of the 1940s to 1970s, where genocide was very much a fringe interest in 
academia. 
Interest in the concept of genocide did eventually grow in the 1980s, mainly in 
response to the evidence of atrocities perpetrated against groups of people in the 1960s 
in Indonesia and Vietnam and in the 1970s in Bangladesh, Burundi, and Cambodia 
and the lack of effective international responses to these situations.29  The initial 
fascination with the term genocide amongst academics was due to the Genocide 
Convention’s preventative potential as it applied during times of war and peace which 
differentiated the crime from crimes against humanity and war crimes which required 
a nexus with war.30 
The growth in interest was predominantly led by a small number of academics and 
scholars such as Leo Kuper, Vahakn Dadrian, Pieter Drost, Helen Fein, Henry 
                                                 
26 Samuel Totten, ‘The State and Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Overview and 
Analysis of Some Key Issues’ (2011) 6 Genocide Studies and Prevention 211, 212–215; Colin Tatz, 
‘Genocide Studies: An Australian Perspective’ (2011) 6 Genocide Studies and Prevention 231, 231; 
Dominik J Schaller, ‘From Lemkin to Clooney: The Development and State of Genocide Studies’ 
(2011) 6 Genocide Studies and Prevention 245, 247. 
27 Frank Chalk, ‘Genocide in the 20th Century – Definitions of Genocide and their Implications for 
Prediction and Prevention’ (1989) 4 Holocaust and Genocide Studies 149, 149. 
28 Colin Tatz, ‘Genocide Studies: An Australian Perspective’ (2011) 6 Genocide Studies and Prevention 
231, 232; Martin Shaw, Genocide and International Relations: Changing Patterns in the Transitions 
of the Late Modern World (Cambridge University Press 2013) 26, 28. 
29 Frank Chalk, ‘Genocide in the 20th Century – Definitions of Genocide and their Implications for 
Prediction and Prevention’ (1989) 4 Holocaust and Genocide Studies 149, 151, 158. 
30 William A Schabas, ‘The International Legal Prohibition of Genocide Comes of Age’ (2004) 5 
Human Rights Review 46, 46; William A Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of 
Crimes (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 11. 
32 
Huttenbach, Irving Louis Horowitz, Israel Charny, Frank Chalk, Kurt Jonassohn, 
Barbara Harff, and Ted Gurr.31  The dominant academics within the emerging field of 
genocide studies were not legal scholars but rather historians, sociologists, 
psychologists, and philosophers.32  This burgeoning period of the discipline of 
genocide studies involved academics undertaking comparative studies of the crime of 
genocide, using the Holocaust and the above mentioned situations, to seek to address 
a number of topics such as whether genocide had been committed in past or recent 
situations of violence, the prevention of genocide, and the conditions that give rise to 
genocide.33 
In conducting their research these researchers also began questioning why the 
Genocide Convention had not been employed to respond to violent situations across 
the globe which for them constituted the crime of genocide.  In addressing this failure 
to respond, the focus quickly settled on the definition of genocide.  The definition of 
genocide provided under Article II of the Genocide Convention was viewed by authors 
such as Chalk and Jonassohn as so restrictive, that it could not apply to any situation 
that had occurred since the Convention was adopted.34  This failure of the Convention 
to adequately address systematic violations of human rights led to most academics 
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studying the crime of genocide in this period to create a new definition of genocide, 
normally by expanding upon the elements included under the Convention, to apply to 
the situation or situations that they were researching.35  Chalk contends that in creating 
new definitions academics believed that a new definition of genocide would contribute 
to being able to predict the crime of genocide and prevent it in the future.36 
However there was and continues to be a lack of ‘consensus’ amongst academics over 
how the definition of genocide should be framed.37  This has meant that there are a 
multitude of definitions employed by academics to describe the phenomenon of 
genocide.38  These attempts to restructure the definition of genocide are not without 
criticism within the literature, where academics have argued that definitional debates 
distract from the issue of genocide prevention.39  Jerry Fowler contends that this focus 
on applying the label of genocide by crafting a new definition of genocide to apply to 
past situations or debating the semantics of genocide means that academics can often 
get caught up on preventing the last genocide, rather than focussing on preventing the 
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next genocide.40  Despite this critique of genocide studies, new researchers to the field 
of genocide studies in the 1990s and 2000s continued to craft alternative definitions 
of genocide. 
The area of genocide studies expanded significantly in the 1990s in the aftermath of 
the genocidal situations in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia as the case law that 
emerged from the investigations in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia prompted a 
flurry of studies into the elements of the crime and how the definition of the crime 
applied in practice.41  This period also saw significant academic interest in the area of 
genocide prevention, as researchers began questioning why states and the international 
community did not respond to the violence in the new post-Cold War environment.  
Research on the failure to respond in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia, as well 
as in Darfur in the mid-2000s focussed on the lack of political will amongst states and 
the UN to respond to and prevent genocide.42  The Genocide Convention was seen as 
failing to sufficiently motivate states to place genocide prevention and intervention as 
one of their key strategic goals. 
While rooted in tragedy, the 1990s proved to be a boon to the area of genocide studies 
as the perpetration of genocide in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as the 
question of genocide in Darfur in the mid-2000s meant that the word genocide entered 
the mainstream consciousness.43  Non-governmental organisations devoted to raising 
awareness of situations of genocide and demanding action sprang up; as civil society 
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activists became pivotal actors in raising the public’s awareness of genocide and 
ardent advocates of confronting genocide.44  Activists play an important role in the 
prevention of genocide as the powerful rhetorical value of the genocide label can draw 
the attention of the general public to a situation of violence which can lead to the 
public placing pressure on politicians to react to claims of genocide.45  These activists 
regarded genocide as a term that will grab the interest of the general public, as 
genocide is the most recognisable term to civil society actors and the public, and the 
use of word will lead to a mobilisation in response to violence.46 
The 21st century, in particular, has seen the rise of ‘anti-genocide activism’, which 
places politicians under pressure to react to violence.47  ‘Never Again’ has been a 
rallying call for advocates seeking an international community that it more willing to 
take action in response to international crimes.48  Activists and academics began 
labelling situations as genocide with the ‘hope … that the “G-word” would create 
public attention, exert moral pressure, and impose a legal obligation on Western 
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governments to take action to stop the genocidal violence.’49  Civil society activists 
were aware of the power of the word amongst the general public as genocide was seen 
as the most evil act that could be committed.50  The passing of the Convention in the 
aftermath of the Holocaust meant that in the opinion of some academics and activists 
the concept of genocide is ‘synonymous with the apex of human evil.’51 
This line of thinking, that genocide is the worst crime, has been scorned by some in 
academia who believe this approach minimises the severity of other international 
crimes such as crimes against humanity and war crimes.52  Authors such as Peter 
Quayle contend that due to the rhetorical value attached to the genocide label in some 
cases atrocities described by academics and activists as genocide are actually legally 
crimes against humanity.53  These academics argue that the concentration on the 
importance of the label genocide was due in part to a lacuna in the other international 
crimes.54  While genocide is defined within the Convention, for a long time there was 
no corresponding equivalence for the concept of crimes against humanity or ethnic 
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cleansing which left these crimes without a definitive understanding in international 
society.55  However the last twenty years has seen crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing rise in prominence as these crimes have been recognised in statutes, 
judgments from international courts and tribunals, and UN resolutions.56  With these 
developments, researchers, such as William Schabas, have questioned the need to 
redefine the crime of genocide when these other terms may be more applicable.57 
Notwithstanding these developments there is a certain ‘allure’ associated with the 
genocide label for academics and activists which is missing in the terms crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing.58  As David Luban states everyone, apart from ‘a 
handful of international lawyers’, views genocide as the crime of crimes.59  The 
genocide label can also be of ‘great emotional importance to victims.’60  For victims 
of atrocities, genocide is the ‘pinnacle of evil’, and they use the word to draw attention 
to their plight as they have experienced the ‘indifference of the outside world to their 
suffering.’61  While the emotional importance of the genocide label to victims cannot 
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be underplayed, research has shown that that the label genocide can be seen as a 
distraction to effective action to prevent genocide.62 
With the symbolic value of the word potentially limiting the ability of states to respond 
to genocide, academics have been questioning the effectiveness of the genocide label 
and debating whether the genocide label should be employed in the midst of violence 
or should an alternative way and means of confronting the crime of genocide be 
utilised.63  In one such proposal it was contended that in dealing with the failure of 
states to respond to ongoing claims of genocide due in part to its high moral value and 
its troublesome definition, states should to abandon the use of the term genocide in the 
midst of violence and instead genocide should be considered under an umbrella 
category of international criminal law, atrocity crimes. 
1.5 Responding to Genocide through the Concept of Atrocity Crimes 
David Scheffer, who served as the United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crime 
Issues under the Clinton administration, advances the concept of atrocity crimes, an 
overarching term of international criminal law which encompasses the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and serious war crimes.64  
Scheffer argues that this new term atrocity crimes should be employed instead of the 
word genocide to characterise violence as it will ‘liberate’ governments and 
international organisations from tackling the tricky task of applying the legal 
definition of genocide to a given situation.65  Scheffer contends that this new category 
of crimes is needed to replace the genocide label as his diplomatic experience led him 
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to view the word genocide as ‘insufficient and even, at times, counterproductive’ in 
responding to violence as the term has been applied to ‘describe atrocities of great 
diversity, magnitude, and character’ and is ‘all too often [an] intimidating brake on 
effective responses.’66  Scheffer argues that it should not matter whether genocide can 
be determined for states to act in response to violence, what should matter is that states 
actually respond and therefore the term atrocity crimes should be used by ‘public 
officials, military officers, the media, and academics’ to appropriately capture the 
scale of violence so as to ensure ‘timely and effective responses’.67  In justifying the 
inclusion of the three other crimes alongside genocide in the category of atrocity 
crimes, Scheffer highlights how the different crimes that comprise atrocity crimes 
have all been recognised by international courts and tribunals as serious crimes of 
international law which require a response.68  This means therefore that there should 
be no difference in employing the atrocity crimes category rather than the term 
genocide as a means of preventing and responding to violence. 
Scheffer’s proposal has received mixed response from scholars and experts in the 
field.  William Schabas agrees that the proposal has merit as the evidence of the 
treatment of the different crimes of international law by international tribunals and by 
states and the UN illustrates that there is no distinction in legal consequences between 
the crimes, and therefore a unified term would add more coherence and greater 
simplicity to prevention.69  Martin Mennecke lends support to the concept of atrocity 
crimes by arguing that the suffering associated with mass atrocities should not be 
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‘measured in labels.’70  Michael Bazyler approves Scheffer’s proposal as a means of 
removing the stigma around the use of the term genocide which impacts on 
international responses to genocide.71  Gareth Evans says there may be a benefit to 
utilising the term atrocity crimes in the midst of violence, and leaving the 
determination of the crime of genocide to international courts and tribunals.72  Dan 
Kuwali also agrees that the term atrocity crimes should be used for ‘policy discussion 
purposes’ surrounding the response to a situation whilst leaving the determination of 
which crime is committed to international courts and tribunals.73  On the other hand, 
a common argument amongst those who dismissed Scheffer’s concept is that new 
words will not change the absence of political will to tackle genocide and other serious 
crimes.74  Furthermore as discussed above, genocide is a powerful word for victims 
which means that a new label could be perceived as diminishing their suffering. 
While ‘atrocity crimes’ is not without its shortcomings as a term to be employed 
to respond to violence, neither is the word genocide.  In fact the flaws are more 
apparent with the word genocide, as discussed previously, as states have been 
reluctant to take action in response to claims and evidence of genocide and actors 
have faced difficulties in identifying the elements of the crime in an ongoing 
situation.  Therefore this thesis as well as examining the utility of the definition 
of the crime of genocide as a means of prevention will also address the utility of 
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employing the atrocity crimes category in confronting and preventing potential 
situations of genocide.  The utility of the atrocity crimes label is a core research 
theme that will flow throughout this thesis, so it is important to clarify for the 
purposes of my research what is meant by the term atrocity crimes, who should 
use it, and when should it be employed. 
1.5(i) What are the Atrocity Crimes? 
I would agree with Scheffer that the term atrocity crimes should be used as an 
umbrella category to describe genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic 
cleansing, and war crimes.  This thesis will contend that these four types of crimes 
should be included for response and prevention purposes under the broader 
category of atrocity crimes, as while the elements that can comprise these crimes 
can vary in severity and scale and there are arguments surrounding the gravity of 
these crimes in the hierarchy of international criminal law, all four share several 
overlapping elements; particularly the acts that comprise the actus reus of the 
individual crimes.  This means that some or all of them could be present in the 
same incident, which then leads to the difficulty of distinguishing these crimes in 
times when a prompt response is required to prevent or halt the 
violence.  Including these four crimes under the banner of atrocity crimes would 
remove the focus off determining which specific crime was committed when 
seeking a response to a situation and place the focus solely on states to respond to 
each atrocity as each crime is of a serious nature in international criminal law.  
Of the four crimes, ethnic cleansing is the only one not defined or included in an 
international criminal law statute.  In particular it is not included under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court which governs the responsibility of 
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individuals for the perpetration of the three other crimes.75  If individuals will not 
be convicted for ethnic cleansing, at least at the International Criminal Court, 
should the term be included under the banner of atrocity crimes?   While it may 
not be defined in statute, the crime of ethnic cleansing has been recognised in the 
judgements of international courts and tribunals.76  Furthermore the term is 
prevalent in policy discussions surrounding which crimes have been committed in 
various situations over the last number of decades, so if the term was omitted from 
the category of atrocity crimes it would mean that there would be gap in the 
understanding of international criminal law.  This would be because there would 
be confusion surrounding whether a crime constituted an atrocity crime or an act 
of ethnic cleansing; this confusion may impact on states’ response to a situation. 
A key argument in favour of the inclusion of ethnic cleansing within the category 
of atrocity crimes is that states have accepted in adopting the Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine (hereafter ‘RtoP’) that they have a responsibility to protect 
citizens from the perpetration of ethnic cleansing alongside genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.77  Therefore the four crimes, regardless of 
whether they share some similarities or have distinct differences, are all crimes of 
a serious nature under international law which states have a duty to protect 
populations from experiencing.  Utilising the atrocity crimes concept does not 
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mean that all the crimes included within the remit have to be regarded as being of 
equal status or gravity in international law; rather the atrocity crimes category is 
used to show that regardless of the type of atrocity being committed, the 
international community has a responsibility to respond to serious violations of 
international criminal law. 
1.5(ii) Utilising the Atrocity Crimes Category? 
In advocating the use of the term atrocity crimes, I would argue that it should only 
be used as a non-judicial legal-political term by political actors, civil society 
actors, the media, academics, and anyone seeking a response to a given situation 
as a part of policy discussions surrounding how a state should respond to that 
particular situation.  In practice it would mean that actors – be it state officials, 
intergovernmental officials, civil society organisations, members of the media, or 
victims of the violence – who are advocating that a state or intergovernmental 
organisation should respond to a situation would use the label atrocity crimes to 
characterise the violence.  In employing this label they would refer to a state’s 
responsibility to protect populations from all atrocity crimes rather than the 
specific crime, as this may end up involving difficulties of distinguishing the 
elements of the crime which allows states to evade their responsibilities to protect 
populations.  The label would also be used when state, regional or 
intergovernmental organisations propose to take action, whether coercive or non-
coercive, through the UN to respond to a situation. 
The label would be used by these actors before violence breaks out, when 
conditions and factors that give rise to the perpetration of each atrocity crime are 
visible, and it would be employed in the midst of violence.  This term ‘in the midst 
of violence’ and the similar terms ‘an ongoing situation’ and ‘ongoing violence’ 
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will be referred to throughout this study so as to reflect the different nature and 
forms of violence which are seen in the world currently.  As the atrocity crimes 
label is a legal-political concept rather than a purely legal term, as discussed in 
Section 1.5(iv), it would not require a nexus with armed conflict in the way that 
war crimes specifically require, rather it would apply to diverse situations such as 
international armed conflict, internal armed conflict, internal armed conflict 
involving international actors, civil unrest, humanitarian crises, and political, 
social, and economic instability.  Therefore in employing the terms ‘in the midst 
of violence’ and ‘an ongoing situation’ throughout this thesis , the point is to 
illustrate that evidence or threats of violence in situations which may not meet the 
legal definition of armed conflict are nonetheless regarded as settings in which 
atrocity crimes may occur which require an international response to prevent and 
halt. 
Furthermore the word can be used as a term to warn of signs that violence may 
occur if there is evidence of a risk of violence occurring.  The term is 
advantageous because as will be described in more detail in Chapter Four, the 
warning signs for the different atrocity crimes all share similar factors and 
conditions, which means it can often be hard to distinguish the crimes and identify 
which crime may be perpetrated before violence occurs.  In fact as will be 
highlighted throughout this thesis, multiple violations of international criminal 
law may take place at the same time so a situation could be displaying warning 
signs of multiple crimes which means that genocide or the other atrocity crimes 
may not be identifiable at the time.  As atrocity crimes would not have a distinct 
criminal legal definition, it would mean states do not have to wait for certain 
conditions or elements such as a certain level or scale or numbers involved of each 
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individual crime to be present to respond.  In employing the atrocity crimes label 
before or in the midst of violence the focus would therefore be removed off 
predicting, identifying, and determining which crime was or will be committed, 
and instead the focus of actors would be on the response to the situation.  
1.5(iii) Responding to Atrocity Crimes 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine should be the basis of the obligation for 
states to respond to atrocity crimes as it sets out the responsibilities of states to 
act through diplomatic or military means under the Charter of the United Nations 
in response to evidence or precursors of the four crimes included under the 
category of atrocity crimes.78  This responsibility is similar to the responsibility 
that states have to respond to genocide under Article I and VIII of the Genocide 
Convention, but it ensures that states have a responsibility to act in response to a 
greater number of crimes and potentially greater number of situations than the 
Convention may apply in which shows the utility of the RtoP doctrine in 
responding to situations or threats of violence. 
However the RtoP doctrine is only a ‘soft law’ political document adopted by the 
members states of the UN in the mid-2000s – unlike the Genocide Convention 
which is a binding legal treaty with seventy years of history, which means it could 
be argued that the responsibility to prevent (and punish) genocide is of greater 
importance than the broader RtoP as it is enshrined in treaty law and is a binding 
legal obligation rather than a political promise of action.  It could also be argued 
that under the Genocide Convention any state could act under Article I to respond 
to genocide, whilst under the RtoP doctrine the responsibility to act is entrusted 
                                                 
78 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (24 October 
2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, para. 138–139. 
46 
to the United Nations Security Council.  In addressing these two potential 
arguments, it is important to note though that states have been reluctant to convert 
this obligation to prevent and respond into action and instead, as highlighted 
above, the Genocide Convention’s promise of prevention has laid largely dormant 
with states taking little or no effective action to respond to claims or evidence of 
genocide.  So while the Genocide Convention may contain a legal obligation to 
act, in distinction to the RtoP, it means nothing if states are willing to ignore this 
provision.  The short history since the adoption of the RtoP doctrine, which will 
be discussed further in Chapter Four, shows that the application of the RtoP is 
also subject to whims of states.  Therefore regardless of whether it is a legal or 
political/moral obligation to respond, the Genocide Convention and the RtoP are 
both dependent on political will, which means that supplementary proposals aimed 
at ensuring states take action to protect civilians need to be explored.  This is why 
this thesis is proposing to focus on employing the atrocity crimes label to 
characterise ongoing violence if the application of the Genocide Convention in a 
given situation is complicated by issues of identifying and determining genocide. 
Employing the term atrocity crimes to characterise violence or as a justification 
for a state/international response to a situation will not complicate the response of 
states, as the options that states have to respond to the four crimes will remain the 
same under the category of atrocity crimes as states will have recourse to Chapter 
VI and VII measures under the UN Charter as part of the RtoP doctrine.   In fact 
rather than complicate the response, the use of the term atrocity crimes could 
benefit the response to a situation as it would address the difficulties surrounding 
invoking the genocide label, issues such as the stigma surrounding the word and 
the politicisation of the word which can often narrow the options available to 
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policymakers to respond to ongoing situations.  Therefore employing the term 
atrocity crimes to characterise violence is beneficial as the concept of atrocity 
crimes would not face the same stigma as genocide so states should be freer to 
employ the term to characterise violence and make a policy decision on how to 
respond to a situation rather than feel like the label they apply to a situation will 
dictate the response, such as states regarding genocide as requiring a mil itary 
response.  Utilising the atrocity crimes label would ensure that there would be a wider 
scope of options, coercive and/or non-coercive, available to states to respond to 
violence, which would be beneficial to the prevention of genocide as this thesis will 
show that in responding to genocide there will not be one perfect response, rather 
different situations require different responses.  This shows the utility of the 
atrocity crimes label as a term to be employed as a preventative label, a key theme 
that flows through the wider research on the utility of the genocide label.  
While the atrocity crimes label would be replacing the specific definitions of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes as a term to 
apply in policy discussions concerning prevention and intervention before or in 
the midst of violence, this does not mean that these crimes will no longer apply or 
that atrocity crimes will become a crime of international criminal law rather the 
term will be confined to prevention and to policy discussions surrounding 
prevention. 
1.5(iv) A Legal-Political Concept not a Judicial Term 
This thesis is not advocating for a legal definition of atrocity crimes, rather the 
thesis is contending that the individual crimes that make up the umbrella category 
of atrocity crimes would still remain crimes of international law however these 
terms would not be employed to characterise violence while it is ongoing.  Instead 
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the thesis will recommend that the question of which crime or crimes was/were 
perpetrated would be left until a competent international court or tribunal had the 
time, and the benefit of access to documentary evidence and witness testimonies 
to make a determination on the act and intent elements of the crime.  This would 
mean that actors would not be rushed into a making a determination in the midst 
of a situation without a full comprehension of the reality of a situation, rather in 
the aftermath of a situation there would be a careful consideration of the evidence 
available to justices so as to arrive at a conclusion on the question of which crime 
was perpetrated.  In recommending this policy change, it is important to 
concentrate on whether leaving the determination of genocide to a court and 
instead employing the atrocity crimes label would have an impact on the status 
and application of international criminal law, and whether it would have an effect 
on the underlying rules of international criminal law. 
The principle of legality is central to the rule of law and the application of international 
criminal law as it requires that laws which are enacted are clear and precise and that 
the administration of justice is fair and impartial.  There are several different strands 
to the principle of legality in international criminal law, which are set out under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  Article 22(1) sets out the principle 
of nullum crimen sine lege, which states that ‘a person shall not be criminally 
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it 
takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.’  Under Article 22(2) it states 
that ‘the definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by 
analogy.’  Article 24(1) sets out the principle of non-retroactivity, which states that 
‘no person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the 
entry into force of the Statute.’  The purpose of these articles and the rationale 
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underlying the principle of legality is to provide specificity and clarity to the law and 
its application so that ‘people can know whether their planned course of action is 
acceptable or not.’79 
With the principle of legality central to ensuring the rule of law, it is important that 
utilising the term atrocity crimes would not contribute to contravening any of the 
elements of this principle by introducing uncertainty into the application of law, in 
particular the application of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
which governs the responsibility of individuals for the perpetration of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  In advocating the use of the word atrocity 
crimes, this thesis is contending that the term atrocity crimes would purely be used 
in connection with prevention, and would have no relation to the punishment of 
the crimes committed in a situation.  This would mean that the atrocity crimes 
label would not be in conflict with the principle of legality as an individual’s 
responsibility for the violation of international criminal law would still be based 
on the existing statutes, including the Rome Statute.  Individuals would not be 
held criminally responsible for perpetrating atrocity crimes, rather their conduct 
would be based on the existing laws which fall under the jurisdiction of a specific 
court, which would mean the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and non-
retroactivity would not be infringed upon by employing the term atrocity crimes.  
Furthermore in advocating utilising the term atrocity crimes this thesis is not 
arguing for international judges to change or extend the meaning or definition of 
the individual crimes by analogy, rather these justices should continue to strictly 
construe the definition of the crimes under their jurisdiction.  The atrocity crimes 
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label would not change the status of international law or the clarity surrounding 
the application of law as while the atrocity crimes label may be used around policy 
discussions on prevention and response, individuals who perpetrate an atrocity 
crime or crimes would still know they could be held responsible for the 
perpetration of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  
While these crimes may not be used to characterise the behaviour of individuals 
and parties in ongoing violence, with the introduction of the concept of atrocity 
crimes it would in fact not be wholly different to the current state of the 
application of international criminal law.  In that while political discussions 
between state and intergovernmental officials over which crimes may have been 
violated in an ongoing situation may involve these actors labelling the violence as  
a specific crime or crimes, this does not mean that an individual will not be 
prosecuted for committing other crimes which are not prevalent in discussion at 
this time.  For instance, as will be discussed in relation to Rwanda, genocide was 
not a prevalent term in international discussion surrounding the response to the 
violence however this did not prevent the majority of case law in relation to the 
Rwandan Genocide involving indictments for genocide.  This shows that 
regardless of what label is applied to a situation when it is ongoing, it will not 
affect the identification and determination of other crimes in an international court 
and tribunal.  Therefore while employing the atrocity crimes label in the midst of 
violence may not refer to a general crime being committed, it will not hinder the 
prosecution and punishment of the crimes committed as the individual who 
perpetrated the crimes will remain accountable under the existing statutes of 
international criminal law. 
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1.5(v) A Practical and Useful Term for Prevention 
This brief discussion on the concept of atrocity crimes has introduced how this 
research perceives and understands the atrocity crimes label and how it will be applied 
before and/or in the midst of violence as a preventative term in policy discussions 
around preventing and responding to violence.  The benefits and advantages of this 
label have been signposted and pinpointed in this section, and will be highlighted in 
further chapters in reference to the difficulties associated with defining, interpreting, 
predicting, identifying, determining, preventing, and responding to the crime of 
genocide.  The aim will be to show how these complexities of the genocide label can 
be addressed by adopting the atrocity crimes label as a preventative label.  To address 
the key concern of this thesis, the utility of the respective labels as preventative terms 
to be employed in the midst of violence so as to respond to and prevent violence, this 
thesis will develop along a research approach that has been shaped by the research 
studies and critiques of the genocide label. 
1.6 Research Approach 
While it seems the majority of research on the subject of genocide questions the 
effectiveness of the term, the field of genocide studies continues to grow with research 
perspectives expanding every day.  While always an interdisciplinary topic – with 
initial researchers of genocide coming from the fields of history, politics, sociology, 
philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and of course law – the area of genocide 
studies became inundated with researchers from a variety of different disciplines 
including economics, linguistics, geography, and medicine.80  An ever expanding 
collection of research now covers diverse topics such as the psychological reasons 
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people commit genocide, the economic conditions that give rise to the perpetration of 
genocide, the language and propaganda employed by perpetrators, the gendered nature 
of the acts, and the public health impact of genocide. 
Nearly every case of mass violence has been studied under the banner of genocide 
studies.  The study of genocide is not just concentrated on post-Convention situations 
of violence, rather there is a considerable amount of research conducted on historical 
case studies such as the Armenian Genocide, the Holodomor, the slave trade, and on 
colonial conquests in the Americas, Australia, Africa, and even here in Ireland.  Ben 
Kiernan even published a book examining historical cases of genocide perpetrated all 
the way back to the time of Sparta.81 
This illustrates that virtually every aspect of the crime of genocide is now being 
explored within the rubric of genocide studies, which makes it difficult for research 
such as this to make a new contribution to the study of genocide.  Notwithstanding 
this the brief overview of genocide studies in this chapter has highlighted some 
interesting areas for exploration.  Research has highlighted the flaws with the 
definition of genocide which impact on its applicability to violence across the globe.  
Research has also highlighted the significant issue of states lacking the political will 
to respond to genocide which has rendered the preventative potential of the 
Convention as ineffectual at best.  However the research has highlighted that this lack 
of political will may be in fact due to the stigma surrounding the genocide label which 
limits the responses of states.  Therefore the study of genocide studies has highlighted 
that there may be difficulties identifying genocide in the midst of violence due to a 
deficient definition of genocide that cannot be determined in the midst of violence 
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and/or due to the symbolic nature of the genocide label which distracts from effective 
responses.  This is a fruitful area for further discussion of genocide, and which 
provides the foundation of this research. 
In addressing the utility of the genocide label as preventative term, the core research 
question of this thesis is focussed on the difficulty of identifying the crime of genocide 
in the midst of violence.  This thesis is contending that in understanding why states 
and international actors fail to label situations as genocide it is of fundamental 
importance to examine the potential limitations of the genocide label as a term to be 
employed to prevent and respond to violence.  The research aims to explore this 
contention that the genocide label may be ineffectual in preventing and responding to 
genocide by examining the potential complexities which may affect the international 
community’s identification of elements of genocide in the midst of violence and 
application of the genocide label to an ongoing situation. 
With the knowledge of the potential limitations of the genocide label, this thesis is 
taking a fresh approach to the study of genocide prevention by concentrating on the 
utility of states and international organisations characterising an ongoing situation as 
genocide, and questioning whether the international community should persist in using 
the genocide label in the midst of violence.  In focussing on this question of the utility 
of applying the label in the midst of violence, the objective of this thesis is to provide 
a contemporary study of genocide prevention which is relevant to how states and 
international organisations confront claims of genocide.  This is an intriguing research 
area as despite the growth of knowledge of the crime of genocide, the world continues 
to see claims of genocide in the seventy years since the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention. 
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The continued failure to confront genocide illustrates that new ways of thinking about 
and framing genocide need to be considered, including questioning whether to persist 
with using the genocide label in the midst of violence or instead looking to employ a 
term such as atrocity crimes to characterise ongoing violence.  With the complexities, 
outlined in the overview of genocide studies, surrounding the genocide label, utilising 
an umbrella category may improve international responses to violence and efforts to 
prevent genocide in the first place.  This research therefore has the objective of 
illustrating that issues of identifying genocide due to a problematic definition and 
understanding of genocide mean that the response to ongoing genocides or the 
prevention of potential genocides requires a new approach, and in this study a new 
term.  To address this research objective, the study will develop along three key 
strands. 
1.6(i) Defining the Crime 
The first strand of this research will address the preliminary issue of which definition 
of genocide is to be applied in an ongoing situation, and the potential limitations of 
this definition in the midst of violence.  The starting point of this analysis will be the 
legal definition of genocide presented within the Genocide Convention.  The study 
will explore the provisions of the Convention for potential ambiguities in the definition 
of genocide which could conceivably impact on the international community using the 
legal definition to make a determination on whether the crime of genocide is being 
perpetrated in an ongoing situation. 
However with the dissatisfaction, outlined in this chapter, within academia and civil 
society with the legal definition of genocide, it is clear that there are drawbacks with 
employing the Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide.  The thesis will explore 
whether the alternative definitions crafted by these actors to remedy the faults within 
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the Convention are more suitable to addressing the crime of genocide?  Within the 
various definitions created since the adoption of the Genocide Convention, has a 
definition of genocide been presented that is more readily applicable to characterise 
ongoing violence?  However it will be important to address the likelihood of the 
international community accepting or agreeing upon a new definition of genocide. 
Furthermore with the existence of multiple definitions of genocide, it raises the 
valuable question of whether there has been a divergence between the legal definition 
of genocide as set out in the Genocide Convention and society’s understanding of the 
crime of genocide.  Is there a difference between the definition employed by 
international justices, UN diplomats, politicians, the media, academics, civil society, 
and the general public?  If there is a divergence on the understanding of genocide held 
amongst different actors, what impact will this have on the international community’s 
response to a claim of genocide? 
This strand of the research is a critical issue as in responding to claims of genocide in 
the midst of violence, a coherent and precise legal definition of genocide is required 
to accurately answer whether the violence is genocidal in nature.  A failure to possess 
a clear-cut legal definition of genocide that can be applied in an ongoing situation to 
make an authoritative finding about the existence of the crime of genocide dooms the 
legal categorisation of genocide to be ineffective or even worthless in situations with 
indications of genocidal violence. 
1.6(ii) Identifying Genocide in the Midst of Violence 
The second strand of the research is concentrated on the core research question of this 
study on the complexities surrounding identifying genocide in the midst of bloodshed, 
and the corollary issue of the efficacy of the genocide label as preventative term in the 
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midst of violence.  To address this question this research will examine the difficulties 
with identifying the crime of genocide in the midst of violence due to the definition of 
genocide and the potential ramifications of a genocide finding on the response to a 
situation. 
The research will examine how the legal definition has been interpreted and 
understood by international criminal courts and tribunals, commissions of inquiry, UN 
actors and bodies, and signatory states to the Convention.  The interpretation of these 
actors is crucial for clarifying how the legal definition of genocide is applied in 
practice.  Within these various actors’ discussions of genocide, have flaws become 
apparent when seeking to apply the definition of genocide to ongoing violence?  Are 
there significant issues within provisions of the definition of genocide which render it 
unidentifiable or indeterminable in the midst of bloodshed?  If there are complications 
involved in applying the definition of genocide to an ongoing situation, what does this 
say about the utility of the genocide label as a means of prevention and response to 
deadly violence? 
In addressing the potential complexities of applying the genocide label in the midst of 
violence, it is necessary to examine the role of states and international actors in the 
prevention of and reaction to genocide.  The thesis will examine why states have often 
been averse to labelling a given situation as genocide despite claims that genocide is 
being perpetrated.  An assumption within the academic and activist communities is 
that the main stumbling block to labelling violence as genocide is not a lack of 
knowledge of the perpetration of the crime but a lack of political will amongst states 
and intergovernmental organisations to take action in response to a claim of 
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genocide.82  Is this assumption accurate, or is it the case that the failure to label 
situations as genocide can be traced back to faults within the definition of genocide 
which render the definition immobilised while violence is ongoing? 
An important corollary matter to address is the utility of labelling a situation as 
genocide in the midst of violence.  Even if genocide is identifiable, is it beneficial to 
the victims of a genocide to proclaim genocide is being perpetrated in ongoing 
violence?  Is employing the genocide label in the midst of violence to characterise a 
situation an effective means of preventing and responding to genocide?  Does labelling 
the situation as genocide lead to an effective response to protect a targeted population 
or could the labelling of a situation as genocide potentially reduce the options available 
to policymakers in addressing violence due to the stigma surrounding the concept of 
genocide?  Does this symbolic value mean that actors and states are more unlikely to 
identify and label a situation as genocide in the interests of peace?  If the genocide 
label proves to be a barrier to action, should we persist with seeking to identify the 
crime and employing the term in the midst of bloodshed or should we remove the 
focus off the genocide label? 
This second strand of the research sits at the centre of this study, and the answers to 
the questions laid out in this section will go a long way to addressing whether the 
crime of genocide can be identified in the midst of violence and even if it can be 
identified should we label ongoing violence as genocide.  If there are significant issues 
with the genocide label as a preventative term due to a flawed definition and/or the 
stigma attached to the label limiting the actions available to an actor to respond, it 
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raises the question of the long-term viability of the genocide label as a means of 
preventing and responding to genocide. 
1.6(iii) Preventing and Responding to Genocide 
The third strand of this study follows on from this stance that if the second strand of 
the research demonstrates that genocide cannot be identified as it is too arduous to 
pinpoint or too dangerous to proclaim, how should states and the international 
community prevent or respond to the potential situations of genocide.  The key 
question to be addressed is whether the international community should continue to 
label ongoing situations as genocide, or instead look for a term or terms which are 
more acceptable or applicable to describe ongoing violence?  Should the relevant 
institutional and diplomatic actors, as an alternative in responding to claims of 
genocide, refer to the umbrella term ‘atrocity crimes’ to describe an ongoing situation?  
Should the genocide label instead be reserved for after violence has ended and a clear 
determination of genocide can be made by an international court or tribunal?  Would 
deferring a finding on genocide and instead employing a general label to characterise 
the violence remove the complexities of applying the genocide label in the midst of 
bloodshed? 
However an important issue to be tackled would be the disadvantages associated with 
the label atrocity crimes, as genocide is an important label for victims of violence due 
to its symbolic value.  Would employing the label diminish the suffering felt by the 
victims?  Furthermore, would a new label even translate into effective action?  Would 
states show any more willingness to act in response to atrocity crimes than they have 
for genocide?  Will any new label sufficiently challenge the absence of political will 
that has marked the time period since the adoption of the Genocide Convention?  
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Nevertheless, the continued failure to prevent genocide is a sign that alternative ways 
of preventing and responding to genocide need to be explored. 
This is why the third strand of this research is critical as it presents a promising way 
of approaching the study of the crime.  If genocide cannot be identified in the midst 
of violence, due to a variety of factors, a different means of preventing and responding 
to genocide needs to be proposed.  The label atrocity crimes provides this, by removing 
the focus off definitions and interpreting crimes in the midst of bloodshed, and putting 
the sole focus on prevention of and response to genocide which is what Lemkin first 
imagined when he created the concept of genocide and which was enshrined within 
the Genocide Convention. 
To address this strand and the other strands of the thesis along with the key research 
questions outlined above, this study will combine a doctrinal approach to legal 
research with contextual and critical analysis of legal rules and practices, in analysing 
academic studies, case law of international courts and tribunals, and documentation 
and reports produced by governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental 
organisations. 
1.7 Methodological Framework 
This thesis will employ doctrinal legal analysis, which provides an analytical view of 
the development of the law and the reasoning underlying the law, as the thesis aims to 
examine how the concept of genocide was developed and how it is applied in 
practice.83  Nearly all forms of legal research contain some elements of doctrinal 
analysis as the purpose of doctrinal research is to illuminate what is the law in regard 
                                                 
83 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong 
Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 19. 
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to a certain issue.84  The approach of my research here is to conduct more than simply 
a description of the law though; in conducting doctrinal research one can critique the 
law by highlighting issues within the application of the law in courts and doctrinal 
research can proffer solutions for any issues identified and recommend reforms to the 
law.85  This is crucial for this thesis in assessing the utility of applying the provisions 
of the Genocide Convention in the midst of violence as the thesis will not only 
examine what the law of genocide is but critique how the law is applied and identified 
in practice. 
Conducting doctrinal research involves the examination of statutes and case law so as 
to understand the application of law, which is why this thesis will examine the 
provisions of the Genocide Convention, documents related to the drafting of the 
Convention, and the case law of international courts and tribunals.86  The analysis of 
these primary sources will highlight how genocide has been defined and how the key 
elements of genocide have been identified and interpreted; this discussion will also 
highlight any ambiguities within the definition of genocide.87  Doctrinal analysis will 
be central to addressing the first strand of this research as it helps in describing how 
genocide is defined in law, and it will also aid in addressing parts of the second strand 
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of the research by examining how the law has been interpreted and identified in case 
law.  The analysis of the primary legal sources, supplemented by secondary legal texts 
including academic studies on the Convention and the case law, will help illuminate 
the complexities of the genocide label which will aid this thesis in addressing the 
research questions set out above. 
While the doctrinal approach to legal research will be important for providing the 
groundwork for this thesis by highlighting the state of the law of genocide, how the 
law is understood and interpreted in the Convention and by international justices, the 
doctrinal approach has its limitations which mean that this approach cannot fully 
address the research questions.  A limitation of doctrinal research studies is that it 
often ignores non-legal factors such as the impact of society, politics, and economics 
on the application of law.88  Doctrinal legal analysis views these issues as external to 
the operation of law, however law does not operate in a vacuum.  External realties will 
influence and shape the direction and application of the law which means that doctrinal 
research is limited as doctrinal research ‘ignores the role played by acts of subjective 
interpretation in the creation, identification, articulation and application of rules, and 
also in their practical implementation and justification.’89 
These faults with doctrinal analysis can be addressed by employing socio-legal 
research methodology, which involves analysing law in its context, how it is shaped 
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by politics, economics, society, and international relations.90  Incorporating a socio-
legal methodology is beneficial to this research as it aims to highlight ‘how legal rules, 
doctrines, legal decisions, institutionalised cultural legal practices work together to 
create the reality of law in action’.91  Examining law through the lens of social context 
and social sciences provides a better ‘understanding of what problems the law can 
solve and what social, economic and cultural factors it remains dependent upon.’92  
Conducting critical legal analysis allows this research to examine how the law of 
genocide has been treated in other disciplines, this is important as shown by the 
previous discussion that genocide has been examined by academics from a wide 
variety of disciplines.  Genocide is a very much an interdisciplinary subject so 
employing a broader research methodology is important to understand not only 
the legal implications but also the political and social implications of utilising the 
genocide label as a means of prevention. 
In employing a critical analysis of the legal rules and practices of the law of 
genocide, this methodology is ensuring that the research assesses the wider scope 
of the application of the law of genocide and how it has been and is influenced by 
the world around it and shaped by the actors applying the law; which will show 
how the law operates in action and reality.  Extending the analysis beyond a legal 
analysis of statutes and case law will highlight the other factors that contributed to the 
emergence and development of the genocide label and the application of the Genocide 
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Convention now.93  Therefore in analysing the application of the genocide label in the 
midst of violence and to weigh up its utility as a preventative term it is important to 
understand the factors and conditions in society that impact and influence the 
development, interpretation, identification, and determination of genocide since its 
conception. 
It is crucial to take this step in examining genocide through the socio-legal analysis as 
the law of genocide cannot be divorced from politics, even the creation of the concept 
genocide was influenced by the political situation surrounding Lemkin.  The legal 
concept in the Genocide Convention is rooted in politics as it reflected the interests of 
the states that drafted the provisions.  This thesis therefore cannot ignore the role that 
politics, society, history, and economics can play in determining whether the genocide 
label is applied in the midst of violence.  The influence of these factors on the law of 
genocide will mean that there is always a subjective element when actors are faced 
with interpreting and applying the law of genocide, as there will be conflicting 
interpretations of the law.94  There is not an objective meaning in law, rather actors 
will always have a choice in how the law is applied, or not applied as is often the case 
with genocide in least in relation to prevention.  This means there will be an 
indeterminacy surrounding the application of the genocide label in a given situation, 
an idea that is pivotal to this thesis.  That is why it is crucial to critically analyse the 
implementation and practice of the Genocide Convention not only in court rooms but 
in the words and actions of states, UN actors, and any other actor who uses the 
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genocide label as a means of response.  Analysing the subjective application of the 
law of genocide is important to this study so as to examine the utility of employing 
the genocide label as a preventative term in the midst of violence. 
This is why this thesis will combine doctrinal research, with a critical legal 
analysis of the rules and practices of the law of genocide.  This research will 
critically analyse how genocide has been defined, interpreted, identified, and 
studied in case law, research studies, academic works, the media, and state, 
intergovernmental, and nongovernmental reports, documents, speeches, press 
statements, meetings, and resolutions.  In conducting a critical analysis of the 
application of the law of genocide this research is not collecting data through 
empirical research but rather is relying on data collected from these primary and 
secondary sources produced by states, intergovernmental organisations, 
nongovernmental organisation, political officials, international justices, lawyers, 
academics, researchers, the media, civil society groups, and victims groups so as 
to analyse how these bodies and actors have dealt with and confronted the issue 
of genocide.  These primary and secondary sources will be critically analysed to 
examine how the actors, outlined above, have identified the elements of genocide, 
and the factors and conditions that impacted on and influenced these actors 
employing or in many cases not employing the genocide label to characterise 
ongoing violence. 
While this research is concentrated on collecting information and data from an 
examination of primary and secondary sources, in assessing the complexities faced 
by actors in determining and identifying genocide it may have been beneficial for 
this research to conduct empirical research in the form of interviews.  There is a 
limitation in concentrating on reports, documents, press statements, and case law 
65 
in that the motivation or the reasons behind the actors who use or do not use the 
genocide label or the difficulties faced by these actors in identifying the elements 
of genocide will not be fully discovered through examining primary and secondary 
sources.  Therefore it may have been beneficial to conduct interviews with state 
and UN officials, members of international courts and justices, and investigators 
involved in finding evidence of genocide to discover the complexities faced by 
actors in identifying the elements of the crime and employing the genocide label 
to characterise violence. 
However this thesis did not pursue this approach, due to doubts about ease of 
access to individuals to interview and questions over whether the information 
obtained from the interviews would have further illuminated the complexities of 
genocide beyond what was included in documents, reports, and speeches by these 
actors.  In the primary sources produced by these actors they outline how the 
elements and signs of genocide can be identified before or in the midst of violence, 
so an interviews may not have provided further insight into identifying elements 
of the crime when it is already contained in case law and UN reports.  Furthermore 
this thesis is not concentrating exclusively on the reasons underlying the use of 
the genocide label by these actors, rather it is aimed at examining if using the 
genocide label may improve a situation.  Therefore interviews and any potential 
data collected from them would not have been central to addressing the research 
questions, rather an a critical examination of primary sources alongside examining 
the political environment of a situation would instead illustrate whether 
employing the genocide label in a situation is useful for preventive purposes. 
Examining how actors have identified genocide in the midst of violence will aid 
this thesis in addressing the second strand of this research and the research 
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questions contained within this strand relating to the complexities faced by these 
actors in identifying genocide not only due to the legal elements of the crime but 
also the political and social environment surrounding the actors that make the 
determination and/or identification of genocide.  Critically analysing how these 
actors arrived at their decisions on the question of genocide, whether it was strict 
legal interpretation or a careful balancing of wider political interests, will be 
pivotal to illustrating the utility of the genocide label as a preventative term, which 
is key to this thesis.  A critical analysis of how the law of genocide operates in 
reality will show why this thesis is advocating for a reform of the approach to 
preventing and confronting the crime of genocide through employing the umbrella 
term, atrocity crimes, which will be central to addressing the third strand of this 
research on how to prevent genocide if the genocide is unsuitable in the midst of 
violence. 
In engaging with a critical analysis of the rules and practices of the law of 
genocide through an examination of primary and secondary sources so as to 
address the questions outlined in this chapter, there are a number of case studies 
(principally the past and present situations in Burundi, the Central African 
Republic, Darfur, Rwanda, Sinjar, South Sudan, and the former Yugoslavian 
states) which will be explored to glean an understanding of genocide and its 
application in an ongoing situation. 
1.7(i) Case Studies 
Before justifying the selection of these particular ongoing and previous case studies 
of claimed or suspected genocide I would stress that as my research is primarily 
concerned with the response to ongoing situations, the thesis has not examined in 
detail the debates surrounding the application of the genocide label to historical 
67 
situations.  The research is focussed on how actors define, interpret, and prevent the 
crime of genocide at the time it is occurring so as to assess the utility of the genocide 
label, rather than an analysis of whether it is appropriate or applicable to characterise 
historical atrocities as genocide.  This has meant that current academic and 
government debates surrounding applying the genocide label to historical situations 
such as amongst other situations the colonial practices in Australia, Canada, and the 
United States, the actions of the German empire against the Herero people of Namibia, 
and the atrocities perpetrated against the Armenian people by the Ottoman empire 
have fallen outside the scope of this research.  The findings of this thesis are limited 
therefore to the question of the utility of the genocide label as a means of response to 
an ongoing situation, rather than applying to an evaluation of the use of the genocide 
label as term to be used by survivors and victims for historical justice and 
accountability. 
In assessing the utility of applying the genocide label to an ongoing situation, the 
aforementioned case studies have been chosen for this study because they highlight 
the variety of complexities involved in identifying genocide in the midst of violence.  
Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Darfur have been selected for analysis due to the 
case law that emanated in the 1990s and 2000s of individual and state responsibility 
for the commission of genocide in these respective situations.  The situations in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia led to the establishment of ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals to prosecute those high-ranking individuals involved in the 
perpetration of violations of international criminal law, including genocide.  The 
jurisprudence that emerged from these institutions was critical in clarifying the 
elements of genocide and elucidating on how the crime of genocide can be identified 
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from evidence and witness testimony, so the case law is crucial in illustrating how the 
definition of genocide is interpreted in the midst of violence. 
The situation in the former Yugoslavia also resulted in two cases at the International 
Court of Justice examining a state’s responsibility for the perpetration and prevention 
of genocide.  In seeking to examine the issue of identifying genocide in the midst of 
violence, this thesis will be concentrated on whether genocide can be identified in the 
actions and behaviour of a state or non-state body so it is important to focus on how a 
court seeks to identify genocide in the actions of a state.  The situation in Darfur is 
important from the point of view of examining the complexity of interpreting the crime 
due to the case of Omar Al Bashir, the former President of Sudan, at the International 
Criminal Court.  The case is significant in that it was the first case concerning genocide 
at the International Criminal Court, and the discussion of genocide in this case is 
critical for illustrating the complexities of identifying genocide in practice. 
The situations in Rwanda and Darfur are not only important for highlighting the 
difficulties of interpreting the definition of genocide in the case law, these case studies 
also highlight a variety of issues surrounding the complexity of preventing and 
responding to genocide.  In particular the case studies of Rwanda, one of the UN’s 
most tragic failings, and Darfur, which saw one of the largest civil society 
mobilisations in response to claims of genocide, have been selected for analysis so as 
to examine the role that political will plays on the response to a situation and the 
determination of genocide or the use of the genocide label by state actor.  Alongside 
addressing how political will may constrain a state’s response the discussion of 
genocide in these respective situations highlight the complexities faced by actors in 
predicting and identifying signs of genocide before or in the midst of violence due to 
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the issues of distinguishing the warning signs and elements of the crime of genocide 
from the other atrocity crimes. 
Darfur, notably, shows the difficulties faced by state and/or UN created commissions 
of inquiry with examining and establishing evidence of violations of international 
criminal law in the midst of violence.  The complexities of identifying signs and 
elements of genocide are never more apparent when these bodies examine in the midst 
of an ongoing situation whether genocide was perpetrated as not only seen by the 
separate UN and US investigations in Darfur, but also the UN investigations into the 
crimes committed in the Central African Republic and the Sinjar region on the Syria 
and Iraq border.  These two situations have been chosen for this thesis as they are two 
relatively recent situations which involved UN mandated commissions of inquiry 
examining whether genocide was perpetrated in the respective situations.  While 
illustrating the complexities faced by commissions of inquiries in identifying and 
distinguishing violations of international criminal law, the discussion of these 
situations will expand beyond to examine the response of states and international 
actors to claims and/or evidence of genocide potentially being perpetrated.  The two 
case studies are both pivotal to this research as the commissions of inquiries arrived 
at two different conclusions on the question of genocide, in one investigation finding 
evidence that genocide may have been perpetrated by ISIS in the Sinjar region and in 
the other investigation finding that there was no reasonable basis to conclude genocide 
occurred in the Central African Republic.  Therefore the wider discussions on the state 
responses to the respective situations will be illuminating with regard to the utility of 
the genocide label as a preventative term to be employed in the midst of violence. 
The knowledge gained from the studies of these situations and the other case studies 
on the various complexities associated with employing the genocide label as a 
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preventative term will be employed to examine two ongoing situations which 
potentially involve the perpetration of genocide or signs that genocide may be 
perpetrated in the future.  The examination of an ongoing situation is integral to this 
research as while the discussion of past cases of actual or suspected genocide can 
highlight the flaws of the genocide label, it is critical for this thesis to examine how 
these complexities affect the response to an ongoing situation so as to address whether 
in responding to evidence of signs or claims of genocide it is beneficial to employ the 
genocide label.  It is important to apply the research findings on these case studies 
onto ongoing situations so as to provide a contemporary examination of the difficulties 
of applying the label genocide in the midst of violence and to highlight how these 
complexities are constant in every situation that involves the perpetration or the threat 
of the perpetration of genocide. 
For the purposes of this research two African countries have been chosen, Burundi 
and South Sudan, so as to examine the complexities of identifying genocide.  These 
two countries were primarily selected for this thesis due to the warnings over the last 
number of years from the primary UN actor dealing with genocide, the Special Adviser 
on the Prevention of Genocide, on the threat for these situations to develop and evolve 
into genocide.95  This warning on the threat of genocide allows this thesis to examine 
the various strands of this research by examining how genocide has been defined, 
understood, predicted, identified, and responded to with regards to the response of the 
different actors involved in the respective countries.  With a threat of genocide 
overhanging both countries, it is pivotal for this research to examine the advantages 
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and disadvantages of labelling the situations as genocide so as to prevent and respond 
to the violence so as to the address the key concern of this thesis, the utility of genocide 
label as a means of prevention. 
While the focus of this research may be concentrated on two African-based studies of 
genocide, the findings and conclusions will not specific to these situations but will 
rather be generalised to ongoing situations of violence that occur across the globe.  For 
instance the findings in relation to these cases can be applied to the situation in 
Myanmar, a situation which has seen repeated claims that genocide is occurring over 
the last number of years.  The situation in Myanmar may have been an interesting case 
study of the utility of the genocide label but limitations in terms of time available to 
conduct research, as the situation only developed in 2016-2017, meant that the 
research proceeded with the already selected research case studies of Burundi and 
South Sudan.  While the situation of Myanmar has seen discussions on the question 
of genocide, these discussions are similar in nature to the other situations already under 
examination so the findings and conclusions in relation to the case studies in this thesis 
will be applicable to not only Myanmar but every situation involving a potential 
genocidal dimension.  This is because it is central to this research to show how the 
complexities of genocide are constant no matter which situation the genocide label 
may be applied in as genocide will always be a flawed term for the identification and 
prevention of international criminal law.  The discussion therefore of the respective 
circumstances and environment in the two countries is important in that while there 
has been violence perpetrated in both situations, the dimensions of the violence are 
typical of other ongoing situations in that they are multifaceted situations involving 
numerous actors competing for power and resources.  Furthermore the levels of 
violence are typical of a lot of ongoing situations in that the threat levels of violence 
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are not constant, rather they can ebb and flow throughout.  Due to lack of uniqueness 
of these situations the references to genocide in Burundi and South Sudan will be 
valuable in answering the research questions, and helping to tie this research together 
by showing how this research can be employed to examine the utility of employing 
the genocide label in different ongoing situations across the globe. 
To conclude in conducting this research through the case studies of Burundi and South 
Sudan, along with the study of Rwanda, Darfur, the former Yugoslavia, the Sinjar 
region, and the Central African Republic the thesis is aimed at drawing out the various 
complexities involved in identifying genocide.  Teasing out the issues with genocide 
within these case studies is crucial for addressing the fundamental concern of this 
research: whether genocide is a term that can be applied in the midst of violence.  
Assessing the utility of the genocide label as a preventative term to be employed in 
the midst of violence is not only important for the purposes of this thesis, it will also 
contribute further knowledge to the field of genocide studies. 
1.8 Contribution of Thesis to Genocide Studies 
While utilising the growing body of research previously conducted on the concept of 
genocide to structure the thesis and its arguments, this thesis will build on this 
knowledge by focussing in on the utility of the genocide label for the prevention of 
violence through an examination of the case studies outlined in the previous section.  
Contextualising the arguments with regard to the deficiencies of the term genocide by 
analysing the discussion of genocide in different situations, both past and ongoing, 
allows this research to provide a fresh approach to the study of genocide.  This is 
because the research will discuss how and why the genocide label is complex to 
identify, and how the context surrounding the identification of genocide will always 
render the term difficult to identify.  In pursuing this contention, this thesis will rely 
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on the indeterminacy argument; in that no matter the context there will be never be a 
clear answer as to whether genocide has been perpetrated.  There will always be a 
level of uncertainty around the definition and the elements of genocide and the 
methods of preventing genocide.  Subjective opinions of actors will always affect 
whether the genocide label is used to characterise violence or a situation, and this will 
apply whether it is an international court room, a UN forum, a government office, a 
nongovernmental organisation, or an investigative body.  While the indeterminacy of 
law is a key debate within discussions of legal theory and jurisprudence, seldom is this 
argument used to critique the law of genocide, which makes this thesis a unique 
contribution to the study of the law of genocide.  This is because this thesis will show 
that regardless of how genocide is conceptualised there will always be a level of 
indeterminacy surrounding the identification of the term in the midst of violence which 
renders genocide an unsuitable term for the prevention of ongoing violence. 
The research will not simply act as a critique of genocide rather it will strive to offer 
a solution as to how genocide should be tackled and prevented in the midst of violence 
through the use of the term atrocity crimes.  Atrocity crimes have been discussed in 
the literature, as discussed previously, however the argument for employing the label 
has rarely relied upon evidence of the utility of the label through an examination of 
case studies.  The discussion of atrocity crimes accepts that the label would be 
beneficial without presenting clearly the arguments and evidence why the atrocity 
crimes label is needed and how it would resolve the difficulties faced in preventing 
and addressing genocide.  This thesis will confront these issues by illustrating how the 
atrocity crimes label will remedy the complexities of defining, identifying, and 
preventing genocide through an analysis of the case studies, case law, and academic 
research on the subject of genocide. 
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The knowledge and evidence gained from this analysis of genocide and atrocity crimes 
will be significant to the study of genocide as it will contribute to the debate and 
argument in the existing literature by highlighting a different way to study and 
approach the prevention of genocide.  In centring this research in the current debates 
surrounding the utility of the genocide and atrocity crimes labels, the thesis is drawing 
on the existing knowledge but seeking to expand and deepen the research on these 
issues and illustrate how these concepts can both coexist so as to be employed in the 
prevention and punishment of genocide.  Therefore in pursuing this research along the 
three core strands, of i) defining the crime, ii) identifying and preventing genocide, 
and iii) how should genocide be prevented, contained within the research questions, 
this research aims to contribute to the study and debate surrounding genocide.  This 
thesis will do this by showing how conducting critical and contextual analysis of a 
situation can illustrate that the label of genocide is not beneficial or effective in the 
prevention of violence and instead indicate that the term atrocity crimes needs to be 
utilised by actors so as to ensure a prompt response to ongoing violence.  The different 
benefits for this approach to the study of genocide will flow throughout the body of 
this research. 
1.9 Structure of the Study 
The thesis consists of eight chapters which deal in various degrees with the different 
elements of identifying the term genocide in the midst of violence.  The three core 
strands of this thesis are interwoven throughout the course of the eight chapters.  The 
purpose of this introductory chapter has been to lay the foundations for the following 
chapters by setting out the key issues and questions which will be addressed 
throughout this research, and outlining the legal analysis that will underpin this study.  
This chapter has also briefly examined the development of the crime of genocide as a 
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legal concept, but also touched upon how the definition has been treated by the 
academic and activist communities. 
Chapter Two will further examine this issue by charting the development of the 
concept of genocide from Lemkin’s original understanding to debates within the UN 
system on drafting a definition to academic and activist reinterpretations of the crime 
for a changing world to current understandings of genocide in society.  The core aim 
of this chapter is to consider the criminal law definition of genocide as well as other 
social conceptions of genocide when it comes to labelling violence.  In this chapter 
the limitations of the variety of definitions and understandings of genocide will be 
presented, and how these deficiencies may impact on the identification of genocide in 
the midst of violence.  Chapter Two will illustrate that it is only the legal definition of 
genocide as set out in the Genocide Convention which can be applied to violence due 
to its longstanding acceptance in international affairs.  Furthermore this chapter will 
argue that even if the Convention’s definition of genocide was changed it would not 
mean that the crime would be identifiable in the midst of genocide due to the 
indeterminacy of law, in that a new definition will be subject to the same political 
realities and contestations that confront the current criminal legal definition. 
After highlighting why the Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide is the only 
definition that can and will be applied to violence, Chapter Three will show how this 
legal definition of genocide has been interpreted by international courts and tribunals 
in judgments related to the atrocities in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavian states, and 
Darfur.  This chapter will address whether any of the criticism of the definition 
resulted in the courts and tribunals changing or evolving the definition, or whether the 
intentions of the drafters of the Convention have been largely followed.  Furthermore 
this chapter will examine the impact of prosecutions for genocide, in the case of 
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Darfur, on the pursuit of a peaceful resolution to a situation and the politics 
surrounding international justice.  Chapter Three will also touch upon how the other 
crimes that constitute atrocity crimes have developed in international law and how the 
distinction between them and genocide is no longer so apparent.  The aim of Chapter 
Three in examining the case law is to explore the issues with identifying the crime of 
genocide as the concept moves from a legal provision within the Convention to a word 
that can be applied within a criminal law institution.  This chapter will indicate that 
despite these judicial interpretations there are still significant issues with identifying 
genocide in the midst of violence due to how the elements of the crime of genocide 
have been interpreted. 
The difficulty of identifying genocide in practice will be further explored in Chapter 
Four by studying the measures undertaken to develop early warning systems for the 
detection of genocide before or in the early stages of a situation.  The examination of 
early warning systems developed by academics, such as Barbara Harff, and within the 
UN’s system will highlight the difficulties with identifying the crime of genocide in 
its incipient stages.  Developing warning signals of genocide is important for the 
prevention of and response to genocide, if lacking clear distinct elements then early 
warning systems are doomed to failure.  This discussion will show how the conditions 
that give to rise to genocide and early signs of genocide could also point towards the 
perpetration of the other atrocity crimes.  This analysis is important for revealing not 
only the difficulties of distinguishing the elements in the midst of violence but also 
why the label of atrocity crimes is advantageous in the midst of violence.  Chapter 
Four will show the increase in the recognition of preventing not only genocide but all 
‘atrocity crimes’ through organs of the UN and the development and acceptance of the 
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doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, which raises questions about the utility of the 
genocide label. 
Chapter Four will also explore how issues such as respecting sovereignty and 
protecting a state’s interest impact on the response to violence.  By studying the 
international reaction to the atrocities in Rwanda, this chapter will also confront the 
key issue of whether the failure of states to respond to genocide is due to a lack of 
political will or the inapplicability of the definition of genocide.  The study of Rwanda, 
one of the first internationally acknowledged genocides since the adoption of the 
Genocide Convention, will illustrate how even in confirmed cases of genocide it is 
difficult to identify elements of the crime or distinguish these elements from other 
crimes of international law.  The response to Rwanda will also highlight how the label 
of genocide became the focus of the international community, rather than the 
prevention of the crime.  The aim of this chapter is to illustrate not only the difficulties 
with identifying genocide due to a flawed definition but how the label of genocide can 
impact on the response to genocide.  This shows the need for a unified term to remove 
the limiting nature of the genocide label. 
The international response to genocide and the effectiveness of the genocide label will 
be further and more concretely examined in Chapter Five, with reference to UN 
investigations into the perpetration of genocide in the Central African Republic, 
Darfur, and into the actions of the Islamic State against the Yazidi population in Sinjar.  
A corresponding inquiry into Darfur conducted by the United States will also be 
studied to analyse any potential differences in how states and the UN reach a 
conclusion on the perpetration of genocide.  The study of these inquiries will show 
how the crime of genocide is identified in practice; what definition is employed to 
characterise genocide and the difficulties of determining the crime.  The responses to 
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these inquiries will show what effect if any a finding or non-finding of genocide will 
have on the response to genocide.  The aim of Chapter Five is to explore the utility of 
labelling a situation as genocide in the midst of violence by examining responses or 
lack of responses to genocide, and to question whether genocide is an effective label 
for prevention.  The failure to meaningfully address the crimes in Darfur, the Central 
African Republic, and Sinjar would raise the argument that atrocity crimes may be a 
better term to be employed in the midst of violence so as to remove the stigma around 
the genocide label which limits action. 
In Chapter Six, the ongoing situations in Burundi and South Sudan will be explored 
to examine the complexities of identifying the crime of genocide in the respective 
countries.  Burundi and South Sudan have been selected for analysis in this study due 
to the claims by domestic and international actors that these countries are at risk of 
genocidal violence.  While the levels of violence and number of actors involved in the 
violence in the respective countries may differ, the two situations are similar as they 
both involve government parties accused of committing atrocities as a means of 
retaining power.  Employing the methods and processes gleaned from Chapter Four 
and Chapter Five for determining the crime of genocide, this chapter will examine 
these two situations for indicators and signs of genocidal violence.  Utilising reports 
and studies conducted in these countries by UN agencies and organs, international 
bodies, and researchers, this chapter will seek to address whether genocide can be 
identified in the midst of violence.  With potential perpetrators of genocide playing a 
key role in the negotiation of an end to the violence, this chapter will also examine the 
utility of labelling the respective situations as genocide as a means of preventing the 
violence and resolving the situation.  With the evidence of the case studies in this 
chapter and the previous chapters, this chapter aims to show that if the crime of 
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genocide is unidentifiable, due to either a deficient definition and/or the interests of 
peace, then there is a benefit to employing the label atrocity crimes for preventing and 
ending the suffering of civilians. 
Chapter Seven will engage with the three core strands of the study and the research 
questions presented within that context, and will apply the knowledge and 
understanding gained from my analysis in the preceding chapters to address the key 
issues around determining genocide.  In Chapter Seven, relying on the preceding 
research of case studies of case law, commissions of inquiry, and the role of different 
international and local actors, the various complexities surrounding the identification 
of genocide will be laid out so as to address whether genocide is a useful label to 
prevent and respond to ongoing violence.  The discussion of these issues will answer 
the central research question of this study, of whether it is beneficial to label an 
ongoing situation as genocide as a means of preventing and responding to violence, 
and the corollary question of whether the label of atrocity crimes should be employed 
instead in the midst of bloodshed.  Chapter Seven will discuss how a deficient and 
indeterminate definition, as shown by the research throughout this thesis, renders 
genocide a difficult term to employ in the midst of violence.  The chapter will show 
how the atrocity crimes label can address these complexities of the genocide label, by 
highlighting the benefits of the atrocity crimes label that have been pinpointed 
throughout this research.  Chapter Seven will argue that the atrocity crimes label is a 
more useful and effective term to be employed to characterise ongoing violence for 
the purposes of prevention and response, and therefore the question of genocide should 
be left until an international court or tribunal can determine the existence of genocide. 
The thesis will conclude with Chapter Eight, in which the various threads of inquiry 
of this research will be tied together.  Chapter Eight will set out again the research 
80 
questions contained with the three core strands of this research, and show how the 
thesis addressed each question through a discussion of the findings and conclusions 
discerned from the case studies and analysis of the primary and secondary sources 
discussed throughout the thesis.  Chapter Eight will clearly show that the findings and 
conclusions of these research questions highlight the need for a new approach to 
preventing and responding to genocide.  In examining the findings and conclusions, 
Chapter Eight will also present a series of recommendations for the different actors 
involved in the response to genocide, in how they should approach the prevention of 
genocide in the future through the use of the term atrocity crimes.  In presenting these 
recommendations, this chapter will critique the current approach to preventing 
genocide in academia and policy circles and highlight how this thesis presents a 
distinct and viable option for a more effective means of preventing genocide.  This 
will contribute to the debates and research surrounding genocide, and provides scope 
for further research of ongoing situations to strengthen the argument on the utility of 
the atrocity crimes label as a term to be employed in the midst of violence to prevent 
and respond to genocide. 
1.10 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has, as it says, introduced the topic of this thesis, and the 
means and methods of how this thesis will research this topic.  This chapter has 
highlighted some of the complexities involved in the concept of genocide, which have 
been explored in academia, and why further research is needed to address how these 
complexities impact on the identification of genocide and therefore on the prevention 
and response to genocide.  In addressing these complexities the chapter has set out a 
number of research questions related to defining, identifying, and preventing genocide 
which will be explored to address the utility of the genocide label.  The chapter has 
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also discussed the concept of atrocity crimes, and how this term may be employed to 
address the complexities of the genocide label if they are apparent in the research 
questions set out above.  In researching the utility of these words as preventative terms 
to be utilised in the midst of violence, this chapter has shown how this research will 
proceed using an examination of a number of case studies and an analysis of the law 
of genocide and its practice and how this approach to the thesis will provide the 
evidence and information necessary to answer the research questions of this thesis. 
To begin addressing the strands of the research in detail and to start providing answers 
to the research questions set out in this chapter, the thesis will proceed in Chapter Two 
to examine the first stand of this research by tracing the development of the concept 
of genocide from the work of one man to the concept as it exists in international law 
and institutions today. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EVOLVING DEFINITION 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the various strands of the research and research questions were 
set out and some of the complexities involved in applying the definition of genocide 
in the midst of violence were outlined.  In this chapter these complexities will begin 
to be examined in more detail.  In this chapter I will examine the various definitions 
of genocide that have been presented in the legal, political, activist, and academic 
spheres as despite the existence of the Convention, genocide is still an ‘elusive’ 
concept.1  The adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide enshrined genocide as a legal concept, however the context of the 
formulation of the word, from the work of Lemkin and the organs of the UN, means 
that it is also an empirical, moral, and political concept which has different meanings 
and usages for various audiences.2  This has meant aside from the definition set out 
within the Genocide Convention, there have been a proliferation of definitions to 
ascribe to the crime of genocide to address failings and flaws with the legal definition. 
Within the various definitions proposed for one of the most heinous crimes in 
existence, is there a definition that can be or maybe more importantly should be 
applied in the midst of violence?  Or, is it the case that the definition of genocide set 
out in the Convention is the only definition that will apply to characterise genocidal 
violence?  And, if the Convention’s definition is the only definition that will apply to 
ongoing situations, what are the limitations of this legal definition for the response to 
and prevention of genocide in the midst of violence?  To address these questions, and 
                                                 
1 Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State – Volume 1: The Meaning of Genocide (IB 
Tauris 2005) 21. 
2 Scott Straus, ‘Contested Meanings and Conflicting Imperatives: A Conceptual Analysis of Genocide’ 
(2001) 3 Journal of Genocide Research 349, 359. 
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to understand why genocide as a crime continues to interest researchers and activists 
this chapter will explore the different definitions that have been created and put 
forward to describe the crime of genocide.  The central aim of this chapter is to address 
the first strand of this research which concerns which definition of genocide should be 
employed to characterise potential genocidal violence.  This chapter will also touch 
upon the second and third strands of the research, by examining how the faults and 
ambiguities within the definition of genocide may impact on the identification and 
determination of genocide and by exploring what other terms could be employed to 
label violence if the genocide label is unsuitable as a preventative term in the midst of 
violence.  To begin examining the definitions of genocide, and analyse which 
definition should be applied in the midst of violence it is important to understand how 
the crime developed from within the mind of one committed activist and academic. 
2.2 The Emergence of a Word 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of genocide emerged from the 
research of Raphael Lemkin who devoted his life’s work to the protection of groups 
and their identity from destruction.  The creation of the term genocide was not the first 
time that Lemkin endeavoured to label a crime that Lemkin believed had blighted the 
world for centuries.  In the 1930s, Lemkin originally promoted the idea of 
criminalising ‘barbarity, the destruction of groups’ and ‘vandalism, attacks on culture 
and heritage.’3  Barbarity was a forerunner for the concept that Lemkin would 
eventually term genocide, while vandalism would later be termed cultural genocide.4  
Lemkin found a lack of support for his new proposals at this time; a fact that would 
                                                 
3 Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2016) 157. 
4 Martin Shaw, What is Genocide (2nd edn, Polity Press 2015) 14. 
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not dissuade him then or in subsequent years when his ideas struggled to gain 
acceptance.5  Lemkin’s campaign to gain international recognition for the protection 
of the existence of groups would accelerate with the rise of the Nazi party. 
The advent of Nazi rule and subsequent occupation of European countries led Lemkin 
to gather ‘Nazi decrees and ordinances’ so as to examine the underlying objectives 
behind the Nazi occupation.6  Analysing his collection of documents, Lemkin could 
identify a pattern behind decisions being taken by the Nazis which pointed towards a 
coordinated plan to destroy groups held under German occupation.7  Based in the US 
after fleeing Poland due to the Nazi occupation, Lemkin used his influence to write a 
memorandum for President Franklin D Roosevelt to persuade him to place the 
protection of groups as a central aim of US war policy.8  This approach failed to gain 
traction so instead Lemkin turned towards the American public to gain support for his 
idea by writing a book to appeal to them to pressurise their political leaders.9 
Using the substantial collection of documents he had gathered over the preceding 
years, Lemkin crafted a manuscript examining the techniques employed by the 
‘Germans’ (Lemkin did not refer to Nazis, instead employing the term ‘Germans’) in 
                                                 
5 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 22. 
6 Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2016) 165–166.  See also Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America 
and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 26; Raphael Lemkin, Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography 
of Raphael Lemkin (Donna-Lee Frieze ed, Yale University Press 2013) 76–78. 
7 Raphael Lemkin, Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin (Donna-Lee Frieze ed, 
Yale University Press 2013) 76–78; Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and 
Crimes against Humanity (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2016) 165–166. 
8 Raphael Lemkin, Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin (Donna-Lee Frieze ed, 
Yale University Press 2013) 114; Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and 
Crimes against Humanity (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2016) 176. 
9 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 28; 
Raphael Lemkin, Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin (Donna-Lee Frieze ed, 
Yale University Press 2013) 115–116; Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide 
and Crimes against Humanity (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2016) 177. 
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dealing with groups in occupied countries.10  It was in this study that Lemkin first 
invoked the concept that would define his life’s work.  Lemkin’s tenacity to apply a 
label to the barbarity of World War II was due to Winston Churchill proclaiming, in 
1941 in the face of the Nazi government’s atrocities, that the world was ‘in the 
presence of a crime without a name.’11  Lemkin realised that his concept needed a new 
name, a term that could capture the unique and evil nature of the crime while 
simultaneously galvanising people to take action to prevent the crime.12  As Lemkin 
says in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, ‘[n]ew conceptions require new terms.’13 
As referenced in Chapter One, Lemkin defined genocide as ‘the destruction of a nation 
or of an ethnic group.’14  Lemkin wrote that the crime of genocide does not imply the 
‘immediate destruction of a nation’ but rather it signifies ‘a coordinated plan of 
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of 
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.’15  For Lemkin 
the techniques of genocide, in this case employed by the Germans, included: 
 Political (destruction of government and administration institutions 
and their replacement with the oppressor’s institutions, disbanding 
political parties, modifying names of people, places, and things to 
the German form, and the removal of populations to colonise an 
area); 
                                                 
10 Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2016) 178–181. 
11 Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (Penguin 1981) 12; Samantha 
Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 30. 
12 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 30, 41–
42. 
13 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1944) 79. 
14 ibid 79. 
15 ibid 79. 
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 Social (abolition of national law and the replacement with German 
law, and the deportation of clergy and intelligentsia to weaken 
resistance and opposition); 
 Cultural (restricting the education of a national language, teaching 
the tenets of National Socialism, limiting a nation’s cultural 
activities such as art, music, and theatre, and the destruction of 
cultural symbols, monuments, and institutions such as libraries, 
museums, and art galleries); 
 Economic (destruction of economic existence through lowering 
standards of living, confiscation of property and money, and 
preventing people from working); 
 Biological (preventing marriages, decreasing the birth rate, 
separating males from females by deporting men, and policies of 
under nourishing adults lowers the capacity of children born to 
starving parents to survive); 
 Physical (rationing food which leads to a decrease in the health of 
people and an increase in the rate of mortality, endangering the 
health of individuals by depriving access to warm clothing and 
blankets, firewood, fuel, medicine, and fresh air by confining 
people to ghettos, and mass killing); 
 Religious (forcing young people to renounce their religious 
affiliation in favour of joining Nazi youth organisations, and the 
destruction of religion by destroying property and persecuting 
church figures); 
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 Moral (destroy the moral fabric of a society by encouraging the 
moral debasement of a people by consuming alcohol, participating 
in gambling, and attending pornographic films and shows so as to 
weaken the resistance of the population.16 
The aim of these actions would be the ‘disintegration of the political and social 
institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic 
existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, 
health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.’17  
Cultural genocide was an important topic for Lemkin as he believed that the crime of 
genocide was composed of two elements, the first was the destruction of the ‘national 
pattern’ of the oppressed group while the second was the imposition of the ‘national 
pattern’ of the oppressor.18 
Lemkin stated that genocide could be perpetrated in peace time as well as in the midst 
of war which differentiated the crime from other international crimes specifically war 
crimes and the emerging crime of crimes against humanity.19  For Lemkin it was 
critical that genocide was criminalised under domestic as well as international law to 
ensure that the crime could be enforced.20  He contended that each state should have 
laws that protect ‘minority groups from oppression because of their nationhood, 
                                                 
16 ibid 82–90. 
17 ibid 79. 
18 Lawrence J LeBlanc, ‘Development of the Rule on Genocide’ in Samuel Totten and Paul R Bartrop 
(eds), The Genocide Studies Reader (Routledge 2009) 12; William A Schabas, Genocide in 
International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 32. 
19 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1944) 93. 
20 ibid 93. 
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religion, or race’ and that there should be ‘provisions inflicting penalties’ for those 
who perpetrate genocide.21 
With the end of World War II, Lemkin believed that the ‘world might be ready to 
listen’ to his new term.22  The newly established trials in Nuremberg would be the 
venue for Lemkin to gain support and recognition for his concept.23  Genocide was 
included, under the heading of war crimes, in the indictments issued by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal.24  Nuremberg would be the first time that leaders of a state faced an 
international trial for the crime of genocide.25  On the first day of the Tribunal, when 
the French prosecutor, Pierre Mounier, read out the indictments he became the first 
person to use the term genocide in a court of law.26  The defendants were accused of 
conducting ‘deliberate and systematic genocide’; genocide was defined as the 
‘extermination of racial and religious groups, against the civilian populations of 
certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people 
and national, racial, or religious groups.’27  Despite the early promise of genocide 
being mentioned on the first day of the Tribunals, a further 130 days of hearings passed 
without it being mentioned again.28 
Lemkin believed that it was up to him to get the crime of genocide back into the Trials 
so he decamped himself to Nuremberg to harry prosecutors and even defence lawyers 
                                                 
21 ibid 93. 
22 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 47. 
23 ibid 49. 
24 Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2016) 188. 
25 ibid 276. 
26 ibid 280. 
27 William A Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 43. 
28 Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2016) 332. 
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to revive the discussion of genocide.29  Genocide returned to the Nuremberg Trials 
when David Maxwell Fyfe, the deputy British prosecutor, in the midst of questioning 
one of the defendants, reminded him that he was charged with genocide as defined by 
Lemkin.30  A couple of days later, one of the defence lawyers said that his client was 
not a génocidaire.31  In his closing speech, the British Prosecutor, Hartley Shawcross, 
accused the defendants of pursing a policy of genocide, and described the patterns of 
genocide evident in the actions of the defendants.32  The French and Soviet prosecutors 
followed in condemning the defendants for perpetrating genocide.33  Despite the 
prosecutors referencing the crime of genocide; in the judgments of the eight justices 
from the Allied Powers, there was no mention of the crime of genocide.34  No 
individual was found guilty of the crime of genocide which resulted in Lemkin calling 
it ‘the blackest day’ of his life.35 
Lemkin did not let his disappointment at Nuremberg stop him, instead he travelled to 
New York to get genocide on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.36  
Lemkin had chosen a fertile period for gaining interest in genocide as images of the 
atrocities in the concentration camps were fresh in the minds of UN delegates.37  
                                                 
29 ibid 330, 334–336. 
30 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 50; 
Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2016) 336–337. 
31 Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity 
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Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity 
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36 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 51. 
37 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 52; 
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University Press 2012) 7. 
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Lemkin’s message of the importance of protecting a group’s identity resonated with 
diplomats who sought to take measures to prevent the recurrence of violence.38  
Building on the ground swell of support for his concept, Lemkin encouraged 
representatives from Cuba, India, and Panama to submit a draft resolution in support 
of genocide to the UN General Assembly.39 
Lemkin’s single-minded perseverance led to genocide entering the parlance of the 
international community, however in the seventy years since he created the term 
genocide, has its meaning in discourse changed drastically from his original concept?  
Has the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide and the discussions of genocide within the academic and activist 
communities led to the development of different and potentially conflicting 
understandings of genocide?  Within these discussions on defining and interpreting 
the crime of genocide, has a definition of genocide been presented that is both 
applicable and identifiable in the midst of violence?  To begin addressing these 
questions, this chapter will turn to examine the origination of the legal definition of 
genocide within the UN system and the potential ambiguities within this definition 
which could conceivably impact on the application of the Convention in the midst of 
violence. 
2.3 Debating and Drafting the Definition within the United Nations 
A reminder that the legal definition of genocide contained within the Genocide 
Convention is set out in Article II, which provides that: 
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In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
As the definition of genocide is central to this research, it is important to understand 
the development of this definition within the organs of the UN.  The record of the 
various drafting bodies highlights how the provisions within this article underwent 
substantial alterations during the drafting process. 
2.3(i) General Assembly Resolution 
The United Nations General Assembly was the first international body to define the 
crime of genocide in 1946.40  The UN General Assembly defined genocide as a ‘denial 
of the right of existence of entire human groups’ and declared that genocide has been 
perpetrated when ‘racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed, 
entirely or in part.’  The resolution stated that the crime of genocide ‘shocks the 
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conscience of mankind’ and ‘results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural 
and other contributions represented by these human groups’.  The UN General 
Assembly declared that genocide is a ‘crime under international law’ which private 
individuals and public officials can be held responsible for and states have a 
responsibility to punish.  This definition is broader than the definition eventually 
adopted in the Convention as it includes political and other groups in the definition of 
genocide.  The inclusion of other groups, in particular political groups, in the list of 
targeted groups became a contested issue for the different drafting bodies. 
The resolution called upon the United Nations Economic and Social Council (hereafter 
‘ECOSOC’) to draft a convention on the crime of genocide; the ECOSOC then 
instructed the Secretary-General of the UN to draw up a convention with the 
‘assistance of experts in the field of international and criminal law.’41 
2.3(ii) The Secretariat Draft 
The Secretary-General drafted, with the assistance of the Secretariat’s Human Rights 
Division and three experts (including Lemkin), the first draft of the Convention.42  
This draft is historic, as it the first attempt at drawing up a convention to govern the 
crime of genocide.  The drafters of the proposed convention undertook the first in-
depth examination of the crime of genocide to identify key elements of the crime.  The 
draft convention drawn up by the Secretariat defined genocide as a criminal act 
directed against racial, national, linguistic, religious or political groups with the 
purpose of destroying the group in whole or in part, or in preventing the preservation 
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or development of that group.43  This definition of genocide includes many elements 
of the crime that would be eventually adopted in the Convention including 
acknowledging the importance of intent to the crime, adopting physical and biological 
acts of genocide, recognising that the partial destruction of a group amounts to 
genocide, and endorsing that acts of genocide are committed against national, racial, 
and religious groups. 
The intent underlying the crime was an important element for the drafters in 
distinguishing genocide as the drafters stated they restricted genocide to the ‘deliberate 
destruction of a human group’ so as to make the crime of genocide distinct from other 
crimes in international law.44  The drafters stated that atrocities committed during 
international or civil war do not amount to genocide unless the intention underlying 
the acts is to destroy a group.45  Policies of forced assimilation and mass displacement 
were ascertained not to constitute the crime of genocide, as they were not aimed at the 
destruction of a group.46 
The criminal acts of genocide recognised in the convention included physical genocide 
(acts that cause the death or injure the health of a group), biological genocide 
(prevention of births), and cultural genocide (brutal destruction of the specific 
characteristics of a group).47  The acts of physical and biological genocide (group 
massacres or individual executions; deliberately inflicting conditions of life including 
a lack of proper housing, clothing, food, hygiene, and medical care and excessive work 
or physical exertion which are likely to result in the death of individuals; mutilations 
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and biological experiments; deprivation of means of living including confiscation of 
property, looting, curtailment of work, and denial of housing and supplies; forced 
sterilisation and compulsory abortions; segregation of the sexes; and restrictions on 
marriage) outlined in the draft convention are nearly identical to the acts subsequently 
included in Article II of the Genocide Convention. 
The category of cultural genocide (forced transfer of children to another group; forced 
and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of the group; prohibition 
of the use of the national language; and the destruction of a group’s books, documents, 
monuments, objects and religious works) proved to be a contentious issue as two of 
the three experts, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres and Vespasian Pella, ‘held that cultural 
genocide represented an undue extension of the notion of genocide’.48  Lemkin argued 
in opposition that the destruction of a culture of a group was ‘as disastrous for 
civilisation as the physical destruction of nations.’49  He stated that a group ‘cannot 
continue to exist unless it preserves its spirit and moral unity.’50 
While the draft convention outlined that genocide can be committed against racial, 
national, linguistic, religious and political groups, Lemkin opposed the inclusion of 
political groups in the definition as this group lacks ‘the permanency and the specific 
characteristics of the other groups’.51  He also warned that the inclusion of political 
groups could risk the adoption of a convention as the world was ‘deeply divided’ on 
this issue.52  Donnedieu de Vabres countered Lemkin’s opinion, arguing ‘that the 
exclusion of political groups might be regarded as justifying genocide in the case of 
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such groups.’53  The disputes surrounding the inclusion of political groups and acts of 
cultural genocide would be replicated in the following months as the process to draft 
a convention moved forward. 
The provisions proposed by the drafters formed the framework for future discussion 
on drafting a convention for the crime of genocide.  The draft convention was 
submitted to the UN General Assembly by the Secretary-General after the ECOSOC 
called on member states to offer comments on the draft conventions.54  A large 
majority of states did not provide comments on the draft convention,55 so as to proceed 
more quickly with the drafting of a convention the UN General Assembly referred the 
matter of genocide back to the ECOSOC.56 
2.3(iii) Ad Hoc Committee Draft 
On instruction from the UN General Assembly, the ECOSOC established an ad hoc 
committee to draft a convention using the Secretariat’s draft as a framework and to 
examine any comments on that draft convention from member states.57  The 
committee comprised China, France, Lebanon, Poland, the United States of America, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Venezuela.58  The committee defined 
genocide as ‘deliberate acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, racial, 
religious or political group, on grounds of the national or racial origin, religious belief, 
or political opinion of its members.’59  The committee’s definition of genocide has 
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four elements: 1) a notion of premeditation, 2) an intent to destroy a human group, 3) 
the existence of a protected group, and 4) a motive to commit genocide.60 
There was no unanimous support for all these elements, in particular the inclusion of 
political groups in the list of protected groups proved divisive.  The representatives of 
Poland and the USSR argued that political groups ‘lack the stability of the other 
groups’.61  The representative of Venezuela stated that the inclusion of political groups 
would threaten the adoption of the convention as it was a controversial matter.62  In 
the end four states voted in favour of the inclusion of political groups with three states 
opposing it.63 
The acts of genocide (killing; impairing the physical integrity; measures or conditions 
of life aimed at causing death; and measures aimed at preventing births) included 
under the definition of genocide are physical and biological acts.  The committee did 
also include cultural genocide in the draft convention, in a separate article, defining 
the crime as ‘any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, 
religion or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of national or 
racial origin or religious beliefs.’64  The inclusion of cultural genocide in the draft 
convention was subject to a thorough debate.65  Those who favoured its inclusion 
including the USSR argued that the targeting of the specific cultural traits of a group 
is a means of destroying a group, in the same way as the physical and biological 
targeting of a group amounts to genocide.66  In opposing its inclusion, representatives 
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including the US argued that cultural genocide was not on the same level as physical 
and biological genocide; acts which had ‘shocked the conscience of mankind.’67  It 
was argued that the crime of cultural genocide was more suited to a treaty concerning 
human rights and the protection of minorities.68  Furthermore, similar to the inclusion 
of political groups, it was contended that the inclusion of cultural genocide within a 
convention would likely reduce the number of states willing to adopt the convention.69  
The article concerning cultural genocide was eventually adopted by four votes to 
three.70 
The draft convention saw the first substantive reference to the question of motive 
behind the crime in the definition of genocide.  A number of states felt a reference to 
motive was superfluous as the definition already specified the intent to destroy a 
group.71  These states sought a compromise that would have recognised that genocide 
is committed for a number of reasons, which was rejected by the other states who felt 
that the definition should specify the motives.72  The ‘majority view was that the 
inclusion of specific motives was indispensable.’73 
The Convention as a whole was supported by five states, with one state against the 
Convention and one state abstaining.74  Poland abstained due to the unhappiness of 
their delegation with a number of the provisions within the draft convention, which 
they hoped would be remedied before the convention was adopted.75  The 
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representative of the USSR opposed elements of the convention as he felt that the 
convention would not be an ‘effective instrument’ in the prevention of genocide.76  
The strong minded opinion of the USSR delegation on the provisions of the 
convention would be seen again during the final stages of the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention. 
While only comprising of seven members, the record of the ad hoc committee 
highlights the difficulty of finding a compromise on the creation of an effective treaty 
to prevent and punish the crime of genocide.  The voting records on cultural genocide 
along with political groups highlighted that these elements were particularly divisive 
issues which might jeopardise the adoption of the Convention if they were respectively 
included or excluded.  The ad hoc committee’s draft convention was presented to the 
UN General Assembly by the ECOSOC.77  The UN General Assembly referred the 
drafting of a convention to its Sixth Committee, which examines legal questions.78  
The outcome of the meetings of the Sixth Committee is the convention that is still in 
place today. 
2.3(iv) The Sixth Committee 
The starting point for the Sixth Committee was a discussion on the draft convention 
prepared by the ad hoc committee.79  As stated previously in its work the Sixth 
Committee did adopt a number of elements of the crime of genocide that had been 
included in previous draft conventions such as the requirement of intent, acts of 
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physical and biological genocide, the whole or partial destruction of a group, and the 
protection of national, racial, and religious groups.  Notwithstanding this the debates 
between the members of the Sixth Committee resulted in significant changes to the 
provisions of the ad hoc committee’s draft convention and to the definitions of 
genocide provided in earlier drafts.80 
One key element that was included in the ad hoc committee’s definition, the notion of 
premeditation, was deleted by the Sixth Committee.81  The provision on ‘deliberate 
acts’ in the draft convention was removed as it was felt by some states that the 
reference to premeditation was superfluous as the intention underlying the crime 
implied premeditation.82  Another important discussion within the Sixth Committee 
was on the inclusion of a motive, which had been included within the draft convention 
of the ad hoc committee.  Similar to the criticism of the inclusion of premeditation, a 
number of delegations within the Sixth Committee believed that the convention did 
not need to provide for a motive underlying the intent to destroy. 
The representatives of Venezuela, Norway, Panama, Brazil, and the United Kingdom 
argued that the inclusion of motives was not important, as the aim of the convention 
was the prevention of the destruction of groups.83  The representative of the United 
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Kingdom stated that the inclusion of motives was limiting, as it allowed those accused 
of genocide to claim they did not commit an act on the grounds of one of the motives.84  
Other delegations including Lebanon, Egypt, the USSR, Iran, New Zealand, 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic believed that motive 
on a set of specified grounds was intrinsic to the crime of genocide as it set it aside 
from other crimes.85  These delegates believed that if the reference to motives was 
deleted, it would mean crimes that are not connected to genocide would come under 
the rubric of genocide.86 
To bridge the gap between the two viewpoints on motive, the Venezuelan 
representative proposed a compromise amendment which would see the deletion of a 
specific list of motives, and instead it would be replaced by the phrase ‘as such’.87  The 
Venezuelan delegate said this phrase meant that for genocide to be committed a group 
must be destroyed for being a group.88  This phrase would still address motives 
implicitly, however it would ensure that the focus of the crime of genocide was on 
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intention.89  The Venezuelan representative also stated that this amendment would 
allow judges when dealing with cases of genocide to examine other motives, than 
those specified in the ad hoc draft convention (motives on the grounds of national or 
racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion).90 
The US delegate supported the Venezuelan amendment as it would address the 
ambiguity of including motives within the definition when the focus of the convention 
should be on intention.91  The USSR representative opposed the reference to ‘as such’ 
as he felt it was ‘too vague and could lead to ambiguity’ due to potential different 
interpretations.92  For instance, the USSR representative believed that ‘as such’ meant 
that people were destroyed solely because they were a member of a group.93  Despite 
the viewpoint that the Venezuelan amendment was ambiguous, it was eventually 
passed by 27 to 22 votes, with 2 abstentions.94 
The debates within the Sixth Committee were often fractious, particularly around the 
inclusion of political groups in the list of enumerated protected groups.  
Representatives of states (including Belgium, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
Iran, Peru, Poland, the USSR, and Venezuela) disagreed with the inclusion of political 
groups for a number of reasons.  Some delegates argued that political groups did not 
                                                 
89 United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee (76th Meeting) ‘Continuation of the 
consideration of the draft convention on genocide [E/794]: report of the Economic and Social Council 
[A/633]’ (16 October 1948) UN Doc A/C.6/SR.76, 124–125. 
90 United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee (77th Meeting) ‘Continuation of the 
consideration of the draft convention on genocide [E/794]: report of the Economic and Social Council 
[A/633]’ (18 October 1948) UN Doc A/C.6/SR.77, 131. 
91 United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee (76th Meeting) ‘Continuation of the 
consideration of the draft convention on genocide [E/794]: report of the Economic and Social Council 
[A/633]’ (16 October 1948) UN Doc A/C.6/SR.76, 123–124. 
92 ibid 127. 
93 ibid 126–127. 
94 United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee (77th Meeting) ‘Continuation of the 
consideration of the draft convention on genocide [E/794]: report of the Economic and Social Council 
[A/633]’ (18 October 1948) UN Doc A/C.6/SR.77, 133. 
102 
have the stability or permanency of national, racial, or religious groups.95  While it 
was acknowledged that people could change their membership of national and 
religious groups; membership of political groups was seen as easier to renounce than 
membership of a national or religious group.96  Furthermore representatives argued 
that the inclusion of political groups would make it difficult for their state or a majority 
of states to support the convention.97 
In opposition, delegates from Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the US argued for the inclusion of political groups.  These representatives 
stated that there was no reason for excluding political groups in comparison to the 
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other groups and that failure to include this element would permit crimes be committed 
against this group without sanction.98  Furthermore representatives stated that 
excluding political groups would be ignoring the intention of the General Assembly 
Resolution 96(I) which recognised genocide committed against political groups.99  
The first vote saw the retention of political groups in the provisions of the convention, 
and the extension of protection to ethnical groups while a proposed amendment by the 
United States to include economic groups within the list of protected group was 
withdrawn due to a lack of support for this provision.100 
The progress of the Sixth Committee was laboured and arduous, and it was decided to 
form a smaller draft committee to consider the text of the convention as adopted by 
the Sixth Committee so as to draw a draft convention.101  The delegates returned to 
the issue of political groups after preparing this draft convention, as a number of states 
said they would not be prepared to ratify the convention if political groups remained 
in the convention.102  The US delegate who favoured the inclusion of political groups 
was willing to exclude the provision if it meant that more states were willing to ratify 
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the convention.103  The representatives ultimately voted to exclude political groups 
from the list of protected groups in the convention.104 
What was meant by the destruction of a group was a particular area of concern for the 
representatives, and it received particular attention in the debates.  One of the most 
contentious questions faced by the Sixth Committee was whether cultural genocide 
should be excluded from the convention.  The delegate from Lebanon said that ‘the 
physical and cultural aspects of the crime were … indivisible’.105  The Ukrainian 
representative stated that cultural genocide should be included in the convention as it 
was a prelude to physical genocide.106  The Venezuela delegate said that a group’s 
existence could be threatened by not only physical destruction but also by the 
destruction of the traits of a group.107  The Czechoslovakian representative said that a 
group may be destroyed either physically or by the destruction of the ‘distinctive and 
permanent characteristics’, and in either case ‘the ensuing loss to humanity’ was no 
less.108  The representative of Pakistan argued that cultural genocide was the end goal 
of those who commit physical genocide, the aim was to destroy every characteristic 
of the group.109  The representative of the USSR argued that excluding cultural 
genocide would be tantamount to condoning crimes against the culture of a group.110 
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In opposition, representatives from Brazil, Canada, Denmark, India, Iran, New 
Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden argued that the provisions of the draft convention 
concerning cultural genocide were not clearly defined and therefore they could not 
support the inclusion of cultural genocide in the convention.111  These delegates 
thought the question of cultural genocide should be dealt with by a treaty concerning 
protection of minorities.  On the first vote concerning cultural genocide, the 
representatives voted to exclude it from the convention.112  On the day the convention 
was being adopted, the USSR tabled an amendment to include cultural genocide in the 
convention.113  The amendment was rejected, and the crimes of cultural genocide were 
excluded from the convention.114  There was one crime that fell into the category of 
cultural genocide that was included in the acts of genocide and adopted by the 
representatives in the final provisions of the convention.  The crime of the forced 
transfer of children to another group was viewed by delegates as being separate from 
cultural genocide.115 
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With regard to other acts of genocide, the question of whether the forced removal or 
forced expulsion of a group constituted or should constitute genocide was debated at 
the Sixth Committee.  An amendment was introduced by the Syrian representative to 
include in the acts of genocide ‘any measures directed towards forcing members of a 
group to leaves their homes.’116  This amendment was strongly opposed by 
representatives who did not view these measures as constituting genocide as the acts 
were not aimed at the physical destruction of the group.117  The amendment was 
swiftly rejected.118 
At the end of weeks of debating numerous amendments and proposals, the Sixth 
Committee adopted the draft convention by thirty votes to none, with eight 
abstentions.119  The representatives put forward reasoned arguments for their support 
of the convention, and reasons why some of them chose to abstain on the vote.  The 
delegation from the United States, who voted for the draft convention, declared that 
the convention was not ‘perfect’, a view shared by numerous delegations, 
notwithstanding this the United States representative believed the draft convention 
‘represented the best possible compromise’ that could be reached by the Sixth 
Committee.120  The French delegate stated that the text agreed, while not entirely 
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satisfactory, was likely the only text that would receive approval from the member 
states.121 
The representative of the United Kingdom had abstained as he believed that the focus 
of the convention should be on states, and not individuals.122  The Polish delegation 
abstained from the vote as it felt the convention did not adequately address 
preventative measures.123  The representative from Yugoslavia abstained due to the 
exclusion of cultural genocide; arguing that cultural genocide was intrinsically linked 
with biological and physical genocide.124  The representative of the USSR stated that 
his delegation had abstained from the vote as the draft convention omitted key 
provisions that the USSR wished to include, and that when the convention came before 
the General Assembly the USSR would seek to introduce new amendments to the 
convention.125 
The records of the drafting process highlight that the definition of genocide was 
subject to a thorough examination and debate, but it also shows that the resulting 
definition contained with the Genocide Convention was the outcome of a political 
compromise.126  This political compromise was due to states being mindful that the 
provisions of the Convention would not be used ‘to criticise or to condemn their 
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conduct.’127  In particular, as highlighted, the discussions around the inclusion of acts 
of cultural genocide and the recognition of a political group involved substantial 
negotiation and compromise as states were fearful that their domestic policies 
(including acts of assimilation and limiting or repressing the participation of political 
groups) concerning political groups and/or cultural groups could be regarded as 
genocide.  These domestic considerations ultimately saw these provisions excluded 
from the Genocide Convention, however it was necessary to ensure that the 
Convention was adopted by as many states as possible.  So while political compromise 
left a less than perfect definition and Convention for many states, the debates and 
negotiations did secure the drafting of a Convention to address a heinous crime. 
2.3(v) Embracing the Genocide Convention 
The Sixth Committee submitted a report of its activities and the recommended draft 
convention to be adopted to the General Assembly, which was discussed by the 
General Assembly on the 9th of December 1948.128  As promised, the delegation from 
the USSR tabled a number of amendments to the draft convention.129  As already 
discussed the General Assembly rejected the reintroduction of the provision on 
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cultural genocide, in addition the General Assembly voted against the USSR’s 
amendment to link genocide with fascism, Nazism, and other race theories.130 
With the General Assembly dismissing the proposed amendments, it was left to vote 
on the draft convention as presented by the Sixth Committee.  Before the final vote, 
the delegations were given one last chance to share their opinions on the convention.  
Representatives once again restated how the convention while not perfect was a 
compromise which as the representative from Iran argued would not endanger the 
‘principle that the existence of racial, religious or national groups was as sacred as the 
life of an individual.’131 
Nearly two years had passed from the UN General Assembly Resolution 96(1) of 1946 
to the 9th of December 1948 when the UN General Assembly voted on the adoption of 
the draft convention of the Sixth Committee.132  In that period, there had been 
numerous meetings and a number of different drafts of the convention drawn up.  After 
all the time and effort put into crafting a treaty to address one of the worst crimes in 
existence, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
was adopted by fifty six votes to none with no abstentions.133  The Convention 
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transformed the concept of genocide from an academic term to a promise of action 
from states across the world.134 
The adoption and eventual ratification of the Genocide Convention unfortunately did 
not translate into states pursuing immediate and effective action to prevent and punish 
the crime of genocide.  Rather as outlined in Chapter One, there were only sporadic 
references to genocide at state level where often it was states using the rhetorical value 
of the genocide as propaganda in a proxy war with rival states.  Genocide did return 
to the courtroom when Adolf Eichmann was charged in Israel with ‘Crimes against 
the Jewish People’, a crime which was based on the Genocide Convention’s definition 
of genocide, for his role in planning and executing the Holocaust.135  However the 
preventative potential of the Convention largely floundered with atrocities perpetrated 
in Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, and Indonesia amongst others in the decades after 
the adoption of the Genocide Convention.  The failure to meaningfully respond to 
these situations, as well as the symbolic power of the genocide label to characterise a 
state’s act/failing and to describe the suffering of a victimised group, stimulated 
academic interest in the concept of genocide and led to various efforts to redefine and 
rework the definition of genocide for a changing world. 
2.4 Rethinking Genocide 
The brief summary of the state of genocide studies in Chapter One highlighted that 
the topic of genocide was of marginal interest in academia for much of the decades 
following the passing of the Convention.  There were only a small number of 
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individual studies into the situations in Armenia, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, Paraguay, the Soviet Union, Sudan, Uganda, and Ukraine.136  It 
was only in the 1980s when a revival in the concept of genocide began as academics 
started paying sustained interest to the Convention.137 
Academic interest in the concept of genocide was resurrected by the work of Leo 
Kuper; whose research triggered an eruption of studies into the crime of genocide, and 
specifically on the definition of genocide.138  As the Genocide Convention had not 
been applied to any case of genocide since its inception, the first studies of the crime 
of genocide by academics took a highly critical approach to the legal definition of 
genocide contained within the Convention.139  The uncertain nature of the definition, 
combined with the failure to enforce the Genocide Convention, prompted studies of 
the definition, and various attempts to improve upon the definition contained within 
the Convention.140 
From the research and work of academics and scholarly organisations it is clear that 
genocide has meant something different to them than what is set out in the legal 
definition.  The academic attempts to shape or more accurately reshape the concept of 
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genocide, is due to their desire to apply the label genocide to their own research.  Frank 
Chalk states that when ‘defining a field for research, the needs of social scientists and 
historians differ from those of international legal authorities.’141  With the emerging 
field of genocide studies primarily composed of historians, philosophers, 
psychologists, and sociologists rather than legal researchers it has meant that these 
academics, and those who subsequently came to bolster the field of genocide studies, 
have been more willing to rework the definition of genocide without any thought for 
the legal consequence.142  This has led to a proliferation of definitions of genocide, as 
numerous academics have crafted an alternative definition of genocide that should be 
applied to label violence. 
In the respective studies of Scott Straus and Adam Jones they document the leading 
definitions crafted by Kuper,143 Pieter Drost,144 Vahakn Dadrian,145 Jack Nusan 
Porter,146 Irving Louis Horowitz,147 Henry Huttenbach,148 Helen Fein,149 Israel 
                                                 
141 Frank Chalk, ‘Genocide in the 20th Century – Definitions of Genocide and their Implications for 
Prediction and Prevention’ (1989) 4 Holocaust and Genocide Studies 149, 150. 
142 William A Schabas, ‘The International Legal Prohibition of Genocide Comes of Age’ (2004) 5 
Human Rights Review 46, 46. 
143 Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (Penguin 1981) 86 (Defined 
genocide as a ‘crime against a collectivity, taking the form of massive slaughter, and carried out with 
explicit intent.’). 
144 Pieter Drost, The Crime of the State (Volume 2) Genocide (AW Sijthoff 1959) 125 (Defined genocide 
as ‘the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership 
of any human collectivity as such.’). 
145 Vahakn Dadrian, ‘A Typology of Genocide’ (1975) 5 International Review of Modern Sociology 
201, 201 (Defined genocide as ‘the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested with formal 
authority and/or with preponderant access to the overall resources of power, to reduce by coercion or 
lethal violence the number of a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held desirable and 
useful and whose respective vulnerability is a major factor contributing to the decision for genocide.’). 
146 As quoted in Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (3rd edn, Routledge 2017) 24 
(Jack Nusan Porter defined genocide as ‘the deliberate destruction, in whole or in part, by a government 
or its agents, of a racial, sexual, religious, tribal or political minority.’). 
147 Irving Louis Horowitz, Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power (Transaction Books 1980) 17 
(Defined genocide as ‘a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic 
apparatus.’). 
148 Henry Huttenbach, ‘Locating the Holocaust on the Genocide Spectrum: Towards a Methodology of 
Definition and Categorization’ (1988) 3 Holocaust and Genocide Studies 289, 295 (Defined genocide 
as ‘the destruction of a specific group within a given national or even international population.’). 
149 Helen Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective (Sage 1993) 24 (Defined genocide as ‘sustained 
purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through 
113 
Charny,150 Yehuda Bauer,151 Ward Churchill,152 Steven Katz,153 Isidor Wallimann and 
Michael Dobkowski,154 and Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn,155 to address the horrors 
of genocide.156  While not the only definitions presented within academia to describe 
the crime of genocide, these definitions highlight the flaws within the legal definition 
of genocide and the desire within the genocide studies community to possess a 
definition that is more easily applied to situations of violence. 
The debate on the definition of genocide takes a number of different forms; some of 
the common arguments are that the definition is too narrow or too broad.157  Scholars, 
such as Israel Charny, have argued that the definition of genocide should be expanded 
to include all forms of mass violence against a group.158  Chalk and Jonassohn employ 
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a broad definition of genocide so as to examine ‘many cases of mass killing’ under the 
rubric of genocide studies.159  On the opposite end of the argument are a number of 
scholars, such as Steven Katz, who argue that the Holocaust is the only true 
genocide.160  These scholars argue that the atrocities of the Holocaust can never be 
compared to any other situation, and any attempt to compare is a means of lessening 
the horrors of the Holocaust.161  The arguments about the uniqueness of the Holocaust 
highlight the symbolic value of the word genocide for labelling the suffering of a 
population, and why academics are keen to redefine genocide to draw upon the 
symbolism of the word so as to apply to the situation or situations they are studying. 
In critiquing the definition of genocide, some scholars criticise aspects of the 
Convention’s definition while others outright reject the definition contained within the 
Convention.162  Whilst scholars acknowledge the limitations of the Convention’s 
definition, they still use it as a benchmark for the examination of the definition of 
genocide.163  A common academic approach to conceptualising genocide recognises 
the deficiencies within the Genocide Convention and crafts an alternative definition 
of genocide to label violence.  The main critiques of the definition of genocide 
contained within the Convention centre on the failure to include additional elements 
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such as a wider range of protected groups and acts of genocide within the definition 
of genocide. 
With regard to the exclusion of groups from the Convention, a common argument 
amongst scholars is that as the legal definition of genocide is restricted to the 
intentional destruction of a national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups; it diminishes 
violence against groups which have been excluded from the definition.  In particular, 
the omission of political groups has been labelled as the Convention’s ‘blind spot’.164  
Kuper, who kick-started the revival in the study of the concept of genocide, states that 
while he supports the definition of genocide contained within the Convention there is 
no reason to omit political groups from the list of protected groups.165  Drost, who 
conducted one of the first critiques of the Convention in 1959, argues that the 
exclusion of political, economic, social, and cultural groups leaves a ‘loophole’ for 
governments to avoid their duty under the Convention to protect civilians.166  Chalk 
bemoans the exclusion of social and political groups from the definition as it ignores 
crimes committed against members of different social classes in the Soviet Union, the 
Nazi crimes against disabled people and people of a different sexual orientation, and 
the actions of the Khmer Rouge against political opponents amongst other atrocities 
of the 20th century.167 
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In redefining genocide academics such as Katz, Ward Churchill, and Jack Nusan 
Porter have sought to broaden the list of protected groups to include cultural, 
economic, gender, LGBTQ, linguistic, political, social, and tribal groups.168  A 
number of scholars including Kuper, Fein, Drost, and Huttenbach do not specify the 
groups included in their definition, rather they refer generally to the concept of a group 
or collectivity.169  Drost argues that genocide should not be restricted to applying to a 
number of groups and instead it should apply to all groups of people as people are 
members of many different groups.170  Huttenbach states that the groups do not need 
to be specified, as the ‘list can never be complete’.171 
Academics have also argued for an expansion of the acts that constitute genocide.  
Isidor Wallimann and Michael Dobkowski state that the crime of genocide includes 
not only ‘mass murder but also forced deportation (ethnic cleansing), systematic rape, 
and economic and biological subjugation.’172  Jack Nusan Porter contends that the 
crime of genocide comprises acts of ‘starvation, forced deportation, and political, 
economic and biological subjugation’ alongside acts of mass killing.173  On the matter 
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of cultural genocide, academics such as Yehuda Bauer, Martin Shaw, and Ward 
Churchill contend that genocide is not just the physical destruction of a group but also 
the elimination of the cultural identity of a group.174 
While a number of definitions provided by academics have sought to expand the 
elements of genocide, several definitions have overly focussed on elements of the 
crime or in some cases omitted elements of the Genocide Convention’s definition.  For 
instance, while the Genocide Convention lists a number of acts comprising the crime 
of genocide, numerous genocide scholars including leading academics such as Kuper, 
Charny, Chalk and Jonassohn, Harff and Gurr, Levene, and Jones have focussed their 
definitions exclusively on the act of killing as constituting the crime of genocide.175  
For these academics, genocide is identifiable by a large number of victims and is 
exclusively linked to murder and killing.  However genocide is not ‘synonymous with 
mass killing’; a clearer reading of the Genocide Convention would show that the 
Convention does not state victims have to die for the crime of genocide to be 
perpetrated, in fact only subsection (a) of Article II mentions the act of killing.176  
Shaw argues that undue focus in academia on the act of killing and on the act of 
physical harm has narrowed the concept of genocide, by reducing the importance of 
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the other material acts that can lead to the destruction of a group identified in the 
Convention.177 
Academics have also debated whether the crime of genocide requires the intent to be 
a ‘total genocide’, where all the victims die.  This debate stems from the mention of 
‘in whole or in part’ in the Convention.  In Katz’s definition of genocide, the intent 
behind the crime must be to destroy the ‘totality’ of a group.178  This was an attempt 
to link the crime of genocide inextricably with the Holocaust as the Holocaust is 
viewed as a total genocide due to the high number of victims.  This definition was 
subject to criticism by his fellow academics who criticised his view of the Holocaust 
as a total genocide considering that Hitler did not target every Jewish person across 
the world for extermination.179  There will never be a total genocide as in every case 
of accepted or suspected genocide, there have always been survivors.180  In creating 
his own definition of genocide, Adam Jones amended Katz’s definition to remove the 
reference to the totality of a group and replaced it with the requirement that the intent 
must be to ‘murder in whole or in substantial part.’181  This definition aligns with the 
majority of academics who refer to the term mass murder in their studies.182 
Furthermore, intent is central to the definition of genocide contained within the 
Convention, but it has had a mixed reaction in literature.  Some scholars are willing to 
include it as part of their definition but others completely omit any notion of 
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intentionality in the crime of genocide.183  Israel Charny is one scholar who rejects 
completely the concept of intent, instead concentrating his definition on the notion of 
mass killing.184  Wallimann and Dobkowski also question the inclusion of intention.185  
Tony Barta is another academic who does not concentrate on the notion of genocide, 
rather he focuses on the structural factors that give rise to genocide.186  For Huttenbach 
the intent underlying the crime is a secondary concern, what is important for the crime 
of genocide is the outcome; that people have died.187 
This viewpoint has been subject to criticism.  Chalk states that genocide does not 
appear without intent.188  Guenter Lewy argues that the role of intent in the crime of 
genocide is crucial as evidence of large scale loss of life is not sufficient to make a 
finding that genocide has occurred.189  The consensus in academia is that genocide 
involves the intentional destruction of a group.190  In the definitions of genocide 
presented by Drost, Kuper, Bauer, Fein, Katz, Horowitz, and Chalk and Jonassohn 
                                                 
183 See discussion in Frank Chalk, ‘Genocide in the 20th Century – Definitions of Genocide and their 
Implications for Prediction and Prevention’ (1989) 4 Holocaust and Genocide Studies 149, 154–157; 
Scott Straus, ‘Contested Meanings and Conflicting Imperatives: A Conceptual Analysis of Genocide’ 
(2001) 3 Journal of Genocide Research 349, 350–355; Meghna Manaktala, ‘Defining Genocide’ (2012) 
24 Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 179, 182. 
184 Israel Charny, ‘Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide’ in George Andreopoulos (ed), Genocide: 
Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 75. 
185 Isidor Wallimann and Michael N Dobkowski, ‘Introduction’ in Isidor Wallimann and Michael N 
Dobkowski (eds), Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death (Syracuse 
University Press 1987) xvi. 
186 Tony Barta, ‘Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia’ in Isidor 
Wallimann and Michael N Dobkowski (eds), Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies 
of Mass Death (Syracuse University Press 1987) 238. 
187 Henry Huttenbach, ‘Locating the Holocaust on the Genocide Spectrum: Towards a Methodology of 
Definition and Categorization’ (1988) 3 Holocaust and Genocide Studies 289, 294. 
188 Frank Chalk, ‘Genocide in the 20th Century – Definitions of Genocide and their Implications for 
Prediction and Prevention’ (1989) 4 Holocaust and Genocide Studies 149, 158. 
189 Guenter Lewy, ‘Can there be Genocide without the Intent to Commit Genocide’ (2007) 9 Journal of 
Genocide Research 661, 671. 
190 Scott Straus, ‘Contested Meanings and Conflicting Imperatives: A Conceptual Analysis of 
Genocide’ (2001) 3 Journal of Genocide Research 349, 350–355, 364; Guenter Lewy, ‘Can there be 
Genocide without the Intent to Commit Genocide’ (2007) 9 Journal of Genocide Research 661, 661–
662; Scott Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum 2016) 31; Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (3rd edn, 
Routledge 2017) 49. 
120 
they refer to intent,191 or to other similar terms such as ‘deliberate destruction’,192 
‘planned destruction’,193 ‘sustained purposeful action’194 and ‘structural and 
systematic destruction’.195 
Alongside the various attempts to redefine genocide, there has been a ‘proliferation’ 
of ‘-cide’ terms to describe violence against civilians in recent years.196  The idea 
behind the creation of these concepts is to link their ‘-cide’ with the moral outrage 
surrounding the crime of genocide.197  These concepts include auto-genocide (mass 
murder of a group to which the perpetrators are also members of),198 classicide (mass 
killing of social classes),199 democide (state-led mass murder of any person),200 
ecocide (destruction of an environment which places the existence of people under 
threat),201 ethnocide (suppression of a group’s culture),202 gendercide (the gender-
selective killings of males or females in a situation),203 and politicide (the destruction 
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of a political group).204  However the spread of ‘-cide’ concepts has only added to the 
confusion surrounding the meaning of the concept of genocide.205 
This section has illustrated that genocide studies has been saturated by academics 
seeking to advance their own understanding of genocide.  As William Schabas 
remarks, it ‘seems as if there are as many definitions of genocide as there are scholars 
working in the field.’206  While there are numerous academics researching within the 
rubric of genocide studies there is a lack of uniformity in academia regarding the 
definition of genocide.207  The above discussion highlights how contested the 
definition of genocide is, and how alternate definitions do not neatly fit into an 
overarching category as academics will often differ on how they conceptualise acts of 
genocide, the groups protected, and the intent element amongst others.  The only thing 
most genocide studies scholars agree upon is the uselessness of the Convention’s 
definition.208  This means that there is no prevailing academic definition of genocide 
though, rather there is an overflowing pool full of definitions that is continually being 
added to with each new academic study.  What does this leave us with?  A multitude 
of definitions which contradict each other, which means that an agreed upon 
understanding of genocide is an impossible task.209 
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What effect, if any, have these scholarly debates had on the understanding of genocide 
held amongst the general public, in particular civil society activists and non-
governmental organisations?  When individuals label a situation as genocide, are they 
applying the legal definition of genocide as set out in the Genocide Convention or are 
they employing a social understanding of genocide?  Have the various scholarly 
definitions provided here had more of an impact on civil society than the legal 
definition has had? 
2.4(i) A Divergence in Understanding 
Since the adoption of the Convention there has been an increased use of the word 
genocide by academics and activists, however the term has often been loosely applied 
to describe conflicts and situations which differ in nature and magnitude, and which 
do not correspond with the provisions of the Genocide Convention.  For example the 
desire amongst academics to utilise the genocide label for their own individual 
research has meant that nearly every episode of mass violence has been labelled as 
genocide over the past number of decades.210  This has meant that the general public 
along with many academics have equated genocide with mass murder, and nearly 
every situation which involves a large number of casualties has been termed 
genocide.211 
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Furthermore even incidents and situations that do not involve violence have been 
labelled as genocide, Scott Straus documents how over the course of 12 months at an 
American university campus fliers and posters referred to ‘cutbacks in an ethnic 
studies department, incarceration rates of African Americans, and even George W 
Bush’s election’ as genocide.212  Abortion, AIDS, animal cruelty, environmental 
pollution, family planning, immigration, nuclear warfare, and urban planning have all 
been termed genocide as well by members of activist communities.213  Kurt Jonassohn 
states that the ‘term genocide is now widely misused to denote almost anything that 
an observer is violently opposed to, whether or not anyone is being killed.’214  Lois 
Presser contends that in these argued cases of genocide, activists do not care about the 
‘accuracy’ of their statement but instead want to label the act as the worst crime 
imaginable.215  Genocide has become associated with the worst crime in existence, 
and the powerful rhetorical and symbolic value of the genocide label has meant that 
academics and activists want to label the situations they are studying or advocating as 
genocide.216 
However in using the term genocide activists are often guilty of oversimplifying a 
situation by focussing on one issue or narrative which is ‘most catchy’ to the general 
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public and this oversimplified understanding of a situation can be detrimental to an 
affected population as activists advocate supposed easy solutions which are in reality 
not achievable by governments as the activists have ignored ‘the broader context and 
underlying issues which contribute to the problem.’217  Furthermore civil society is a 
‘fickle entity’ as its interest in a situation can be guided by what is receiving attention 
in the media, and this interest can easily fade away when a situation disappears from 
media coverage.218 
Notwithstanding this the powerful symbolic nature of the genocide label has meant 
that academics and civil society actors are more willing than the UN and its member 
states to label a situation as genocide, without any thought for legal repercussions, so 
as to attract attention to a cause.219  For instance, Alex de Waal admits that his labelling 
of the situation in the Nuba Mountains in Sudan in the mid-1990s as genocide was a 
tactical means of drawing attention to an ‘unknown’ situation.220  He believed at the 
time that using the word would ‘grab headlines’ in the same manner as the genocide 
in Srebrenica.221  In this century, the labelling of the situation in Darfur as genocide 
meant that it received more attention from activists and the media than the situation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, despite the latter situation involving a greater level 
of violence.222 
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This symbolic value of the genocide label can not only be significant for raising 
awareness of a situation within the wider public but can be a means of castigating a 
state for the crimes it committed.  In 1967 the International War Crimes Tribunal, a 
body composed of ‘writers, politicians, philosophers, scientists and lawyers’ created 
by Bertrand Russell and chaired by Jean-Paul Sartre, proclaimed that the US 
perpetrated genocide in Vietnam.223  In defining the crime of genocide, Sartre included 
elements of cultural genocide; for him ‘the destruction of the national character, 
culture, customs and even language of a group constituted genocide’ as ‘it destroyed 
social structures and prevented religious and cultural life.’224  While having no legal 
effect, as the body was non-governmental and non-judicial in nature, Sartre was 
drawing upon the symbolism of the word genocide to compare the US actions in 
Vietnam to the Holocaust as means of denouncing the actions of the US 
government.225  The significance of the word genocide is therefore driving this 
divergence between the legal understanding of genocide and the social understanding 
of genocide as academics and activists push to associate their situation with the 
pinnacle of evil, even if it does not correspond to the legal definition. 
The divergence in understanding of the crime of genocide can be seen not only in the 
understanding of the crime held amongst academics, activists, and the general public 
but also in how the crime has been treated by states, in particular two separate 
investigations into the colonial practices of the Australian and Canadian governments 
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respectively.226  The two inquiries determined that the practice of forced removal of 
children from indigenous groups and the assimilation of these groups into society 
amounted to genocide.227  However both inquiries rather than examine how the policy 
of forced removal and assimilation would lead to the physical or biological destruction 
of a group, rely instead on the cultural destruction of a group for determining genocide 
had been committed. 
The Australian inquiry stated that the practice of absorption and assimilation amounts 
to genocide as it aimed to destroy the ‘cultural unit.’228  The inquiry states that the 
objective of this policy was ‘the disintegration of the political and social institutions 
of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economical existence of 
Indigenous peoples.’229  The Canadian inquiry determined that the crime of cultural 
genocide encompassed the ‘destruction of those structures and practices that allow the 
group to continue as a group.’230  The acts of cultural genocide include land seizure, 
forced transfers of populations, restriction of movement, suppression of language, and 
prohibition of cultural beliefs such as spiritual practices.231  These acts are intended to 
                                                 
226 Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, ‘Bringing Them Home, Report of 
the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their 
Families’ (1997); Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, ‘Honouring the Truth, Reconciling 
the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada’ 
(2015). 
227 Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, ‘Bringing Them Home, Report of 
the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their 
Families’ (1997) 190; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, ‘Honouring the Truth, 
Reconciling the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada’ (2015) 1, 54–56, 133. 
228 Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, ‘Bringing Them Home, Report of 
the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their 
Families’ (1997) 237. 
229 ibid 237. 
230 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, ‘Honouring the Truth, Reconciling the Future: 
Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada’ (2015) 1. 
231 ibid 1. 
127 
destroy the ‘political and social institutions’ of a group and prevent the transmission 
of culture from one generation to the next.232 
In proving that the respective governments possessed an intent to destroy underlying 
their actions the two inquiries focussed on the policy of assimilation as proof of an 
intent to destroy a group.  This argument that cultural assimilation amounts to 
genocide relies directly upon the work of Lemkin who had included cultural 
assimilation in his definition of genocide.233  However the practice of cultural 
assimilation and the idea of cultural genocide had been deliberately excluded from the 
Convention by the drafters of the document.234  The Canadian inquiry does actually 
acknowledge that cultural genocide is not included under the provisions of the 
Convention.235 
The labelling of the policy of forced removal and assimilation as genocide might 
provide the victims and descendants of the victims with a symbolic acknowledgement 
of their suffering, however absorption and assimilation are not crimes under the 
Convention.  This attempt to stretch the Convention’s definition of genocide to include 
elements of attacks on culture only adds to the confusion surrounding genocide in 
society as it associates genocide with cultural genocide.  As these are two prominent 
inquiries, it will result in an even further divide between the legal definition of 
genocide and society’s understanding of what elements are comprised in the definition 
of genocide. 
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In the seventy years since Raphael Lemkin created the term genocide its meaning in 
discourse has changed drastically from Lemkin’s original concept and from the legal 
definition provided in the Convention.236  Genocide is now ‘much more than a word’ 
it is ‘a label which can have tremendous impact.’237  The divergence between the legal 
understanding of genocide and society’s understanding is not a new phenomenon, 
since the adoption of the Genocide Convention it is clear that society had a wider 
understanding of genocide that what was conceptualised within the Convention.  This 
divergence is driven by the work of academics and activists who in rethinking and 
reinterpreting the definition of genocide have created different notions of what 
encompasses genocide, and which has translated into the understanding of genocide 
held amongst the general public.238  Within the public’s imagination, genocide is 
associated with generalised mass violence and is regarded as the worst crime in 
existence.  A genocide declaration has also been equated with intervention by activists.  
This perception of genocide could potentially affect the response of the international 
community to claims of genocide as actors will be pressurised to label the violence as 
genocide and take action to halt the violence.  The effect of the social understanding 
of genocide on the international response to genocide will be explored further in the 
following chapters. 
Before exploring this issue, the thesis will examine whether with a clear desire 
amongst academics and activists for a less restrictive definition of genocide and with 
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the flaws apparent in the Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide, should the 
Convention’s definition of genocide be revisited? 
2.5 A New Definition? 
Why should the legal definition of genocide not be changed?  The current definition 
‘excludes numerous cases of organised mass violence, which together amount to a 
death toll even greater than that of genocide cases.’239  Is it not right therefore to 
properly describe the suffering of populations from tragedies such as war, famine, 
slavery, and colonialism as genocide?  Is their suffering less than the victims of 
genocide as intentional exterminatory killing?  Does their membership of political, 
social, economic, gender, and other groups mean that they are less important than 
ethnic groups or racial groups?  Is the destruction of a group’s culture and cultural 
existence not sufficiently serious enough for attention?  These are salient questions in 
the study of genocide, and ones which researchers have been confronting within the 
rubric of genocide studies since the adoption of the Genocide Convention.  They are 
not easy questions to dismiss, as genocide’s association with the worst crimes in 
existence means that the genocide label is extremely important for victims of violence 
to characterise their suffering. 
However it must be acknowledged that a new definition of genocide would not mean 
that any new groups which would fall under the definition would receive greater 
protection in international affairs.  The evidence from Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, 
Darfur, the Sinjar region, and Myanmar illustrates that genocidal acts have been 
continually perpetrated since the Convention was adopted, ethnic and racial groups 
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are no more immune from violence than political or social groups.240  A new definition 
will not exist in a vacuum, instead it will continue to be influenced by state and 
economic interests.  Therefore however genocide is redefined or reconceptualised, it 
will not translate into effective action to prevent and respond to genocide in the current 
climate of international relations.  Even if states could agree to a new definition, there 
is no guarantee that the new definition would not be subject to the same ambiguities 
that plague the current definition as a level of indeterminacy within the provisions is 
necessary to ensure that states accept a treaty.  Due to this indeterminacy the elements 
of a new definition could continue to be unidentifiable in the midst of violence.  
Particularly as the definitions of genocide presented in academia contain some of the 
flaws that academics say hinder the ability to identify genocide in ongoing situations 
including the difficulty of identifying intent.  Therefore a new definition is not a 
panacea for all the faults and deficiencies with the legal label of genocide. 
Furthermore while there may be compelling arguments to amend or completely 
rewrite the definition of genocide, the main issue to be addressed in seeking to redefine 
genocide is how probable is it that the international community will agree to revise 
the Genocide Convention.  This is a question that is often overlooked by genocide 
academics, who in offering a new definition of genocide neglect to discuss the legal 
practicalities of how the international community would revise the definition of 
genocide.241 
Under Article XVI of the Genocide Convention a state can request to revise the 
Convention, however no state has ever proposed to revise the Convention under this 
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article.  The UN did undertake inquiries into potentially revising the Convention in 
the 1970s and 1980s; with the Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities appointing Special Rapporteurs to examine the Convention.  
In the first report presented in 1978, the Special Rapporteur, Nicodème 
Ruhashyankiko, reported that if the Genocide Convention was revised, he would 
advise that political and other groups would not be added as it would prevent states 
becoming party to the Convention.242  Furthermore the Special Rapporteur stated that 
these groups were already protected under statutes of international law.243  In a further 
report by a new Special Rapporteur, Benjamin Whitaker, it was recommended to 
expand the list of protected groups to include sexual (men, women, and different 
sexual orientations) and political groups.244  Despite these recommendations, no effort 
was made by the UN to revise the definition. 
The Convention has been adopted without any changes in the statutes of the Rwandan 
and former Yugoslavian ad hoc tribunals, and in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.245  In fact there was very little discussion at the Rome Conference of 
revisiting the definition of genocide.246  Cuba was the only state to discuss expanding 
the scope of the definition, with the inclusion of political and social groups in the 
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protected groups.247  This suggestion received no traction, and the crime of genocide 
was left untouched in the final document of the Rome Conference.248 
Therefore the likelihood that the UN would agree to review the Convention is slim, 
and furthermore there is an even slimmer chance that the UN would get agreement on 
revisions to the text.249  The records of the drafting bodies, and in particular the ad hoc 
committee which only included seven representatives, highlights the difficulty of 
finding a compromise on the creation of an effective treaty to prevent and punish the 
crime of genocide.  It would be an even greater challenge now to agree upon a new 
definition as the UN General Assembly’s membership has trebled since 1948.  The 
chances of the international community enforcing the Convention are greater than the 
odds of the international community being able to decide on a new treaty.250 
The continued permanency of the Convention has led a number of genocide scholars, 
including William Schabas, to dismiss any attempt to redefine genocide beyond the 
legal definition provided by the Genocide Convention.251  These scholars accept that 
there are faults within the Genocide Convention but argue that it is the only accepted 
definition; pointing out the fact that states have made no attempt to change the legal 
definition of genocide despite the numerous chances they have had to amend the 
definition, and therefore it should be followed.252  While this definition excludes 
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additional elements such as attacks on the culture of a group and recognition of 
political and others groups, these elements have been subsumed under the category of 
crimes against humanity with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.253 
The passing of the Rome Statute has meant that a number of academics who 
questioned the definition of genocide abandoned their push for a new definition, as 
many of the elements they campaigned to be included within the definition of genocide 
were now included within the category of crimes against humanity.254  This is not a 
universal opinion in academia as researchers such as Mark Levene, Martin Shaw, 
Daniel Feierstein, and Donald Bloxham continue to present definitions of genocide 
that are distinct from the Genocide Convention’s definition.255  However while 
academics and activists can ‘develop all of the alternative definitions they wish’, there 
is still only one definition recognised by states and international courts.256  As Kenneth 
Campbell argues ‘there is only one universally accepted legal definition of genocide 
upon which effective international prevention, suppression, and punishment can be 
authoritatively based.’257 
In conclusion despite longstanding criticisms of the Convention’s definition and the 
determination amongst academics and activists to redefine the definition, the 
definition of genocide contained within the Genocide Convention has remained 
untouched over the decades since the Convention was adopted which means that it is 
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the definition which will continue to apply to a situation which potentially involves 
genocidal violence.258  The durability of the Convention is remarkable but are the 
provisions sufficient for identifying genocide in an ongoing situation and taking action 
to prevent the perpetration of genocide? 
2.6 Identifying the Convention’s Definition in the Midst of Violence 
From a reading of Article II of the Convention and academic critiques of this definition 
of genocide there are a number of ambiguities within the provision which would 
potentially impact on the identification of genocide in the midst of violence.  The 
discussion of academic definitions within Section 2.4 of this chapter illustrates some 
of the uncertainties within academia with this article including questions over how is 
an intent to destroy established or proved,259 is the definition restricted to the four 
named groups,260 is the definition of acts of genocide restricted to the acts outlined in 
(a)–(e),261 and what does in whole or in part mean;262 does it imply that there is a 
numerical limit of victims.263  These ambiguities reflect the compromises that were 
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necessary to guarantee that the Convention was passed and adopted, however it left 
significant questions over identifying genocide in the midst of violence. 
If these elements are difficult to identify in the midst of violence it raises the utility of 
seeking to determine genocide in an ongoing situation.  If determining the existence 
of an intent to destroy and establishing the ‘part’ of a group destroyed is too complex 
of a task in an ongoing situation for observers and monitors, should the genocide label 
continue to be employed to characterise ongoing violence.  Rather it is not more 
effective for international response and prevention to employ an umbrella term such 
as atrocity crimes.  The research in this chapter has shown the benefits of using the 
term atrocity crimes as a deficient definition has proved to be extremely problematic 
for researchers and activists. 
The research has illustrated that the definition of genocide is flawed with ambiguities 
and uncertainties strewn throughout Article II.  Employing the label atrocity crimes 
would address some of these flaws as the focus would be removed off seeking to 
identify these vague elements in the midst of violence, and instead leave the 
identification of genocide to a competent international court and tribunal.  This court 
or tribunal would then have the benefit of time and access to contemporaneous 
documents and witness statements to make a determination on genocide.  Utilising the 
term atrocity crimes would remove the focus off trying to pinpoint the elements of a 
flawed definition in an ongoing situation, and instead place the focus of attention back 
on prevention and punishment. 
This chapter has highlighted that this would be an advantageous approach as genocide 
is a complex crime to identify, not only due to a deficient definition but also the 
understanding of genocide held amongst the general public.  The symbolic value 
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attached to the genocide label, due to its association with the Holocaust and other 
tragic atrocities, has meant that the focus of academics and activists is often on 
employing the term genocide without any appreciation for whether the circumstances 
of the situation meet the elements of the crime.  This connation of genocide as the 
worst crime in existence could prove problematic for states in responding to genocide, 
as the focus of the response becomes centred on whether genocide is determined rather 
than whether the response is effective.  Too often the flawed definition and 
understanding of genocide has meant that researchers can spend more time debating 
the provisions of Article II and redefining the concept of genocide so as to characterise 
a situation as genocide, rather than examining how to prevent genocide in the first 
place and to meaningfully convert a state’s duty under the Convention into reality.  
The label of atrocity crimes would remove the highly charged symbolism of the 
genocide word in the midst of violence, and instead ensure that focus was on 
prevention and response rather than definitional debates. 
While atrocity crimes is not a perfect concept in preventing and responding to crimes, 
the fact that with no appetite to revisit the definition of genocide new approaches need 
to be examined and utilised for confronting the crime of genocide.  The label atrocity 
crimes would remedy a lot of the faults raised with the definition of genocide in this 
chapter by removing the complexities of identifying and employing a flawed 
definition and understanding of genocide which could hinder or completely prevent 
any effective response.  The goal of research into the crime of genocide and the area 
of genocide studies should be the prevention of genocide, and any idea that advances 
the preventative potential of the Genocide Convention should be explored.  Whether 
atrocity crimes is the term that can address the deficiencies within the definition of 
137 
genocide and the Genocide Convention is a central question that will be explored in 
the following chapters. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the first strand of the research, and the research questions 
contained within and has addressed the key aim of this chapter by arguing that the 
legal definition of genocide as set out in the Genocide Convention is the only 
internationally accepted definition that will apply to eliminatory violence.  Therefore 
in the following chapters when examining the complexities of identifying and 
determining genocide, the thesis will be concentrated on the Convention’s definition 
of genocide under Article II when conducting examinations of the case studies and 
case law.  However in examining the discussions surrounding the definition of 
genocide within the political, academic, and activist spheres, ambiguities and 
deficiencies within the legal definition have been pinpointed which will be further 
explored in the following chapters as the discussion of the second and third strand of 
the research develop.  This chapter has highlighted some initial complexities that could 
conceivably impact on the identification and determination of genocide; complexities 
which raise the utility of the genocide label as a term to be employed to respond to 
and prevent the occurrence of genocide. 
Before turning to examine this question, it is important to note that while this chapter 
has illustrated that this definition of genocide is flawed, the interpretation of the crime 
of genocide is not restricted to the text of the Convention.  The interpretation of the 
crime has undergone a period of evolution over the past twenty five years as a number 
of judicial decisions have contributed to fleshing out the provisions and giving life to 
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the meaning of the Convention.264  Looking at these judgments, has the definition of 
genocide remained tied to the Genocide Convention, or have the academic attempts to 
rethink the crime had an impact on expanding the elements of the crime?  Has the 
definition of genocide moved closer to a social understanding of genocide or have the 
international courts and tribunals affirmed the work of the drafters of the Convention?  
Furthermore within the jurisprudence of these courts, has a definition of genocide been 
advanced which is identifiable and applicable in the midst of bloodshed, or is the 
definition still plagued by ambiguities that render it unidentifiable in ongoing 
violence? 
                                                 
264 William A Schabas, ‘The “Odious Scourge”: Evolving Interpretations of the Crime of Genocide’ 
(2006) 1 Genocide Studies and Prevention 93, 97. 
139 
CHAPTER THREE: REVIVING THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME 
3.1 Introduction 
In addressing the utility of the genocide label as preventative term, the last chapter 
began examining the various strands and research questions of this thesis and 
established that the legal definition of genocide contained with the Genocide 
Convention is the only definition that will apply to situations of violence.  The 
previous chapter highlighted some deficiencies within this definition that could impact 
on the identification of genocide due to the ambiguity of the elements of 
genocide.  This chapter will further explore the complexities of the genocide label by 
examining how the definition has been interpreted in international courts and 
tribunals.  The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide was given a new lease of life in the mid-1990s by being placed at the centre 
of the international community’s attempt to punish the most heinous crimes in 
international law.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter 
‘ICTR’), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter 
‘ICTY’), the International Criminal Court (hereafter ‘ICC’), and the International 
Court of Justice (hereafter ‘ICJ’) became key institutions in dealing with violations of 
international criminal law by individuals and by states. 
In examining the case law of these international criminal law institutions the core aim 
of this chapter is to address the second strand of the research which concerns the 
complexities of identifying the crime in practice.  This chapter will do this by 
examining whether within the jurisprudence of these international institutions have the 
international justices provided us with an interpretation and understanding of the 
Convention’s definition which is more readily identifiable in an ongoing situation of 
violence?  Or is it the case that despite the judicial clarifications we are no closer to 
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possessing a definition of genocide which can be accurately applied to violence in the 
midst of a situation?  The knowledge gained from addressing these questions will help 
highlight the flaws that may impact on the identification of genocide in the midst of 
violence.  Furthermore in exploring the wider context of the case law in this chapter, 
the examination of the case studies will highlight the potential complexities of 
pursuing justice in the midst of violence.  To examine these complexities of the 
identification and determination of genocide, this chapter will begin by focussing on 
the first conviction for the crime of genocide from an international criminal tribunal. 
3.2 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
The United Nations Security Council established the ICTR in November 1994, after 
the violence in Rwanda had ceased and the perpetrators had fled the country or been 
detained.1  The full title of the statute for the ICTR, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed 
in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 
1994, highlighted that the primary focus of the ICTR would be on prosecuting the 
crime of genocide.  The definition of genocide in Article 2(2) of the ICTR Statute, set 
out in the UN Security Council resolution establishing the ICTR, was adopted, without 
any changes, from Article II of the Genocide Convention.  The ICTR shared an 
Appeals Chamber with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
which has helped ensure a uniform approach to serious violations of international 
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humanitarian law.2  Since it began its operations in 1995 the ICTR has indicted ninety 
three individuals, with the majority of cases concerning the commission of genocide.  
The ICTR was first called upon to address the crime of genocide in the case of 
Akayesu,3 and the Trial Chamber’s judgment is an important starting point as it is the 
first time an international court examined the elements of the crime of genocide. 
3.2(i) Akayesu: A Remarkable Judgment 
The Trial Chamber analysed every ingredient of the crime so as to formulate a 
definition of genocide that could be applied to the crimes committed in Rwanda.  The 
essential elements of the crime of genocide were conceptualised within two categories; 
the physical acts, actus reus, and the mental intent, mens rea.4  Before exploring the 
culpability of Jean-Paul Akayesu, a bourgmestre of the Taba commune, the Trial 
Chamber concluded genocide had been committed in Rwanda as acts of genocide 
including widespread killings and acts causing serious bodily harm were committed 
with the intent to destroy the Tutsi, a protected ethnic group.5  The Trial Chamber 
determined that genocide took place in Rwanda due to the meticulous organisation of 
the massacre.6  Evidence of the intent to destroy the Tutsi underlying the acts of 
genocide was manifest in the deliberate targeting of Tutsi, lists of Tutsi being 
compiled, training of militia, media propaganda, and speeches, slogans, and songs of 
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the extremists.7  The Trial Chamber did stress that the fact genocide was committed 
in Rwanda had no bearing on the individual guilt of the accused.8 
Physical Acts 
The Trial Chamber considered first the material elements of the crime of genocide 
under Article 2(2) (a)–(e) of the ICTR statute.  The Trial Chamber clarified that 
‘killing members of a group’ under Article 2(2) (a) amounted to ‘homicide with the 
intent to cause death.’9  With regard to Article 2(2) (b) the Trial Chamber determined 
that ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group does not 
necessarily mean that the harm is permanent and irremediable.’10  The Trial Chamber 
listed torture, inhumane and degrading treatment, and persecution as examples of acts 
which cause serious bodily or mental harm.11  Sexual violence, including rape, also 
constituted genocide for the Trial Chamber as it viewed these acts as causing serious 
bodily and mental harm to the victim/s.12  Akayesu was the first judgment to recognise 
rape as an element of the crime of genocide. 
In considering the provision under Article 2(2) (c) concerning deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or part, the Trial Chamber held that the acts of ‘subjecting a group of people to 
a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential 
medical services below minimum requirement’ would meet the criteria for this 
provision.13  These acts would not have to lead to the immediate death of individuals 
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but would ultimately lead to their destruction.14  Measures intended to prevent births 
under Article 2(2) (d) within the group were determined to include ‘sexual mutilation, 
the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and 
prohibition of marriages.’15  The Trial Chamber in addition stated that the measures 
intended to prevent births may also be mental, in that the effects of the trauma lead a 
person to not procreate.16  The crime of forcibly transferring children from one group 
to another under Article 2(2) (e) includes not only the act of forcibly transferring 
children but also any ‘threats or trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of 
children from one group to another.’17 
Mental Intent 
The Trial Chamber determined that the crime of genocide was distinct from other 
crimes due to its requirement of special intent or dolus specialis, ‘which demands that 
the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged.’18  The special intent of the 
crime of genocide according to the Trial Chamber is the intent to destroy in whole or 
part one of the protected groups.19  The Trial Chamber stressed that the group must be 
the target of the attack, individuals must be selected because of their membership of a 
protected group and not due to their individual identity.20  Thus according to the Trial 
Chamber the ‘victim of the crime of genocide is the group itself.’21 
The Trial Chamber had to tackle the tricky issue of defining a group, a provision which 
had long been the subject of criticism due to the exclusion of political, gender, 
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economic, ideological, linguistic, and cultural groups.  The Trial Chamber determined, 
after examining the travaux préparatoires of the Convention, the intention of the 
drafters of the Convention was to restrict the definition to ‘stable’ groups.22  ‘Stable’ 
groups were permanent groups which were determined by birth.23  The Trial Chamber 
argued that the four protected groups shared the common feature that membership in 
the group ‘would seem to be normally not challengeable by its members, who belong 
to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner.’24  This 
definition would exclude mobile groups, such as political and economic groups, which 
an individual can join.25 
The Trial Chamber judged that it should respect the intention of the drafters of the 
Convention and ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group.26  The Trial 
Chamber defined a national group as ‘a collection of people who are perceived to share 
a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and 
duties.’27  An ethnic group was defined as ‘a group whose members share a common 
language or culture.’28  The Trial Chamber stated that the definition of a racial group 
is ‘based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with geographical region, 
irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors.’29  A religious group 
was defined as a group ‘whose members share the same religion, denomination or 
mode of worship.’30 
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The Trial Chamber was confronted with determining whether the Tutsi were an ethnic 
group under the statute, a task which proved difficult in justifying.  The Trial Chamber 
acknowledged that the Tutsi did not have a distinct language or culture from the 
Hutu.31  The distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was based on lineage rather than 
ethnicity.32  The Trial Chamber took an objective approach to determining the Tutsi 
were an ethnic group, ruling that identity cards introduced during colonial times and 
used during the Genocide to separate the Tutsi at roadblocks were an indicator that the 
Tutsi were a distinct group recognised in Rwandan society.33  Ethnicity was also 
recognised in the Constitution and statutes of Rwanda.34  Witnesses before the Trial 
Chamber also identified themselves by reference to their ethnic group.35  The Tutsi 
were also recognised as an ethnic group by those committing the murders.36  The Trial 
Chamber concluded that the Tutsi were targeted due to their membership of an ethnic 
group.37 
After establishing that the Tutsi were a protected group under the statute, the Trial 
Chamber faced the complex task of proving that Akayesu possessed the intent to 
destroy the Tutsi.  On the question of establishing the intent to destroy in the actions 
of Akayesu, the Trial Chamber stated that without a confession from the accused it is 
nearly impossible to prove that the accused possessed the specific intent to destroy a 
group.38  The Trial Chamber declared that it could infer specific intent from the ‘scale 
of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, 
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the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their 
membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups’.39  
Later on in the judgment the Trial Chamber declared intent can also be inferred ‘from 
all acts or utterances of the accused, or from the general context in which other 
culpable acts were perpetrated systematically against the same group, regardless of 
whether such other acts were committed by the same perpetrator or even 
perpetrators.’40 
The totality of the evidence against Akayesu helped the Trial Chamber reach its 
decision that Akayesu possessed the intent to destroy the Tutsi and therefore was 
criminally responsible for the crime of genocide.41  The Trial Chamber sentenced 
Akayesu to life imprisonment for his conviction for the crime of genocide, a decision 
which was affirmed on appeal.42 
The Legacy of Akayesu 
Akayesu took his place in history by becoming the first individual to be convicted of 
the crime of genocide under the criminal framework established by the Genocide 
Convention.  His conviction was swiftly followed by Jean Kambanda, interim prime 
minister during the genocide, who became the first ever former head of state convicted 
of genocide.43  Over the next eighteen years, a further forty four accused have been 
convicted of genocide, and had their convictions upheld on appeal.  Over this time, 
the ICTR has brought to justice key figures involved in planning the genocide and 
spreading the extremist ideology including prominent military leaders, politicians, 
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governmental officials, businessmen, religious figures, and members of the media.  
These historic judgments have largely adopted the elements of genocide as set out by 
the Trial Chamber in Akayesu, however in a number of cases the Trial and Appeals 
Chambers of the ICTR have clarified the provisions and expanded on the definitions 
presented in Akayesu. 
3.2(ii) Clarifying the Convention 
Physical Acts 
In addressing physical and mental harm amounting to genocide, the Appeals Chamber 
in Seromba determined that examples of serious bodily harm are ‘torture, rape, and 
non-fatal physical violence that causes disfigurement or serious injury to the external 
or internal organs.’44  The Appeals Chamber stated that serious mental harm is ‘more 
than minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties such as the infliction of strong 
fear or terror, intimidation or threat.’45  The Trial Chamber in Kayishema and 
Ruzindana clarified the conditions which could amount to deliberately inflicting 
conditions calculated to bring about the destruction of a group under Article II (c); by 
declaring that ‘lack of proper housing, clothing, hygiene and medical care or excessive 
work or physical exertion … rape, the starving of a group of people, reducing medical 
services below a minimum, and withholding sufficient living accommodation for a 
reasonable period’ would lead to the ‘slow death’ and destruction of a group.46 
The ICTR had to tackle the controversial issue of whether acts of ‘cultural genocide’ 
(in the sense of destroying the fabric of a group through the destruction of its cultural 
bonds, rather than killing its members) were included in the crime of genocide or 
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whether the definition was confined to physical and biological genocide.  In Semanza, 
the Trial Chamber said that the drafters of the Genocide Convention ‘unequivocally 
chose to restrict’ the definition to physical and biological genocide.47  In the case of 
Seromba the Trial Chamber definitively stated that ‘[t]he notion “destruction of the 
group” means the material destruction of a group either by physical or by biological 
means, not the destruction of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other 
identity of a particular group.’48 
Mental Intent 
A key issue to be addressed by the Trial and Appeals Chambers was the difficulty of 
determining the existence of a group.  The Trial Chamber in Semanza highlighted the 
difficulty of identifying a group, ‘[t]he Statute of the Tribunal does not provide any 
insight into whether the group that is the target of an accused’s genocidal intent is to 
be determined by objective or subjective criteria or by some hybrid formulation.’49  
The Trial Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana determined that a group could be 
subjectively identified by those in the group (self-identification) or by others, 
including the perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others).50  The Trial 
Chamber in Rutaganda stressed that the determination of a group depended not only 
on objective and subjective criteria but on the ‘political, social and cultural context.’51  
The Trial Chamber in Semanza supported this approach by stating that determining 
whether a group was protected under Article 2 should be ‘assessed on a case-by-case 
basis by reference to the objective particulars of a given social or historical content, 
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and by the subjective perceptions of the perpetrators.’52  The Trial Chamber in 
Bagilishema sought to reconcile the objective and subjective approaches by declaring: 
The Chamber notes that the concepts of national, ethnical, racial, and 
religious groups enjoy no generally or internationally accepted 
definition.  Each of these concepts must be assessed in the light of a 
particular political, social, historical, and cultural context.  Although 
membership of the targeted group must be an objective feature of the 
Society in question, there is also a subjective dimension.  A group may 
not have precisely defined boundaries and there may be occasions 
when it is difficult to give a definitive answer as to whether or not a 
victim was a member of a protected group.  Moreover, the perpetrators 
of genocide may characterize the targeted group in ways that do not 
fully correspond to conceptions of the group shared generally, or by 
other segments of Society.  In such a case, the Chamber is of the 
opinion that, on the evidence, if a victim was perceived by a perpetrator 
as belonging to a protected group, the victim could be considered by 
the Chamber as a member of the protected group, for the purposes of 
genocide.53 
The Trial Chamber’s approach in Bagilishema of combining subjective evidence with 
objective facts as a means of establishing group membership has become the accepted 
approach in the ICTR, and this hybrid formulation has been adopted into the approach 
of the ICTY. 
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The Trial and Appeals Chamber had to tackle the issue of whether the crime of 
genocide required a numerical threshold.  The confusion is centred on the precise 
meaning of the phrase ‘destroy in whole or in part’ in the statute of the ICTR.  In 
Muvunyi the Trial Chamber stated that there was no upper or lower limit of victims,54 
while the Trial Chamber in Muhimana ruled that ‘the phrase “destroy in whole or in 
part a[n] ethnic group” does not imply a numeric approach.’55  The Trial Chamber in 
Bagilishema considered that ‘the intention to destroy must target at least a substantial 
part of the group.’56  In Kajelijeli, the Trial Chamber stated that ‘[a]s has been 
explained in judgments of this Tribunal, in order to establish an intent to destroy “in 
whole or in part”, it is not necessary to show that the perpetrator intended to achieve 
the complete annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe.  Nevertheless, 
the perpetrator must have intended to destroy more than an imperceptible number of 
the targeted group.’57 
The ICTR has emphasised the importance of intent, in Kambanda the Trial Chamber 
stated that ‘genocide is unique because of its element of dolus specialis (specific 
intent).’58  The ICTR though has recognised the difficulty of establishing intent, the 
Appeals Chamber in Gacumbitsi acknowledged that it is unlikely that an accused will 
admit to possessing genocidal intent, intent therefore must be inferred from the 
evidence.59  The Appeals Chamber in Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze stated that 
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genocidal intent will be inferred if is the ‘only reasonable inference from the totality 
of the evidence.’60 
In establishing the intent of the accused, the Trial and Appeals Chambers have 
examined the conduct of the accused and identified a number of patterns that can be 
analysed to determine if the accused possessed the requisite intent to destroy a group.  
In Kayishema and Ruzindana, the Trial Chamber declared that intent could be inferred 
from the ‘word or deeds’ of the accused and ‘by a pattern of purposeful action’ 
undertaken by the accused.61  The Trial Chamber considered that evidence of ‘the 
physical targeting of the group or their property; the use of derogatory language 
toward members of the targeted group; the weapons employed and the extent of bodily 
injury; the methodical way of planning, the systematic manner of killing’ was proof 
that the accused had sufficient intent to destroy a group.62  The Trial Chamber in 
Seromba provided a comprehensive list of facts and circumstances which the Chamber 
could examine to determine if the accused possessed intent, the list includes but is not 
limited to: 
(a) The general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts 
systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts 
were committed by the same offender or by others; 
(b) The scale of atrocities committed; 
(c) Their general nature; 
(d) Their execution in a region or a country; 
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(e) The fact that the victims were deliberately and systematically 
chosen on account of their membership of a particular group; 
(f) The exclusion, in this regard, of members of other groups; 
(g) The political doctrine which gave rise to the acts referred to; 
(h) The repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts; 
(i) The perpetration of acts which violate the very foundation of the 
group or considered as such by their perpetrators.63 
The Seromba test was adopted by the Trial and Appeals Chamber, and it is the standard 
used to determine if an accused had the requisite intent to destroy a group. 
Other Elements 
The Trial and Appeals Chambers have had to examine several issues about the 
elements of the crime of genocide that do not appear in the statute of the ICTR.  The 
Trial and Appeals Chambers have addressed the question of whether the crime of 
genocide requires a plan or policy.  The Trial Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana 
ruled that a plan or policy was not an element of the crime of genocide, however it 
stated that it would not be ‘easy to carry out a genocide without a plan or 
organisation.’64  Furthermore the Trial Chamber stated that the existence of a plan or 
policy ‘would be strong evidence of the specific intent requirement for the crime of 
genocide.’65  The Trial and Appeals Chamber also examined whether motive is an 
element of the crime.  The Appeals Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana determined 
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that ‘criminal intent (mens rea) must not be confused with motive.’66  The Trial 
Chamber in Muvunyi declared that an accused can be found guilty of genocide even if 
his personal motivation went beyond the intent to commit genocide.67  On the question 
of premeditation, the Trial Chamber in Semanza held that premeditation is not an 
element of the crime.68 
3.2(iii) A Pioneering Role 
The ICTR has played a pioneering role in international criminal law, it was the first 
international court to convict a person for the crime of genocide and convict a former 
head of state.69  The ICTR has held leading figures in the planning and organising of 
genocide accountable for their crimes which sent a signal that politicians and public 
figures can no longer act with impunity.70  The ICTR has made an immense 
contribution to the understanding of the Genocide Convention by breathing life into 
its provisions.71  The ICTR was faced with interpreting and defining a crime which 
had been overlooked since the UN adopted the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948.  In its workings the ICTR did not 
restrict or widen the scope of the definition of genocide, or attempt any signification 
modification of the Convention’s definition of genocide.72  Instead through its 
judgments, the ICTR has clarified ambiguities in the provisions of the Convention, 
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and its work leaves us more knowledgeable about the elements of the crime of 
genocide.73 
3.3 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
The UN Security Council established the ICTY in May 1993, in the midst of armed 
conflict across the territories of the former Yugoslavia.74  The ICTY has indicted 161 
individuals (including heads of state, prime ministers, government ministers, 
prominent military leaders, and mid-level political and military officials) over the 
course of its investigation into crimes across the situations in the former Yugoslavia.  
The ICTY has focussed its attention on war crimes and crimes against humanity, with 
23 of the 161 indictments including charges against individuals for the commission of 
genocide.  Only six of these individuals have been convicted of genocide with the rest 
of the cases leading to acquittals, plea agreements to lesser charges, an individual 
being transferred to a national jurisdiction or individuals passing away before their 
case has come to trial.  While there is a low rate of convictions for genocide in the 
ICTY, the judgments of the tribunals can illuminate the understanding of genocide. 
3.3(i) Evolving the Crime 
Physical Acts 
The ICTY has largely adopted the descriptions of material acts provided in the 
judgments of the ICTR, and has affirmed the judgments of the ICTR by ruling that the 
definition of genocide does not apply to acts of cultural genocide.75  In Tolimir, the 
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Appeals Chamber had to address whether the destruction of mosques in Srebrenica 
and the surrounding area was an act that inflicted on the Bosnian Muslims conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its destruction.  The Appeals Chamber ruled that the 
destruction of mosques was an act of cultural genocide, and as cultural genocide is 
excluded from the statute, therefore the crime of destruction of mosques is not covered 
by Article 4(2) (c) of the ICTY statute, which covers the crime of genocide.76 
The acts that do meet the threshold under Article 4(2) (c) include ‘deprivation of food, 
medical care, shelter or clothing, lack of hygiene, systematic expulsion from homes, 
or subjecting members of the group to excessive work or physical exertion.’77  When 
examining whether an act deliberately inflicts on a group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, the Trial Chamber in 
Popović et al. stated that it would examine the objective probability that the act would 
lead to the physical destruction of the group.78  To assess this probability the Trial 
Chamber would examine factors such as ‘the nature of the conditions imposed, the 
length of time that members of the group were subjected to them and characteristics 
of the targeted group like vulnerability.’79 
The Trial and Appeal Chambers of the ICTY have also ruled that forcible deportation 
or transfer of a population, ethnic cleansing, does not constitute an act of genocide, 
however these crimes can be evidence of an intent to physically destroy a group.80  
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The Trial Chambers of the ICTY have held that the act of deportation, along with acts 
of sexual violence and forceful interrogations, can lead to serious mental harm under 
Article II (b).81  Furthermore survivors of mass executions may suffer serious mental 
harm due to the ‘fear of being captured’, ‘having their identification documents taken 
away from them’, ‘the separation’ from family, ‘the sense of utter helplessness and 
extreme fear for their family and friends’ safety as well as for their own safety’, seeing 
the ‘killing fields covered with bodies’, witnessing the ‘executions of relatives and 
friends’, and the ‘mental anguish of lying still, in fear, under the bodies – sometimes 
of relatives or friends – for long hours’.82 
Mental Intent 
The Trial and Appeals Chambers have emphasised the importance of specific intent, 
in Jelisić the Trial Chamber stated that it is the ‘mens rea’ of the crime ‘which gives 
genocide its speciality and distinguishes it from an ordinary crime and other crimes 
against international humanitarian law.’83  Attacks which have encompassed the actus 
reus of genocide against groups in regions and territories in the former Yugoslavia 
have been found not to constitute genocide as they have lacked the intent to destroy a 
protected group, rather the intent was to forcibly create an ethnically homogenous 
state.84  In the case of Brđanin, there was a considerable amount of evidence of killing, 
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acts causing serious bodily or mental harm, and acts deliberately inflicting upon the 
group conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction.85  Notwithstanding 
the large-scale nature of atrocities, Brđanin was acquitted of the charge of genocide as 
he lacked the intent to destroy a group.86  The case of Brđanin highlights the crucial 
role that intent plays in the crime, and how someone involved in widespread atrocities 
will not receive a genocide conviction unless the specific intent to destroy is manifest 
in the crimes committed. 
Convictions for genocide have been restricted to individuals involved in the incidents 
at Srebrenica.  In Srebrenica, there was both extensive evidence of the crimes 
committed, as an estimated 7,000-8,000 Bosnian Muslim men were systematically 
murdered in mass executions by the Bosnian Serb Army while women, children, and 
the elderly were expelled from Srebrenica, and evidence of an intent to destroy 
underlying these actions.87  In establishing the existence of a protected group, the Trial 
Chamber in Brđanin stated that ‘[t]he correct determination of the relevant protected 
group has to be made on a case-by-case basis, consulting both objective and subjective 
criteria.’88  The Trial Chamber in Krstić held that ‘the Genocide Convention does not 
protect all types of human groups’; rather the Convention only applies to national, 
ethnical, racial, and religious groups.89  In identifying the victims of the crimes of the 
Bosnian Serbs, the Trial Chamber in Stakić determined that the victim groups could 
not be defined in negative terms such as ‘non-Serbs’.90  The Bosnian Muslims were 
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recognised as a distinct national group by the Trial Chamber in Krstić.91  The Yugoslav 
Constitution of 1963 recognised Bosnian Muslims as a ‘nation’ and the Trial Chamber 
in Popović relied on this evidence to determine that the Bosnian Muslims were a 
protected group under the statute.92 
In determining whether the Bosnian Muslims were a protected group, the Trial and 
Appeals Chambers had to confront the questions of whether the Bosnian Muslims of 
Srebrenica constituted a substantial part of the wider Bosnian Muslim population and 
whether genocide had to be perpetrated throughout a country or could it be restricted 
to a particular area.  On the latter point, the Trial Chamber in Jelisić held that ‘genocide 
may be perpetrated in a limited geographic zone.’93  On the first question, the Trial 
Chamber in Krstić declared that the perpetrators do not have to target the entire group 
for destruction but rather target a distinct part of the group.94  The Trial Chamber in 
Jelisić stated that the intention to destroy has to ‘affect either a major part of the group 
or a representative fraction thereof, such as its leaders.’95  The Trial Chamber in Jelisić 
added that a smaller number of victims may be targeted as the impact of their 
disappearance would harm the survival of the group.96  In Stakić, the Trial Chamber 
declared that it was not necessary to determine the ‘size of the victimised population 
in numerical terms.’97  In determining whether a targeted part of a group is substantial 
the Trial Chamber in Popović et al. stated that it would consider a number of factors 
apart from the numeric size of the group; the factors are the prominence of the targeted 
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part of the group within the whole group, whether that targeted part was emblematic 
of the group, and if the targeted part of group is essential to the survival of the group.98 
The ICTY judges held that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica constituted a 
substantial part of the targeted group, due not to the numeric size of the group but due 
to the strategic importance that Bosnian Serbs attached to Srebrenica, and the 
prominence of Srebrenica to Bosnian Muslims and the international community as 
Srebrenica was a UN safe zone.99  In Karadžić, the Trial Chamber held that the attack 
on ‘every able-bodied Bosnian Muslim male from Srebrenica’ constituted an intent to 
destroy the Bosnian Muslim group in Srebrenica as it affects the group’s ability to 
sustain itself.100 
When inferring intent, the Trial Chamber in Brđanin stated that inference can be drawn 
when it is ‘the only reasonable inference available on the evidence.’101  The ICTY 
inferred the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in the incidents at Srebrenica from 
a number of factors: i) the long-term impact the elimination of the men of Srebrenica 
would have on the survival of the community;102 ii) the targeting of military-aged 
men;103 iii) forcible transfer;104 iv) the existence of a plan or policy;105 v) the 
perpetration and/or repetition of other destructive or discriminatory acts committed as 
part of the same pattern of conduct;106 and vi) statements of the accused.107 
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Other Elements 
In Jelisić, the Appeals Chamber held that that ‘a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient 
of the crime’ of genocide however ‘in the context of proving specific intent, the 
existence of a plan or policy may become an important factor in most cases.’108  The 
Appeals Chamber in Jelisić also stated motive is not an element of the crime, and the 
fact that a perpetrator may possesses the motive to gain political power or economic 
advantage does not preclude them from also possessing the specific intent to destroy 
a group as such.109  These declarations illustrate the consistency between the ICTY 
and the ICTR in elucidating the crime of genocide. 
3.3(ii) A Critical Contribution 
Whereas the ICTR was primarily concerned with the crime of genocide, the ICTY had 
a greater focus on war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in a diverse 
number of conflicts over a number of years.  It was less clear whether the crime of 
genocide had been committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.  The ICTY 
has made a monumental contribution to the interpretation and application of the 
Genocide Convention.110  In particular, the Tribunal’s judgments relating to the crimes 
committed in Srebrenica have provided us with valuable information on the issues of 
genocide being committed in a limited geographical territory and the question of how 
to assess the substantial part of a group.  These cases highlight the crucial role which 
intent plays in the crime, and how someone involved in widespread atrocities will not 
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receive a conviction for genocide unless the specific intent to destroy is manifest in 
the crimes committed.  In addition, the Trial and Appeals Chambers largely supported 
the findings of the ICTR, in relation to interpreting the definition of genocide, which 
has helped to create a consolidated jurisprudence on the crime of genocide which is 
beneficial when confronting the question of whether genocide is being perpetrated in 
an ongoing situation. 
While the case law of the ICTR and ICTY is significant for identifying the key 
elements of the crime of genocide; in seeking to identify genocide in the midst of 
violence, it may be difficult, without the benefit of a judicial investigation, to divine 
the intent to destroy a group in the actions of an individual perpetrator.  Therefore it 
is beneficial in seeking to identify genocide in an ongoing situation to focus on how 
an international court establishes the intent to destroy a group in the actions of a 
state/non-state actor. 
3.4 The International Court of Justice 
The ICJ was established as the principal judicial organ of the UN under Chapter XIV 
of the Charter of the UN.111  Article IX of the Genocide Convention gives jurisdiction 
to the ICJ to settle disputes between states in relation to the ‘interpretation, application 
or fulfilment’ of the Genocide Convention, and in particular to settle disputes 
concerning the responsibility of states for genocide.112  Fourteen cases have been taken 
under Article IX, however only two of the cases reached the stage where the ICJ had 
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to make a judgment.113  The ICJ was first called upon to address the question of state 
responsibility for genocide in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro.114  While primarily concerned with the question of state responsibility 
for genocide, the judgment of the ICJ has helped clarify the elements of the crime of 
genocide. 
3.4(i) Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro 
The case commenced in 1993, when Bosnia and Herzegovina alleged that the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (respondent amended to Serbia and Montenegro in 2003) had 
directly or through its surrogates violated the Genocide Convention.115  The surrogates 
in questions were the Republika Srpska,116 a Bosnian Serb established territory in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,117 and the Army of the Republika Srpska, the Vojska 
Republike Srpske (VRS).118  In response the Government of Serbia and Montenegro 
submitted firstly that genocide had not occurred and that if it had been perpetrated it 
was not committed by organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.119  The ICJ only 
delivered its judgment in February 2007, which highlights the protracted nature of 
international justice. 
The Court considered that the obligation to prevent genocide under Article I of the 
Genocide Convention also placed a corresponding obligation on states to not commit, 
‘through their organ or persons or groups whose conduct is attributable to them’, an 
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act of genocide under Article III.120  In order to address whether the Government of 
Serbia and Montenegro was responsible for genocide, the Court had to firstly establish 
that atrocities had taken place, secondly it had to see if these atrocities were covered 
by Article II of the Genocide Convention, and whether the perpetrators of these 
atrocities had the required intent to destroy a protected group.121  The ICJ declared that 
a state can be found responsible for the commission of genocide even if an individual 
connected with a state has not been convicted of the crime of genocide in an 
international court or tribunal.122 
In conducting its examination of the crime of genocide, the ICJ relied upon and largely 
adopted the findings of the ICTY and ICTR for establishing the elements of genocide.  
With regard to the acts of genocide, the ICJ affirmed the approach of the ICTY finding 
that ethnic cleansing is not an act of genocide but that evidence of acts of ethnic 
cleansing can be ‘indicative of the presence of specific intent’.123  In discussing 
protected groups, the ICJ held that acts must be directed against a recognised group, 
and not a category such as ‘non-Serbs’.124  The Court supported the rulings related to 
substantiality in the case law of the ICTR and ICTY, by stating that the part of the 
group targeted for destruction ‘must be significant enough to have an impact on the 
group as a whole.’125  With regards to intent to destroy a group in a geographically 
limited area the Court once again reaffirmed the approach of the ICTY, by highlighting 
that it is well accepted in the jurisprudence of the ICTY that the intent to destroy can 
be restricted to a territory.126  The ICJ affirmed the rulings from the ICTR and ICTY 
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on the importance of the specific intent to destroy a group in distinguishing the crime 
of genocide, and emphasised that ‘[g]reat care must be taken in finding in the facts a 
sufficiently clear manifestation of that intent.’127  In establishing the intent to destroy, 
the ICJ looked at whether there was a ‘concerted plan’ to commit genocide and/or 
there was ‘persuasive and consistent evidence for a pattern of atrocities’ perpetrated 
against a group which would indicate this intent.128 
In addressing the commission of genocide, the ICJ examined in detail the extensive 
evidence of killings and atrocities committed across Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
including in towns and concentration camps for evidence of an intent to destroy 
underlying these atrocities.129  Relying on the judgments of the ICTY, the ICJ was 
unable to establish, apart from the incidents at Srebrenica, that these acts were 
committed with the intent to destroy a group.130  The Court concluded that the 
evidence of the killing of members of the protected group across the territory of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina fulfilled the requirement of the material element of killing under 
Article II (a) of the Genocide Convention.  The Court turned towards the judgments 
of the ICTY to establish whether these killings were committed with the intent to 
destroy the Bosnian Muslim group.  Leaving aside the atrocities committed in 
Srebrenica, there were no convictions for the crime of genocide in any of the cases of 
the ICTY dealing with atrocities across Bosnia and Herzegovina.131  With an absence 
of convictions of genocide for crimes committed in the concentration camps and 
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villages across Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court could not conclusively establish 
that the killings were committed with the intent to destroy.132 
The Court addressed whether acts deliberately inflicting conditions of life upon a 
group calculated to bring about its physical destruction under Article II (c) had been 
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.133  The Court firstly determined that the 
encirclement, shelling, and starvation during the siege of Sarajevo while evidence of 
conditions of life that can bring about the physical destruction of a group; the acts 
lacked the requisite intent to destroy.134  The Court also concluded that the deportation 
and expulsion of Bosnian Muslims lacked the intent to destroy the group.135  The Court 
had to address whether the destruction of historical, religious, and cultural property 
amounted to imposing conditions of life that would lead to the physical destruction of 
a group.136  This issue brought up the question of whether acts of cultural genocide 
were included in the Genocide Convention, the Court following the jurisprudence of 
the ICTY declared that ‘the destruction of historical, religious and cultural heritage 
cannot be considered to be a genocidal acts within the meaning of Article II of the 
Genocide Convention.’137  However attacks against cultural property and heritage can 
be ‘considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group.’138  Lastly the 
Court had to examine if the experience of the detention camps that operated in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina inflicted upon the group conditions of life that would bring about its 
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physical destruction.139  The Court determined that the acts committed in the camps 
were not committed with the intent to destroy a group.140 
In concluding its examination of material acts, the Court had to examine if the totality 
of evidence of acts committed under Article II demonstrated that there was an overall 
plan to commit genocide.141  The Court stated it would only recognise a pattern of 
conduct as evidence of a plan to destroy a group if the pattern of conduct could only 
point to the existence of an intent to destroy.142  In reviewing the case law of the ICTY, 
and in particular the acquittals for genocide – save for the case of Srebrenica, the Court 
could not identify a pattern of conduct that would lead it to believe that an overall plan 
existed to destroy the Bosnian Muslims.143 
With reference to the ICTY case law, the Court determined that ‘the acts committed 
at Srebrenica falling within Articles II (a) and (b) of the Convention were committed 
with the specific intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as such.’144  The Court quoting the Trial Chamber’s and Appeals 
Chamber’s judgments in Krstić, determined that ‘the acts committed at Srebrenica 
falling within Articles II (a) and (b) of the Convention were committed with the 
specific intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
as such’.145  Relying on the judgments of Krstić and Blagojević and Jokić¸ the Court 
determined that over 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men were killed in Srebrenica, which met 
the conditions for the act of killing under Article II (a).146  The Court also concluded, 
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with reference to Krstić and Blagojević and Jokić, that the material act of causing 
serious bodily and mental harm under Article II (b) was committed against ‘those who 
were about to be executed, and to the others who were separated from them in respect 
of their forced displacement and the loss suffered by survivors among them.’147 
After concluding that acts of genocide had been perpetrated in Srebrenica, the ICJ 
determined that the Government of Serbia and Montenegro did not possess the intent 
to destroy ‘either on the basis of a concerted plan, or on the basis that the events … 
reveal a consistent pattern of conduct which could only point to the existence of such 
intent.’148  Furthermore, the ICJ held that the acts perpetrated in Srebrenica could not 
be attributed to the Government of Serbia and Montenegro as the genocide was not 
committed or directed by organs of the state.149  The ICJ did however conclude that 
the Government of Serbia and Montenegro had ‘violated its obligation to prevent’ 
under Article I of the Genocide Convention in the genocide in Srebrenica, as the 
Government knew that genocide was a possibility and had the ‘means’ to prevent the 
genocide but ‘manifestly refrained from using them.’150 
3.4(ii) Croatia v Serbia 
The case commenced in 1999 when Croatia alleged that the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (respondent amended to Serbia in 2006) had breached directly or through 
persons for whose conduct it is responsible the Genocide Convention.151  The 
Government of Serbia counterclaimed that the Government of Croatia had violated 
the Genocide Convention in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, a Serb territory in 
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Croatia, during the same time period.152  The final judgment in the case was delivered 
on the 3rd of February 2015. 
In addressing the crime of genocide, the Court began by examining the precise 
meaning of the provisions of the Genocide Convention.  The Court accepted the 
definitions of the material acts of genocide provided in the case law of the ICTY and 
in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro.153  One key issue 
the Court addressed was the meaning and scope of the intent to destroy.154  Croatia 
argued that the intent to destroy is not limited to the physical destruction of the group, 
but ‘includes also the intent to stop it from functioning as a unit.’155  Serbia argued 
that intent to destroy is only concerned with physical destruction.156  The Court 
referring to the drafting of the Convention determined that the scope of the crime of 
genocide was restricted to physical and biological destruction of a group.157  The Court 
also addressed the issue of how to establish that the targeted part of the group is 
substantial, the Court stated that it would ‘take into account the quantitative element 
as well as evidence regarding the geographic location and prominence of the allegedly 
targeted part of the group.’158 
In examining the evidence, the ICJ started with the claim by the Government of 
Croatia.  The Government of Croatia’s allegations relate to acts committed by 
Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (JNA) (Yugoslav People’s Army), and a number of 
defence and paramilitary groups which the Court termed ‘Serb forces.’159  The 
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Government of Croatia alleged that the Government of Serbia was responsible for 
these groups at that time.  The Government of Croatia asserted that the JNA and the 
Serb forces perpetrated acts under Article II (a) to (d) with the intention of destroying 
a protected group.160  The Court identified the protected group under the Convention 
as the Croats, a national or ethnical group.161 
The ICJ established that there was extensive evidence of killings and acts causing 
serious bodily or mental harm committed throughout Croatia.162  A number of the 
arguments put forward by Croatia with regards to acts causing conditions of life 
calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction were held to not come under 
the scope of Article II (c), such as the systematic expulsion from homes and forced 
displacement,163 restrictions on movement,164 forced wearing of insignia of 
ethnicity,165 looting of property belonging to Croats,166 and the destruction and looting 
of the cultural heritage.167  The Court determined that ‘Croatia failed to establish that 
acts capable of constituting the actus reus of genocide, within the meaning of Article 
II (c) of the Convention, were committed by the JNA and Serb forces.’168  Croatia also 
failed to provide evidence that JNA and Serb forces took measures in order to prevent 
births within the Croat group under Article II (d).169 
Having establishing that the Serb forces perpetrated acts under Article II (a) and (b), 
the ICJ then moved to examine whether these acts were committed with the intent to 
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destroy the Croats.170  In addressing the potential existence of an intent to destroy, the 
ICJ examined the pattern of conduct of the Serb forces to see if the only reasonable 
inference which could be drawn from the evidence is that the Serb forces possessed 
the intent to destroy the Croats.171  After examining the evidence submitted by the 
Government of Croatia, the ICJ concluded that Croatia did not prove that the only 
reasonable inference which could be drawn from the pattern of conduct of the Serbian 
forces was that they intended to destroy the Croat people.172  The ICJ relied on the 
case law of the ICTY, pointing out that no individual has been indicted for genocide 
against the Croat population.173  As Croatia could not provide evidence of genocide 
being committed, the ICJ did not have to address the question of the responsibility of 
the Government of Serbia under the Genocide Convention.174 
After dismissing the claim of Croatia, the ICJ turned its attention to the counterclaim 
of Serbia.175  The ICJ determined that acts of genocide under Article II (a) and (b) had 
been directed at the Serbian population by the Croatian forces, and the question again 
was whether the intent to destroy was present in these acts.176  The ICJ concluded that 
the pattern of conduct did not conclusively point towards a campaign of genocide.177  
The ICJ held that the material acts which were factually proved were not committed 
on such a scale to point towards the only inference being that the Croatian forces 
intended the destruction of the Serbs in Croatia.178  The ICJ concluded that the 
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‘existence of the dolus specialis has not been established’, and therefore Serbia’s claim 
was dismissed.179 
3.4(iii) A State’s Responsibility for Genocide 
The role of the ICJ is of a great importance as the ICJ has established that a state is 
not only responsible for punishing and preventing the crime of genocide, there also 
exists an obligation on a state not to perpetrate the crime of genocide as nowhere in 
the Genocide Convention did it explicitly say that a state could be held responsible for 
committing genocide.180  The impact of these judgments is momentous as it expands 
the notion of state responsibility for genocide, while establishing the ICJ as an 
effective recourse for states to seek remedies against another state for violations of the 
Genocide Convention. 
The two cases, while concerning state responsibility under the Convention, have added 
to our understanding of how the definition of genocide is applied to violence.  The two 
cases, in following the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, have provided a 
consistent interpretation of the elements of the crime of genocide.181  Despite the 
wishes in academia, the activist community, and amongst victims for an expanded 
definition of genocide, the ICJ followed the jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY in 
applying the definition of genocide as contained within Article II of the Convention.182  
The cases show however the arduous task of establishing that genocide took place, 
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and the difficult process of assigning responsibility for genocide to a state.183  
Furthermore the protracted nature of the cases highlights, along with the judgments of 
the ICTR and ICTY, how justice can be delayed until long after the incidents have 
taken place.  If justice for victims of genocide is delayed for years, is there any utility 
to labelling their suffering as genocide in the midst of violence?  The work of the ICC 
in addressing genocide in an ongoing situation, is beneficial for examining the impact 
of a genocide determination by an international criminal institution in the midst of 
violence. 
3.5 The International Criminal Court 
On the day that the UN General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention, it also 
voted to request that the International Law Commission study the question of 
establishing an international criminal tribunal for prosecuting individuals for the crime 
of genocide.184  The progress of the development of a draft statute for an international 
tribunal was slow.185  The long-drawn out discussions eventually resulted in a 
diplomatic conference held in Rome in 1998; which included representatives from 160 
states, over 20 intergovernmental organisations, 14 bodies of the UN, and over 200 
NGOs.186  The outcome of this conference was the ICC which was established by the 
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998, which entered into force in 
2002.187 
The jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.188  The 
Court cannot undertake cases which are already being investigated or prosecuted by a 
state, unless the state is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute domestically.189  
The ICC can investigate international crimes in three situations: 1) when a state refers 
itself to the ICC;190 2) when the United Nations Security Council refers the case to the 
ICC;191 and 3) when the ICC Prosecutor has initiated an investigation.192  When the 
Prosecutor initiates an investigation they can seek information from states, organs of 
the United Nations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, and other 
reliable sources.193  If the Prosecutor believes there is enough evidence to warrant an 
investigation they can request the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to authorise their 
investigation.194  The Pre-Trial Chamber has the power to issue a warrant for the arrest 
of an individual based on the evidence gathered during the Prosecutor’s 
investigation.195 
The ICC is responsible, under the Rome Statute, for adjudicating cases of individuals 
who violate serious international crimes.196  The provisions of the Rome Statute grant 
the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of genocide,197 crimes against humanity,198 war 
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crimes,199 and the crime of aggression.200  The definition of the crime of genocide in 
Article 6 is adopted word for word from the Genocide Convention.  The ICC is 
supported in its understanding of the crime of genocide under Article 9 which outlines 
an ancillary text the ‘Elements of Crimes’ which ‘shall assist the Court in the 
interpretation and application’ of the crimes under its jurisdiction.201  The Elements of 
Crimes expand on the definition in the statute and provide the ICC with an in-depth 
analysis of the provisions in Article 6.202  The Elements of Crimes state that the 
material elements of the crime of genocide require that: i) the perpetrator committed 
the act; ii) the person or persons targeted by that act belonged to a particular national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group; iii) the perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or 
in part, that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such; and iv) the conduct 
took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that 
group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.203 
The ICC was first called upon to examine the crime of genocide when the UN Security 
Council referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Prosecutor of the ICC, which 
was the first ever referral to the ICC by the UN Security Council.204  After conducting 
an investigation to identify particular individuals who may have violated the Rome 
Statute, the Prosecutor submitted a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to 
issue an arrest warrant for Omar Al Bashir, the then President of Sudan for committing 
genocide under Article 6 of the Rome Statute as well as war crimes and crimes against 
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humanity.205  The Prosecutor did not accuse Al Bashir of physically perpetrating a 
crime, but of using the powers of the state to commit the crimes.206  It was submitted 
that Al Bashir, as the President of the Republic of Sudan and the Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces, was at the centre of the hierarchical state structure and had 
absolute control.207  The Prosecutor alleged that Al Bashir intended to destroy groups 
within Darfur, and to achieve this aim he used the organs of the state alongside militia 
to target civilians in towns and villages across Darfur.208 
3.5(i) The Arrest Warrant of Omar Al Bashir 
The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC undertook two separate examinations into the crime 
of genocide due to originally failing to apply the correct standard of proof to issue an 
arrest warrant for the commission of genocide.  The evidentiary grounds for the 
issuance of an arrest warrant is ‘reasonable grounds to believe’, which is a lower 
threshold of proof than the standards of proof required to charge or convict an 
individual.209  In determining whether the evidentiary standards of proof were met, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber examined the elements of the crime of genocide and has largely 
adopted the jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY. 
Physical Acts 
The Pre-Trial Chamber has not diverged from the findings of the previous tribunals 
on the acts that comprise the actus reus of genocide.210  The Pre-Trial Chamber did 
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state, when examining the material elements of genocide, that the acts of genocide are 
identical to the acts of crimes against humanity.211  The Pre-Trial Chamber determined 
that evidence of the crimes against humanity of murder, extermination, forcible 
transfer of population, torture, and rape can be relied upon to show that acts of killing 
under Article 6 (a), acts causing serious bodily or mental harm under Article 6 (b), and 
conditions of life deliberately afflicted to bring about physical destruction under 
Article 6 (c) had been perpetrated in Darfur.  However, as stated by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, the difference between these two crimes is the intent to destroy a protected 
group. 
Mental Intent 
As Al Bashir was head of the government, the Pre-Trial Chamber focussed on whether 
the Government of Sudan possessed the intent to destroy.212  In examining the intent 
to destroy, the Pre-Trial Chamber adopted a similar approach to the ICTR and ICTY 
by analysing the nature and extent of the acts committed, public statements and 
documents indicating a policy to commit genocide, and whether the government had 
a strategy to deny and conceal the atrocities committed.213  On the basis of the 
evidence, the Pre-Trial Chamber, in its second examination of the situation, 
determined that there were reasonable grounds to conclude that the Government of 
Sudan deliberately targeted citizens based on the membership of three separate ethnic 
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groups; the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa communities.214  The three groups were 
recognised by the Pre-Trial Chamber as distinct ethnic groups as each had its own 
language and customs.215 
One interesting element addressed was whether the crime of genocide requires a 
contextual element as Article 9 of the ‘Elements of Crime’ outlines that the acts of 
genocide under the Genocide Convention ‘must have taken place in the context of a 
manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against the targeted group or must have 
had such a nature so as to itself effect, the total or partial destruction of the targeted 
group.’216  While this contextual element is not included within Article 6 of the Rome 
Statute, which mirrors the provisions of Article II of the Genocide Convention, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber determined that there is no contradiction between the definition of 
genocide and the requirement of a contextual element.217  Furthermore the case law of 
the ICTR and ICTY has shown that in establishing the intent to destroy underlying the 
acts of genocide the tribunals have examined the wider context of which the acts of an 
individual have been perpetrated.  Therefore there is no divergence in the approach of 
the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals in determining the existence of genocidal intent. 
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3.5(ii) A Momentous Judgment? 
On the 12th of July 2010, nearly two years after the Prosecutor initially submitted the 
application for an arrest warrant, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir acted with the specific intent to destroy 
the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups.218  The Pre-Trial Chamber declared that 
the attacks were ‘large in scale, systematic and followed a similar pattern’; and were 
part of similar conduct directed at the targeted group.219  On the foot of this conclusion, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber issued an arrest warrant for Al Bashir for: i) genocide by 
killing, within the meaning of Article 6 (a) of the Rome Statute; ii) genocide by 
causing serious bodily or mental harm, under Article 6 (b) of the Statute; and iii) 
genocide by deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about the group's physical destruction, as set out in Article 6 (c).220  This 
followed on from an earlier decision, in which an arrest warrant had also been issued 
against Al Bashir for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.221 
The case of Omar Al Bashir is historic, as it was the ‘first case involving the alleged 
crime of genocide before the ICC’ and Al Bashir also became the first ever head of 
state to be issued with an arrest warrant by the ICC.222  However the issuance of the 
arrest warrant did not lead to Al Bashir being brought to justice.  Instead he remained 
the President of Sudan in the aftermath of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s judgment and 
flouted his arrest warrant.  The failure to enforce the arrest warrant illustrates that a 
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charge of genocide does not automatically lead to action.  The fact that Al Bashir has 
not been brought to justice opens up important questions on the utility of genocide 
prosecutions in the midst of violence. 
3.6 The Politics of Justice 
While the past twenty five years has seen a monumental shift in international justice 
with individuals being indicted and convicted of violating international criminal law, 
it has also raised questions on the utility of prosecuting prominent individuals in the 
midst of violence when an investigation or court case could potentially jeopardise a 
peace process and prolong a situation.  There is an argument that the pursuit of peace 
should come before the pursuit of justice.223  In this scenario, domestic and 
international investigations would be deferred until after a peaceful resolution can be 
obtained.  Alternatively there is an argument that a peaceful resolution of a situation 
can only be achieved through justice and accountability for the victims of atrocities.224 
With the creation of the ICC we have seen an increased focus on this ‘peace versus 
justice’ dilemma as the court has to maintain a delicate balance between the two 
interests in its involvement in situations.225  The Rome Statute declares that a 
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prosecutor can chose not to pursue a case or investigation if they believed it did not 
‘serve the interests of justice.’226  The Security Council also has the power under 
Article 16 to postpone an investigation or prosecution for twelve months.227  The 
reasoning underlying this intervention into judicial affairs was that it would allow the 
Security Council to pursue its ‘primary responsibility’ of maintaining peace and 
security.228  Therefore a judicial inquiry and the ‘demands of justice’ could be set aside 
to give precedence to achieving peace through talks or treaties.229  Notwithstanding 
this the former Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, and the current 
Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, have stated that they do not consider the demands of 
peace in conducting their work.230  Ocampo stated that there can be no political 
compromise on the accountability of individuals for violations of international law.231  
                                                 
226 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, Article 53(1) (c).  See also Annalisa Ciampi, 
‘The Proceedings against President Al Bashir and the Prospects of their Suspension under Article 16 
ICC Statute’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 885, 892; Kenneth A Rodman, ‘Is Peace 
in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal 
Court’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 99, 103–104; Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, 
Darryl Robinson, and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 160. 
227 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, Article 16.  See also Annalisa Ciampi, ‘The 
Proceedings against President Al Bashir and the Prospects of their Suspension under Article 16 ICC 
Statute’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 885, 888–891; Lutz Oette, ‘Peace and Justice, 
or Neither?: The Repercussions of the al-Bashir Case of International Criminal Justice in Africa and 
Beyond’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 345, 350–351; Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, 
Darryl Robinson, and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 170. 
228 Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson, and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 170. 
229 ibid 170. 
230 Luis Moreno Ocampo, ‘The International Criminal Court – Some Reflections’ (2009) 12 Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law 3, 6; Fatou Bensouda, ‘International Justice and Diplomacy’ The 
New York Times (19 March 2013).  See also Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson, and 
Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (3rd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2014) 573; Kenneth A Rodman, ‘Justice as a Dialogue Between Law and 
Politics: Embedding the International Criminal Court within Conflict Management and Peacebuilding’ 
(2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 437, 438; Michael A Newton, ‘A Synthesis of 
Community-Based Justice and Complementarity’ in Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall, and Carsten Stahn 
(eds), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 131. 
231 David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 131. 
181 
Bensouda does however contend that the pursuit of justice and accountability can have 
a ‘positive impact’ on peace and stability within a country.232 
Notwithstanding the positive impact that criminal justice can have on a situation, the 
arrest warrant for Al Bashir failed to deliver either justice or peace to Darfur and 
Sudan.  The case of Al Bashir reflects this peace versus justice dilemma: rather than 
sparking international action to prevent and punish the crime of genocide, the arrest 
warrant sparked inaction on the part of UN Security Council members and also 
sparked criticism of the warrant from African and Middle Eastern governments, the 
African Union (hereafter ‘AU’), China, and Russia.233  These actors argued that the 
arrest warrant jeopardises any hope for sustained peace in Sudan and instead 
potentially risks prolonging that situation and deepening the level of violence 
perpetrated against civilians.234  The dissatisfaction amongst a number of states in 
Africa and the Middle East with the warrant has led to these states disregarding the 
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warrant’s application by permitting Al Bashir to travel to these countries without them 
honouring their obligation under the ICC statute to arrest him.235 
The arrest warrant has also been criticised by human rights activists and international 
organisations for its potential to endanger humanitarian operations in internally 
displaced persons camps.236  On the other hand the Prosecutor’s actions in seeking an 
arrest warrant for Al Bashir has received praise from human rights activists and 
international organisations, as it illustrates that those who commit crimes under the 
Rome Statute can no longer act with impunity.237  The reaction to the arrest warrant 
highlights how contested the quest for international justice is amongst actors, even by 
those who are motivated by humanitarian goals. 
With the failure of the arrest warrant to bring either peace or justice to the people of 
Darfur, it is understandable that the ICC’s pursuit of justice has been subject to 
criticism.238  However, Michael Struett is correct in reminding us that it was Al Bashir 
and not the ICC who was committing violence against civilians and restricting 
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humanitarian aid.239  Stanton argues as well that if the prosecutor did not charge Al 
Bashir then he would have been ignoring the evidence of atrocities committed and 
condoning Al Bashir’s impunity.240  The Sudanese government was not cooperating 
with the international community before the issuance of the arrest warrant so it is 
unlikely that the arrest warrant had a substantial impact on the peace process.241 
Notwithstanding this the case of Al Bashir illustrates that support for international 
justice is undermined when an arrest warrant potentially affects peace negotiations, 
the deliverance of humanitarian aid, and which leads to the alienation of key regional 
states.242  In fact the involvement of the ICC in Darfur highlights that labelling a 
situation as genocide and indicting individuals for the crime severely narrows the 
options states have to respond to that situation.243  Particularly, when a state which 
commits genocide remains in power it is difficult to receive cooperation in prosecuting 
individuals in international courts.244  If you do seek to indict combatants and leaders 
in an ongoing situation you potentially risk prolonging that situation and deepening 
the level of violence perpetrated against civilians.245  If a state or actor is branded as 
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genocidal, it potentially removes the option of seeking a political compromise to a 
situation and instead states are left with the option of military intervention.246  
However what actions are taken is dependent on the political will of states, rather than 
the interests of justice. 
The failure to enforce Al Bashir’s warrant showed the gulf between seeking 
accountability and attaining justice, a chasm that has to be bridged by the political will 
of states to take diplomatic and/or coercive action in support of the warrant.247  
However those who seek accountability and justice are forced as argued by Akhavan 
to contend with a ‘culture of impunity’ that has marked the UN’s experience of 
violence.248  Although the international community has spoken about the importance 
of accountability and justice, it ‘rarely fortifies its words with actions.’249 
While the response to violations of international law is selective, international law 
itself is intrinsically selective.  Not every situation that involves the perpetration of a 
crime of international law will end up before a court of justice, rather the application 
of justice will be selective.  In particular the UN Security Council, is selective in 
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applying law as despite the wide ranging crimes committed throughout the 1990s 
across various countries of the world, the UN Security Council only established 
institutions to address the crimes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.250  In fact the 
administration of justice can be seen as a form of ‘victor’s justice’; in that the crimes 
of the victorious party who hold onto or gain power are immune from prosecution.251 
The enforcement of law ‘resides with a war's winning coalition or a winning coalition 
on the UN Security Council.’252  An example can be the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals where the focus was entirely on the crimes of the Axis powers, while 
ignoring any violations of international law perpetrated by the Allied powers.253  With 
the ICTR, significant crimes committed by the Tutsi in Rwanda were not prosecuted 
by the tribunal.254  The victorious parties of a conflict can dictate the nature of justice 
as they can withhold support, political and financial, from a court.255  Or they could 
decide that there should be no trials at all.  This means that ‘international laws are 
enforced only when states are subjugated to those laws by more powerful states.’256  
When a party is defeated, such as the Hutu extremists in Rwanda, or becomes an 
international pariah, such as the former Serbian government in the former Yugoslavia, 
it is easier to administer justice as it less complex in getting agreement between the 
powerful states of the UN on the need to prosecute these crimes.  This encapsulates 
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the nature of international justice as ‘international justice is the product and subject of 
international politics.’257 
The establishment of the ICC has not challenged the inherent political nature of 
international justice as while actors at the ICC are keen to stress that the court does 
not act in a political manner in its work, it is very hard to divorce the law from the 
political realm, as the ICC is a political creation.258  The nature and structure of the 
ICC means that it is highly dependent on state cooperation in its workings.259  The 
actor at the ICC that is most likely under threat from the influence of politics is the 
Prosecutor as the process of proceeding with a case is a decidedly political act, 
however the decision to not undertake a case is also highly political act. 
The Prosecutor has been reluctant to challenge the leading states by undertaking 
investigations into situations that directly concern the actions of states such as the US 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Russia in Georgia.260  This has meant that the ICC has 
largely concentrated its work in Africa, where there were less competing interests of 
major states.  However this focus on Africa led several African countries and members 
of the AU to argue in response to the arrest warrant of Al Bashir that his case was 
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further proof that the ICC unjustly targets African countries while ignoring the crimes 
of the major powers.261  While the interests of major states guide which situations are 
investigated, when an investigation has already been initiated and in particular has 
received the support of the Security Council, the Prosecutor has been more willing to 
ignore the concerns of major states and act independently from their interests.262  This 
is illustrated by the Prosecutor seeking an arrest warrant for Al Bashir in opposition to 
the will of certain states as the Security Council had already granted the Prosecutor 
the responsibility for investigating the situation in Darfur.263 
Notwithstanding this, international law is inherently political; it is impossible to apply 
law in a vacuum without any interference of political interests.  The politicisation of 
law can be witnessed in the manner in which states and non-state actors have used 
institutions such as the ICC and ICJ to pursue a political agenda.  When a state initiates 
a case against another state or non-state actor it is an inherently ‘political act.’264  An 
allegation of genocide can have a ‘strategic value’ for a state, as a charge of genocide 
by one state against another can be used as a means of attracting diplomatic as well as 
military support.265  In addition, a charge of genocide can be used by one side to distort 
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the international community’s view of a situation and affect the ICC’s or ICJ’s 
approach to a case.266 
The administration of international justice shows how intrinsically linked international 
law and international politics are, as every decision to pursue or not pursue 
prosecutions is the result of a deliberate choice of an actor (state, organisation, or 
individual) rather than a strict application of international law.  This means that the 
application of the Genocide Convention to each situation is not just dependent on an 
actor identifying the elements of the crime in the midst of violence but also dependent 
on the interests of the actors making the determination or the context of the 
determination.  Even when justice is administered the decisions of the ICTR, ICTY, 
ICC, and ICJ were rendered years and even in some cases more than a decade after 
the events under examination.  Therefore the application of the Convention will be 
inherently incoherent and inconsistent; however this reflects the nature of international 
law and justice. 
For now though, it is important to note that the failure to enforce the arrest warrant in 
the case of Al Bashir illustrates that a charge of genocide does not automatically lead 
to action.  A finding of genocide will not halt atrocities or induce a perpetrator to hand 
themselves over to the mechanisms of justice.  An arrest warrant for genocide will not 
lead to states automatically pursuing justice and accountability for the victims of 
atrocities.  If even an arrest warrant for genocide does not result in action, should we 
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continue to use the label of genocide as a preventive term in the midst of violence?  
However while not bringing Al Bashir to justice or delivering accountability to the 
people of Darfur, the jurisprudence of the ICC along with the jurisprudence of the 
ICTR, ICTY, and ICJ has added to the knowledge of genocide and identifying the 
elements of the crime in the midst of violence. 
3.7 Applying the Legal Interpretation to Ongoing Violence 
The re-emergence in the 1990s of the legal prohibition on genocide has changed the 
landscape of international law.  The legal definition of genocide originally 
conceptualised under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide has continually evolved due to the judgments of the ICTR, the ICTY, the 
ICC, and the ICJ.  The judgments of these international courts and ad hoc tribunals 
have addressed ambiguities and complexities in the provisions of the Genocide 
Convention.  In conducting their examination of genocide, these legal institutions have 
followed the wishes of the drafters of the Convention by not expanding the definition 
to include additional elements, including acts of cultural genocide and a wider scope 
of groups covered, proposed since the adoption of the Convention.  The wishes in 
academia and wider society for a new and different understanding of genocide have 
not been followed by the courts and tribunals or by the drafters of the statutes for these 
institutions.  In following strictly the provisions within Article II of the Convention 
the case law outlined in this chapter has created a common definition of genocide, 
there is a little variety in interpretation between the different courts nevertheless the 
basic elements of the crime of genocide have become accepted in the jurisprudence.  
While it is beneficial for the prevention and response to violence that there is only one 
definition of genocide that is observed and recognised by international courts and 
tribunals, the complexities in identifying the elements of genocide that were raised by 
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academics and activists continue to plague the definition of genocide.  The 
jurisprudence of the international courts and tribunals illustrates that the difficulty of 
identifying each of the elements of genocide in the midst of violence varies in 
complexity. 
Establishing the actus reus was not particularly difficult in the judgments of the ad 
hoc tribunals and international courts, as there was widespread evidence of the crimes 
committed across the territories of Rwanda, Darfur, and in Srebrenica.  The case law 
expanded the scope of the acts under Article II (a)–(e) of the Genocide Convention, 
by outlining what crimes were encompassed under these provisions.267  One of the 
most historic aspects of the jurisprudence of the courts and tribunals is the widespread 
recognition that sexual violence and rape can be an act of genocide that causes serious 
bodily and mental harm.268  The case law has been important as well in highlighting 
what crimes are not included in the definition.  The legal definition is restricted to 
physical and biological genocide, which excludes acts of cultural genocide.269  The 
acts of genocide are generally visible in the midst of a situation, particularly the act of 
killing, therefore identifying the actus reus is the most accessible task in determining 
if genocide is being perpetrated in a situation.  The difficulty of affixing the genocide 
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label to a situation is due to the problems of ascertaining the existence of a group and 
establishing the presence of the dolus specialis in the actions of an accused. 
It has to be established that the target of the crime is the group, an individual is targeted 
due to their membership of a group.270  The courts and ad hoc tribunals have 
continually stressed that the definition of genocide is restricted to national, ethnical, 
racial, and religious groups.271  In determining whether a group is protected under the 
Genocide Convention, an exploration of the case law of the tribunals and courts show 
that they ‘have consistently identified victim groups of genocide based on objective 
evidence of contemporaneous legal recognition of groups, subjective evidence of the 
victims themselves and subjective evidence demonstrated through stigmatisation by 
the perpetrators.’272  The courts and ad hoc tribunals have held that the substantial 
nature of the group can be determined by not only the number of people targeted, but 
also the importance of the individuals targeted to a group’s existence and whether a 
segment of a population or a population in a limited geographic area targeted is 
representative of a larger group.273  Even if you ascertain the existence of a group the 
legal determination of the crime of genocide hinges on establishing that the accused 
possessed the specific intent to destroy a group. 
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The ad hoc tribunals, the ICJ, and the ICC have all stated that the dolus specialis is the 
‘defining element which distinguishes genocide from other crimes’.274  The proof of 
genocidal intent is one of the hardest aspects of identifying the crime of genocide.275  
The ICTR, ICTY, and ICC have inferred intent on an individual level by analysing 
factors such as ‘the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts 
systematically directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the 
systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership in a particular group, 
or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts.’276  The ICJ used two 
alternative methods to determine whether a state possessed the specific intent to 
destroy, the first was based on identifying a ‘concerted plan’ to commit genocide while 
the second method was based on establishing a ‘consistent pattern of conduct’.277 
This chapter has shown that the ICJ along with the ICC, ICTY, and the ICTR have 
provided us with a greater understanding of identifying the intent to destroy within the 
actions of an accused, be it an individual or a state.  Despite the considerable growth 
of our knowledge of the crime of genocide, there are still a significant number of issues 
which make a genocide determination in the midst of violence a difficult decision.  
The jurisprudence of the international courts and tribunals illustrates some of the 
issues raised in academia with the definition of genocide remain, in particular the 
difficulty of establishing evidence of an intent to destroy.  Establishing the intent to 
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destroy in the actions of an accused is the most critical barrier to be overcome in 
making a legal determination of genocide in the midst of violence. 
While this chapter has presented the means of establishing the specific intent, it has 
highlighted the difficulties faced by judges even after the situation has ended to 
identify this intent.  The complexity of determining genocidal intent is even greater 
when faced with the issue of identifying genocide in the midst of a situation.  
Identifying the intent to destroy as violence rages on is a substantially different task to 
the investigation that a court can conduct into a situation after it has finished.  An 
international court or tribunal has the benefit of contemporaneous documents, witness 
testimonies, and time to assess the weight of evidence before making a determination.  
Therefore while the jurisprudence of the international courts and ad hoc tribunals has 
been extremely beneficial in instructing us on how to identify genocide when a 
situation has ended, it is less clear what the case law can teach us about identifying the 
definition in an ongoing situation. 
The complexity of identifying the elements of genocide, in particularly the intent to 
destroy, in the midst of violence, has steered this research to focus on the utility of the 
genocide label in ongoing situations as a means of prevention and response.  With a 
deficient definition of genocide, even with the judicial interpretations outlined in this 
chapter; should the genocide label continue to be employed in the midst of bloodshed 
or should an alternative label, atrocity crimes, be used instead to characterise ongoing 
violence leaving the determination of genocide to a competent court or tribunal?  Is 
there any utility to persisting with the genocide label? 
Legally there is no difference between claiming that genocide or the other atrocity 
crimes are being perpetrated as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic 
194 
cleansing have been recognised in the statutes and judgments of the ad hoc tribunals 
and the international courts.  Crimes against humanity and war crimes have been 
central to the work of the ICTY, and have featured heavily in the cases in front of the 
ICC.  The major difference between the crimes is not in their legal nature but in their 
symbolical and rhetorical value, as genocide has been associated with the worst crimes 
in existence and has been regarded by wider society as the most evil violation of 
international criminal law. 
At first it looked as if the international courts supported the viewpoint that genocide 
sits at the apex of international criminal law, when the Trial Chamber at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Kambanda declared genocide as the 
‘crime of crimes’ when sentencing the former prime minister of Rwanda.278  However 
only three years later the Appeal Chamber at the same tribunal in Kayishema and 
Ruzindana determined that no hierarchy existed in the international crimes under its 
jurisdiction as these crimes were all serious violations of international law.279  After 
the initial missteps the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have 
consistently taken the approach of not ranking the international crimes.280  With the 
‘historic boundaries’ between the atrocity crimes in terms of gravity ‘largely 
disappeared’ over the years due to the judgments of courts and tribunals this means 
that there is little ‘meaningful distinction between the various’ crimes.281  Therefore 
while there may be a ‘symbolic value’ to victims to have their suffering labelled as 
                                                 
278 Prosecutor v Kambanda (Sentence) ICTR-97-23-S (4 September 1998) [16]. 
279 Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Appeals Judgment) ICTR-95-1-A (1 June 2001) [367]. 
280 Barbora Holá, Catrien Bijleveld, and Alette Smeulers, ‘Consistency of International Sentencing: 
ICTY and ICTR Case Study’ (2012) 9 European Journal of Criminology 539, 543. 
281 William A Schabas, ‘Semantics or Substance? David Scheffer’s Welcome Proposal to Strengthen 
Criminal Accountability for Atrocities’ (2007) 2 Genocide Studies and Prevention 31, 35–36.  See also 
Madeline Morris, ‘Genocide Politics and Policy’ (2003) 32 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 205, 207. 
195 
genocide, there is ‘no legal consequence anymore’ in terms of severity in describing a 
situation as genocide rather than crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing.282 
This should mean that the attraction to reworking the definition of genocide should be 
at an end with the development in the concepts of crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing.283  The crimes are all of a serious nature which require an international 
response.  When genocide is singled out as the apex crime, it only increases the 
incentive to apply or not apply the genocide label to a given situation.284  Activists and 
academics should realise that any distinction in legal status and applicability that might 
have once existed between these crimes and genocide has largely dissipated over the 
last twenty years, and that the continued fixation on the genocide label is not the 
solution to prompting a state to prevent atrocities. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In setting out this chapter, the aim has been to highlight how the definition of genocide 
has been interpreted in international courts and tribunals with regards to cases 
involving individual and state responsibility and to investigate whether there are 
ambiguities within the elements of the crime that affect the identification of genocide 
in the midst of violence.  The discussion is this chapter has developed along the second 
strand of the research and has shown the complexity of identifying the different 
elements of the crime, in particular the element of the intent to destroy which becomes 
more problematic to identify when examining ongoing situations of violence.  
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Furthermore the research has shown how the term genocide and case law concerning 
the perpetration of genocide can impact on the determination of genocide by a political 
and/or legal actor due to the stigma surrounding the term.  The key argument for this 
chapter is that these complexities in identifying genocide in case law and employing 
the term genocide in a criminal institution mean that the genocide label is unsuitable 
for the prevention of genocide in ongoing situations as it complicates the response.  In 
proposing this contention under the second strand of the research, this chapter has had 
to confront the third strand of the research and the utility of employing the atrocity 
crimes label to remedy the faults and deficiencies within the genocide label. 
This chapter has shown that with the crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and to a lesser extent ethnic cleansing all enshrined in international law; 
utilising the term atrocity crimes would remove the potential complexities of 
identifying the elements of genocide in the midst of violence and instead ensure the 
focus is on the response and prevention of these acts.  This would be beneficial to 
those who strive for a more responsive international community, as while this chapter 
has illustrated that we have a much clearer idea of what encompasses the legal 
definition of genocide, it is less clear whether this enhanced legal definition has made 
it possible to identify the crime of genocide in the midst of violence.  There is no 
simple answer to this question, to address this issue the following chapters will 
examine how international actors have identified or sought to identify genocide in an 
ongoing situation and the complexities faced by these actors in responding to and 
preventing genocide. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF PREVENTION 
4.1 Introduction 
Following on from the last chapter in which the various complexities involved in 
identifying and determining genocide within a criminal law institution were set out, 
this chapter will turn to examine the complexities faced by actors in seeking to identify 
signs of genocide before violence breaks out or in the midst of violence and to examine 
the steps taken by actors to respond to genocidal violence.  While there have been 
great strides made in punishing the crime of genocide, the preventative aim of the 
Genocide Convention has languished in the seventy years since the passing of the 
Convention.  The aim of this chapter is to explore whether the fact that states have 
often been reluctant or slow to respond to claims of genocide can be traced back to 
flaws within the definition and understanding of genocide which can affect both 
identifying the signs of genocide and employing the genocide label in the midst of 
violence. 
This chapter will address this aim by exploring the international response to Rwanda 
and the measures adopted in the aftermath to address both how to identify the warning 
signs of genocide and how better to prevent similar violence in the future.  Following 
on from Chapter Three, this chapter further develops the second strand of this research 
on the complexities involved in identifying and determining genocide, but also 
touches more on the third strand of this research on the utility of employing the atrocity 
crimes label in the midst of violence by examining the development and practice of 
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.  Before commencing further examination on 
the flaws that affect the identification and determination of genocide, the chapter will 
start by examining some of the factors within international politics and international 
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relations that have impacted on the prevention of genocide and which have often led 
to a lack of reaction to genocide. 
4.2 Responding to Genocide 
Since the adoption of the Genocide Convention states have been reluctant to take 
action to prevent or intervene in situations of violence, despite the promise of action 
under the Convention.  This failure to convert the Convention’s promise of action into 
reality reflects the nature of international relations as while the prevention of violence 
is one of the key aims of the UN, prevention is probably the wrong word to use to 
describe the actions of the UN in responding to violent situations.1  Instead the practice 
and work of the UN is defined by a culture of a reaction, if there is a reaction at all.2  
For a time it looked as if the normative prohibitions of genocide would challenge this 
attitude of inconsistent and selective responses which had dominated the international 
legal landscape for centuries.  Why did this early promise fail to materialise into 
tangible preventative policies and actions? 
In the aftermath of World War II, governments came together to form an international 
community which would prevent atrocities, such as those seen during World War II, 
ever occurring again.3  The introduction of the concept of genocide by Raphael 
Lemkin therefore came at the right time as the international community witnessed the 
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significant faults with sovereignty in the aftermath of the Holocaust.4  The Genocide 
Convention challenged this unrestrained notion of state sovereignty, as under Article 
I states undertake to prevent the crime of genocide.5  It was anticipated by the drafters 
that this new Convention would inspire states to regard sovereignty as encompassing 
a right to take action to prevent violence with a genocidal dimension rather than wait 
to punish perpetrators after a violent situation has culminated with numerous victims.  
The Genocide Convention alongside powerful international instruments such as the 
Charter of the United Nations were created to offer the greatest protection to peace 
and security across the world by recognising that the right of sovereignty is not 
absolute.6  Bound by these international obligations, member states of the UN joined 
together to say ‘never again’ to genocide.7 
This hope of a new way of conducting international relations did not fully materialise 
with the introduction and criminalisation of the concept of genocide.  Why did the 
Convention fail to translate into meaningful action to prevent genocide, could it be 
solely due to states protecting their own interests or are there issues with how states 
should act to prevent and respond to genocide under the Genocide Convention? 
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For a Convention which contains the word prevention in its title, there is scant 
reference to prevention within its provisions.8  Article I which sets out the duty of 
states to prevent genocide was adopted without much disagreement by the Sixth 
Committee at the UN, however this lack of debate meant that there is no guideline as 
to how a state would meet this duty.9  Article VIII is the only article which expressly 
deals with prevention, as it calls upon the organs of the UN to take action in response 
to the crime of genocide.10  However it does not specify what actions the UN should 
pursue in responding to a claim of genocide, which leaves room for a number of 
different interpretations of this provision.11  Does the article require the UN to use 
military force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter or could diplomatic measures 
under Chapter VI of the Charter be used to prevent genocide?  The ambiguity of this 
provision left states uncertain as to what steps they had to take in response to a finding 
of genocide.  This ambiguity would be exploited in the future by states unwilling to 
take any measure of action in response to claims of genocide. 
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While it was unclear what action should be taken under the Convention to respond to 
genocide, the behaviour of states ensured for a long time that there was no action taken 
to respond to claims or evidence of genocide.  The notion of genocide prevention 
which was so prominent in the minds of diplomats when they adopted the Convention 
quickly disappeared into the vacuum of politics and state interests.12  This is despite 
the principal aim of the UN being to ‘maintain international peace and security.’13  
However coupled with this responsibility is the duty to respect the sovereignty of 
states.14 
The UN and its member states have to maintain a delicate balancing act between 
respecting sovereignty and protecting the rights of individuals whose rights and 
protections are abdicated by a given state.15  This creates an uneasy relationship 
between keeping the peace across the world while also respecting the right of states to 
govern themselves.16  The tension between sovereignty and humanitarian protection 
can be ‘boiled down to a single core question: Should sovereignty and the basic order 
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it brings to world politics be privileged over the rights of individuals, or should it be 
overridden in certain cases, so as to permit intervention for the purpose of protecting 
those fundamental rights.’17 
This uneasy relationship manifests itself through the work of the UN as the primacy 
of sovereignty has often resulted in a lack of response to violence.18  On the other hand 
the right of sovereignty is not absolute and states have acted, with and without the 
consent of a state, under the provisions of the Charter to address gross human rights 
violations which have been recognised as threats to international peace and security.19  
However there is an inherent selectivity with the situations as the question of whether 
a state will take an interest in preventing or intervening in a situation of violence, 
involving genocide or another crime, is dependent on whether the state possesses 
sufficient political will to take action.20 
A state will balance competing domestic and international interests before deciding 
whether to become involved diplomatically or militarily in a situation.  Violence in 
peripheral regions often fails to engage the ‘strategic, economic, and diplomatic 
interests’ of the influential states.21  Even if a situation does concern the interests of a 
state, there may be competing interests at stake which need to be balanced before a 
decision on intervention is reached.  This can be due to the strategic partnerships which 
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states maintain with the perpetrators or allies of the perpetrators of the crimes.22  Thus 
a state’s intervention either unilaterally/in a coalition or under the UN banner is often 
not motivated by a purely humanitarian concern of protecting civilians but by a desire 
to pursue its vital interests.23  Ultimately the application of the genocide label to a 
situation is a ‘political calculation’ on behalf of states.24 
Therefore fulfilling the Convention’s preventative potential is dependent on the 
member states of the UN possessing the political will to get involved in a situation of 
violence and provide financial and logistical support for any operation within a region 
of violence.25  However the UN’s response to violence is often dictated by the interests 
of the UN Security Council’s Permanent Five, who have a stranglehold over the UN’s 
mechanisms of intervention.26  Intervention is contingent on the interests of the 
Permanent Five aligning on the question of intervention and prevention, otherwise 
there is a deadlock and inaction.27  Totten argues that the dominance of the Permanent 
Five in the response to violent situations ensures the Permanent Five assume a ‘God-
like role’ in ‘deciding who will live and who will die.’28 
While political will dictates whether there will be a response to a situation, the 
presence or absence of political will does not mean that genocide is readily identifiable 
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in the midst of violence.  The difficulties of identifying the different elements of the 
crime, outlined in the previous chapters, are not addressed by states willing to act in 
response to genocide.  Therefore there are complexities in responding to and 
preventing genocide due to not only how states perceive and respond to the genocide 
label, but also the difficulties associated with recognising signs of genocide in ongoing 
situations as a result of a flawed definition of genocide.  The complexities of the label 
genocide are exemplified by the tragic case of the Rwandan Genocide where not only 
was the reluctance of states and the UN Security Council to take action in response to 
a claim of genocide never more apparent as states avoided the use of the word genocide 
in case it created an obligation on them to intervene; there were also challenges faced 
by actors in identifying the elements of the crime in the midst of violence.  While 
clearly occurring before the case law that has clarified the elements of genocide, the 
case of Rwanda illustrates the difficulties of identifying the Convention’s definition 
of genocide in the midst of violence that continue to be evident in the current 
understanding of genocide. 
4.2(i) The Failure to Act in Rwanda 
Nearly fifty years on from the international community’s powerful declaration that 
‘Never Again’ would international actors remain passive in the face of genocide, the 
world once again experienced the crime of genocide.  Over the course of 100 days 
‘800,000 Rwandan men, women and children were brutally murdered in an orgy of 
violence almost beyond the capacity of the human heart to contemplate.’29  It was one 
of the fastest killing sprees in history, with a rate of killing that outpaced the 
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Holocaust.30  Tutsi and moderate Hutu were slaughtered out in the open while the 
international community remained on the side-lines.31  The failure of the UN in 
Rwanda was ‘one of the most shameful, painful and defining moments’ in its history.32  
An independent inquiry established in 1999 to understand why the UN had failed in 
its duty to protect the people of Rwanda found that the UN and its member states 
should have been aware of the risk of genocide.33  The Independent Inquiry determined 
the UN system failed in Rwanda due to a lack of political will amongst member states, 
in particular members of the Permanent Five, to respond to the bloodshed.34  Therefore 
the major lesson from the tragic case of Rwanda for the Independent Inquiry was the 
need to have the political will to intervene.35  Hearings by the US and Belgium 
governments came to a similar conclusion.36 
This conclusion has been echoed by many researchers of the Rwandan Genocide, who 
believe that there was enough evidence available to the international actors before the 
outbreak of violence and in the early stages of the bloodshed to make a finding that a 
genocidal campaign was taking place.37  These researchers lay the blame for the UN’s 
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failure to act on these warning signals on the lack of political will amongst key 
member states and actors within the UN system.  The common view is that the ‘the 
world bore silent and shameful witness to its own apathy.’38  Is this view that the 
Rwandan Genocide could have been prevented by the UN and the UN Security 
Council possessing the political will to intervene correct in light of the information 
available to the actors at the time?  Or should we examine the potential difficulties 
faced by the international community in identifying warnings signs of genocide before 
the outbreak of violence and the complex task of determining genocide in the midst of 
the bloodshed? 
Identifying Precursors of Genocide 
The role of the past in the Rwandan Genocide cannot be understated.  The history of 
the Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic groups created the narrative of ancient tribal hatred 
which pervaded top level discussion of Rwanda before and during the genocide.39  
Was this a mistaken view of Rwandan history, were the Hutu and Tutsi always pitted 
against each other?  To an extent they were in the colonial and post-independence era 
due in part to colonial policies, but it rarely led to large-scale bloodshed.  The violence 
witnessed in the civil wars while ethnic in nature was never part of a coordinated plan 
to exterminate the Tutsi.40  Throughout the history of Rwanda there were no concrete 
signs that a genocidal campaign was being planned.  When the early 1990s saw a flare 
up of ethnic tensions in Rwanda, for the international community it was seen as part 
of the longstanding ethnic hatred between the Tutsi and the Hutu.  International actors 
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were conditioned to see violence in Rwanda as a revival of ethnic hatred and not a 
prelude to genocide.41  Gérard Prunier observes that unless one had a full 
understanding of the complexities of the Rwandan society it would have been hard to 
predict that a genocidal campaign would be launched.42  While the narrative of tribal 
hatred was mistaken, Rwanda had been beset by over thirty years of ethnic tension 
when the UN became involved in a peacekeeping mission in the country which 
clouded the Secretariat and UN Security Council’s view of the situation. 
The UN had a presence on the ground in the form of a peacekeeping mission which 
had been deployed to the country in October 1993.  The UN Security Council had 
established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (hereafter ‘UNAMIR’) 
to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords, a peace agreement which 
introduced a power-sharing government with the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(hereafter ‘RPF’) which had been at war with the Hutu-led government.43  UNAMIR 
was mandated to monitor the ceasefire, establish demilitarised zones, and contribute 
to the security within a weapons-free zone in the capital, Kigali.44  The restrictive 
mandate of UNAMIR meant that the peacekeeping force could not engage militarily 
with local forces.  Thus, tragically, international troops which had the potential to 
intervene were bystanders when the killings spread across the country. 
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Peace had apparently come to Rwanda after the signing of the Arusha Accords.  It was 
not an easy path to peace but for the international community there seemingly existed 
parties who were committed to the peace process.45  Rwanda was seen as an easy 
mission within the UN which would only last for a short duration, so the Security 
Council only equipped it with a basic peacekeeping mandate.46  However from the 
start UNAMIR was struggling.47  When UNAMIR was deployed, it was under-
resourced and ill-equipped.48  UNAMIR lacked any intelligence capabilities, which 
would have aided it in gathering information on the likelihood of the implementation 
of the Arusha Accords.49 
In the view of the Independent Inquiry, the time period before the outbreak of genocide 
was a crucial opportunity for the international community to observe precursors to 
genocide.  The Independent Inquiry notes that the divisions created by the Arusha 
Accords were an indicator that genocidal violence was a possibility.50  The Arusha 
Accords failed to neutralise the extremist elements within the Hutu community, as 
they still had a central role within the two most powerful institutions of the state, the 
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government and the army.51  The Independent Inquiry states that these clear divisions 
in Rwandan society alongside evidence of ‘killings, serious ethnic tension, militia 
activities and the import and distribution of arms’ should have been connected with 
the warning signs which were present before the outbreak of violence.52 
The UN and its member states were well aware of the extremist elements in Rwanda 
which were advocating reprisals against the Tutsi.53  Their response was to use 
diplomacy to coerce the government into respecting the Arusha Accords and the 
installation of the transitional government.54  The Security Council had put its trust in 
the peace process, and relied on the Arusha Accords and the peacekeeping force to 
deliver peace to Rwanda.55  Before the genocide started, the UN was taking the 
conventional approach to Rwanda by using diplomacy to bring peace to the country.  
With the information we now have, we know it was the wrong approach.  The 
International Inquiry contends that if more attention had been paid to these warning 
signs then the international actors would have been able to spot that the violence was 
evidence of a genocidal campaign unfolding.56  In detailing the failure of the UN to 
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connect the warning signs of genocide, the Independent Inquiry paid considerable 
attention to a cable sent by the force commander of UNAMIR, Romeo Dallaire.57 
Most academics who argue that the international actors knew genocide was occurring 
will point to this fax sent by Dallaire to Maurice Baril, military adviser to the 
Secretary-General, and to Kofi Annan, the Under-Secretary-General of the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (hereafter ‘DPKO’) on the 11th of January 
1994.58  In the fax, Dallaire reported that an informant had come forward with 
information of a plan to exterminate Tutsi.  The informant said that he had been 
ordered to register Tutsi across Rwanda with the aim of exterminating them.  The 
informant said that the Hutu militias could kill 1,000 Tutsi in twenty minutes, and that 
he could point UNAMIR to supplies of weapons which the militias had been 
stockpiling.  In the fax, Dallaire outlined a planned raid on the weapons cache over 
the next 36 hours. 
The response from the DPKO was immediate; they ordered Dallaire not to take any 
action to raid the arm caches as raids were not permitted under the mandate of 
UNAMIR.59  The DPKO did not share the fax with the Secretary-General or the 
Security Council, preferring Dallaire to handle the matter on the ground.60  Dallaire 
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was instructed to inform the President of Rwanda of the threat.61  It is understandable 
why the DPKO told Dallaire to bring the information to the President of Rwanda, as 
UNAMIR was meant to be an impartial monitoring force.62  The international 
community had placed far too much faith in the Arusha Accords, their optimism 
blinded them to the threats to peace which were manifesting themselves in Rwandan 
society.63  The focus on diplomacy to enforce the Arusha Accords meant that killings 
were seen as stumbling blocks on the road to peace.64  They were not seen for what 
they were, the preliminary stages of a genocidal campaign.  The refusal to share this 
fax had a devastating impact on Rwanda, but was it clear from the fax that genocide 
was being planned? 
While the training of militias, the stockpiling of weapons, and the listing of names all 
point towards a campaign of extermination being planned; Dallaire did not express 
full confidence in the information, stating at the end of the fax that a possibility of a 
trap existed.65  The doubts over the plan of extermination expressed by both the 
informant and Dallaire did enough for the DPKO to not treat the fax as seriously as it 
should have, and resulted in the fax never reaching the UN Security Council.66  It is 
important to note that the Rwandan Genocide did not operate in a vacuum.  The reports 
from the ground were going to the DPKO, which was managing numerous situations 
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around the world.67  It was not the first fax which the DPKO had ever received which 
declared killings as a possibility, during this period the DPKO was receiving similar 
information from its other missions.68  It is a hard task to monitor every situation 
around the world for signs that a genocidal campaign is being planned.69  The speed 
of the violence witnessed in Rwanda also complicated the task faced by analysts as 
‘events happened much faster than analysts could interpret them.’70 
With all the information available to us now on the genocide, it is easier to see warning 
signals which pointed to the planning of genocide.71  However, at the time the dots 
were never connected by those in positions of power due to the failure of UN actors 
to share information and a lack of definitive evidence of genocide.  The inability to 
understand the intentions of actors in a particular localised context was the weakness 
of the UN infrastructure during the genocide.  A lot of the warning signals which arose 
from Rwanda such as militia training and the spread of weapons pointed towards the 
resumption of a civil war rather than a genocidal campaign.72  Concrete evidence of 
something contrary to the narrative was needed to persuade policymakers that Rwanda 
was threatened by genocide. 
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Determining Genocide In the Midst of Violence 
The genocide began on the 6th of April 1994, after a plane crash resulted in the death 
of the Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, and quickly spread across the 
country as Hutu comprised government forces, militias, and civilian mobs went from 
house to house rooting out the Tutsi.73  The genocidal violence was sparked by the 
resentment felt by Hutu extremists towards the Arusha Accords.74  The primary 
response to the violence came from the RPF who resumed their combat with 
government forces so as to reach areas besieged by violence.  The RPF’s return to 
warfare gave the impression to a number of international actors that what was being 
witnessed in Rwanda was the resumption of the type of civil war unrest which had 
beset Rwanda since its independence.75 
In the first few weeks of the violence, the future of UNAMIR dominated the agenda 
of the UN Security Council.76  Seldom did their attention turn to the actual killings.  
On the 21st of April, the UN Security Council took its first action since the outbreak 
of the genocide when it voted to reduce UNAMIR to a skeleton force with a reduced 
mandate to call for a ceasefire and a return to the Arusha Accords.77  The UN saw 
itself as a mediator in the Rwandan conflict, and withdrew its forces when that task 
became impossible with the outbreak of violence.  The first few days of the genocide 
were crucial to the response of the UN to the situation; firm evidence from the ground 
pointing to a campaign of genocide would have forced the hand of the UN.  Lacking 
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a confirmation of anything other than ethnic killings and a civil war, the UN withdrew 
as it felt it had no prominent role to play.  It was a fundamental misunderstanding of 
what was happening in Rwanda combined with a reluctance to intervene which led to 
the UN refusing to support any intervention. 
This decision to reduce UNAMIR is seen by academics and international actors as a 
critical moment in the response to the genocide.78  Critics of this inaction believe that 
the UN Security Council possessed the knowledge of the crime of genocide at this 
point, and that if the UN Security Council members possessed the will to intervene, 
then the genocide could have been halted at this stage.  However could it be 
definitively stated that genocide was occurring when the UN Security Council made 
their decision?  At the time the UN voted to reduce UNAMIR, genocide was not a 
prevalent term in international discussion.  In fact only one actor publicly stated that 
the killings were genocide in the first three weeks of the violence.79  On the 13th of 
April, the RPF claimed in a letter to the UN Security Council that the murders were 
part of a genocidal campaign.80  The claim was treated as dubious by the UN Security 
Council members as the RPF was in the midst of a civil war with the government.81 
On the other side the interim government established in the aftermath of the plane 
crash was claiming that the killings were a backlash to the assassination of 
Habyarimana.82  The government also claimed that the killings were connected with 
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the renewed civil war.83  It is important to note that Rwanda was one of the non-
permanent members on the Security Council during the genocide, which allowed it to 
influence the direction of the discussion of the Rwandan conflict.84  This allowed the 
interim government to conduct a campaign of disinformation amongst international 
actors.85 
The situation on the ground was complex, it was not just a genocidal campaign which 
began on the 7th of April; it was also the outbreak of a military coup, a slew of targeted 
political assassinations, and the renewal of a civil war.86  All these events only added 
to the confusion both on the ground and at the UN.87  The confusion about the situation 
on the ground can be highlighted by the reports which Dallaire was providing to the 
Secretariat.  A communication from Dallaire to the Secretariat on the 8th of April stated 
that there was an ethnic dimension to the violence, but stopped short of calling the 
violence genocide.88  However in a report on the 15th of April, Dallaire identified the 
violence as coming from both sides of the conflict.89  A fax by Dallaire to the 
Secretariat on the 17th of April portrayed the killings as being organised by a militia 
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which was distinct from the interim government.90  The Secretary-General in his report 
to the Security Council on the 20th of April stated that the killings appeared to have 
both an ethnic and political element.91  The media by and large was treating the conflict 
as a flare-up of ethnic hatred, its reporting helped inform the approach of the UN.92 
Thus, even Dallaire struggled before the 21st of April to term the killings as genocide, 
and he was the most senior UN official closest to the ground.93  When the Secretariat 
was receiving intelligence of this nature, how could the Secretary-General have been 
in a position to tell the Security Council that genocide was occurring in Rwanda?  The 
intelligence showed a lack of centralised organisation and intention on the part of the 
interim government.94  In the first few weeks of the violence, no international actor 
could convincingly state that the killings in Rwanda were genocide.  They knew the 
killings were ethnically motivated but did not have definitive proof of an intent to 
exterminate an entire race. 
A major weakness of the response was that genocide was never contemplated by those 
in the international community.  Karel Kovanda stated that ‘the Rwanda events fell so 
dramatically out of the normal curve of nations’ possible behaviours that one 
instinctively refused to believe them.’95  This is one of the major issues with 
identifying genocide, in that genocide as a concept is so beyond the comprehension of 
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actors.96  The concept of genocide is largely associated with the Holocaust, and that 
form of highly mechanised genocide blinded the international community to the fact 
that genocide could be committed in a poor country with weapons as simple as a 
machete.97 
It was not until the end of April and the beginning of May that international actors 
began labelling the violence as genocide.98  It was only at this time it became more 
evident that a genocidal campaign was underway.99  On the 29th of April, Oxfam 
became the first international actor to publically acknowledge that what was 
happening in Rwanda was genocide.100  Subsequently Dallaire used the term for the 
first time at the end of April.101  However despite the greater recognition of the ethnic 
nature of the violence, the UN Security Council shunned the word genocide.  The 
United States, in particular, deliberately avoided the use of the term genocide for the 
violence which was ravaging Rwanda as the US administration believed that 
employing the term to describe the violence would require them to take action in 
response under the provisions of the Genocide Convention.102 
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The reluctance of the US to get involved in Rwanda stemmed from its engagement in 
Somalia the previous year.103  A UN Security Council-sanctioned US-led peace 
enforcement mission in Somalia led to the deaths of 18 US soldiers.104  The murder of 
the US servicemen shocked the American public particularly as there was footage of 
the body of one of the soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.105  
Somalia and Mogadishu were not only important incidents in US history; they became 
symbols and slogans for future US action abroad, cautionary tales for future 
administrations.106  The experience of the US in Somalia conditioned its response to 
the conflict in Rwanda.107  In the aftermath, America adopted an anti-interventionist 
approach to UN missions unless it was in America’s interests.108  This led to the US 
developing the ‘Mogadishu Line’, a line that the US was determined not to cross so as 
to avoid putting US forces in danger.109  Rwanda was the first test of this new 
approach.110 
The US as the world’s superpower at the time had enormous influence in dictating the 
approach of the United Nations.111  France also was a key player in the response to the 
violence as the French government had a strong relationship with the ruling Hutu 
government; ‘[v]irtually from the moment of the RPF invasion in 1990 to the end of 
the genocide almost four years later, the French were the Rwandan government’s 
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closest ally militarily, politically, and diplomatically.’112  Reluctant to intervene, the 
US and France, along with the UK and China, resisted any attempt by other members 
of the UN Security Council to label Rwanda as a genocide in the first few weeks of 
the violence.113  This was despite a recognition by representatives of non-permanent 
members of the UN Security Council; Argentina, Czech Republic, New Zealand, and 
Spain, that genocide was being perpetrated and that the UN members were bound to 
act under their obligations within the Genocide Convention.114 
The opposition of the permanent five to intervention meant that a statement issued by 
the UN Security Council on April 30th condemning the violation of international law 
failed to mention the word genocide.115  The internal disputes amongst the members 
of the UN Security Council over the use of the term genocide meant little or no action 
was taken to respond to the bloodshed, this inertia led to hundreds of thousands dying 
while the UN ‘dawdled’ over definitional debates.116  Even when the UN Security 
Council voted to deploy a more robust peace keeping force to the region in the middle 
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of May, it failed to use the word genocide.117  In addressing the violence, the UN 
Security Council stated ‘the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention 
of destroying such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under 
international law.’  The UN Security Council’s resolution was couched in the terms of 
the Convention without saying the word genocide.118 
The first acknowledgement from within the UN that the genocide has been committed 
came at the end of May, after representatives of the Secretary-General presented a 
report based on their visit to Rwanda.119  Their report confirmed that Rwandan 
civilians were being systematically targeted in areas under the control of the interim 
government by government forces and militias.120  The report concludes that on the 
basis of evidence of large scale killing of members of an ethnic group, ‘there can be 
little doubt that it constitutes genocide’.121  Finally, the UN Security Council used the 
word genocide on the 8th of June when it passed a resolution acknowledging ‘acts of 
genocide’ had been perpetrated.122  However, by this stage the genocide was nearly 
over, as the RPF had gained control of the majority of the country and driven Hutu 
extremists into neighbouring countries. 
A Complex Failure 
This thesis is not disputing the claim that the member states had no political will to 
intervene in Rwanda, rather it is arguing that the evidence of genocide was not strong 
enough to override the will of the member states.  The ability to respond to future 
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genocides is not dependent on political will alone but rather the ability to detect 
warning signals of genocide and identifying genocide in the midst of violence.  The 
ability to predict the outbreak of genocide or distinguish acts of genocide from other 
crimes is not a straightforward task, as shown by the Rwandan case. 
Rwanda had a complex history of ethnic violence which developed into a multifaceted 
situation with a civil war breaking out alongside the deliberate targeting of Tutsi 
civilians.  While with the benefit of hindsight and extensive documentary evidence it 
is clear that this targeting was part of a plan or policy to destroy the Tutsi group, in the 
midst of violence it is a substantially different task to ascertain what were the 
intentions underlying these actions.  As Kuperman argues, it is easy to spot the signs 
of genocide when you retrospectively examine the conflict.123  At the time it is a lot 
harder to judge if a particular incident will lead to genocide.  A lot of the warning 
signals which arose from Rwanda such as militia training and the spread of weapons 
pointed towards the resumption of a civil war rather than a genocidal campaign.124  
How can the international community predict when a civil war will descend into a 
genocide?125 
The intentions of people are hard to judge, but this is exactly what has to be discovered 
if the international community believes a genocidal campaign is underway as the 
international courts and tribunals have confirmed that the specific intent to destroy a 
protected group is central to the crime of genocide.126  The inability to understand the 
motivations of actors who are a thousand miles away from you was the weakness of 
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the international community during the genocide.  Knowing the motivations of the 
actors was a near impossible task for the people on the ground such as Dallaire and 
the rest of the UNAMIR contingent. 
What have we learnt from the example of the Rwandan Genocide?  We have learnt 
that genocide is a complicated concept; difficult to diagnose beforehand and hard to 
comprehend in the midst of violence.  Focussing on political will ignores the greater 
issue of not being able to identify warning signals or connect warning signals before 
the outbreak of violence.  The failure to address this issue compromises the UN’s 
involvement in violent situations across the globe as it will once again fail to realise 
what is actually happening on the ground.  Therefore a central issue in the prevention 
of genocide is whether or not the UN will be able to identify the crime of genocide in 
future situations or will it sadly, as the Rwandan case, not fully understand the violence 
until after the fact? 
4.3 Signs of Genocide 
Developing the preventative component of the Genocide Convention hinges on the 
assumption that it is possible to identify indicators of genocide before the outbreak of 
violence and/or recognise signs of genocide in the midst of violence.  A country or 
region does not suddenly explode into genocidal bloodshed without evidence of 
violence being a possibility.127  However the task of determining whether a situation 
will ‘creep towards or explode into a genocidal situation’ is not straightforward.128  
This has meant that predicting signs of genocide at an early stage so as to mount an 
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effective preventive strategy ‘has proved to be one of the most challenging tasks 
confronting the United Nations.’129 
4.3(i) Forecasting the Risk of Genocide 
Theories over why people commit genocide and/or the conditions that give rise to 
genocide from a criminological, economic, historical, philosophical, psychological, 
and sociological perspectives amongst many other perspectives have been a keenly 
debated topic in genocide studies.  Over the years, a number of academics and NGOs 
have identified circumstances which make a country vulnerable to the crime of 
genocide, and have used this knowledge to develop their own early warning systems 
and risk assessments to predict which countries are susceptible to genocide.  One of 
the earliest studies into the conditions that give rise to genocide was presented by Kurt 
Jonassohn who identified a number of precursors to genocide: i) official statements 
from a government which are violent in nature; ii) the appearance of refugees fleeing 
the territory; iii) government regulations which override human rights provisions; and 
iv) propaganda by the state media.130  One of the most influential warning systems in 
academia and policy circles was created by Barbara Harff who identified seven 
variables which are preconditions for the crime of genocide: i) political upheaval; ii) 
state-led discrimination; iii) a history of genocide; iv) an ethnically polarised elite; v) 
exclusionary ideology; vi) an autocratic government; and vii) trade openness and 
international engagement.131  Harff uses these factors to develop a model to assess the 
risk of genocide in countries across the world.  A drawback to Harff’s model of 
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examining countries is that she employs her own definition of genocide rather than the 
legal definition as contained in the Convention. 
Gregory Stanton, the founder and President of the non-governmental organisation 
Genocide Watch, has developed a model of ten stages of genocide: 
1) Classification (society is divided by membership of one of the 
protected groups); 
2) Symbolisation (the protected group is labelled with a name and/or 
symbolic identifiers); 
3) Discrimination (infringing on civil and political rights); 
4) Dehumanisation (propaganda used to degrade a protected group); 
5) Organisation (strengthening of state structures, forming of militias, 
and stockpiling weapons); 
6) Polarisation (propaganda used to drive groups apart); 
7) Preparation (plans are drawn up, and there is increased hate 
propaganda); 
8) Persecution (targeting of a protected group by forcing them to wear 
identifying symbols, confiscating their property, segregation into 
ghettoes or concentration camps, and the restriction of access to 
resources such as food and water); 
9) Extermination (beginning of the campaign of genocidal violence); 
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10) Denial (perpetrators cover up evidence and blame the conflict on 
the victims).132 
The ten stages do not occur in a linear process, stages can happen simultaneously and 
latter stages can precede earlier stages but for Stanton all ten stages are present in a 
genocide.  Such attempts to structure the crime of genocide into stages are not without 
criticism.  Mark Levene criticises those who believe that genocide follows some 
predictable pattern.133  Despite this, there are now a variety of organisations (state, 
intergovernmental, and NGO) which study the risk of a country or region exploding 
into genocide violence which illustrates the importance attached to prediction as a 
means of prevention.134  The risk factors and early warnings signals generated by these 
actors highlight some commonality as they have recognised that conditions which give 
rise to genocide include: 
 A history of prior genocide or mass atrocities 
 An autocratic or non-democratic regime 
 Ongoing state-led discrimination 
 Political instability 
 Ongoing domestic armed conflict 
 Armed conflict in neighbouring states 
 Economic factors 
 Increased hate media 
 Public rallies and popular mobilization against vulnerable groups 
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 Upcoming elections 
 Public commemorations of past crimes or contentious historical 
events that exacerbate tensions between groups 
 Rapid change in government leadership, such as through 
assassination or coup 
 Natural disasters 
 Sharp increase in repressive state practices 
 Arrest, torture, disappearance or killing of political, religious, or 
economic leaders 
 Physical segregation or separation of the targeted group from the 
broader population 
 Increase in weapons transfers to security forces or rebels 
 Rapid increase or decline in opposition capacity 
 Deployment of security forces against previously targeted civilian 
groups 
 Commencement/resumption of armed conflict between 
government forces and rebels 
 Spill over of armed conflict from neighbouring countries 
 Nowhere for targeted civilian groups to flee as violence 
escalates.135 
While these factors are important for predicting genocide, there is a drawback to 
forecasting the risk of genocide as many of the supposed warning signs and precursors 
of genocide could equally point towards the perpetration of other crimes.  In this 
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regard, Jonassohn notably even qualifies his own statement by saying that the 
precursors he identified ‘may be generated by tragedies other than genocide, and 
refugees may be fleeing from disasters other than mass killings.’136  The difficulty of 
predicting genocide may be due to the similarity between genocide and crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing. 
These crimes share several overlapping elements, in particular the acts which comprise 
the actus reus of their crimes.  Crimes against humanity, which were initially under 
developed in international law, were finally defined in statute under Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  Under this provision crimes against 
humanity include acts of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible 
transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, sexual violence, 
persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid, and other inhumane acts which are 
committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population.  Many of these acts also constitute crimes under Article II (a)-(e) of the 
Genocide Convention.  Crimes against humanity in distinction from genocide do not 
require the specific intent to destroy, rather it requires the perpetrator possessing 
knowledge of the attack.137  The crime of persecution is conceptually the closest to 
genocide as it requires an intent to discriminate against a group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender grounds.138 
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Ethnic cleansing, which ‘entered the international vocabulary’ in 1992 to describe the 
policies being pursued by the parties to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, is not 
defined in statute.139  However a UN Commission of Experts’ report into the situation 
in Yugoslavia defined ethnic cleansing as a means of ‘rendering an area ethnically 
homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from 
the area.’140  The means of carrying out ethnic cleansing are ‘murder, torture, arbitrary 
arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of 
civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of 
civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and 
civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property.’141  While elements of the crime of 
genocide can bear remarkable similarities to ethnic cleansing, international courts 
have held that ethnic cleansing is not an act of genocide, as ethnic cleansing is 
undertaken with the intent to forcibly displace a group from an area while the acts of 
genocide are intended to destroy a group.142 
While the intent underlying each of these crimes is distinct, the three crimes share 
several overlapping elements, such as the acts that constitute each crime, which means 
it may be a complex task to identify the elements of each crime in the midst of 
violence.  This difficulty has meant that increasingly the three crimes, along with war 
                                                 
139 William A Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 221.  See also Drazen Petrovic, ‘Ethnic Cleansing – An Attempt at 
Methodology’ (1994) 5 European Journal of International Law 342, 342–343; John Quigley, ‘State 
Responsibility for Ethnic Cleansing’ (1998–1999) 32 University of California Davis Law Review 341, 
343–344. 
140 United Nations Security Council ‘Interim Report of the Commission of Experts’ (26 January 1993) 
UN Doc S/25274, para. 55. 
141 ibid para. 56. 
142 Prosecutor v Stakić (Trial Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) [519]; Case Concerning the 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, [190]; Case Concerning 
the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia 
v Serbia) (Judgment) [2015] ICJ Rep 3, [510]. 
229 
crimes, have been grouped together under the category of ‘atrocity crimes’ or ‘mass 
atrocity crimes’.  In forecasting the risk of genocide, academics and NGOs usually 
also predict the risk of atrocity crimes.143  As these academic and NGO models which 
seek to predict the crime of genocide have illustrated the difficulties of distinguishing 
the crime of genocide, have the recent attempts by the UN proved more successful in 
recognising the signs of genocide before or in the early stages of violence?  Or is there 
a continued complexity in identifying elements of genocide which combined with the 
existence of an umbrella grouping of international crimes, atrocity crimes, raises the 
question of the utility of seeking to identify or determine genocide in the midst of 
violence when this general term can be employed to label a situation? 
United Nations Measures to Detect Genocide 
The noted failures of interpreting information from the field in Rwanda and Srebrenica 
led the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to pledge to ‘move the UN from a 
culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.’144  In a speech marking ten years since 
the Rwandan Genocide, Annan contended that the UN in responding promptly to 
violence should not be constrained by ‘legalistic arguments’ in determining whether a 
situation meets the definition of genocide.145  Annan stressed that gaps in the UN’s 
capacity to analyse information it receives had affected its ability to respond to claims 
of genocidal violence in Rwanda and Srebrenica.146  To address this failing in the UN’s 
operations, Annan announced his intention to create the post of Special Adviser on the 
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Prevention of Genocide.147  The mandate of the Special Adviser as outlined by Annan 
was to: 
(a) Collect existing information, in particular from within the United 
Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin which, if not 
prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; 
(b) Act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and 
through him to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention 
potential situations which could result in genocide; 
(c) Make recommendations to the Security Council, through the 
Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or halt genocide; 
(d) Liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the 
prevention of genocide and work to enhance the United Nations 
capacity to analyse and manage information relating to genocide or 
related crimes.148 
Since the creation of the post of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide in 
2004, there have been great strides forward in identifying warning signs of 
genocide.149  After ten years of developing and refining the approach to identifying 
signs of genocide, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide along with the 
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect produced a framework of analysis for 
the prevention of atrocity crimes as a guide to assess the risk of genocide, crimes 
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against humanity, and war crimes.150  The framework presents eight risk factors which 
are common to all three atrocity crimes, and an additional two factors which are 
exclusive to the crime of genocide.151  The list of risk factors draws upon the 
precursors of genocide recognised by academics and NGOs which illustrates there is 
consistency in the approach to recognising indicators of genocide. 
The eight common risk factors are: 
1) Situations of armed conflict or other forms of instability (security 
crises, humanitarian crises, natural disasters, political tensions, regime 
change, autocratic government, growing opposition movements, 
political repression, economic issues, and social problems); 
2) A record of serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law (past acts of genocide and other atrocity crimes, a 
history of impunity, inaction to prevent atrocities, and justification of 
crimes); 
3) Weak state structures (under resourced institutions, lack of 
independent and impartial judiciary, corruption and poor governance, 
lack of oversight and accountability, and a lack of awareness of human 
rights and humanitarian law amongst institutions and security forces); 
4) Motives or incentives (political, economic, military, perceived 
threats by protected groups, historical grievances, and ideological); 
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5) Capacity to commit atrocity crimes (financial resources, availability 
of arms and personnel, and a culture of obedience to authority); 
6) An absence of mitigating factors (lack of organised civil society, 
absence of independent media, lack of participation with international 
organisations, and lack of interest amongst United Nations member 
states to support a state in exercising its responsibility to protect its 
population from atrocity crimes); 
7) Enabling circumstances or preparatory action (imposition of 
emergency laws which erode fundamental rights, suspension or 
interference with state institutions, increased inflammatory statements 
and propaganda, strengthening of security apparatus, acquisition of 
large quantities of arms and ammunition, restricting or expelling 
international organisations, NGOs and the media, increased violations 
of rights, and serious acts of violence); and 
8) Triggering factors (sudden deployment of security forces, spill over 
of armed conflict or tension in neighbouring country, threats to a state’s 
sovereignty by international actors, abrupt regime changes, serious acts 
of violence, religious intolerance, historical celebrations of past crimes, 
incitement, propaganda, elections, epidemics, natural disasters, and 
financial crises).152 
The two specific risk factors to the crime of genocide are: 
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1) Past or present intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination 
against protected groups (history of crimes against a group, 
discriminating, segregating, restricting, or excluding access to 
resources and rights, and denying the existence of a group); and 
2) Signs of intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group.153 
The difficulty of identifying the intent to destroy from an early warning perspective is 
acknowledged by the Office of the Special Advisers as the report notes that proving 
the intent to destroy is ‘both one of the most fundamental and one of the most difficult 
elements of the crime of genocide’.154  However the report states that it is not an 
impossible task as there will be some indicators, which are unlikely to be explicit but 
which allow us to infer from the conduct of the actions that there is an intent to 
perpetrate genocide.  As the specific intent of the crime of genocide distinguishes it 
from other atrocity crimes, it is beneficial to examine the indicators of this intent as 
perceived by the Office of the Special Advisers. 
The indicators of genocidal intent are: 
i) Official documents, political manifests, media records, or any other 
documentation through which a direct intent, or incitement, to target a 
protected group is revealed, or can be inferred in a way that the implicit 
message could reasonably lead to acts of destruction against that group; 
ii) Targeted physical elimination, rapid or gradual, of members of a 
protected group, including only selected parts of it, which could bring 
about the destruction of the group; 
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iii) Widespread or systematic discriminatory or targeted practices or 
violence against the lives, freedom or physical and moral integrity of a 
protected group, even if not yet reaching the level of elimination; 
iv) Development of policies or measures that seriously affect the 
reproductive rights of women, or that contemplate the separation or 
forcible transfer of children belonging to protected groups; 
v) Resort to methods or practices of violence that are particularly 
harmful against or that dehumanize a protected group, that reveal an 
intention to cause humiliation, fear or terror to fragment the group, or 
that reveal an intention to change its identity; 
vi) Resort to means of violence that are particularly harmful or 
prohibited under international law, including prohibited weapons, 
against a protected group; 
vii) Expressions of public euphoria at having control over a protected 
group and its existence; and 
viii) Attacks against or destruction of homes, farms, businesses or other 
livelihoods of a protected group and/or of their cultural or religious 
symbols and property.155 
The development of these warning signals illustrates the evolution in the knowledge 
of the conditions that give rise to genocide and the indicators of genocidal violence in 
the early stages of a genocidal campaign.  From this reading of the development of 
early warning systems for genocide, it is clear that there has been a consistency in the 
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risk factors of genocide identified by academics, NGOs, and UN actors.  The studies 
highlight that states/regions are susceptible to genocide if there is political, social, 
economic, humanitarian, or environmental instability which creates a conducive 
atmosphere for a state or organisation to take measures to discriminately target a group 
or population. 
4.3(ii) An Elusive Crime? 
The research presented so far has shown that signs and evidence of genocide can be 
identified before or in the midst of violence, however there are a variety of 
complexities involved in identifying genocide which render it an arduous task.  
Identifying the precursors of genocide in the midst of violence is a substantive task as 
genocide rarely occurs in a vacuum, genocidal violence is usually part of a much larger 
conflict or situation with many different dimensions as highlighted by the situation in 
Rwanda.  The ‘Framework of Analysis’ illustrates the similarities between the acts of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleaning which mean that in the midst 
of bloodshed it is difficult to pinpoint these crimes.  These crimes may be 
distinguished by the intent underlying the crime, however identifying this intent as 
violence rages on is a complicated task for any observer.  While the ‘Framework of 
Analysis’ presents indicators of genocide intent, in practice it is a substantially 
different undertaking to connect the signs of genocide with the intent to destroy as 
violence swirls around. 
Furthermore identifying the presence of risk factors may not even be sufficient for 
preventing atrocity crimes, as the former Special Adviser on the Responsibility to 
Protect, Edward Luck, claims that the weakness of the UN system is not in identifying 
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early warning signals but in the analysis and assessment of these warning signs.156  For 
this reason while the indicators of genocidal intent are extremely helpful in providing 
criteria against which a situation may be analysed, it may still be difficult to fully 
comprehend these indicators in the midst of violence and to clearly distinguish the 
crime of genocide from other atrocity crimes.  Therefore while undoubtedly the 
creation of the position of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide is a huge 
step forward in the prevention of and early intervention into violent situations across 
the globe, the complicated task of identifying the elements of genocide remains.  The 
role of the Special Adviser is unlikely to be helpful in this regard due to the fact when 
creating the position Annan stated that ‘the Special Adviser would not make a 
determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the Convention had 
occurred.’157  The Special Adviser has said that ‘[i]f I wait until all the elements of 
genocide are in place according to international law, then by definition I have not 
prevented it.’158 
Nevertheless the mandate of the Special Adviser ensures that they or the UN is not 
rushed into making a definitive finding on the question of genocide in the midst of 
violence.  As the Special Adviser does not make a determination on genocide, when 
describing a situation they have used phrases such as ‘risk of genocide’ and ‘potential 
for genocide’ to describe unfolding threats or violence.159  Regardless of what term is 
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used, a statement declaring that genocide has been perpetrated ‘will remain a very 
serious allegation to make against a … government—and this would likely be equally 
true for any allegation that “precursors of genocide” are present on the territory of a 
given state.’160  With the potential for the genocide label to evoke strong political 
reactions, it may be more strategic or palatable for the Special Adviser to employ the 
label atrocity crimes to describe situations of violence. 
As a consequence of sharing a joint office with the Special Adviser on the 
Responsibility to Protect, those who have held the position of Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide have not always concentrated exclusively on the crime of 
genocide, rather they have also examined episodes of mass killings which do not 
always meet the definition of genocide.161  Public statements by the current Special 
Adviser, Adama Dieng, along with the development of the ‘Framework of Analysis 
for Atrocity Crimes’ illustrates that increasingly the focus of the Special Adviser’s 
activities is on the prevention of not just genocide but also the other atrocity crimes.162  
This is a promising development due to the difficulties of predicting the outbreak of 
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genocide and the issues surrounding identifying genocide in the early stages of 
violence. 
The difficulties outlined so far in this chapter with predicting the outbreak of genocide 
and recognising the signs of genocide in the early stages of violence illustrate the 
unsuitably of the genocide label as a means of preventing violence.  On account of this 
inadequacy, the thesis is proposing that the international community removes the 
focus on identifying genocide before or in the midst of violence.  Instead the 
international community should concentrate on preventing atrocity crimes, regardless 
of which legal label has been applied to characterise the violence.  Situating the 
prevention of genocide within the broader outlook of the prevention of atrocity crimes 
has been increasingly emphasised within the UN.  The statements of Kofi Annan and 
the work of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide highlight an approach 
which is aimed at preventing rather than defining or determining the crime of 
genocide.  A policy for prevention which does not get bogged down in definitional 
debates or in ranking the international crimes is a valuable strategy in addressing 
atrocity crimes.  The contention of this thesis is of a similar viewpoint in that with the 
rise in prominence of the duty to prevent atrocity crimes, the international community 
should not exhaust energy and time on identifying genocidal intent before or in the 
midst of violence.  The focus should be on analysing and interpreting the warning 
signals for atrocity crimes and formulating a preventative strategy to address the 
potential or actual violations of international law. 
However even if the presence of indicators of atrocity crimes can be identified before 
they happen or in the early stages of the perpetration of the crimes it does not mean 
that action will be taken in response to these indicators, and that preventative measures 
will be enacted to stop a situation before it breaks out or expands.  The nature of 
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international politics means that the world does not have the capacity for early warning 
signals and prevention; international politics is structured for crisis management but 
even that response is haphazard, if there is a response in the first place.163  Currently 
the prevention of violence is talked about far more than it is practiced.164  Samuel 
Totten is correct in asserting that ‘[w]ithout the willingness of an international body, 
a group of nations, or, at the very least, a single nation, to act to prevent a genocide or 
intervene early on, not even the most sophisticated and most efficiently operated 
genocide early warning system will be of much, if any, use.’165  The study of Rwanda 
highlights that if a state or states are reluctant to intervene no action will be pursued 
regardless of the levels of violence or signs of impending violence.  In Rwanda the 
lack of political will may explain why warning signals were missed or were refused to 
be acknowledged.166  Therefore the effectiveness of the early warning systems and the 
success of preventative strategies are tied to the political will of states, a lack of desire 
on their part to respond to atrocity crimes will ensure that the world is doomed to once 
again bear witness to genocide. 
4.4 Converting the Convention’s Promise to Reality 
The failure of the international community to convert the Convention’s obligation to 
prevent into a meaningful norm of international law has led to tragic consequences 
with the atrocities witnessed in Rwanda and Srebrenica.  In the aftermath of these 
genocides and the increased focus on political will, it was hoped that international law 
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would take precedence over politics.167  The subsequent creation of the ICC looked 
like the ground-breaking moment in the shift from realpolitik to the protection of 
international law.168  The judgment of the ICJ on state responsibility in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro lent support to this new trend as the Court 
declared that states have a direct obligation to prevent genocide under Article 1 of the 
Convention.169 
In examining the obligations under Article I of the contracting parties to the Genocide 
Convention, the ICJ held that state parties to the Convention have a responsibility to 
prevent and punish the crime of genocide.170  The ICJ held that the obligation to 
prevent arises when a state becomes aware or should be aware of the existence of the 
crime of genocide.171  The obligations to prevent and to not commit genocide have no 
territorial limit, they apply to states ‘wherever it may be acting or may be able to act 
in ways appropriate to meeting the obligations’.172  In meeting this obligation, states 
should employ all means and measures available to it and within its power to prevent 
genocide.173 
Despite this initial promise of action at the turn of century, we continue to observe an 
international community which is selective in preventing violence, regardless of 
whether the genocide label has been applied to a situation.  Issues of sovereignty and 
political will continue to plague the response and prevention of genocide, however 
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this is the political environment within which the Genocide Convention has to 
operate.174  Therefore the thinking around genocide prevention has to be around ways 
of seeking to address the crime of genocide, while removing the difficulties of the 
problematic label in the midst of violence.  As the failure of the international 
community to protect civilians at risk from massacre in Rwanda and also in 
Srebrenica, at a similar time point, and Darfur, in the early years of the 21st century, 
dashed the fanciful notion that the promise of ‘Never Again’ was being taken seriously 
by the international community.175  These tragic failures ‘laid bare that the world 
lacked a coherent policy and the will to prevent and respond to genocide and mass 
atrocity.’176  A new approach was required to protect civilians in the future. 
4.4(i) The Responsibility to Protect 
In the aftermath of Rwanda and Srebrenica; activists, politicians, and scholars began 
reconceptualising sovereignty, with sovereignty seen as encompassing a responsibility 
to protect civilians from grave violations of their human rights.177  This movement 
eventually led to the creation of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect.  In 2001, 
the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (hereafter ‘ICISS’), which developed the notion of a state 
bearing the responsibility for protecting its population.178  If a state fails to honour this 
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responsibility, then other states have a responsibility to disregard the norm of non-
intervention and take action to protect that state’s population.  The ICISS affirm that 
the UN Security Council is the appropriate UN actor for authorising intervention, 
however the ICISS would permit the UN General Assembly and regional 
organisations to act in situations where the UN Security Council had failed to act.179 
When the UN General Assembly met in September 2005 to celebrate sixty years of 
existence and debate its future objectives, the delegates voted to accept the doctrine of 
the Responsibility to Protect in the final Outcome Document.180  In comparable 
circumstances to the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the acceptance of a 
responsibility to protect populations arose at a time when the international community 
needed to find a way to address the failure to respond to atrocities.181  The doctrine 
declares that states have a responsibility to protect their populations from the crimes 
of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.  It is the 
responsibility of the international community to aid a state in protecting its population, 
and if a state fails to protect its population then the international community should 
engage diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means to protect populations.  If 
peaceful means are ineffective, the UN Security Council should be prepared to act 
under Chapter VII of the Charter to protect a population. 
The Outcome Document identifies the UN Security Council as the body responsible 
for authorising action.  Under the doctrine there is no obligation upon the Security 
Council to act and there is no mechanism for other states to act outside the realm of 
the Security Council.  This is despite the earlier ICISS report recommending that the 
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UN General Assembly and regional organisations could act in cases where the UN 
Security Council failed to respond.  There is also no reference in the Outcome 
Document to unilateral action or acting as a part of a coalition.  The designation of the 
UN Security Council as the organ responsible for authorising action was due to fears 
amongst non-aligned and smaller states, that the doctrine of RtoP is a mechanism that 
could be abused by larger states to justify intervention in the sovereign affairs of these 
smaller states.182  These states are ‘sceptical’ of the ‘altruistic claims’ behind the 
intervention of larger states in situations.183 
The fear with international law which focuses on intervention is that it will be used as 
a shield for military action by the major international players; in fact these states are 
more likely to use international law to justify inaction.184  This decision to restrict 
authorisation for action to the UN Security Council limits the application of the 
doctrine of the RtoP due to the threat of a veto which means that similar to the 
prevention of genocide, the responsibility to protect is dependent on political will.185  
Therefore we are reliant on the interests of the UN Security Council members aligning 
                                                 
182 Christine Gray, ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security System’ (2007) 56 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 157, 167; Karen A Mingst and Margaret P Karns, The 
United Nations in the 21st Century (3rd edn, Westview Press 2007) 112; Thomas G Weiss, ‘Halting 
Genocide: Rhetoric versus Reality’ (2007) 2 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, 17; Alex J Bellamy, 
‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention’ (2008) 84 International Affairs 
615, 616; Carlo Focarelli, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too 
Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine’ (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 191, 202; 
Edward C Luck, ‘Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 10, 17–18. 
183 Karen A Mingst and Margaret P Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century (3rd edn, Westview 
Press 2007) 112. 
184 Edward C Luck, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early Promise?’ (2010) 24 Ethics 
& International Affairs 349, 361. 
185 Aidan Hehir, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: “Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing”?’ (2010) 24 
International Relations 218, 222; Alex J Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Turns 10’ (2015) 29 
Ethics & International Affairs 161, 180; Aidan Hehir, ‘The Viability of the “Responsibility to Protect”’ 
(2015) 3 Politics and Governance 85, 91, 94. 
244 
for action to be taken in response to genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic 
cleansing, and war crimes. 
Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of the doctrine of the RtoP back in 2005, 
its relatively brief history has illustrated its mixed fortunes.186  The de-escalation of 
ethnic violence in the aftermath of disputed electoral results in Kenya is regarded as a 
successful application of the concept of the RtoP.  An AU-established mediation team, 
with the support of the UN, employed diplomatic and non-coercive measures to 
negotiate a political settlement.187  Despite the potential threat of genocidal violence, 
the actors did not employ the label genocide to describe the violence.  Instead during 
the violence, the Secretary-General and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide used the language of the RtoP to remind the parties to the violence that they 
had a responsibility not to violate the rights of civilians.188 
Since Kenya, the UN Security Council has increasingly referred to the RtoP to 
characterise situations in Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, 
Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Mali, and Syria, amongst other situations.189  RtoP terminology 
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has become increasingly part of the workings of UN actors and bodies such as the UN 
General Assembly, the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
the Human Rights Council, and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.190  
The history of the RtoP has undoubtedly shown that states have accepted that they 
have a responsibility to protect populations.  How they pursue this responsibility is 
another matter, however.191  There have been noted failures to respond with action to 
situations in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Sri 
Lanka, and Somalia.192  In particular, the failure of the UN Security Council to respond 
to the atrocities in Syria illustrates the difficulty of applying the RtoP in a world of 
powerful political alliances.193 
It seems that the RtoP doctrine as the Convention before it has failed to sufficiently 
challenge the primacy of state sovereignty and the will of states to pursue their own 
interests over the protection of populations.194  If states lack the will to intervene in a 
situation of violence without a state’s consent then the doctrine of the RtoP can never 
be an effective preventative instrument.  Instead the term Responsibility to Protect will 
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become part of the legacy of the failure of the international community to hold to their 
promise of ‘Never Again’. 
4.5 The Difficulty of Responding to Genocide 
The promise of prevention under the Convention has ‘lain dormant’ since the adoption 
of the Convention.195  The response to genocide is dictated by political interests and 
the notion of respecting sovereignty.196  However it appears that state practice has 
shown undue respect for the principle of sovereignty at the expense of protecting 
populations afflicted by violence.  Sovereignty is a bendable concept when it comes 
to advancing a state’s own interests, but appears as more rigid when it comes to an 
issue that is not directly in that state’s interests, including genocidal violence 
elsewhere.  The case of Rwanda exemplified the failings of states and highlighted the 
‘weaknesses’ of international law ‘rather than their strengths’.197  The much heralded 
creation of the role of Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not 
challenged the politicisation of the response to the crime of genocide.198  The hope of 
prevention expressed in the Convention has sadly fallen away to be replaced by an 
acceptance that intervention depends on a state weighing up the potential beneficial or 
disadvantageous rationale for intervening in a situation. 
While the prevention of genocide is dependent on the interests of states aligning, there 
remains complexities involved in identifying signs of genocide before or during 
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violent episodes that have been signposted throughout this chapter.  This chapter has 
described how the crime of genocide does not suddenly appear overnight, rather there 
are precursors that are lesser in ‘intensity, gravity and scale.’199  Through the work of 
academics, non-governmental organisations, and organs of the United Nations we 
have a much clearer picture of early indicators of the crime of genocide.  However the 
question of identifying the intent to destroy in the actions of a state or organisation is 
still a complicated task despite the expansion in our knowledge of the path to 
genocide.200  The difficulty of determining the crime of genocide can be highlighted 
in statements of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide that the risk factors 
of genocide could point not only towards genocide but also to other atrocity crimes.201 
Rwanda, albeit one of the clearest cases of genocide since the adoption of the 
Convention, illustrates the complexity of identifying warning signs of genocide before 
the outbreak of genocide and determining genocide in the midst of violence.  While 
precursors of genocide in Rwanda can be easily pinpointed after the fact, it was a 
complicated task faced by the international community to connect these warning signs 
to the crime of genocide in a country that had been beset by violence for much of its 
recent history.  Even with the outbreak of violence, it was unclear for the first few 
weeks whether the violence was the latest in the long line of ethnic strife connected 
with the civil war or genocidal violence.  When the international community becomes 
accustomed to a certain level of violence in a country or region, it becomes difficult 
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to change the mind-set of these actors to accept that genocide is a probable crime in a 
situation.  The proof of the perpetration of the crime of genocide, while evident to us 
now with the benefit of hindsight and documentary evidence, was unclear to the 
relevant actors at the time as the information provided to them was vague on the 
intention underlying the violence. 
If the genocide label sparks debates over definitional questions as it did in Rwanda 
rather than mobilising the international community into action, should the label be 
seen as a beneficial term to be employed in the pursuit of preventing widespread 
killing?  A question has to be asked, does the word genocide need to be spoken by the 
actors intervening in a situation for the crime to be prevented?  For example, in Kenya 
the successful intervention of the mediation team contributed to a de-escalation of 
ethnic violence that could potentially have become genocidal in nature.  Actors such 
as the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide never labelled the violence as 
genocide, instead they used the language of RtoP by reminding the parties to the 
violence that they had a responsibility not to violate the rights of civilians.  The 
successful intervention in Kenya illustrates that it is not important what label is applied 
to violence, instead what is critical is that preventative measures are taken against the 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes. 
This approach to violent situations is increasingly reflected in the work of the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide as alongside a closer relationship with the 
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, the Special Adviser on the Prevention 
of Genocide has assumed a mandate relating to the prevention of atrocity crimes 
alongside the prevention of genocide.  In dialogue with states, the Special Adviser has 
repeatedly affirmed that states have a responsibility to protect their populations from 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleaning.  This illustrates 
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that the United Nations and its members states responsibility for the prevention of 
genocide cannot be distinguished from its responsibility to prevent atrocity crimes.  
Therefore the distinction that had existed between the crimes has nearly completely 
disappeared over the last decade. 
With the difficultly of determining the intent to destroy before the outbreak of violence 
and in the midst of violence, is it helpful to continue to use genocide as a preventative 
label?  Especially when the adoption of the principles of the RtoP by states places the 
obligation to prevent genocide on the same standing as the duty to respond to crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing.  The initial fascination with the 
Convention was that it included a duty to prevent genocide, a duty that was not explicit 
in crimes against humanity or war crimes.  The elements of these crimes and the 
obligations contained within have been ‘significantly strengthened’ since the adoption 
of the Convention.202  The development of legal norms aimed at deterring international 
crimes culminating in the adoption of the RtoP doctrine has largely eliminated the 
flaws and gaps between genocide and enforcement of these international crimes.  The 
acceptance of the importance of preventing these crimes alongside their inclusion in 
the statute of the ICC illustrate that the lacuna which once existed in international 
criminal law has largely receded in recent decades. 
Therefore if states are hesitant or unwilling to employ the term genocide in the midst 
of genocide due to its complex understanding, which renders it arduous to identify and 
difficult to label, should the international community persist with the genocide label 
in the midst of violence or instead explore utilising the term atrocity crimes.  The term 
‘atrocity crimes’ could be employed to label ongoing violence while leaving the 
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determination of the crime of genocide to a competent international court or tribunal 
who can assess the evidence with the benefit of time rather than having to make an 
impulsive judgement in the midst of violence. 
Preferably delaying a determination on the issue of genocide until a competent 
international court or tribunal has the benefit of time to examine the evidence and 
render a conclusion based on the documentation and testimony it has collated over the 
years should remove a number of the complications and frustrations involved with 
attempting to apply the legal definition of genocide to an ongoing situation.  It could 
potentially remove the politicisation of the term in the midst of violence and eliminate 
the time taken to decide if the label should be applied to a situation.  If the genocide 
label is eliminated as a term to be applied to ongoing violence, it might potentially 
lead to states not being able to hide behind the defence of the difficulty of identifying 
the crime of genocide in the midst of bloodshed as a shield for their inaction in the 
face of violence. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the second strand of the research by examining why states 
and actors have often failed to label violence as genocide, and whether this lack of 
reaction is solely due to a lack of political will or could it be traced to faults within the 
definition of genocide, which render the elements of the crime difficult to identify and 
distinguish before violence occurs or in the midst of violence.  The research has shown 
that issues of sovereignty and state interests will guide the response of states and 
political actors to a given situation, however the presence of political will alone does 
not mean that genocide is suddenly identifiable as argued in this chapter.  The central 
argument of this chapter, as highlighted in the discussion of the response to Rwanda 
and the evaluation of the early warning systems for signs of genocide, is that warning 
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signs and evidence of genocide may be identifiable in the midst of violence however 
connecting the dots between the signs and evidence is a complex and arduous task.  
This means that the genocide label is ineffective if seeking a prompt response to a 
situation as it has complicated the response of states to situations of violence.  
Therefore this chapter has contended that in seeking a response to violence and to 
address the difficulties of identifying the signs and evidence of genocide, the atrocity 
crimes label should be employed to characterise violence so as the focus of prevention 
can be on the response and not the term used to label the violence.  The following 
chapter will explore further this proposal by examining the difficulties faced by organs 
of the UN and states when they investigate the potential perpetration of the crime of 
genocide, and in particular the problems encountered by these actors whilst attempting 
to identify the intent to destroy in the midst of violence. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CLOAKED BY BLOODSHED 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have illustrated the complexities of identifying genocide, as 
the determination of the crime of genocide hinges on proving that the intent to destroy 
is present in the actions of a perpetrator or state/organisation.  This element is difficult 
to distinguish in the midst of violence, however it is not an impossible task as 
illustrated by the jurisprudence of the international courts and tribunals and the 
indicators of genocide within the ‘Framework of Analysis’.  However the case study 
of Rwanda illustrates the complexity involved in determining genocide may not solely 
be due to identifying the elements of the crime but with how states respond and react 
to the genocide label.  These complexities of the genocide label are never more 
apparent in the midst of violence than when actors undertake investigations to 
determine whether genocide has been perpetrated in a given situation. 
The difficulties faced by the actors investigating the perpetration of genocide will be 
illustrated in this chapter by an examination of two UN-established inquiries, the first 
into the crimes committed in the Central African Republic, and the second on the 
crimes perpetrated by the Islamic State in the Sinjar region on the border of Iraq and 
Syria.  The UN is not the only actor who undertakes inquiries into the perpetration of 
genocide, individual states have also initiated their own commissions of inquiry in 
certain contexts.  I will analyse the potential conflicting approaches to determining 
genocide between a state and the UN by examining two separate investigations into 
the violence in Darfur, undertaken by the United States and the UN respectively.  The 
situation in Darfur sparked the most significant debate since the Rwandan Genocide 
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on the question of whether genocide had been perpetrated.1  The two investigations 
came down on opposite sides of the question as to whether genocide had taken place.  
The findings of these inquiries will be analysed to address why two investigations into 
the same situation resulted in different conclusions. 
The results of these disparate studies presented throughout this chapter should inform 
our knowledge of the crime of genocide and its applicability to an ongoing situation 
which will further address the second strand of the research on the difficulties of not 
only identifying genocide but employing the genocide label in the midst of violence.  
If the process of identifying genocide in the midst of violence is too complex or 
onerous, it raises further questions about the utility of the genocide label as a 
preventative term to be deployed in a situation which leads into the third strand of the 
research on how genocide should be prevented and responded to using the label of 
atrocity crimes.  Before beginning to address these contentions the chapter will turn to 
examine how the UN has sought to identify which crimes of international law have 
been perpetrated in the midst of violence and the potential difficulties faced by the 
actors and bodies in conducting an investigation in an ongoing situation. 
5.2 Investigating the Perpetration of Genocide 
The responsibility of examining whether genocide may have been perpetrated in an 
ongoing situation is generally given to commissions of inquiry established and 
mandated by organs of the UN.2  Commissions of inquiry have been variously created 
by the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, 
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the Secretary-General, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights.3  As 
commissions of inquiry are mandated by organs of the UN, the creation of an inquiry 
hinges on whether these actors and states possess the political will to address 
impunity.4  The inevitable selectivity in the establishment of commissions of inquiry 
means that double standards in international relations will prevail as not every 
situation involving the suspected violation of international law will be investigated.  
Similar to ICC investigations, commissions of inquiry will rarely be directed to 
examine the conduct of major states or their allies despite claims that their actions may 
violate international law due to the influential role of these states in international 
relations.  Therefore, once again similar to the ICC, the inquiries are predominantly 
focussed on violations of international law in African countries. 
The commissions of inquiry which are authorised are composed of three or five 
individuals; experts in the area of international criminal law and human rights who are 
usually from geographically diverse backgrounds.5  In conducting their investigations, 
commissions of inquiry gather background information on a situation, organise 
country visits, interview individuals, visit sites of reported atrocities, and examine 
documents, reports, and satellite imagery.6  The commissions of inquiry have to 
examine if: i) did the event or events under investigation occur; ii) does the 
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event/events constitute a violation of international law; and iii) whom is responsible 
for the violation of international law.7 
Commissions of inquiry are concentrated on the responsibility of a state or a non-state 
body for violations of international law rather than at the level of individual criminal 
responsibility.8  As commissions of inquiry are non-judicial in nature, the standard of 
proof generally employed by the commissions is ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’ that a crime has been committed.9  The standard of proof needed 
to determine an accused’s guilt in a court of law is distinct from the standard of proof 
required to classify a situation as genocide.  Instead of making definitive findings of 
crimes committed such inquiries recommend a course of action to international actors 
to respond to a situation.10  Commissions of inquiry are often the precursor to judicial 
investigation by the ICC or action taken by a UN body.11 
The potential complexities outlined in this research with identifying the elements of 
the crime before or in the midst of bloodshed does not mean that the UN commissions 
                                                 
7 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Commissions of Inquiry and 
Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice’ 
(2015) 60. 
8 Lyal S Sunga, ‘How can UN Human Rights Special Procedures Sharpen ICC Fact-Finding?’ (2011) 
15 The International Journal of Human Rights 187, 189. 
9 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Commissions of Inquiry and 
Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice’ 
(2015) 62. 
10 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Commissions of Inquiry and 
Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice’ 
(2015) 7, 10–11.  See also Dov Jacobs and Catherine Harwood, ‘International Criminal Law Outside 
the Courtroom: The Impact of Focusing on International Crimes for the Quality of Fact-Finding’ in 
Morten Bergsmo (ed), Quality Control in Fact-Finding (Torkel Opsahl Academic 2013) 329; Larissa J 
van den Herik, ‘An Inquiry into the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in International Law: Navigating 
the Tensions between Fact-Finding and Application of International Law’ (2014) 13 Chinese Journal 
of International Law 507, 527. 
11 Stephen Wilkinson, Standards of Proof in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-
Finding and Inquiry Missions (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
2012) 12; Dov Jacobs and Catherine Harwood, ‘International Criminal Law Outside the Courtroom: 
The Impact of Focusing on International Crimes for the Quality of Fact-Finding’ in Morten Bergsmo 
(ed), Quality Control in Fact-Finding (Torkel Opsahl Academic 2013) 335–336. 
256 
of inquiry cannot establish evidence that points towards the perpetration of genocide 
in ongoing situations.  The discussion of the report by the representatives of the 
Secretary-General in Rwanda in the previous chapter illustrates that genocide can be 
ascertained in the midst of violence.  However there are difficulties faced by these 
commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions in conducting their work and 
assessing the evidence gathered that illustrate the drawbacks of seeking to identify 
genocide in the midst of a situation. 
Conducting an investigation in the midst of a situation presents a number of challenges 
as the reality on the ground can constantly change.12  The missions work within a tight 
deadline so as to report back to their mandating body, in some cases it is only a couple 
of days they spend conducting country visits.13  Due to these resource and time 
constraints a commission of inquiry cannot examine every allegation; rather it has to 
select case studies to examine and investigate.14  This hampers their ability to 
accurately comprehend and represent the situation on the ground.  In the midst of a 
situation with ‘chaotic scenes of blood, broken bodies, busted buildings and shredded 
lives’, an investigator has to get to grips with the ‘historical, political, social and 
military context’ of the situation.15  Furthermore a dearth of available ‘reliable “inside” 
information makes it difficult to uncover the full range of motives behind official 
actions and policies’.16  Investigators are never the first to witness violence rather it is 
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local civilians, activists, journalists, and NGOs who are responsible for the early 
recording and reporting of a situation.17  It is these local actors who are most 
knowledgeable about the violence.18  However an ongoing situation hampers the ease 
of access to areas to visit and individuals to interview as an investigation is commonly 
carried out in a region beset by turmoil with uncooperative parties hindering the 
collection of evidence.19  The problem might not be a lack of evidence but rather an 
abundance of evidence of atrocities which investigators will have to sift through to 
identify a perpetrator’s intent to destroy a protected group.20 
The difficulties of determining intent are magnified when those who are committing 
genocide take steps to mask the genocidal violence.21  States or organisations are 
seldom explicit with their intent to destroy a group, rather they employ a number of 
strategies to hide the intent behind their actions and policies.22  This means that the 
intent of a perpetrator is hard to establish, particularly when a violent situation is 
‘unfolding in some inaccessible location.’23  Furthermore when there are numerous 
actors involved in a situation of violence, it can be difficult to identify who are the 
perpetrators and the victims when a country or a region is engulfed in violence.  
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Genocide is also unlikely to be the only act being committed in a situation; crimes 
against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes could be perpetrated by the same 
actors against the same target group/population.  Therefore in the midst of violence, 
the ability to infer intent in the conduct of an actor is an onerous task particularly when 
a situation is multifaceted and a perpetrator is acting in a manner to obscure the intent 
behind their actions. 
Notwithstanding the potential difficulties faced by commissions of inquiry in 
conducting their work, the benefits of an analytical view of a situation are of critical 
importance for international actors in responding to a situation.  Not only are the 
findings of an inquiry of importance in responding to a situation, the very presence of 
a commission in a country or region can potentially play a preventative role in a 
situation by encouraging a change in an actor’s behaviour by increasing the political 
engagement of an aggressor.24  However there is also the potential negative reaction 
to the deployment of a commission of inquiry such as a disengagement from a peace 
process, the expulsion of peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, and an increase in 
violations against a vulnerable population.25 
The discussion above highlights the difficulties faced by commissions of inquiry not 
only in trying to identify which crime or crimes of international law have been 
perpetrated, but also in conducting an inquiry in the midst of violence.  These 
difficulties can contribute to the complexity of identifying genocide as seen by 
examining the two distinct inquiries initiated by the government of the US and the UN 
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into the violence that enveloped the Darfur region in western Sudan over the course 
of 2003 and the ensuing years. 
5.3 Contrasting Conclusions in Darfur 
The deep levels of violence within Darfur compelled the United States government to 
undertake an investigation into the crimes committed which led Colin Powell, at the 
time the US Secretary of State, to declare that the violence was genocide.26  Powell 
referred the situation in Darfur to the UN Security Council, who established its own 
investigation, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, into the violations 
of international criminal law and which determined that genocide had not been 
perpetrated.27  How did these two investigations result in different conclusions when 
the two inquiries were examining similar facts?  Before examining the investigations, 
a brief history of the situation in Darfur will be outlined to explain why investigations 
needed to be conducted. 
Similar to the situation in Rwanda, the violence in Darfur was rooted in historic 
animosity and conflict as Darfur is home to a mixture of Arab and non-Arab ethnic 
groups, who have been competing for scarce resources over the decades.28  The non-
Arab ethnic groups believed that the Sudanese government gave preferential treatment 
to the Arab ethnic groups, and that Darfur was marginalised economically, socially, 
and politically.29  In 2003, a group calling itself the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
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attacked key infrastructure in Darfur controlled by the government of Sudan.30  In 
response to these attacks the Sudanese Army and an Arab militia, the Janjaweed, 
attacked non-Arab settlements in Darfur.31  The violence was repetitive in nature; the 
Sudanese army would carpet-bomb a village and then the Janjaweed force would 
attack the village.32  The attacks led to mass displacement of people in Darfur who 
sought refuge in internally displaced person camps.33 
The ten year anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide brought international attention to 
the inaction of the UN and its member states in Darfur.34  Numerous reports from 
academics, the media, and human rights organisations warned of a humanitarian crisis 
in the region, and a number of actors advised that the violence seen in Darfur could be 
genocidal in nature.35  Questions were raised over whether these attacks on villages 
had any connection with the conflict with the rebel movement or was it an attempt to 
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target non-Arab civilians.36  A major question was raised over the relationship between 
the Janjaweed and the government of Sudan, with reports that the Janjaweed were not 
only financially supported by the Government but also that Government troops 
participated in attacks on civilians.37  The investigative teams deployed by the US and 
the UN sought to clarify the relationship between the Janjaweed and the Government 
of Sudan, and establish what crimes were being committed and whether civilians were 
being targeted. 
5.3(i) United States’ Investigation 
An investigation was triggered by satellite images collected by the US government 
which showed the mass migration of the population and the widespread devastation 
across Darfur.38  To establish whether there was genocidal intent behind these actions, 
the US Department of State created the Atrocities Documentation Team, which 
included experienced investigators who had been involved in the ICTR and the 
ICTY.39  It was the ‘first ever official field investigation of a suspected genocide by 
one sovereign nation into another sovereign nation’s actions while the killing was 
underway’.40  The Atrocities Documentation Team conducted over a thousand 
interviews in refugee camps in Chad over the summer of 2004.41 
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Most interviews revealed a similar pattern in the attack, the first stage would be the 
aerial bombing of villages; which would be followed by government soldiers arriving 
in trucks and the Janjaweed arriving on horses and camels; then the soldiers and 
militias would enter and loot the village; and finally the villages would be destroyed 
to prevent civilians returning.42  Many interviewees stated that they had knowledge of 
mass burial grounds.43  The interviews revealed that the language used by the soldiers 
and militia was racist, including statements about killing ‘all the blacks’.44 
The Atrocities Documentation Team did not make a determination on whether 
genocide had been perpetrated; this question was left to the Department of State.  
Relying on the information and testimony gathered by the Atrocities Documentation 
Team and other sources available to the Department of State, Colin Powell felt 
confident to declare that the violence in Darfur was genocide.45  Powell contended that 
the evidence proved that the violence was not random but part of a coordinated attack 
to target the group with an intent to destroy.46  The decision was based on a number 
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of factors: i) villages of black Africans were targeted for attack; ii) the number of 
males who were killed and the number of women who were raped; iii) the destruction 
of crops, livestock, and water supply so as to prevent a means of existence; and iv) the 
prevention of humanitarian assistance in the form of medical care and food to reach 
internally displaced person camps.47  Powell held the Janjaweed and the Government 
of Sudan responsible for the genocide.48 
After making his determination, Powell acted under Article VIII of the Genocide 
Convention, and called upon the UN Security Council to undertake an investigation 
into the violations of international law.49  Powell took this approach as a legal adviser 
at the State Department had advised him that a finding of genocide would not obligate 
the US to intervene under the Convention; instead the US would satisfy its requirement 
under the Convention to prevent genocide by referring the situation to the UN Security 
Council.50  Therefore ten years on from the Clinton administration believing that using 
the word genocide in the midst of violence would require a state to take action in 
response, the United States’ government arrived at a diametrically opposed 
conclusion.51  The referral to the UN Security Council raises the question of the utility 
of a finding of genocide in the midst of a situation if it does not spark preventative 
action under the Genocide Convention to suppress genocide but rather results in more 
debates and deliberations about applying the genocide label to describe the violence. 
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Notwithstanding this, the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Project is historic for two 
reasons.  First of all it is the first time an individual state has undertaken an 
investigation to determine if the crime of genocide is being perpetrated, and secondly 
it is the first time a state has cited the provisions of the Genocide Convention when it 
referred the question of genocide to the UN Security Council.52 
5.3(ii) The United Nations’ Inquiry 
One week after Powell declared that genocide had been perpetrated in Darfur, the UN 
Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a commission of inquiry 
to ‘investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide had 
occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring 
that those responsible are held accountable’.53 
The Commission of Inquiry was chaired by Antonio Cassese, the first president of the 
ICTY.54  The Commission of Inquiry conducted a three month investigation, which 
included a number of trips to Darfur and the Sudan to gather evidence and interview 
witnesses from the Government of Sudan, the Janjaweed, the rebel groups, and 
NGOs.55  In examining the situation the Commission first of all set out that there were 
two irrefutable facts arising from the violence, the first fact was that there was mass 
displacement of the population and the second fact was that there was large-scale 
destruction of villages.56  The Commission determined that the Government of Sudan 
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and the Janjaweed were responsible for these violations of international law.57  The 
Commission determined that the Government of Sudan was legally responsible for the 
crimes committed by the Janjaweed as they had effective control over their actions.58  
On the question of which law/s of international law had been violated, the Commission 
stated that war crimes and crimes against humanity had potentially taken place; 
leaving it to an international court to conclusively rule on what specific laws had been 
violated.59  In contrast to Colin Powell’s finding, the Commission of Inquiry 
concluded that the Government of Sudan did not pursue a policy of genocide.60  How 
did the Commission arrive at this conclusion? 
The Commission recognised that some elements of the crime of genocide may be 
identified in the violence.61  In the opinion of the Commission there was undoubtedly 
evidence of systematic killing, violence causing serious bodily or mental harm, and 
the deliberate infliction of conditions of life likely to bring about the physical 
destruction of a protected group.62  In addressing whether there was a particular 
targeted group, the Commission used a subjective approach to conclude that the Fur, 
Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes were a protected ethnic group, ‘African’, under the 
Convention.63  The Commission recognised the distinction between ‘Arab’ and 
‘African’ which was prevalent in society in Darfur, and which was based upon support 
for the rebels (‘African’) or support for the government forces (‘Arab’).64 
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In examining the evidence of intent, the Commission looked to see if the Government 
of Sudan pursued genocidal plans or policies.65  The Commission acknowledged that 
there were potential indications of intent in the systematic nature of the violence and 
in statements made by those who are involved in targeting the African tribes.66  
Notwithstanding this evidence, the Commission determined that there were more 
convincing indicators which revealed the lack of intent.67  One such example was that 
the Government troops and the Janjaweed refrained from killing all civilians in a 
number of villages; rather the militia selected people out of the group who they 
believed were rebels.68  The Commission considered this as evidence of a lack of intent 
as the target of the attack were people who were viewed by the Government forces as 
rebels rather than the target being the group itself.69 
Another example the Commission presented was the evidence that people displaced 
from their villages after an attack are not killed but rather are provided for in internally 
displaced person camps.70  The belief of the Commission was that the aim of the 
Sudanese Government was to force the people to abandon the region, and not an 
attempt to destroy the group.71  The Commission stated that the conditions in these 
camps do not bring about the destruction of the group as the Government of Sudan is 
allowing humanitarian access to the camps.72  Interestingly the Commission concluded 
with a case involving two camel-owning brothers; in which one brother who owned 
two hundred camels was spared when the Janjaweed took the camels off him, while 
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the other brother was shot dead after refusing to hand over his one camel.73  The 
Commission produced this case as evidence that the Janjaweed did not have the 
intention to destroy a group, rather the intention was to steal the camels because if 
they possessed the intention to destroy the group they would have killed both 
brothers.74 
In its conclusion, the Commission determined on the basis of evidence obtained that 
the Government of Sudan had not pursued a policy of genocide in Darfur.75  The 
Commission found that the actions of the Sudanese Government was a component of 
its plan to drive the groups from their villages in its ‘counter-insurgency’ campaign in 
Darfur.76  The Commission stressed that their finding that genocide was not being 
perpetrated in Darfur did not detract from the international crimes which were 
committed against the groups or belittle the suffering felt by the victims.77  The 
Commission acknowledged that the crime of genocide ‘bears a special stigma’ but 
argued that other international crimes, in particular categories of crimes against 
humanity, are similarly heinous in nature.78 
5.3(iii) The Correct Approach? 
The Commission of Inquiry’s finding that the Government of Sudan did not pursue a 
policy of genocide was controversial and subject to critiques.  A number of human 
rights organisations, genocide scholars, and members of the Atrocities Documentation 
Team have been highly critical of the Commission’s report and instead have sided 
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with the finding of the US State Department.79  Critics have lambasted the 
Commission’s focus on the complete destruction of a group rather than addressing 
whether the targeted group was a substantial part of the larger group.80  Criticism has 
also been directed against the Commission for relying on the story of the two brothers, 
this example is maligned due to the opinion that focussing on one case study where 
genocidal intent is missing disregards the far more convincing evidence which was 
collected which indicated the intent behind the attacks.81 
The Commission’s conclusion is denounced for failing to account for the civilians who 
have been forced to flee their homes to internally displaced person camps, as the 
conditions in these camps have potentially led to the deliberate infliction of conditions 
calculated to bring about the destruction of the group as the Sudanese government has 
restricted humanitarian access and aid to these camps.82  The Commission’s finding is 
also dismissed for failing to address the genocidal act of bodily and mental harm which 
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has been perpetrated against civilians who have survived the attacks on the village but 
have suffered rape and torture.83  The rushed nature of the inquiry has also been 
criticised as the Commission only had three months to complete its investigation, a 
problem that the Commission acknowledges in its report.84  The role of the UN and its 
member states is also criticised, due to questions surrounding the backing and support, 
political and financial, provided to the Commission.85 
The Commission’s conclusion has been subject to criticism that this finding was based 
on political motivations rather than being the outcome of an appropriate legal 
determination.86  It is believed that because the AU, the Arab League, and China were 
opposed to labelling the violence as genocide, the Commission was pressurised to 
tailor their report to the satisfaction of these major states.  In critiquing this argument, 
Touko Piiparinen contends that the avoidance of the word genocide by the UN and its 
members states was not related to a lack of political will but rather due to a desire to 
maintain diplomatic relations with Sudan so as to advance peace talks and gain the 
Sudanese government’s cooperation in the protection of civilians.87  So even if the 
Commission’s finding on the question of genocide was tailored to suit international 
actors it does not automatically mean that states were reluctant to get involved, instead 
the genocide label could have been viewed by states as an obstacle to peace in the 
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region.  The subsequent reaction of the Sudanese government to Al Bashir’s ICC 
indictment for genocide illustrates that the fear expressed by these states about the 
threat to the peace process by employing the genocide label to characterise the 
situation was apt. 
Furthermore the finding that genocide was not perpetrated should not be automatically 
assumed to be a ‘deliberate denial’ of genocide as the Commission of Inquiry was not 
the only actor to find that genocide was not perpetrated.88  The European Union, 
Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Human Rights Watch have all 
stated that genocide was not committed as there was no evidence of the government’s 
intent to perpetrate genocide.89 
In fact a similar accusation that the finding on the issue of genocide was based on 
political concerns rather than legal substance has been directed towards the United 
States.90  It is claimed that the domestic pressure placed on the US government left 
Powell with no choice but to declare that genocide was being perpetrated.91  The 
political nature of the genocide determination was due to the United States government 
facing increasing pressure from Congress, Christian church groups, the media, and 
civil society groups to label the violence as genocide.92  Darfur saw one of the largest 
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mobilisations in civil society of actors since the anti-Apartheid movement, with the 
creation of the Save Darfur Coalition who protested against the violence and 
demanded action to be taken.93  These activists believed that labelling the violence as 
genocide would legally require the US government to intervene in Darfur.94 
The case study of Darfur, the ‘first case in which the Convention was officially 
invoked and directly applied to an on-going genocide’, perfectly captures the 
complexity of the genocide label as definitional difficulties complicated the response 
to the violence.95  These inquiries reveal the difficulty of identifying the intent 
underlying the crime of genocide in a multifaceted situation.  Despite the presence of 
political will from one of the leading states within the UN, the Commission of Inquiry 
could not infer the intent to destroy from the actions of the Sudanese government.  The 
United States’ engagement with the violence in Darfur illustrates that a finding of 
genocide is ‘not equivalent to actual action on the ground.’96  Apart from the US 
government’s declaration that genocide was being perpetrated in Darfur, the 
international reaction to the violence was comparable to the inaction witnessed in 
Rwanda.97  Even during a promising period when the doctrine of Responsibility to 
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Protect was being accepted in international circles and the UN created the office of 
the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, the international community failed 
to halt and meaningfully respond to the atrocities in Darfur.98 
The failure to respond to the violence in Darfur even after a huge awareness raising 
campaign by civil society actors shows that ‘raising the profile of an issue and 
generating domestic political will are insufficient to galvanize a policy to halt 
genocide.’99  The failure to respond should highlight to activists that genocide is not a 
‘magic word that triggers intervention.’100  The Save Darfur Coalition and the media 
have been accused of oversimplifying the situation by overly focussing on intervention 
as a means of ending the violence without providing a lasting solution to the 
situation.101  While the genocide label was important for ‘drawing attention’ to the 
situation in Darfur, it became a ‘distraction to effective action’ as actors dawdled over 
its definition.102  The debate over what label to apply to the violence shifted the focus 
nearly entirely away from the suffering felt by victims across Darfur.103  Darfur 
highlights the ‘dangers of placing too much emphasis on a term rather than on 
meaningful action.’104 
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The reaction amongst the media and civil society actors to the declaration by the 
Commission that genocide had not been perpetrated in Darfur further highlights the 
fundamental gap between the legal and social understandings of genocide.105  The 
Commission’s findings were labelled by some observers and civil society actors as a 
betrayal of victims and ‘virtually equivalent to Holocaust denial’.106  This sentiment 
completely overlooks the fact that the Commission did refer to crimes against 
humanity being committed which in international law were no less serious than 
genocide.107  Therefore whether a declaration of genocide is announced is of no real 
benefit to activists seeking intervention into a situation as they can refer to a state’s 
responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes.  The continued use of the 
term genocide by activists in an ongoing situation when they could refer to the other 
atrocity crimes emphasises that their focus on the genocide label is less on its promise 
of prevention but more on the moral value attached to a declaration of genocide in the 
midst of violence. 
It is important to note that the Commission did state that its findings on the lack of 
genocidal intent on the part of the Government of Sudan does not rule out the 
possibility that an individual within the Government committed acts of genocide with 
the intent to destroy a group.108  However the Commission declares that it is for a 
competent court or tribunal to assess whether an individual might be indicted for the 
                                                 
105 David Luban, ‘Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report’ 
(2006) 7 Chicago Journal of International Law 303, 309. 
106 See discussion in William A Schabas, ‘Darfur and the “Odious Scourge”: The Commission of 
Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 871, 873, 883. 
107 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, ‘Report of the International Commission on Darfur 
to the United Nations Secretary-General’ (25 January 2005) para. 505–506, 522.  See also David Luban, 
‘Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report’ (2006) 7 Chicago 
Journal of International Law 303, 306–309; Don Hubert and Ariela Blätter, ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect as International Crimes Prevention’ (2012) 4 Global Responsibility to Protect 33, 44–45. 
108 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, ‘Report of the International Commission on Darfur 
to the United Nations Secretary-General’ (25 January 2005) para. 520. 
274 
crime of genocide.  The Commission did hand over a list of names of individuals it 
identified as having potentially violated international law.109 
The fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC five years later had reasonable grounds 
to believe that the President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir, possessed the intent to destroy 
ethnic groups in Darfur highlights the potential benefits of not providing a definitive 
finding on the question of genocide in the midst of violence.110  This is the main 
argument of this research, that genocide is simply not a term which can be employed 
in an ongoing situation as the flawed nature of the definition ensures that the elements 
of the crime are indeterminable in the midst of bloodshed.  However it also important 
to note that the failure to execute the arrest warrant highlights the complexity of 
utilising the term genocide in a situation where an individual or state accused of 
genocide remains in power.  Therefore even if an international court or tribunal has 
the time to assess the evidence and make a conclusive finding on genocide, it does not 
mean that this will translate into effective action to prevent or suppress genocide. 
However the lack of response to genocide is not unique, if states do not possess the 
will to act no action will be taken regardless the label applied to a situation or evidence 
of violations of international criminal law produced by commissions of inquiry as 
illustrated by the failure of international actors to meaningfully respond to the 
situations in the Central African Republic and the crimes of the Islamic State.  The 
findings of these two inquiries are of critical importance in documenting violations of 
international law, however what do the inquiries reveal about the complexities of 
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identifying genocide and applying the genocide label in the midst of an ongoing 
situation? 
5.4 The Crisis in the Central African Republic 
The International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic was 
established in December 2013 by the UN Security Council to investigate reported 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law.111  The inquiry was 
created in response to a fear that the situation in the Central African Republic ‘could 
turn into a genocidal killing spree.’112  While the UN Security Council did not refer to 
genocide in establishing the Commission, fears of genocide potentially taking place in 
the Central African Republic were expressed by the Special Adviser on the Prevention 
of Genocide, the Director of Operations of the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the NGO the International Federation for 
Human Rights.113 
5.4(i) The Context of the Inquiry 
The post-colonial history of the Central African Republic is a familiar story, with a 
succession of military dictators running the country for their own benefit.114  With an 
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authoritarian state, weak governance and institutions, an underdeveloped economy 
and society, and a history of violence the Central African Republic displayed 
numerous indicators of atrocity crimes, and was ever present in the 2010s on the 
warning lists, created by academics and NGOs of countries at high risk of mass 
atrocities.115 
The violence which the Commission of Inquiry was investigating began in March 
2013 when Michel Djotodia and his Séléka rebel coalition, predominantly comprised 
of Muslim fighters, ousted the incumbent dictator and installed a new military 
government with Djotodia as the new president.116  The Séléka lacked homogeneity, 
rather it was a combination of loose groupings of rebel factions that were brought 
together against the ruling leader due to issues of corruption, lack of access to power, 
lack of services and development, and the feeling that government excluded Muslims 
while preferring Christian groups.117  Similar to the situations in Rwanda and Darfur, 
existing tensions between groups, while not always violent in nature, were exacerbated 
and manipulated.118 
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Initial feelings of hope with this new government were quickly dispelled when it 
carried out similar violations of human rights which had characterised the previous 
government.  The forces targeted neighbourhoods which were loyal to the previous 
government, and there were reports of executions, illegal detentions, torture, rape, 
looting, and destruction of property.119  These attacks were largely perpetrated against 
the Christian and Animist communities.  Djotodia did order the disbanding of Séléka 
in September 2013, however this had ‘little practical impact’ on halting the violence 
as the loose nature of the Séléka meant that Djotodia lacked control over large swathes 
of the coalition.120 
Opposition to the Séléka formed in the aftermath of these incidents; with the creation 
of anti-balaka militias, a loose association of self-defence groups comprising former 
government and army members and which are primarily Christian.121  The anti-balaka 
militias responded to the Séléka atrocities against non-Muslims by waging a campaign 
of violence against Muslims.122  The violence spiralled into reprisals by both sides 
targeting either the Muslim or non-Muslim groups.123  Civilians became the primary 
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casualty of the Séléka and anti-balaka violence.  The violence resulted in over 400,000 
civilians seeking refuge in neighbouring countries and over 800,000 internally 
displaced persons.124  The violence also contributed to a humanitarian crisis in a 
country that even before the outbreak of violence was severely underdeveloped.125 
In response to the crisis, regional and international actors have been active in 
condemning the violence and taking measures to address the violations of international 
law.  While before the outbreak of violence, the Central African Republic was of low 
importance in the international community the Central African Republic did appear as 
the perfect venue for the application of the RtoP doctrine.126  This was due to clear 
evidence of mass atrocities occurring that the government was not protecting its 
citizens from, there was support or at least no obstacles from regional actors for action, 
and probably most importantly the Central African Republic was not at the centre of 
competing strategic international importance for actors of the UN Security Council.127 
In 2013, the AU Peace and Security Council suspended the Central African Republic 
from the AU and imposed sanctions against senior officials.128  The UN also imposed 
a sanctions regime, including a travel ban and assets freeze, against leading figures in 
the crisis.129  The AU created a peacekeeping mission, the African-led International 
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Support Mission to the Central African Republic (hereafter ‘MISCA’) with a force 
strength of around six thousand troops.130  At the same time as the UN Security 
Council created the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African 
Republic, the UN Security Council also authorised MISCA, alongside a French 
mission Operation Sangaris, under Chapter VII of the Charter to protect civilians, 
support humanitarian access, contribute to security, and disarm the militias.131  France, 
the former colonial power in the Central African Republic, deployed a 1,200 strong 
force (Operation Sangaris) to bolster 400 troops already stationed in the country 
because Laurent Fabius, the French Foreign Minister, warned that genocide was on 
the verge of occurring.132 
Initially it seemed as if the international and regional involvement was having a 
measure of success, as the increasing number of atrocities committed by both the 
Séléka and anti-balaka militias forced the Central African Republic’s neighbouring 
countries to demand that Djotodia step down as president in early 2014.133  A new 
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transitional government was installed, and while this process removed the Séléka from 
power the transition of power did not put an end to the violence as the two sides 
continued their respective campaigns against the civilian population.134  MISCA was 
also struggling as the mission was lacking in financial and logistical support, and also 
lacked the number of troops required to oversee the operations in a sizeable country.135  
The diplomatic efforts to install the new transitional governmental meant that the UN 
Security Council ignored concrete action to prevent the violence.136  ‘Reminiscent’ of 
Rwanda and Darfur the ‘early warnings of the escalating systematic violence in the 
CAR were not matched by an immediate, adequate response from the international 
community.’137  The failure to adequately address the violence eventually led to the 
EU Council to deploy a mission, authorised by the UN Security Council, to the Central 
African Republic in April 2014.138  With the failure of MISCA to stabilise the situation 
the UN established the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the 
Central African Republic (hereafter ‘MINUSCA’) with a force strength of 12,000 to 
replace MISCA in April 2014.139  The AU, Russia, and the US were initially opposed 
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to a UN mission as they believed that MISCA, Operation Sangaris, and the EU mission 
could stabilise the situation.140  By the time MINUSCA deployed, after 18 months of 
violence, there were thousands killed, and tens of thousands left injured, mentally and 
physically.141 
In the midst of this violence and spiralling humanitarian crisis, the International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic conducted its investigation 
into violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by undertaking site 
visits and interviewing over nine hundred individuals (including victims, witnesses, 
religious leaders, civil society representatives, local and international NGOs, UN and 
international actors, government officials, opposition politicians, and members of the 
armed groups).142  This was complicated by the ongoing violence as access to a 
number of areas of the country and sites of potential crimes was impeded, which 
potentially may have impacted on the ability of the Commission to identify elements 
of genocide in the midst of violence.143 
5.4(ii) The Question of Genocide 
On addressing the question of genocide, the Commission concentrated on the 
atrocities committed by the anti-balaka militias against Muslim civilians.144  The 
Commission recognised that the anti-balaka deliberately targeted the Muslim 
population.145  The anti-balaka militias conducted a widespread campaign against the 
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Muslim population with, as recognised by the Commission, the ‘desire to kill as many 
Muslims as possible’.146  The anti-balaka deliberately targeted the Muslim population 
by burning their houses, businesses, and mosques, and by killing Muslims who tried 
to flee.147  The Commission found that the majority of the Muslim population was 
deported or forcibly transferred from the country due to the campaign directed against 
them by the anti-balaka.148  A number of Muslims were forced to stay in international 
protected enclaves however the anti-balaka deliberately prevented them from 
accessing food, water, and medical care.149  The campaign against the Muslim 
population led to the reduction of the number of Muslims living in the capital city, 
Bangui, by 99% (from 100,000 to 1,000 in a couple of months).150  It was estimated 
that more than 80% of the Muslim population has had to flee the country.151 
To establish if genocide was perpetrated, the Commission concentrated on whether 
the expulsion of the Muslim population created conditions of life calculated to bring 
about the destruction of a group under Article II (c) of the Convention.152  To identify 
the specific intent behind these crimes the Commission examined ‘the general context, 
the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, 
the scale of the atrocities, whether there was systematic targeting of victims on account 
of their membership of a particular group, and whether the destructive and 
discriminatory acts were repetitive.’153  The Commission concentrated on the acts of 
forcible transfer of a population to determine whether there was specific intent 
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underlying the acts.154  The Commission agreed with the case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals that while the crime of forcible transfer is not an act of genocide it may 
indicate genocidal intent.155  Therefore the Commission examined whether there were 
‘sufficient indicia of genocidal intent for which forcible transfer would lead to the 
establishment of a reasonable inference of specific intent to destroy the targeted 
group.’156 
On the basis of the evidence available to its investigation, the Commission could not 
conclude that genocide had been committed by the anti-balaka militias.157  The 
Commission stated that ‘[i]n the absence of evidence demonstrating reasonable 
grounds to believe that the targeting and transfer of the population took place with 
specific intent to destroy the group as such, the Commission is not able to conclude 
that the crime of genocide took place.’158  There was not ‘sufficient evidence’ for the 
Commission to conclude that ‘attacks of the anti-balaka forces against the Muslim 
population were undertaken with the specific intent to achieve the physical destruction 
of the group, either in part or in whole.’159 
The Commission did determine that the anti-balaka’s campaign against the Muslim 
group ‘could constitute the crime of persecution.’160  The Commission also determined 
that the anti-balaka militia’s campaign against Muslims could be deemed as ethnic 
cleansing, which the Commission stated is comprised of the crimes of persecution and 
forcible transfer and therefore should be prosecuted as a crime against humanity.161  
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The Commission stressed that a lack of a finding that genocide had occurred did not 
lessen the crimes which had been perpetrated in the situation.162  The Commission 
cautioned that the perpetration of the crime of genocide is still a possibility in the 
future if the situation in the Central African Republic is not addressed.163 
5.4(iii) The Utility of a Genocide Determination 
While the Commission may have concluded that genocide was not perpetrated, the 
work of the Commission and the international responses to the violence in the Central 
African Republic illuminate the various complexities, outlined in this study, involved 
in identifying genocide in the midst of violence.  The various warnings of genocide 
have been criticised for failing to understand the violence; Alex de Waal contended 
that genocide was not occurring, as the violence was not ‘large-scale and systematic’ 
and was being ‘driven by the contingencies of fear, not a deeply nurtured intent to 
destroy another ethnic group.’164  Ilmari Käihkö and Mats Utas also stated that what 
was happening in the Central African Republic was not genocide as the Séléka, the 
anti-balaka, and other militias lacked the central organisation that is required to 
perpetrate genocide.165  De Waal argued that when the French Foreign Minister 
warned of genocide, this reference to genocide was a means of building domestic 
support for action by relying on the rhetorical value of the genocide label.166 
For de Waal this misdiagnosis of the situation as genocide can have ‘serious 
downsides’ as it can lead to states taking the ‘wrong actions to resolve it.’167  Käihkö 
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and Utas argue that while the focus on genocide may bring greater international 
attention to the situation it may lead to international actors ‘taking the wrong decisions 
and focussing on the wrong issues.’168  However it is difficult to assess the impact that 
the fears of genocide expressed by the French Foreign Minister alongside similar fears 
expressed by UN actors had on the response to the violence and whether it led to these 
actors pursing the wrong approach.  However it does show how actors can view the 
genocide label as a distraction from or impediment to effective measures to respond 
to violence. 
The report of the Commission does illustrate the difficulty of predicting the crime of 
genocide as despite the various warnings of the risk of genocide from international 
actors the situation did not develop along genocidal lines.  While the creation of early-
warning signals by academics, NGOs, states, and the UN have been a positive 
development in the prevention of violence, there remains the question of how certain 
states such as the Central African Republic which exhibit risk factors of atrocity 
crimes manage to avoid genocide or large-scale violence.169  The UN has recognised 
this concern by noting that the presence of risk factors of atrocity crimes in a 
country/region does not inevitably mean that atrocity crimes will be perpetrated.170  
The ‘Framework of Analysis’ discusses the idea of triggering factors of atrocity crimes 
such as sudden changes to a country brought about by regime change, natural disaster, 
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epidemics, and financial crises.  These triggering factors can often explain why a 
country/region can suddenly be engulfed in violence, however they may be difficult 
to predict due to their abrupt nature.171  Therefore it is still an arduous task in predicting 
whether a country/region will be enveloped in violence. 
Genocide is not only difficult to predict, it is a complex crime to identify as 
emphasised in the report of the Commission.  The Commission once again, as the ad 
hoc tribunals and other commissions of inquiry before it, underlines the central 
importance of the intent to destroy element of the crime in identifying genocide.  The 
report of the Commission highlights the difficulties of divining this intent to destroy 
in the actions of an accused state or organisation, particularly when an actor is 
perpetrating multiple violations of international law.  It is an arduous task to 
distinguish the crime of genocide from other atrocity crimes especially when an act 
such as the forcible transfer of a population can be presented as evidence of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. 
However did this inquiry overlook persuasive evidence which indicated that the 
murders and widespread attacks perpetrated against the Muslim population were 
committed with the intent to destroy a group?  Specifically the Commission’s finding 
that the anti-balaka possessed the ‘desire to kill as many Muslims as possible’ would 
imply that the anti-balaka acted with the intent to destroy a group.  In their report, the 
Commission fail to reconcile this desire to kill with their finding that there was a lack 
of evidence of specific intent.  It seems a critical issue to not consider the evidence of 
a desire to kill all Muslims and instead concentrate on identifying the specific intent 
underlying the forcible transfer of the Muslim population.  Conceivably the forced 
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displacement of the population is a consequence of this intent to kill all Muslims.  
Therefore it could be argued that there are reasonable grounds to believe genocide has 
been perpetrated with the specific intent to destroy the Muslim population. 
If the evidence pointed towards reasonable grounds for concluding that genocide may 
have been committed, why did the Commission not label the violence as genocide?  
Did the Commission tailor their findings due to a lack of political will on behalf of 
states to act in response to genocide?  This is a complex question; while at certain 
times in 2014 a number of states showed a reluctance to get further involved, regional 
and international actors played a key role in the response including the deployment of 
security missions.  While it could be argued that the Commission had to be mindful of 
the potential ramifications of a genocide finding on the resolution of the situation, the 
fact that the Commission highlighted that crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing were equally serious crimes requiring international response illustrates that 
the Commission were not hesitant in reminding states of their obligations under 
international law. 
Furthermore it could be the case that the Commission is overstating this desire to kill, 
and instead murder and widespread attacks are being used as a method to force the 
Muslim population to flee the country; acts which, absent an intent to destroy, would 
fall into the categories of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.  The 
Commission of Inquiry is not the only actor to find no evidence of a genocidal 
campaign due to a lack of specific intent and instead label the violence as crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. 
The Prosecutor of the ICC, in conducting a preliminary inquiry into the situation in 
the Central African Republic after the government of the country referred itself to the 
288 
ICC in 2012, found that there is a ‘reasonable basis to believe that both the Séléka and 
the anti-balaka groups have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes’.172  
On the issue of genocide, the Prosecutor determined that the evidence available ‘is 
inconclusive on the question of whether the alleged crimes described in this report 
were committed with the requisite intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical racial or religious group, as such.’173  The Commission did refer to the ICC’s 
conclusion on the question of genocide in reaching their own finding on the existence 
of a campaign of genocide.174  The Prosecutor did state that this ‘conclusion is 
provisional and not binding for the purpose of any future investigation.’175 
As the Prosecutor of the ICC’s preliminary examination was presented before the 
submission of the Commission’s report, the information contained in the 
Commission’s investigation may have altered their view on the existence of a 
campaign of genocide.  This could be important as on the basis of the evidence 
gathered during the preliminary inquiry and on a referral from the transitional 
government of the Central African Republic, the Prosecutor was authorised to open 
an investigation into crimes committed since 2012.176  The findings of this 
investigation may mirror the ICC investigation in Darfur, where with the benefit of 
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time and access to greater levels of documentation, the Prosecutor of the ICC can 
identify the elements of the crime. 
However regardless of whether the ICC eventually finds potential evidence of 
genocide, the Prosecutor as well as the Commission have found evidence that indicates 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing were perpetrated; which are not lesser 
crimes than genocide.  The international community has the responsibility to protect 
populations from these crimes of international law as reinforced by the 
Commission.177  Therefore a finding of genocide should not change the approach of 
the international community to resolving the situation in the Central African Republic.  
It seems uncertain that a finding of genocide would have changed the strategy of the 
international community towards the situation as by the time the Commission’s report 
was presented the international community had already taken steps to respond to the 
violence.  While the efforts to halt the violence were inadequate; states were already 
acting to prevent violence using a combination of diplomatic and more forceful 
measures and the ICC was acting to punish violations of international law.  If genocide 
does not provoke a different response to crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing, 
is there any benefit to international actors in employing the singular term in the midst 
of violence. 
Therefore irrespective of whether genocide occurred, the complexities of the genocide 
label, in regards to predicting and identifying the crime, highlight the need for a 
unifying term such as atrocity crimes.  The presence of a new name does not mean 
that suddenly action will be taken to respond to atrocity crimes, as the response to the 
evidence of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing in the Central 
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African Republic illustrates, as Rwanda and Darfur before it, that ‘[d]ecisions on the 
prevention of widespread human rights violations remain hostage to the political will 
of P5 members.’178  However the current situation is not viable as while the efforts of 
the international community to resolve the situation in the Central African Republic 
have had some successes, including the democratic election of a new government, 
there have been numerous setbacks, and the situation between the anti-balaka and the 
ex-Séléka forces remains tense and vulnerable to the perpetration of mass violence.179  
The failure to halt the violence meant that in 2017 there were further warnings about 
the risk of genocide from the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs.180  
This failure to adequately address the situation indicates that a new way is needed to 
fulfil the international community’s responsibility to protect civilians from all atrocity 
crimes.  Removing the focus off labels and onto the prevention of and response to 
violations of international law, can only be beneficial to the victims of atrocities as 
while genocide is a significant label for victims its use does not signify action and/or 
accountability as illustrated by the case of the Yazidis of Sinjar. 
5.5 The Destruction of the Yazidi People 
The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 
was established by the Human Rights Council to conduct investigations into the 
violations of international law in Syria since 2011.181  The Commission’s mandate for 
the particular investigation which I will focus on in this section was to examine the 
events after the attack on the 3rd of August 2014 by members of the Islamic State and 
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Al-Sham (hereafter ‘ISIS’) against the Yazidi group in the Sinjar region of Northern 
Iraq, with a particular focus on whether ISIS had perpetrated genocide.182 
5.5(i) A Destructive Environment 
The Yazidi are a ‘Kurdish-speaking religious minority.’183  There are an estimated 
700,000 Yazidis located across the world, however the majority of adherents of the 
Yazidi faith live in the Sinjar region; the region, located close to the Iraqi-Syrian 
border, is predominantly comprised of the Yazidi population with a number of Arabs 
who are Sunni Islam also living in the region.184  The Sinjar region was surrounded by 
ISIS-controlled areas in Iraq and Syria.185  Even before the creation of ISIS, the Yazidi 
were on the margins of society in Iraq due to their ‘relatively small numbers and their 
religious beliefs.’186  The tenets of their religion, the belief in a fallen angel, have seen 
the Yazidi perceived as devil worshippers by Muslims and Christians.187  These 
religious beliefs have led to the Yazidi being repeatedly persecuted throughout their 
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existence.188  These religious beliefs came into conflict with the goal of ISIS in 
creating an Islamic caliphate.189  ISIS regarded the Yazidi as ‘theologically impure 
due to their diverging belief systems.’190  The beliefs of the Yazidi made them 
‘legitimate targets of mass murder, forced conversion and slavery.’191  ISIS’s 
‘interpretation of Qur’anic principles and Islamic history’ served as justification for 
targeting the Yazidis of Sinjar for destruction.192 
The attack on the Sinjar region began in the early hours of the 3rd of August, with ISIS 
coordinating attacks on the towns and villages from its bases in Iraq and Syria.193  The 
vast majority of the population fled the region, but those Yazidis remaining were 
forced to convert or suffered acts of repression.  ISIS fighters concentrated on 
capturing Yazidis by setting up checkpoints and encircling villages, and the 
Commission estimate that thousands were captured in that way.194  In the towns and 
villages across Sinjar, ISIS separated men from women and children, recalling the 
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violence seen in Srebrenica, and perpetrated ‘systematic and distinct’ violations 
against each group.195  Within days of the attack, reports emerged of systematic 
violence being perpetrated against the Yazidis including mass killings, forced 
conversion of religion, forced transfer of women and children into Syria, forced 
marriages of women to ISIS commanders, sexual slavery of women and young girls, 
and young boys being placed in ISIS training camps.196  Hundreds of men were 
executed, if they refused to convert, while thousands of women and children were sold 
into sexual slavery.197 
Those who fled the region, over 100,000 Yazidi, before the arrival of ISIS to their 
villages also suffered distinct violations as ISIS killed or captured many who tried to 
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flee.198  A number of Yazidi, estimated around 40,000 to 50,000, who fled made their 
way to Mount Sinjar where they sheltered in the upper plateau.199  Tragically ISIS 
encircled the mountain and trapped tens of thousands of men, women, and children in 
unbearable conditions without access to food, water, and medical attention.200  In 
response to the developing humanitarian crisis on Mount Sinjar, the US, French, and 
UK governments authorised humanitarian aid drops in the days after the attack.201  The 
US conducted air strikes, at the request of the Iraqi government, beginning the 8th of 
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August around Mount Sinjar to help relieve the suffering population.202  Obama stated 
that he authorised these air strikes due to the threat of genocide.203  Despite these air 
strikes, hundreds died on Mount Sinjar before the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish forces 
created a corridor for the Yazidis to flee the mountain.204 
The effects of the attack on the Yazidi is plain to see, as the 400,000 Yazidis who lived 
in the Sinjar region have ‘all been displaced, captured, or killed.’205  Whether the 
atrocities perpetrated against the Yazidis constituted the crime of genocide, amongst 
other violations of international law, is what the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic sought to answer. 
5.5(ii) The Critical Element 
In conducting their inquiry, the Commission interviewed ‘survivors, religious leaders, 
smugglers, activists, lawyers, medical personnel, and journalists’ and relied upon 
documentary evidence from ‘statements, photographs, satellite images, and reports’ 
as well as material produced by ISIS themselves to document the violations of 
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international law.206  In addressing the crime of genocide, interestingly the 
Commission refers to how genocide as viewed in the ‘public imagination’ is different 
than the legal definition.207  The Commission states that genocide is often equated with 
the mass extermination of civilians without any reference to the specific intent to 
destroy a group.208  The Commission reinforces that the specific intent to destroy is 
the key component of the crime of genocide.209 
Before examining whether the intent to destroy could be inferred from the actions and 
statements, the Commission addressed the other elements of the crime of genocide.  
The Commission, following the jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY, used a 
combination of objective and subjective elements to determine that the Yazidis were 
a protected religious group.210  Objectively the Yazidi religion has existed for 
thousands of years and while it incorporates elements of other religions it has its own 
distinct traditions.211  Members of the Yazidis who were interviewed by the 
Commission also self-identified themselves as a ‘separate religious denomination’.212  
Furthermore ISIS subjectively identified the Yazidis as a distinct religious group as it 
used the religious beliefs of the Yazidis as justification to abuse and attack the 
Yazidis.213 
In documenting the acts under Article II of the Genocide Convention perpetrated 
against the Yazidi, the finding that the act of killing had been committed in the attack 
was apparent from the evidence provided by witnesses to the initial attack and the 
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subsequent violence imposed on the Yazidis.214  The Commission considered that 
evidence of rape, sexual violence, sexual slavery, enslavement, torture, forcible 
transfer, indoctrination, and inhuman and degrading treatment amounted to acts 
causing both physical and mental harm.215  The Commission found that the 
perpetration of these acts and the forced separation of families had a profound effect 
on the mental health of the victim’s/victims’ family as they were forced to either bear 
witness to crimes committed or suffer the uncertainty of the fate of family members 
after being forcible transferred.216 
The Commission determined that ISIS had committed and was presently committing 
the act of deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical 
destruction of the Yazidis.217  They reached this decision after examining the evidence 
of ISIS encircling and besieging the Yazidis who fled into the upper slopes of Mount 
Sinjar in the aftermath of the attack on the 3rd of August.218  ISIS deprived the Yazidis 
access to food, water, and medical care, and also prevented planes from delivering aid 
packages and attacked rescue helicopters which sought to evacuate those in need of 
medical attention.219  Furthermore, the Commission determined that ISIS deliberately 
inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of women and girls 
that were enslaved and subjected to sexual violence, as they were deprived of food, 
water, and medical care while in captivity and servitude.220 
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The Commission concluded that ISIS had imposed and was still imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the Yazidis.221  The Commission stated that the acts 
of ‘rape; sexual mutilation; the practice of sterilisation; forced birth control; separation 
of the sexes; prohibition of marriages; impregnation of a woman to deprive group 
identity; and mental trauma resulting in a reluctance to procreate’ were committed 
with the intent to prevent births.222  The Commission determined that ISIS had 
committed and was committing the crime of forcibly transferring children from the 
Yazidi group.223  When young girls reached the age of nine, they were forcibly taken 
from their mother and sold as sex slaves.224  Young boys who turn seven are forcibly 
removed from their mothers and taken to training camps to instruct them how to fight 
and to convert them to Islam.225  This forced transfer seeks to destroy the children’s 
identity as a Yazidi and prevent them from practising their religion.226  The 
Commission looked at the issue of whether destruction of cultural property and 
heritage could amount to genocide as evidence was presented that Yazidi temples and 
shrines were destroyed in the aftermath of the attack.227  Referring to the case law of 
the ICTY and ICJ, the Commission held that the destruction of cultural property is 
evidence of an intent to destroy.228 
In examining the genocidal intent of ISIS, the Commission referring to the approach 
developed in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, inferred the intent to destroy from 
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the conduct, propaganda, and public statements of ISIS.229  The Commission believed 
that the acts perpetrated against individual Yazidis was part of an ‘overall objective’ 
to destroy the Yazidi identity which would lead to the destruction of the Yazidis 
themselves.230  The Commission determined that the matter of ISIS fighters possibly 
being motivated by ‘territorial control’ or ‘sexual gratification’ from the enslavement 
of Yazidi women and girls did not prevent the ISIS fighters also possessing the intent 
to destroy the Yazidis in their actions.231  The aim was to destroy the Yazidi identity 
by death, forced conversions, or forced transfers.232 
The Commission refer to the obvious ‘organisational effort’ which was put in place to 
align the actions of the ISIS fighters with the ideological position of ISIS with regard 
to the treatment of the Yazidis when they were captured so as to create a uniform 
approach to the attack and its aftermath.233  Propaganda material released by ISIS, 
including its English language magazine Dabiq, was analysed to show that ISIS had 
developed an ideological approach to treating the Yazidis before their attack.234  The 
‘religious interpretation’ provided by Islamic State scholars guided the actions taken 
by the ISIS fighters when they captured Yazidis and their treatment of Yazidis in 
captivity and servitude.235  The ideology of ‘ISIS-interpreted Islam’ was present in the 
interactions ISIS fighters had with the Yazidis, with Yazidi women and girls being 
labelled as kuffar (non-believers) when they were being held as slaves.236  The actions 
taken by ISIS fighters of killing males and adolescent boys who did not convert, 
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enslaving and sexual slavery of women and girls, and the forced conversion and 
indoctrination of boys into the ranks of ISIS all ‘adhered seamlessly to the religious 
mandates set out by its “scholars” concerning how to treat Yazidi captives.’237 
The Commission found that ISIS fighters concentrated their attention exclusively on 
the Yazidis, by virtue of them being Yazidi.238  The other religious communities in the 
region did not suffer the level of destruction faced by the Yazidis.239  In the Sinjar 
region, Arab civilians were allowed to remain living in their villages.240  The Christian 
community, in ISIS-controlled territories, live a difficult and precarious existence but 
they are allowed to exist as Christians in the Islamic State as long as they pay a tax.241  
The Yazidis are not afforded these opportunities to exist as group inside the Islamic 
State as the existence of the Yazidis is incompatible with ISIS ideology.242 
After examining the evidence of the genocidal acts and the indicators of genocidal 
intent, the Commission concluded that ‘ISIS has committed, and is committing, the 
prohibited acts with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Yazidis of Sinjar, 
and has, therefore, committed the crime of genocide.’243  The findings of this inquiry 
into the commission of genocide illustrate the importance of the intent to destroy in 
the definition of the crime of genocide.  Absent evidence of an intent to destroy 
underlying the action of a state or organisation, a commission of inquiry will not have 
reasonable grounds to conclude that genocide has been perpetrated.  The findings of 
this inquiry shows that it is not impossible to apply the legal definition of genocide to 
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ongoing violence; nevertheless the circumstances of this situation are quite distinct 
from other violent situations which the UN has investigated as this is one of the most 
clear cut cases of genocide in history.  Indeed the Commission acknowledged that 
there was no attempt by the Islamic State to ‘hide or reframe its conduct’; rather the 
Islamic State openly embraced a genocidal ideology.244 
The intent to destroy was plainly evident from the propaganda, their online videos and 
their magazine, Dabiq, and from the scale of atrocities.245  The intent to destroy was 
manifest in the violence as the attack on Sinjar and the perpetration of the abuses 
highlighted a high level of planning and organisation, in particular the 
‘institutionalisation of the sex slave trade’.246  Statements and articles within Dabiq, 
in which ISIS employed religious doctrine to contend that ISIS fighters had a religious 
duty to enslave the Yazidi women and kill the Yazidi men so as to create an Islamic 
state, showed clearly that the intent behind these actions was the destruction of the 
Yazidi.247  Seldom will a perpetrator be as open and explicit with their intent to destroy 
a group as the Islamic State is, rather it will depend on an inquiry divining the intent 
to destroy in the actions of an actor who takes steps to mask their intent. 
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If the crime of genocide is potentially unidentifiable in cases of genocide due to the 
difficulty of ascertaining the intent to destroy, is there any benefit for commissions of 
inquiry in seeking to identify the crime in the midst of violence?  Does a finding of 
genocide spark a new or different approach by states to addressing the crimes of a 
perpetrator, in this case ISIS? 
5.5(iii) Consequences of a Genocide Finding 
After concluding that genocide may have been perpetrated, the Commission 
recommended that the UN Security Council should refer the situation to the ICC or to 
an ad hoc tribunal.248  The Commission recommended that the UN Security Council 
should consider utilising measures under Chapter VII to respond to the threat which 
ISIS poses to international peace and security.249  The Commission also appealed to 
states which are signatories to the Genocide Convention, to act under Article VIII of 
the Convention and call upon the UN Security Council to take action under the Charter 
with the aim of preventing and suppressing genocide.250 
For a long time before the Commission released their report, the UN Security Council 
and individual states had been acting to halt the threat of ISIS across the world, as can 
be seen by the US airstrikes on Mount Sinjar after the attack of August 2014.  However 
the US abandoned efforts on Mount Sinjar, despite people still being trapped and ISIS 
remained in control of the territory.251  The response to ISIS was constrained as ‘[n]o 
one committed adequate resources to the defeat of ISIS’ after the attack in Sinjar.252  
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When the violence of ISIS spread to Europe with terrorist attacks this prompted a 
response as Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US 
all conducted air strikes on ISIS positions in Iraq, with the support of the Iraqi 
government; while the US also ‘extended the campaign against ISIS into Syria.’253  In 
confronting ISIS, the international community is utilising a multi-layered approach 
through military action, sanctions aimed at stopping the flow of money and arms, and 
measures aimed at stopping the recruitment of fighters.254  Despite the international 
efforts to combat ISIS, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic stated, on the third anniversary of the attack in 2017, that the 
genocide against the Yazidi was still ‘on-going and remains largely unaddressed’.255 
Alongside the measures aimed at preventing the violence, actors within the 
international community are seeking to ensure accountability and justice for the 
victims of ISIS.  While the threat of prosecutions may not deter ISIS fighters from 
committing atrocities as ISIS fighters are willing to give their life for their cause, steps 
are being taken to ensure that these actors cannot avoid justice.256  Even though a draft 
UN Security Council resolution to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC was vetoed 
in 2014 by China and Russia, the UN Security Council passed a resolution in 2017, 
after the request of the Iraqi government, establishing the Iraq Investigative Team 
which would support the Iraqi government in collecting and preserving evidence and 
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assist in the prosecution of ISIS fighters in Iraq and abroad.257  Prior to this and with 
the failure of the UN Security Council to act, the UN General Assembly established 
the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation 
and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International 
Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 in 2017.258  This body 
would collect evidence of violations of international law and assist states with future 
prosecutions by preparing files.259 
The Commission for International Justice and Accountability, a NGO supported by 
the UK, the US, the EU, and other international partners, is another key actor 
documenting crimes on the ground for use in prosecution.  Originally conceived as an 
idea by the UK government to train Syrians in documenting evidence of violations 
that could be used in future prosecutions from 2011 onwards, it has developed into an 
organisation that includes Syrian and Iraqi investigators and which has worked 
alongside the Iraq Investigative Team and the International, Impartial and Independent 
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Mechanism in collecting evidence of atrocities including Sinjar.260  These 
developments are a promising but slow move towards justice and accountability. 
However with the Iraq Investigative Team only focussing on the crimes of ISIS while 
excluding the myriad of crimes committed by both state and non-state actors in Iraq, 
Janet Benshoof, the President of the NGO the Global Justice Center, stated that the 
creation of the Iraq Investigative Team ‘reeks of victor’s justice’.261  This reflects the 
nature of international justice in a world of political influence as illustrated in Chapter 
Three.  The status of ISIS as an international pariah means that it is a little less 
complicated pursuing accountability for the crimes committed by ISIS than it is for 
addressing the other violators of international law in Iraq and Syria due to the 
competing interests of the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council.  With the 
international environment being more palatable to addressing the crimes of ISIS; this 
may have translated into the findings of the Commission on the question of genocide. 
The Commission’s conclusion on the existence of genocide do raise a number of 
questions on the elements of genocide, and whether the Commission stretched the 
definition of genocide so as to apply it to the crimes committed.  For instance there 
was not a massive number of victims of the attack on Sinjar, it was estimated that less 
than 1,000 were killed and a couple of thousand were forcibly transferred to ISIS 
territory, in comparison to widespread genocides such as the Holocaust and Rwanda.  
However with regard to the number of victims, similar to the approach of the ICTY to 
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cases concerning Srebrenica, the Commission examined the impact of these acts on 
the wider Yazidi population.262  In addressing the perpetration of genocide the 
Commission acknowledges that the genocide has not ‘primarily been accomplished 
through killings’ but ‘[r]ather ISIS seeks to destroy the Yazidis in multiple ways, as 
envisaged by the drafters of the 1948 Genocide Convention.’263  The Commission 
looked beyond the act of killing to examine how acts such as sexual slavery, forcible 
transfer, and forced conversions, which were key elements of ISIS’s strategy for 
destroying the Yazidi, constituted crimes of genocide as these acts targeted the Yazidis 
identity.264 
While this bleeds into the concept of cultural genocide as it is targeted at a group’s 
identity, the elements of the crime of genocide have always had a close relationship 
with cultural genocide with elements such as the forced transfer of children, 
deliberately inflicting conditions of life, mental trauma, and the prevention of births 
concerned with the social existence of a group and how a group can sustain itself.265  
The Commission in applying the Convention to the case of ISIS is giving life to the 
various provisions of Article II rather than stretching the definition of genocide.  
Notwithstanding this, the Commission’s approach to examining the different elements 
of the crime to find the existence of a genocide campaign may have been made easier 
by the international response to the crimes of ISIS. 
In addressing the crimes of ISIS, it was less complex for the Commission to apply the 
genocide label to situation, as there was acceptance within sections of the international 
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community that genocide had been perpetrated against the Yazidi population.  The US 
State Department, the US House of Representatives, the Council of Europe, the 
European Parliament, the UK House of Commons, the Canadian House of Commons, 
the French Senate and National Assembly, the Australian House of Representatives, 
and the Iraqi and Kurdish regional governments have all labelled the violence as 
genocide.266  In employing the genocide label, these bodies did not undertake complex 
legal examinations of the crime rather they used the genocide label to legitimise their 
military response to ISIS. 
These bodies also faced domestic and international pressure to label the violence as 
genocide from civil society groups and individuals who were demanding justice and 
accountability for the Yazidi.267  The treatment of the Yazidi, particularly the sexual 
violence and slavery suffered by the women, ‘triggered significant outcry’ amongst 
civil society groups.268  The genocide label was also extremely important for the 
Yazidi, as it would help them ‘understand what had happened to them’, while also 
giving the Yazidi recognition as a distinct group and using the word genocide would 
guarantee the safety of the Yazidi.269  Vian Dakhil, a Yazidi Member of the Iraqi 
Council of Representatives, Aldo Zammit Borda, and Alexander Murray contend that 
the designation of the situation of genocide is important ‘both from the perspective of 
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the victims and for the legal–historical record.’270  While the genocide label has proved 
important for the victims, it has not ensured justice or accountability yet for the Yazidi 
of Sinjar. 
The strong reaction of the international community and civil society to the atrocities 
suffered by the Yazidis can help explain why the Commission came to its conclusion 
on the question of genocide.  As the international community was not engaged or 
interested in peace talks with ISIS, there was no risk that a genocide finding would 
complicate the resolution of the situation.  However this does not mean that genocide 
was not perpetrated, as the findings of the Commission substantiate the existence of a 
genocidal campaign, rather it shows that genocide can be identified when states 
possess the political will.  Therefore the application of the genocide label to this 
situation proved to be relatively uncomplicated due to the clear evidence of an intent 
to destroy and the lack of international opposition to a finding of genocide. 
However was the genocide label important for the response?  Pieter Omtzigt and 
Ewelina Ochab argue that an interim determination of genocide, pending a legal 
determination, by a state is important as unless it is determined then states will not 
take the action to prevent it.271  To address this question and contention, it is beneficial 
to examine if the Commission’s conclusion on the issue of genocide altered the 
strategy of the international community to addressing the problem of ISIS.  While 
there is a not a consistent approach to confront the crimes of ISIS within the 
international community, due to the divergent interests of states, there is strong action 
being continually taken against ISIS over the past number of years due to their threat 
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to international peace and security.  It is doubtful that the Commission’s finding had 
a significant impact on the different international response to ISIS.  It is unlikely that 
if the Commission had instead concluded that ISIS was committing ethnic cleansing 
or crimes against humanity that individual or a collection of states would have altered 
their strategies for confronting ISIS.  Therefore while the genocide label was 
significant for characterising the violence against the Yazidis, it did not change how 
the international community perceived how to address the situation. 
While the work of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic, along with the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central 
African Republic is important for documenting violations of international law, if their 
reports are not altering the approach of the international community, have these 
commissions improved the situation for the victims of these crimes?  The continued 
violence in Iraq, Syria, and the Central African Republic illustrates that regardless of 
whether the labels of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic 
cleansing are applied to the situation, these situations will not be resolved by a finding 
or determination of a violation of international law in itself.  Rather the resolution of 
such a situation requires international and regional actors committed to taking action, 
whether diplomatic or more forceful measures, to prevent and halt these crimes of 
international law. 
5.6 The Complexity of Confronting Genocide 
The case studies of the commissions of inquiry presented in this chapter have 
emphasised that proving the intent to destroy is the critical barrier to be overcome in 
reaching a conclusion on the perpetration of the crime of genocide.  The findings of 
these investigations have highlighted that widespread death and destruction against a 
targeted group does not constitute the crime of genocide absent an intent to destroy a 
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group underlying these acts.  It is this ingredient of the crime which determines 
whether a situation can be labelled genocide.  The findings of the inquiries have 
illustrated that identifying this intent to destroy in the midst of violence is a difficult 
undertaking.  The case of the Islamic State is unusual as rarely will a perpetrator be as 
transparent with the intent underlying their actions.  Clear-cut cases of genocide are 
not the norm, rather investigators will have to tackle the tricky task of inferring the 
intent to destroy from a multifaceted situation comprising multiple actors and 
numerous violations of international law. 
The complexity of identifying the intent to destroy element of the crime, as highlighted 
by the respective studies, illustrates the indeterminate nature of the definition of 
genocide.  Despite the existence of the Genocide Convention, genocide does not have 
a precise legal meaning.  Genocide is a ‘contested concept: there is much disagreement 
about what qualifies for the term’; the word genocide can mean different things to 
different people with some associating genocide with large scale crimes as witnessed 
in the Holocaust and Rwanda, and others applying the genocide label to situations that 
differ in scope and magnitude.272  These situations may not be any less deserving of 
the genocide label as there is uncertainty over which elements fall under the definition 
of genocide.  While the Convention may spell out the acts of genocide, and the 
interpretation of the international courts have illustrated which elements are and are 
not included under the provisions of the Convention, ‘there will always be some 
indeterminacy of meaning at the edges of the definition.’273  This can be observed by 
examining how the different investigations approached the act of forcible transfer with 
the US investigation in Darfur and the Independent International Commission of 
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Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic finding that the forcible transfer of population is 
evidence of an intent to destroy.  In contrast the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur and the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African 
Republic concluding that forcible transfer was evidence of a campaign of ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
Case studies highlight the indeterminate nature of genocide, as the meaning of 
genocide and the response to the crime can vary between which actors apply the 
genocide label.  For example in Darfur, the Bush administration stated that a finding 
of genocide only necessitated a referral to the UN Security Council, while in response 
to the violence in Sinjar, Obama asserted that the threat of genocide required military 
action in response.  The ‘generality of legal language’ within the Convention on 
prevention and response was ‘used to buttress particular policies or preferences.’274  
The provisions of the Convention can be used to justify inaction due to the lack of 
clarity around preventing genocide and the difficulties with identifying genocide due 
to ambiguous provisions. 
The ambiguity surrounding the elements of the crime of genocide and the response to 
genocide reflects international law as the language of international law is 
indeterminate.275  This ‘[i]ndeterminacy of language is one reason’ why law ‘can never 
be completely clear and certain.’276  However this indeterminacy in international law 
is not by accident, it was a deliberate choice by those who drafted treaties and 
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conventions.  Without a level of indeterminacy in applying international law, states 
would never agree to the acceptance of treaties and conventions.277  As highlighted in 
Chapter Two, the provisions of the Genocide Convention were left deliberately vague 
by international actors to ensure widespread acceptance and adoption of the principles 
of preventing and punishing genocide. 
However it is not just language and words that are indeterminate, it is the legal system 
and international law itself that are indeterminate.278  The response of actors to a 
question or issue of international law is governed not only by ‘international law’ but 
by ‘political, moral, social’ contexts.279  This means that the application of law, by a 
judicial body, commission of inquiry, or state, in a given situation can never be truly 
objective as there will always be a subjective choice.280  There will always be 
discretion in the application of law as the ‘[a]ssessment of factual evidence can ‘never’ 
be ‘politically neutral.’281  Therefore whether a situation is regarded as genocide is 
dependent on the views of those applying the Genocide Convention, rather than a strict 
application of the law.  This indeterminacy can be observed in the response to Darfur, 
as despite the US and UN inquiries examining similar facts, they arrived at different 
conclusions on the questions of genocide.  This was because they were not strictly 
applying the Genocide Convention in a vacuum, rather there were divergent political 
interests in play. 
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The indeterminacy of law does mean that there is no consistent interpretation of the 
Genocide Convention, as there will always be elements of genocide that fall at the 
margins of the crime, and that there is no standard response to genocide, as states can 
advocate or adopt different approaches or strategies for preventing or punishing 
genocide depending on the context of the situation.  This is the nature of international 
law though; genocide will always be affected by external realities.  The indeterminate 
nature of genocide along with the complex issues of identifying and determining 
genocide in the midst of violence outlined in this chapter is the reason why this thesis 
is contending that commissions of inquiry, mandated by states or by organs of the UN, 
should abstain from making a finding on the question of genocide or other 
international crimes such as crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.  These 
commissions of inquiry should instead collect evidence of violations of international 
law, which can be used by the ICC or international tribunals to make a determination 
on which international crimes has been perpetrated. 
There are certainly drawbacks from refraining on making a conclusion, even an 
interim one, on the crime of genocide in the midst of violence as the process of 
determining genocide through commissions of inquiries and international criminal 
courts is a long and arduous task, and it could be many years down the line before a 
determination can be made.  In a time when decisive action is needed to respond to 
genocide, these processes can be too slow.  There is also the difficultly that each new 
case of genocide requires the same level of detailed examination of the evidence.282 
Notwithstanding the potential faults in reserving a definitive conclusion on genocide, 
deferring an inquiry would eliminate the difficulty of attempting to apply the Genocide 
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Convention’s flawed definition of genocide in the midst of violence and instead ensure 
that the identification of the crime of genocide is determined after a careful and 
thorough examination of evidence.  Furthermore refraining from characterising a 
situation as genocide would remove the potential difficulties which arise after a 
determination of genocide which affect the resolution of a situation such as an accused 
state withdrawing from peace negotiations and a lack of regional and international 
support for a coordinated response.  If the present situation persists, the international 
community will continue to both struggle to identify genocide in the midst of bloody 
violence and take action in response to a finding of genocide which will bring us no 
closer to transforming the commitment of ‘Never Again’ into a reality. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The discussion of the complexities involved in identifying and determining genocide 
in the case studies of the commissions of inquiry investigations and the international 
reaction to situations potentially involving genocidal violence further highlights the 
issues that have been pinpointed throughout this thesis in relation to the utility of the 
genocide label as a preventative research.  This chapter has shown that while elements 
of genocide may be identifiable in the midst of violence, it is complex to identify the 
intent to destroy element, and even if this element is identifiable it does not ensure 
there will be an effective response.  The research has highlighted that the response to 
violence is not dictated by the label applied to characterise the violence, rather political 
will and state interests will guide the response of states.  Therefore the central 
argument of this chapter is that the fact that the label applied to a situation will not 
prompt a response combined with the complexity of identifying the different elements 
of the crime in the midst of violence means that the genocide label is not a useful term 
to be employed in the prevention of violence.  Rather as argued in this chapter, and 
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throughout the research the term atrocity crimes should be employed to label violence 
so that the focus on prevention can be on the response and not a flawed label that could 
provide an impediment to action. 
The next chapter will advance this discussion in more detail by examining two 
ongoing situations in Burundi and South Sudan which could potentially involve the 
perpetration of the crime of genocide.  The benefits and disadvantages of labelling 
these situations as genocide, while violence continues to rage on in these countries 
will be addressed with reference to the contention of this thesis that the determination 
of genocide should be reserved until after a situation has ended and a competent 
international court or tribunal has time to weigh up the evidence.
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CHAPTER SIX: IN THE MIDST OF BLOODSHED 
6.1 Introduction 
The discussions of genocide in the preceding chapters in the case law and case studies 
of accepted and claimed cases of genocide has led to this chapter in which the three 
core strands of this thesis will be interwoven so as to explore the complexities 
surrounding applying, defining, determining, and identifying the crime of genocide in 
the midst of two ongoing situations.  While the world’s attention has been largely 
focussed in recent years on addressing or resolving the situations in Syria, Myanmar, 
and North Korea, two situations have been slowly bubbling away under the surface in 
the heart of Africa.  The violence that has developed in Burundi and South Sudan over 
the last few years has scarcely received any coverage in the international media, 
despite the significant humanitarian impact of the respective situations.  There has 
been widespread acts of violence and repression directed against civilians which has 
resulted in a number of casualties and the substantial displacement of segments of the 
population in both countries.  In the midst of the violence that has engulfed these two 
countries, the word genocide has been referred to sporadically to either describe the 
violence in Burundi and South Sudan or to warn of the likelihood that the violence 
could develop along genocidal lines in the respective countries. 
The various references to genocide in these two situations illustrate some of the 
complexities identified with the crime of genocide outlined so far in this study 
including the difficulty of predicting and identifying genocide and the value of the 
genocide label as a preventative term.  In analysing these two case studies, the chapter 
will examine the benefits of the atrocity crimes label to remedy the apparent and 
perceived faults with the genocide label so as to offer a term that is more useful for 
those who seek a response to violence and for those who seek justice for victims.  To 
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start examining the utility of the two labels as a means of preventing and responding 
to potential genocidal violence, the thesis will proceed with an examination of the 
discussions and references to genocide in the respective situations. 
6.2 Burundi on the Brink 
Burundi, similar to its neighbour to the north, Rwanda, has struggled in the aftermath 
of independence to transition to a stable state free from conflict and bloodshed.  
Burundi has been in a near constant state of violence since it gained independence in 
1962, as a destructive power struggle between two ethnic groups has frequently 
descended into armed clashes which have resulted in mass civilian casualties.1  The 
latest episode of political strife to grip Burundi unfolded over the course of 2015, due 
to controversy surrounding the presidential election.  The rising levels of repression 
and violence led to a number of claims that genocide could be perpetrated.  With the 
forewarnings of genocide in Burundi is it possible to identify indicators of genocide 
present in the violence since 2015?  Are there warning signs throughout the history of 
Burundi that would point towards the perpetration of genocide? 
6.2(i) A History of Hostility 
The ethnic makeup of Burundi is nearly identical to its neighbour Rwanda, as the Hutu 
and Tutsi are the two predominant ethnic groups in society, with the Hutu comprising 
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85% of the population.2  Division between the ethnic groups was fostered under 
colonial rule as the Belgian government, employing a system of indirect rule, 
promoted the Tutsi to prominent administrative and governing roles, while affording 
the Tutsi unequal access to educational and employment opportunities.3  The 
inequality in society built up feelings of resentment amongst the Hutu against the 
Tutsi, which would explode in the aftermath of independence. 
Amid the wave of decolonisation sweeping across the African continent in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the Tutsi seized power in Burundi; with a Tutsi monarchy controlling the 
state following independence until it was overthrown by Tutsi-led military officer 
coup in 1966.4  The Tutsi dominance in all sections of society in the post-independence 
years fostered dramatically increasing levels of division between the Hutu and Tutsi.5  
A Hutu uprising in Rwanda in 1972, which led to the Hutu seizing power there, 
sparked clashes in Burundi as its Hutu community similarly sought to gain control 
while the Tutsi military dictatorship sought to hold onto power.6  The ethnic tensions 
in Burundi boiled over as the Hutu uprising was brutally quashed by the Tutsi-
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dominated army which led to over 100,000 Hutu deaths.7  The Tutsi retributive 
campaign at this time against the Hutu has been labelled by researchers of the 
Burundian situation as ‘genocide’ due to the deliberate targeting of important 
members of the Hutu community, including political leaders, civil servants, and 
educated adults.8 
As the Tutsi brutally supressed any Hutu insurrection, the Tutsi continued to dominate 
the political, economic, and military structures of the state until the 1990s.9  Burundi 
began a slow process towards democratisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, under 
President Pierre Buyoya of the Union for National Progress (hereafter ‘UPRONA’), a 
Tutsi political party.10  In 1993, the first ever presidential elections were held which 
led to a Hutu, Melchior Ndadaye, of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (hereafter 
‘FRODEBU’), a Hutu political party, gaining power.11  Ndadaye planned an overhaul 
of the Burundian government by pursuing a policy of reconciliation which would 
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dismantle the ethnic bias within political and military institutions.12  However 
Ndadaye lasted only three months in his role before he was assassinated by Tutsi army 
officers, who feared the marginalisation of the Tutsi under Hutu rule, as part of a failed 
coup attempt.13  Resulting clashes between the Hutu and Tutsi in the aftermath of the 
assassination led to 150,000 casualties.14 
A UN Security Council established International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi 
into the clashes of 1993 determined that acts of genocide had been perpetrated by Hutu 
forces against the Tutsi minority during this period.15  Furthermore, although the 
Commission did not examine the events of 1972, it suggested that acts of genocide 
may have been perpetrated against the Hutu at this time.16  Despite the findings of this 
report, no domestic or international mechanisms were created to examine 
accountability for these two genocides.  This illustrates that a finding of genocide will 
not compel a state or international actors to punish the perpetration of genocide, even 
in historical cases; which raises further questions as to the utility of the genocide label 
to not only prevent genocide but punish the commission of the crime. 
In the aftermath of Ndadaye’s assassination, the country continued to be ruled by a 
Hutu president, but behind the scenes the Tutsi regained control of the institutions of 
the state and were steadily expanding their influence.17  This period continued to see 
an escalation of ethnic violence, as Hutu and Tutsi civilians were increasingly being 
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targeted respectively by the Tutsi-led army and Hutu-formed militias, such as the 
National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy 
(hereafter ‘CNDD-FDD’) and the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-National 
Forces of Liberation (hereafter ‘PALIPEHUTU-FNL’).18  In 1996 the Burundian 
Army, comprised nearly entirely of Tutsi, launched a coup to overthrow the 
government and installed Pierre Buyoya as president again.19  Buyoya stated that the 
army took power to stop the genocidal violence being perpetrated by both the Hutu 
and Tutsi communities.20  This new regime did not stop the violence, instead the 
situation descended into a full-scale ethnic clash.21 
International condemnation of the violence and pressure from its regional partners in 
the form of sanctions imposed on the Burundian government forced Buyoya into 
negotiating with the opposition.22  A peace agreement, the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement, which created a power-sharing government was signed in 
August 2000 between Tutsi and Hutu political parties.23  Under the terms of the 
Agreement, Buyoya would hold the presidency of Burundi for 18 months and after 
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that the presidency would transition to a member of FRODEBU.24  Despite the 
significant accomplishment of signing the Arusha Agreement, the Arusha negotiations 
excluded the two leading opposition groups, CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL, 
which challenged the long-term stability of the peace agreement.25  However, in 
November 2003, CNDD-FDD joined the transitional government after signing a 
ceasefire agreement.26  Buyoya also successfully transitioned the presidency to 
Domitien Ndayizeye, a member of FRODEBU, in 2003 which indicated that Burundi 
was on the correct path to democratic governance.27 
The year 2005 witnessed significant progress in the peaceful transition to power-
sharing governance as the Burundian people approved a new constitution and voted in 
the first democratic elections since the signing of the Arusha Agreement.  The 
constitution further enshrined ethnic power-sharing by providing that the parliament 
and the government would be split 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi.28  The newly 
adopted constitution also provided for ethnically-balanced military and security 
forces.29  In the 2005 elections CNDD-FDD transformed from Burundi’s main rebel 
group to its leading political party, as CNDD-FDD became the largest party in 
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parliament.30  Furthermore as the constitution provided for the direct election by the 
parliament of the first post-transition president, CNDD-FDD selected their candidate 
Pierre Nkurunziza as the new president of Burundi.31  Due to the requirement of ethnic 
power-sharing, Nkurunziza’s government while primarily comprised of members of 
CNDD-FDD also included members of FRODEBU and UPRONA.32  The power-
sharing government had a promising start as it signed a ceasefire with FNL, who had 
dropped the ‘ethnically exclusive’ PALIPEHUTU from its name, which came into 
effect in 2009.33 
The successful transition of power and implementation of power-sharing governance 
seemed to mark a new period in Burundian politics, with violence replaced by 
democracy.  However the peace proved to be fragile, as the power-sharing government 
began crumbling in the lead up to the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2010 
as CNDD-FDD sought to restrict the opposition’s freedom of assembly and 
expression.34  While the political situation was becoming ‘increasingly fragmented 
and partisan’, the ‘main schisms’ in society were ‘not along ethnic lines’ rather it was 
disputes and clashes between primarily Hutu led political parties that resulted in these 
divides.35 
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The 2010 elections furthered deepened divisions between the political parties as 
parties joined together in opposition to CNDD-FDD and boycotted the presidential 
and parliamentary elections.36  This boycott led to Nkurunziza being re-elected 
unopposed, this time by popular vote, and CNDD-FDD forming a power sharing 
government with UPRONA and FRODEBU-Nyakuri, a splinter party of FRODEBU, 
who were seen as closely aligned with CNDD-FDD.37  Burundi essentially became a 
de facto one-party state after 2010.38  CNDD-FDD consolidated its dominant position 
in Burundian society by eliminating political opposition, and curtailing the freedom 
of assembly and expression of the media and civil society actors.39 
The detention and restriction of movement of opposition political figures by the 
government security forces led to Léonce Ngendakumana, the leader of a leading 
opposition coalition, to call upon the Secretary-General and the international 
community to prevent ‘political genocide’ in Burundi in 2014.40  Ngendakumana 
claimed that there were similarities between the actions of the CNDD-FDD and the 
Rwandan government in 1994 as the CNDD-FDD was employing its youth wing, the 
Imbonerakure, and the media to stir up tensions.41 
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The reference to political genocide highlights how the social understanding of 
genocide has diverged from the legal definition, as political groups are not recognised 
as a protected group either under the Genocide Convention or in the jurisprudence of 
the international courts.  Furthermore the act of detaining individuals or restricting 
their movement is not an act of genocide, as it would not lead to the destruction of a 
group.  Ngendakumana, similar to other activists and victims as outlined in Chapter 
Two, was not concerned with matching the situation to the legal definition of 
genocide, but rather employed the word genocide as a means of drawing attention to 
the situation and sparking the international community into action.  Associating 
Burundi with one of the worst atrocities of the last twenty five years, in Rwanda, was 
a further means of Ngendakumana drawing upon the powerful rhetorical and symbolic 
nature of the genocide label. 
While political genocide may not amount to genocide, there was significant evidence 
that violence, if it did break out, may develop along genocidal lines within Burundi 
due to the presence of warning signs of genocide.  Burundi’s history of atrocity crimes, 
including genocide, combined with its political instability contributed to a situation 
where genocide may be committed.  However the warning signs may also point 
towards the commission of other atrocity crimes due to the atrocity crimes sharing the 
same risk factors as genocide as illustrated in Chapter Four.  Furthermore, even if 
Burundi was displaying indicators of genocide pre-2015 it is not an inevitability that 
genocide will be perpetrated as Chapter Four has highlighted that the presence of 
warning signals in a situation does not mean that atrocities will be committed.  
Genocide and other atrocity crimes requires a triggering factor, which is hard to predict 
before it happens.  Therefore while Burundi was exhibiting signs of genocide prior to 
2015, it was a hard task to predict genocide that would occur before the outbreak of 
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violence and repression in 2015 due to near identical warning signs of each atrocity 
crime. 
6.2(ii) A Deteriorating Situation 
The increasing escalation in hostility between the ruling party and the opposition 
parties and civil society reached its zenith at the 2015 elections.  Tension between the 
government and the opposition was inflamed in 2015 by the issue of whether 
Nkurunziza was eligible to run for a third term as president under the terms of the 
constitution and the Arusha Agreement.  The constitution provides that the president 
is directly elected by the people for a term of five years, which is renewable once.42  
Nkurunziza and his supporters’ argument for running for a third term was that he was 
only directly elected by the people once, because when he was first elected in 2005 as 
President it was by the members of the parliament as set out in the constitution.43  The 
opposition argued in response that the Arusha Agreement restricted presidential 
mandates to two five-year terms.44 
Opposition to the third term developed into public protests by opposition parties and 
civil society groups which led to sharp crackdown by the security forces and the 
Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD, on civil society and the media so 
as to dissuade the holding of demonstrations.45  Even a number of members of CNDD-
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FDD were strongly against Nkurunziza’s third term which led to Nkurunziza purging 
internal opposition from within CNDD-FDD.46  Despite the opposition, CNDD-FDD 
officially selected Nkurunziza as their presidential candidate in April 2015.47  The 
climate of repression and violence only intensified after Burundi’s Constitutional 
Court ruled that it was permitted under the constitution for Nkurunziza to run for a 
third term.48  Acts of repression, including acts of arbitrary arrests and detention, 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and extrajudicial killings, accelerated after 
an attempted coup in May by members of the police and military while Nkurunziza 
was out of the country.49  The coup was quickly stopped after two days and its leaders 
were either remanded in prison or fled into exile.50  The suppression of dissent led to 
clashes between armed opposition groups and government forces; grenade attacks 
became a daily occurrence in the capital Bujumbura, which led to a further crackdown 
on civil society.51 
When the violence and repression broke out in 2015, there were further references to 
genocide by activists and victims as a means of calling upon the international 
community to take action.  In May 2015, in the midst of the protests, members of the 
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Tutsi ethnic group expressed, in interviews with the International Crisis Group, fears 
that the government was planning a genocide against them as government forces 
cracked down on Tutsi protestors.52  Similar to other victims of genocide and atrocity 
crimes, these actors, who are predominantly victims of the government-led repression, 
may be employing the word genocide to characterise the violence as they are relying 
on the moral value of the term to attract international interest to their plight, which 
highlights the effect of the social understanding of genocide on the general public. 
The period leading up to the elections saw increased clashes and further violence 
between the government forces and the opposition, as well as the continued ill 
treatment of the civilian population.53  The rising levels of violence and the sharp 
crackdown on civil society led the EU and the AU to withdraw their respective 
electoral observer teams arguing that conditions in the country were not conducive to 
the holding of free and fair elections.54  While the UN and the regional grouping the 
East African Community (hereafter ‘EAC’) did monitor the elections, they stated that 
the ‘climate was not conducive for an inclusive and credible electoral process.’55 
In the elections the opposition parties failed to organise a united campaign against 
Nkurunziza, instead they splintered into a number of groupings, which led to 
Nkurunziza and CNDD-FDD winning re-election in July 2015.56  Nkurunziza’s re-
election while deepening the political divide also led to an outbreak of violence and 
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continued repression of opposition political parties, civil society, and the media.57  
Actors within the UN were cognisant of the risk of genocide in the aftermath of the 
elections.  Matthew Rycroft, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to 
the UN, warned in November 2015 that the situation could develop into a ‘possible 
genocide’ unless the UN took action to prevent violence.58  This warning was made 
after the UN Security Council received briefings from key figures coordinating the 
response on the ground to the violence including the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention of Genocide, and the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.59  
While these actors did not specifically mention genocide, they warned that 
inflammatory statements by members of the government could be seen as preparation 
for widespread violence.60  In particular, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide drew parallels between the government speeches and language employed 
during the Rwandan Genocide.61 
In response to these warnings, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for 
the government of Burundi to commit to peace negotiations, and stated that the UN 
Security Council would consider taking additional measures against Burundian actors 
who impede the peaceful solution to the situation.62  Despite the acknowledgment 
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from the UK representative that if these warnings were ignored the situation could 
spiral into a genocide, the UN Security Council did not spring into action which 
highlights that a warning of genocide does not automatically lead to states taking 
forceful action, including military deployment, to stop the violence.  The UN Security 
Council was not to be swayed from its approach of focussing on diplomatic measures 
to resolve the situation in Burundi. 
The UN efforts on the ground to mediate the situation and support dialogue are being 
led by the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which has been supporting peacebuilding 
efforts in Burundi since 2006, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great 
Lakes Region, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Conflict Prevention, and 
the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi.63  The UN Security Council 
has also been active, since the outbreak of demonstrations and associated violence in 
April 2015, in condemning the violence by passing resolutions and issuing press 
statements urging the Burundian government and the other parties to put an end to the 
violence and commence dialogue.64  Regional actors have also been key players in 
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responding to the situation as the regional bloc the EAC appointed President Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda and the former president of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa as the 
mediator and facilitator respectively of the inter-Burundi dialogue between CNDD-
FDD and opposition political parties and civil society groups.65 
Therefore rather than deploying troops the focus of international and regional actors, 
in responding to the repression and violence since the genesis of the situation in 2015, 
has been on utilising diplomatic measures to facilitate dialogue.  When more forceful 
action is taken or advocated by international and regional actors it has been met with 
a sharp response by the Burundian government.  For instance when the EU imposed a 
travel ban and asset freeze against high ranking security officials the government 
stated that these measures jeopardised the peace talks.66 
Despite the political interventions, tension remained high in Burundi after the 
President of the Senate gave a speech which threatened political opponents that they 
would be ‘pulverised’ if they continued to resist while also encouraging supporters of 
the government to ‘go to work’ (attack opposition members).67  The rhetoric of this 
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speech was seen as similar in manner to speeches given during the Rwandan 
Genocide.68  The increasing levels of tension and repression against those supporting 
or perceived to support the opposition led to people fleeing areas due to fears of 
government attacks and reprisals on areas associated with the opposition.69 
The worst period of violence was in December 2015 after an attack by armed 
opposition groups on four military positions in and around Bujumbura led to a sharp 
increase in abuses and atrocities perpetrated against the civilian population by 
members of the security forces and the Imbonerakure.70  The reprisal against the 
civilian population conducted in the days after the attacks left more than one hundred 
dead while many more were victims of torture, gang rape, and sexual violence.71  In 
the aftermath of this period of violence the AU’s Peace and Security Council did 
threaten to intervene militarily in the situation with a protection and prevention 
mission comprising 5,000 soldiers.72  However the AU member states failed to agree 
on deploying a military mission and instead the AU sent human rights observers and 
military experts into Burundi to monitor the situation.73  The UN sought to send 
                                                 
68 ibid para. 8. 
69 United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council ‘Report on the Independent Investigation 
on Burundi’ (25 October 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/33/37, para. 98–100. 
70 Amnesty International, ‘“My Children are Scared”: Burundi’s Deepening Human Rights Crisis’ (22 
December 2015) 2–8; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Report of the Delegation 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on its Fact-Finding Mission to Burundi 7 - 
13 December 2015’ (17 May 2016) para. 99; United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council 
‘Human Rights Situation in Burundi: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights’ (17 June 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/32/30, para. 7, 13. 
71 Amnesty International, ‘“My Children are Scared”: Burundi’s Deepening Human Rights Crisis’ (22 
December 2015) 3–8; Amnesty International, ‘Burundi: Satellite Evidence Supports Witness Accounts 
of Mass Graves’ (28 January 2016) Press Release; United Nations General Assembly Human Rights 
Council ‘Report on the Independent Investigation on Burundi’ (25 October 2016) UN Doc 
A/HRC/33/37, para. 43–44. 
72 Bridget Conley, ‘The “Politics of Protection”: Assessing the African Union’s Contributions to 
Reducing Violence against Civilians’ (2017) 24 International Peacekeeping 566, 569, 580. 
73 International Crisis Group, ‘The African Union and the Burundi Crisis: Ambition versus Reality’ (28 
September 2016) 9–10. 
333 
assistance to the AU mission with the deployment of a police component however the 
Burundian government have continually refused to consent to this deployment.74 
There was a further reference to genocide after a UN Security Council visit to Burundi 
in January 2016 when the Permanent Representative of France to the UN reported that 
opposition figures, ‘members of the so-called radical opposition, not represented in 
the official institutions’ of the state, believed that ‘genocide was either already 
happening in Burundi or was about to.’75  This warning that genocide was underway 
or close to being perpetrated, did not lead to the UN Security Council taking any 
drastically different action other than to maintain the focus on diplomatic solutions. 
These efforts to support dialogue have largely been unsuccessful; however, since the 
violence of December 2015 there has been a reduction in the levels of violence as 
armed clashes between government forces and opposition groups have declined in 
frequency.76  The United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (hereafter 
‘UNIIB’), a joint UN/AU investigation authorised by the UN General Assembly 
Human Rights Council after a Special Session on the situation in Burundi in December 
2015, attributes this decrease in violence to the increased repression by government 
forces.77  The Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, established by the Human Rights 
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Council in 2016, states that since 2016, the violations are being perpetrated in a ‘more 
clandestine, but equally brutal, manner’.78  There is continued evidence of 
extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, grenade attacks and 
exchanges of gunfire as well as a rise in cases of torture and inhuman treatment of 
those arbitrarily detained.79 
The sustained violence resulted in a campaign launched in 2016 by the international 
NGO, the International Federation for Human Rights, and the Burundian human rights 
organisation, the ITEKA League, which called for the UN and the AU to deploy a 
peacekeeping mission to Burundi to prevent genocide.  These groups contend that 
genocide is a possibility in Burundi as the actions and rhetoric of the government, 
security forces, and the Imbonerakure illustrates a ‘willingness … to destroy the Tutsi 
community in its entirety because of their ethnicity.’80  They maintain that while the 
Tutsi are not the only group targeted by the government, ‘ethnicity is sufficiently being 
used for the current situation in Burundi to be called a repression with genocidal 
dynamics.’81  Similar to the Darfur advocacy campaign, this campaign is using the 
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term genocide to mobilise support around intervention which illustrates the rhetorical 
value attached to the word genocide. 
While civilians and civil society groups may be employing the genocide label in order 
to draw attention to Burundi, there could be merits to the claims from witnesses and 
actors on the ground that genocide is being perpetrated as it is important to remember 
that in Rwanda it was actors on the ground who were the first ones to characterise the 
violence as genocide.  However these actors are predominantly claiming that genocide 
could be perpetrated, rather than claiming it is already being perpetrated.  Is it possible, 
with the knowledge outlined so far in this study of the difficulty of identifying 
genocide, to predict an outbreak of genocide? 
Indicators of Genocide 
The International Federation for Human Rights and the ITEKA League state that the 
toxic environment in Burundi could lead to genocide being perpetrated as ‘all the 
criteria and conditions for the perpetration of genocide are in place: ideology, intent, 
security institutions, mobilization via militias, identifying populations to be 
eliminated, and using historical justifications to do so.’82  The UNIIB warn that due to 
Burundi’s history of violence ‘the danger of the crime of genocide also looms large.’83  
Such claims must be closely interrogated in assessing the extent of the threat of 
genocide in Burundi. 
Burundi’s history of ethnic violence and ethnic division would make one assume or 
even expect that civilians would be targeted due to their ethnicity in the latest wave of 
repression.  However the ethnic divisions of the past were not evident in the initial 
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stages of the situation.  While the protests against Nkurunziza’s third term did take 
place in largely Tutsi neighbourhoods in Bujumbura, the demonstrations included a 
large number of Hutu protestors.84  Rather than ethnicity being a significant marker in 
these clashes, the situation in Burundi is rooted in political tension between 
Nkurunziza/CNDD-FDD and the opposition (political parties, civil society, and the 
media) which has been steadily growing since CNDD-FFD came to power in 2005.  
Since the genesis of the situation in April 2015, the majority of UN actors, UN organs, 
AU bodies, and NGOs maintain that the government, the defence and security forces, 
and the Imbonerakure are deliberately targeting through acts of violence and hate 
speech those in opposition or perceived to be in opposition to the government.85 
The International Federation for Human Rights and ITEKA League report is the only 
study of the situation to label the violence against the civilian population as perpetrated 
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with the intent to destroy the Tutsi.  The separate in-depth inquiries conducted by 
international law and human rights experts on behalf of the AU and UN, who are also 
relying on witness testimony, have found no evidence of the existence of a genocidal 
campaign targeted against the Tutsi ethnic group.  Unlike the UN inquiries established 
to investigate whether of acts of genocide were perpetrated in the Central African 
Republic, Darfur, or by ISIS, the inquiries created by the various organs of the UN 
and the AU were not specifically mandated to investigate the crime of genocide.  This 
would indicate that these bodies do not think that genocide is being perpetrated in 
Burundi, or it could be the case that they are wary of labelling the violence as genocide 
due to the potential implications. 
Regardless of whether states were reluctant to use the word genocide, the Commission 
of Inquiry did examine the question of genocide, and found that ‘although, within the 
context of certain violations such as arrests, torture and sexual violence, the 
Commission was able to show that the Tutsi were targeted by insults of an ethnic 
nature, it is not in a position to establish the existence of a political will to destroy that 
ethnic group in whole or in part.’86  The definition of genocide employed by the 
Commission of Inquiry corresponds to the Convention’s definition as the Commission 
highlights the central role of intent to the crime of genocide.  Evidence of genocidal 
acts targeted against a protected group will not amount to genocide absent an intent to 
destroy underlying the crime. 
While the Commission of Inquiry is employing the legal definition of genocide to 
support their finding that genocide was not perpetrated it could also be the case that, 
given similar criticisms of the UN Darfur inquiry that the report was tailored to the 
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wishes of the major states, the Commission of Inquiry refused to label the violence of 
genocide due to international pressure.  However the Commission of Inquiry along 
with the UNIIB have separately identified evidence of violations that may amount to 
crimes against humanity in Burundi since the outbreak of violence and repression in 
2015.87  The international community has the same responsibility to respond to these 
crimes as genocide, so regardless of using the word genocide the inquiries are still 
placing pressure on the international community to respond to the violence. 
Notwithstanding the evidence of violations that may amount to crimes against 
humanity the UNIIB do state that due to the ‘closed and repressive’ nature of 
Burundian society, it is impossible to fully determine the crimes which have been 
perpetrated.88  There is sufficient evidence that the Tutsi are often the target of 
brutality and hate speech which means that if the violence does intensify in the future 
then the Tutsi could be deliberately targeted (as the Tutsi ethnic group, rather than as 
Tutsi who happen to be political opponents) for destruction.89  There have been 
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warnings about the potential for the political crisis to inflame ethnic tensions.90  This 
speculation on the threat of ethnic violence illustrates the difficulty of actors predicting 
if a situation will develop along ethnic lines before the outbreak of large scale 
violence.  If it is a complex task to predict an ethnic element to a situation, it is an even 
more arduous task to predict that an ethnic group will be targeted for destruction. 
Even if the situation develops an ethnic dimension it does not mean that genocide will 
be perpetrated, as the violence might lead to the commission of crimes against 
humanity or other atrocity crimes.  There have been a multitude of stark warnings 
from key actors within the UN system on the potential for Burundi to descend into 
widespread bloodshed with the risk of the perpetration of atrocity crimes.91  This 
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illustrates, as discussed in Chapter Four, that the warning signs of genocide are nearly 
identical to other atrocity crimes as these crimes share the same indicators and 
underlying conditions as genocide. 
Despite the advancement in the knowledge of predicting genocide, with the UN’s 
creation of the ‘Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes’, there continues to be 
difficulties with identifying signs of genocide.  As argued in Chapter Four genocide 
does not follow a predictable pattern, so any attempt to break down the crime into 
stages or map it onto a guide will have inherent limitations.  Chapter Four shows that 
a situation may display all the indicators of the perpetration of atrocity crimes but this 
does not actually mean that a situation will result in mass bloodshed.  Therefore in a 
fluid situation such as Burundi, were the violence is relatively low level, it is a 
complex task to not only predict if a situation will explode into genocidal violence but 
also to identify the trigger that will ignite the situation. 
The situation in Burundi illustrates the complexity of predicting genocide before the 
outbreak of violence, and the difficulty of identifying genocide in the early stages of 
a situation.  This is why this research is advocating for the label atrocity crimes to be 
employed instead of undertaking the complex task of distinguishing the identifiers of 
each atrocity crime to predict the likelihood of which crime will be committed.  It 
would remove the time spent focussing on labels rather than concentrating on the 
response to the situation. 
In Burundi the label applied to characterise the violence will not trigger a response, 
this can be seen by the fact that the campaign launched by the International Federation 
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for Human Rights and ITEKA League did not lead to the AU and/or the UN to 
mobilise under the banner of the RtoP or the Genocide Convention to take action to 
prevent genocide.  This signifies how a claim of genocide does not translate into 
immediate and effective action.  The failure to halt the violence in Burundi should also 
indicate that if the definition of genocide is expanded to include additional elements 
such as political groups it would not lead to a different response to crimes against these 
groups.  Does this failure to respond signify a lack of political will to act? 
States may not possess the political will to get further involved in Burundi as unlike 
in Darfur the situation in Burundi has scarcely received attention in the media which 
as a consequence means that there is no mass movement of civilians, NGOs, and the 
media calling for states and the UN to take stronger action.  Therefore facing no 
pressure from domestic constituencies, states may feel relatively free to continue their 
current approach to the situation without fearing the potential consequence of inaction.  
However on the other hand it could be argued that states on the UN Security Council 
do possess the political will to act as they have agreed upon the deployment of a UN 
mission but are cognisant of the fact that undermining Burundi’s sovereignty would 
not aid the negotiation of a peace agreement and instead it could further destabilise 
the situation. 
This is why the campaign by the International Federation for Human Rights and 
ITEKA League can be seen as flawed, as it proposes a solution (military intervention) 
without any appreciation of the reality faced by international actors on the ground.  As 
highlighted in Chapter Two and Chapter Five, activists are often guilty of 
oversimplifying a situation and focussing on a quick fix rather than addressing the 
underlying issues which give rise to violence.  The case of Burundi should show that 
possessing the political will to act does not automatically mean that states will pursue 
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military action, rather it could mean that states are willing to act instead through organs 
of the UN and regional bodies to achieve peace. 
6.2(iii) Pursuing Peace or Justice 
While international and regional actors have primarily focussed on diplomacy and 
dialogue in their quest for peace, there has been a move towards justice and 
accountability which could potentially involve competing interests in the resolution of 
the situation.  The perpetration of acts of violence and repression led Fatou Bensouda, 
Prosecutor of the ICC, to announce in April 2016 that she was opening a preliminary 
examination of the situation in Burundi as the Office of the Prosecutor had received 
reports of acts which fall under crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC being 
committed in Burundi.92  In response to the Prosecutor’s move to examine the 
situation, the government of Burundi voted to withdraw from the Rome Statute and 
officially notified the Secretary-General of its withdrawal in October 2016.93  As well 
as withdrawing from the ICC, the government of Burundi suspended cooperation with 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other human rights 
monitoring mechanisms and denied the Commission of Inquiry access to the country 
to investigate the violations of international law.94 
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Burundi’s departure from the ICC took effect one year later on the 27th of October 
2017.95  Burundi’s withdrawal from the ICC does not preclude an investigation into 
crimes committed in Burundi while it was a signatory of the Rome Statute.  In 
September 2017 the Prosecutor requested the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to 
authorise an investigation into the situation in Burundi.96  On October 25th, two days 
before Burundi officially withdrew from the Rome Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
determined that there was a reasonable basis to authorise an investigation into the 
situation in Burundi.97  The Pre-Trial Chamber stated that the evidence submitted by 
the Prosecutor shows that since April 2015, members of the civilian population who 
support or perceive to support the opposition have been targeted by high-ranking 
officials of the Burundian government, the police, the intelligence service, the military 
services, and the Imbonerakure (the youth wing of the ruling party).98 
The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC determined that there is a reasonable basis to 
believe that acts of murder, attempted murder, imprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape, enforced disappearances, and persecution 
constituting crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute have been 
committed by members of the Burundian security forces and the Imbonerakure.99  The 
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scope of the investigation is limited to acts committed in Burundi from the 26th of 
April 2015 to the 26th of October 2017, however the Prosecutor can extend her 
investigation to events before and after this time period if legal requirements under the 
Rome Statute are met.100  While the Prosecutor made no submissions and arguments 
concerning the commission of genocide, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that the 
Prosecutor can ‘on the basis of the evidence, extend her investigation to other crimes 
against humanity or other article 5 crimes, i.e. war crimes and genocide’.101 
The involvement of the ICC has not had any noticeable effect on ameliorating the 
government of Burundi’s behaviour and inducing it into negotiating with the 
opposition through the auspices of the inter-Burundi dialogue.  International criminal 
justice alone cannot end violence unless states are willing to respond.102  For instance 
the establishment of the ICTY and the involvement of the ICJ in the former Yugoslavia 
in the early 1990s did not act as a barrier to the Srebrenica genocide.103  International 
justice and accountability under the auspices ICTY only began gaining results when 
states took coercive action to prevent violence and bring individuals to justice.104  
Therefore stopping the violence ‘lies in politics, not law’.105 
As revealed by the reaction to the Al Bashir warrant described in Chapter Three, it is 
particularly difficult to pursue justice when a state which is accused of being involved 
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in the commission of crimes remains in power.106  The study of the Al Bashir warrant 
highlighted that if you do seek to indict combatants and leaders in an ongoing situation 
you potentially risk prolonging that situation and deepening the level of violence 
perpetrated against civilians.107  While the investigation may not have led to deepening 
levels of violence, it has certainly prolonged the situation as Burundi suspended 
cooperation with international organisations which mirrors the response of the 
Sudanese government to the arrest warrant. 
There are further similarities between the reactions to the ICC investigations in 
Burundi and Darfur, as the involvement of the ICC has been criticised by neighbouring 
countries as President Museveni of Uganda and the president of Tanzania, John 
Magufuli condemned the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to open an investigation 
for its potential to jeopardise the EAC led peace negotiations.108  These regional actors 
do not want to be placed in the difficult situation of negotiating a peace agreement 
with individuals who may be subject to international arrest warrants.  Therefore, 
comparable to the regional reaction to the Al Bashir warrant outlined in Chapter Three, 
there are influential regional actors contending that criminal justice should be side-
lined for the pursuit of peace.  This raises the dilemma of whether peace can be 
achieved in Burundi, with the threat of prosecution hanging over the head of 
government and security officials. 
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While justice should not be undermined, it is difficult to achieve accountability when 
not only is a government refusing to cooperate with an investigation but also two 
important facilitators of the peace process are opposed to any judicial mechanism.  
Therefore the Prosecutor’s investigation and the potential issuance of arrest warrants 
is a key obstacle which will have to be confronted in the future if the situation is not 
resolved. 
A negotiated settlement looked unlikely in 2018, as tension rose again in Burundi after 
Nkurunziza and his government’s decision to hold a referendum in May 2018 on 
proposed changes to the Constitution, which would remove the power-sharing 
provisions and restrictions on term limits set out within the Constitution and the 
Arusha Agreement.109  The changes to the constitution were approved by nearly three 
quarters of voters, with a turnout of over 95% in a referendum campaign that was 
marked by voter intimidation and violence.110 
In the lead-up to the Constitutional Referendum, government officials in public 
statements warned people not to oppose the amendments while also threatening to 
target anyone who does campaign against the government.111  The referendum 
campaign led to an increase in repression as government forces targeted opposition 
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politicians and civil society actors calling for a No vote.112  In May 2018, the most 
violent attack since December 2015 was perpetrated when at least 24 people, including 
women and children, were murdered by unidentifiable individuals.113  With the 
passing of the referendum and the continued reluctance of the Burundian government 
to enter dialogue with the opposition and engage with international bodies, the 
situation remained tense in 2018. 
There is no definitive number of those who have been killed since the beginning of 
the violence, the last official account was from the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights which documented 593 violations of the right to life 
from April 2015 to the 31 December 2016.114  There has also been widespread 
displacement since April 2015, as more than 430,000 people have fled the country to 
seek refuge in neighbouring countries while there are over 175,000 internally 
displaced persons within Burundi.115  Furthermore over 3 million people, which 
accounts for one quarter of the population require humanitarian assistance.116 
While the levels of violence have fluctuated in Burundi since 2015, there are 
indications that the violence could develop into genocide in the warnings coming from 
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individuals and groups on the ground.  Would a genocide finding improve the situation 
in comparison to a finding of atrocity crimes?  With the international community 
failing to meaningfully respond to threats of genocide and atrocity crimes, would a 
clear determination of genocide by an actor or inquiry of the UN and the AU alter their 
approach to the situation? 
6.2(iv) The Value of a Genocide Finding 
If the genocide label was utilised it should not spark a different reaction to the current 
approach of international and regional actors as to what further response beyond 
international inquiries and an ICC investigation would a claim of genocide spur?  The 
label genocide would unlikely lead to military intervention as the examination of 
previous situations illustrates that the genocide label is a recipe for inaction which 
could in fact destabilise an already precarious situation. 
In Burundi, the label to be applied to the violence is not dictating the international 
response to the situation rather the level of violence and government response is 
guiding the approach to resolving the situation.  With the situation in Burundi not yet 
involving large-scale violence the focus of international and regional efforts is on 
employing softer measures to facilitate dialogue, encouraging the government of 
Burundi to re-engage with international human rights bodies, and gaining the 
government’s cooperation with the deployment of AU and regional forces to aid in 
peacebuilding operations and human rights monitoring. 
A determination of genocide in the midst of the situation would be problematic due to 
the potential responses of the Burundian government, and regional and international 
actors.  An accusation of genocide could push an already internationally disengaged 
Burundi over the edge, as the international community’s options for resolving the 
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Burundi crisis would drastically narrow.  A finding of genocide by a state or a 
commission of inquiry would make peace negotiations virtually impossible as civil 
society actors would decry any attempts of dialogue with those accused of, in their 
minds, the gravest crime.  There would also be the further issue of civil society actors 
advocating impractical solutions, which means that the international community 
would be at a standstill.  This would not improve the lives of the very people suffering 
from the violence, whether it is genocidal or not. 
While the UN Security Council and the AU may not be using the label genocide, it 
does not mean that steps are not being taken to prevent genocide in Burundi.  The 
word genocide does not need to be spoken in Burundi to prevent the crime.  The 
international efforts to halt the perpetration of human rights violations, while not 
explicitly aimed at the prevention of genocide, are directed at addressing the 
conditions that give rise to atrocity crimes, which as we know are nearly identical for 
each atrocity crime.  Therefore activists and victims should not be concentrating on 
labelling the violence as genocide or extending the definition of genocide, as the 
genocide label or an expanded definition of genocide encompassing elements of a 
social understanding of genocide will not improve the situation on the ground as 
repression and violence will continue regardless the label applied to describe the 
violence. 
In conclusion while the violence in Burundi may not amount to the crime of genocide, 
the references to genocide in this chapter have highlighted the various drawbacks 
associated with the genocide label discussed throughout this study.  Genocide as a 
crime is difficult to predict, due to the complexity of forecasting whether a campaign 
of genocide will evolve from the signifiers of genocide present in a situation.  Burundi 
is a typical ethnic conflict, however this does mean that Burundi will follow some 
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predictable pattern.  Despite Burundi’s history of atrocity crimes, including the 
perpetration of genocide, it is near impossible to know that genocide will be 
perpetrated.  Even when crimes are perpetrated, genocide is hard to identify due to the 
difficulty of distinguishing the elements of genocide from other crimes of international 
law in the midst of spiralling violence.  The intent to destroy differentiates the crime 
of genocide, however this element is onerous to identify in the midst of violence as 
actors are rarely explicit with the intent underlying their actions.  In Burundi, similar 
to many situations of violence, actors have concealed their actions and policies under 
the guise of political and military objectives. 
As well as illustrating the complexities surrounding identifying signs and evidence of 
genocide the case of Burundi highlights that employing the label genocide or 
expressing fears of the risk of genocide does not provoke effective international or 
regional responses to violence.  Genocide has not sufficiently challenged the political 
will of states to prevent and respond to genocide.  The inadequacy of the genocide 
label as a preventative term in the midst of violence raises significant questions for the 
future study of genocide.  Should focus continue to be on defining the crime or should 
there be an acceptance that genocide as a term provides more obstacles to peace than 
remedies for halting violence due to the variety of complexities involved in identifying 
the crime in the midst of violence?  The discussion of genocide within the context of 
Burundi indicates that genocide is a problematic label for prevention, but perhaps the 
term has been more successfully employed to address violence in a situation that has 
developed to the north of Burundi. 
6.3 South Sudan Facing the Abyss 
The world’s newest state South Sudan achieved independence in July 2011 after a 
protracted military campaign against the Sudanese government.  Unfortunately 
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independence did not deliver peace and stability; instead South Sudan’s post-
independence experience has been marked by political infighting which in 2013 
descended into widespread bloodshed and a large scale humanitarian crisis.  With 
various warnings related to the threat of genocide present in the situation in South 
Sudan, is it possible to forecast the risk of genocide or identify the initial stages of 
genocide in South Sudan?  Furthermore if these signs are identifiable, is it beneficial 
to label the violence as genocide in seeking to halt the violence that has plagued South 
Sudan since 2013? 
6.3(i) Forging a Nation 
The roots of the violence that ignited in South Sudan in 2013 can be traced back to the 
South’s struggle for self-determination in Sudan.  Cultural, economic, political, and 
religious disparities between the north and the south of Sudan led to a civil war 
breaking out in 1955, in the midst of the country gaining independence from Britain 
and Egypt’s colonial rule.117  While the south of Sudan is home to a diverse ethnic 
population with over sixty different ethnic groups, these ethnic groups united together 
with the objective of achieving greater levels of autonomy from the Khartoum 
government.118  The south largely united under the banner of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement and its Army (hereafter ‘SPLM’ and ‘SPLM/A’), led by John 
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Garang, a member of the Dinka ethnic group.119  The SPLM/A did not seek 
independence but rather a new secular inclusive Sudan.120 
This vision of a united Sudan espoused by Garang was not accepted by all the 
members of the SPLM, instead an opposition movement within the SPLM, led by Riek 
Machar and comprising primarily of members of the Nuer ethnic group, called for the 
succession of the South.121  The divisions within the different factions of the SPLM 
created a civil war within a civil war, and saw some of the bloodiest atrocities of the 
civil war period.122  The legacy of this split within the SPLM is seen in the violence 
that arose in 2013 as references to historical atrocities are being used to inflame 
tensions between groups. 
The feuding groups within the SPLM did reunite, after years of crippling violence, 
under the SPLM banner in the interest of negotiating a peace agreement.123  Peace 
negotiations between the SPLM and the Sudanese government started in 1993 with 
the support of the regional grouping the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(hereafter ‘IGAD’).124  While the process was slow, regional and international 
                                                 
119 Amir H Idris, Sudan’s Civil War: Slavery, Race and Formational Identities (The Edwin Mellen 
Press 2001) 3; Andrew S Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 66. 
120 Douglas H Johnson, ‘Twentieth-Century Civil Wars’ in John Ryle, Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo, 
and Jok Madut Jok (eds), The Sudan Handbook (Rift Valley Institute 2011) 127; Andrew S Natsios, 
Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press 2012) 67. 
121 Amir H Idris, Sudan’s Civil War: Slavery, Race and Formational Identities (The Edwin Mellen 
Press 2001) 129–130; Douglas H Johnson, ‘Twentieth-Century Civil Wars’ in John Ryle, Justin Willis, 
Suliman Baldo, and Jok Madut Jok (eds), The Sudan Handbook (Rift Valley Institute 2011) 130–131. 
122 Amir H Idris, Sudan’s Civil War: Slavery, Race and Formational Identities (The Edwin Mellen 
Press 2001) 129–130; Andrew S Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to 
Know (Oxford University Press 2012) 79, 98. 
123 John Young, The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process (Zed 
Books 2012) 54. 
124 Douglas H Johnson, ‘Twentieth-Century Civil Wars’ in John Ryle, Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo, 
and Jok Madut Jok (eds), The Sudan Handbook (Rift Valley Institute 2011) 131; John Young, The Fate 
of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process (Zed Books 2012) 83; Kasaija 
Phillip Apuuli, ‘IGAD’s Mediation in the Current South Sudan Conflict: Prospects and Challenges’ 
(2015) 8 African Security 120, 126. 
353 
commitment to a negotiated peace brought about further talks.125  A seminal moment 
in the peace negotiations occurred in 2002 when the Machakos Protocol was signed 
by the Sudanese government and the SPLM which outlined the broad principles of a 
peace agreement, and crucially granted the South the option of holding a referendum 
for independence.126  Then in 2005, one of the longest running civil wars in Africa 
ended when the government of Sudan and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.127 
Garang who was one of the leading negotiators of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement died in a helicopter crash a number of months after the signing of the 
agreement.128  Salva Kiir Mayardit, Garang’s deputy commander in the SPLA and a 
member of the Dinka ethnic group like Garang, replaced him as the leader of the 
SPLM while Riek Machar, who had re-joined the SPLM before the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, became second in command.129 
In January 2011 the south voted overwhelmingly (98.83%) to become an independent 
country, which formally occurred on the 9th of July 2011 with the creation of the 
Republic of South Sudan.130  As leader of the SPLM, Kiir became the President of the 
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newly independent South Sudan while Machar assumed the position of Vice 
President.131  On the 14th of July 2011, South Sudan was admitted as the 193rd member 
of the UN.132  Despite its membership of the community of nations, South Sudan has 
not ratified the Genocide Convention or the Rome Statute.  On gaining independence 
South Sudan became one of the poorest and least developed nations, and its socio-
economic difficulties and weak state institutions have contributed to political 
instability and the rise of violence within the new state.133  Rather than deliver the 
peace which was tantalisingly promised, independence has reopened old rivalries as 
there has been a power struggle between Kiir and Machar since independence which 
boiled over in 2013. 
Would this tension evolve along genocidal lines, or is it impossible to predict due to 
the similarities between the atrocity crimes?  The instability in society combined with 
South Sudan’s recent history of atrocity crimes indicates that South Sudan pre-2013 
was vulnerable to the perpetration of atrocity crimes, including genocide.  However 
this does not mean that the situation in South Sudan which developed in 2013 would 
lead to the perpetration of genocide due to the complexity of distinguishing indicators 
of the atrocity crimes and the difficulty of identifying a triggering factor for genocidal 
violence.  Until the violence broke out, it was impossible to predict that genocide 
would be perpetrated. 
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6.3(ii) A Violent Eruption 
The situation that developed in South Sudan in 2013 was sparked by an announcement 
by Machar that he would challenge for the presidency, a decision which led to Kiir 
removing Machar from his role as Vice-President in June 2013 and dismissing his 
entire cabinet.134  This action led to a power struggle within the government and the 
military.135  In December 2013, fighting broke out in the capital Juba amongst 
members of the Presidential Guard which quickly spread to army barracks surrounding 
Juba.136  In response to the clashes, Kiir accused Machar of leading a coup against him 
and detained eleven politicians, however Machar avoided arrest as he fled the 
capital.137  While the situation was founded in a political confrontation between Kiir 
and Machar, there was a definite ethnic element to the violence as Dinka soldiers 
within the Dinka-dominated SPLA deliberately targeted members of the Nuer ethnic 
group in house to house searches in Juba in the initial days of the situation.138 
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Outside the capital, units of the SPLA defected to Machar, who was also bolstered in 
support by militia groups.139  Machar’s forces, who were associated with the Nuer 
ethnic group, became known as the SPLM/A in Opposition (hereafter ‘SPLM/A-IO’), 
repeatedly clashed with the SPLA as violence spiralled into other towns and villages 
across South Sudan.140  The situation became more complex as the violence spread 
across South Sudan as other armed groups and militias became involved in the 
violence, clashing with both the SPLA and the SPLA-IO and fighting amongst 
themselves.141  These armed groups and militias formed primarily along ethnic lines, 
which lead to the SPLA, SPLA-IO, and other militias to deliberately target civilians 
on the basis of their ethnicity due to their real or perceived support for an opposing 
side.142 
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In response to the violence the international community has continually attempted to 
mediate the situation and halt the slaughter.  The IGAD negotiated a ceasefire between 
the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A-IO in January 2014 but it was repeatedly broken by 
both sides and it did nothing to abate the violence.143  Continued attempts by the IGAD 
to negotiate ceasefires stalled over the following months as violence raged on.144  The 
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UN is also involved in negotiating a peaceful settlement to the situation through the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (hereafter ‘UNMISS’), a UN Security Council 
created Chapter VII mission deployed to South Sudan after the vote for secession.145  
Since the genesis of the situation and in response to the constant levels of violence, 
the UN Security Council repeatedly bolstered the mandate and the force strength of 
UNMISS.146  With the repeated failure to halt the violence and foster dialogue the UN 
Security Council in March 2015 created a sanctions regime, a travel ban and asset 
freeze, which would be targeted against those who violated international law and 
prolonged the violence.147  The US, Canada, and the EU have also imposed travel bans 
and asset freezes against high ranking SPLM/A and SPLM/A-IO officials.148 
Signs of Genocide 
With mediation frustrated, violence continued unabated which led to claims that 
genocide could be perpetrated due to the ethnic dimension to the violence.  In April 
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2014, Eric Reeves, a genocide researcher, and John Prendergast, a genocide 
prevention activist, contended that the violence bears ‘all the hallmarks of genocide’ 
due to the ethnic split in the army which is leading armed groups to target individuals 
on the basis of their ethnicity.149  In May 2014, the then US Secretary of State John 
Kerry stated that ‘with respect to the question of genocide, there are very disturbing 
leading indicators of the kind of ethnic, tribal, targeted nationalistic killings taking 
place’.150  On the next day, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide warned 
the UN Security Council about the presence of risk factors and precursors of genocide 
and other atrocity crimes in the violence including ethnically-motivated violence, 
discrimination based on ethnicity, groups forming around ethnicity, and radio 
broadcasting of hate speech and incitement to violence.151  In the same month, Navi 
Pillay, the then High Commissioner for Human Rights and a former President of the 
ICTR, reported that she witnessed a number of precursors of genocide in the violence, 
such as ‘hate media including calls to rape women of a particular ethnic group; attacks 
on civilians in hospitals, churches and mosques; even attacks on people sheltering in 
UN compounds – all on the basis of the victims’ ethnicity.’152 
The language employed by the observers reflects the difficulty of predicting the 
outbreak of genocide as they refer to indicators and signals of genocide within South 
Sudan.  These references to genocide are speculative as the presence of warning signs 
in South Sudan does not mean that the situation will escalate.  The discussion in 
Chapter 4 on the warning signs of genocide showed that not every situation which 
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displays signs of genocide will result in genocide being perpetrated.  In fact the 
warnings may indicate that the violence may develop into crimes against humanity 
and ethnic cleansing due to the similar warning signals for each crime.  As highlighted 
in Chapter 4, it is a complex task to predict not only if an atrocity crime will be 
committed but also to predict which atrocity crime will be perpetrated. 
While the observers cautioned of the risk of genocide in 2014, the violence did not 
develop along genocidal lines, as least according to the AU Commission of Inquiry, 
which was the only inquiry to address the perpetration of genocide.  The AU 
Commission of Inquiry stated that notwithstanding the central role of ethnicity in the 
situation, there were no reasonable grounds, based on interviews and evidence, to 
believe genocide had been perpetrated.153  Despite the deliberate targeting of Nuer 
civilians on the basis of their ethnicity at roadblocks and in house-to-house searches 
by the SPLA in Juba in December 2013 resembling the early days of the Rwandan 
Genocide, the AU-mandated Commission of Inquiry considered these actions as 
evidence of a government plan to commit crimes against humanity.154  This illustrates 
the difficulty of comparing situations and applying the lessons of one situation to 
another, as not every situation that involves the deliberate targeting of civilians on the 
basis of their membership of a protected group amounts to genocide.  Furthermore it 
highlights the central role of intent within the crime of genocide, as there was clear 
evidence of physical acts occurring which were targeted against ethnic groups, but a 
genocidal intent underlying these acts was not discernible from the available evidence. 
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Instead of finding evidence of a campaign of genocide, inquiries conducted by the AU 
Commission of Inquiry, the Human Rights Division of the UNMISS, and the UN 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have determined that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that government and opposition forces have perpetrated 
war crimes and crimes against humanity since December 2013 due to the widespread 
and systematic nature of the attacks.155  Furthermore in their reports to the UN Security 
Council, the UN Secretary-General has communicated their belief that crimes against 
humanity have been committed throughout the violence.156  In statements and 
resolutions the UN Security Council has repeatedly contended that the violence may 
amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity.157  Therefore the majority of 
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observers to the situation are consistent in their view that the violations may amount 
to crimes against humanity and war crimes rather than genocide. 
However this does not mean genocide was not occurring in South Sudan in 2013 and 
2014; it could be that genocide was being perpetrated by one or more parties to the 
situation but the elements of the crime were not identifiable or distinguishable to 
observers and the inquiries.  The multifaceted nature of the situation in South Sudan 
means that there have been numerous violations committed by the different parties at 
the same time, which means it may have been difficult in 2013 and 2014 to distinguish 
indicators of genocide from these other crimes. 
Regardless of whether genocide was perpetrated in South Sudan in 2013 and 2014, 
international and regional observers were aware of the risk of genocide in the situation 
during this time period due to the multiple warnings.  Arguably signatory states to the 
Genocide Convention had a responsibility to prevent genocide during this time period 
due to their awareness of the threat of genocide.  John Kerry tacitly acknowledged this 
responsibility when he stated that the levels of ethnic and tribal killing ‘present a very 
serious challenge to the international community with respect to the question of 
genocide.’158  In responding to the violence, Kerry argued for the implementation of 
sanctions and the deployment of additional troops to bolster UNMISS, measures 
which had been adopted by the UN Security Council.159  These measures are not 
exclusively aimed at preventing genocide, instead the intention behind the adoption of 
these measures is to address the root causes of all atrocity crimes which are plaguing 
South Sudan.  This raises the utility of the genocide label in the midst of violence, as 
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the presence of warning signs of genocide did not exclusively inform the approach of 
the international community at the time, rather the levels of violence primarily dictated 
the response to the situation. 
Further issues with the utility of the genocide label as a preventative term are 
illuminated by the fact that the international community, while aware of the threat of 
genocide, was still willing to negotiate a peace agreement with potential perpetrators 
of genocide in 2014 and 2015.  Genocide is no different than the other atrocity crimes; 
regional and international actors are willing to ignore the perpetration or potential 
commission of crimes in order to prioritise the pursuit of peace. 
Eventually negotiations involving the IGAD, the AU, the EU, the US, the UK, China, 
and Norway led to Kiir and Machar signing the Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (hereafter ‘ARCSS’), an agreement which 
provided for a power-sharing government and the return of Machar as Vice President, 
in August 2015.160  This does not mean that the pursuit of criminal justice in South 
Sudan should be side-lined, as the ARCSS provides for the establishment of a hybrid 
court by the AU Commission which would have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and other crimes of national and international law 
committed since December 2013.161 
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While the international community may not have responded meaningfully with 
military force to prevent the violence that engulfed South Sudan since 2013 the focus 
on diplomacy did lead to the signing of the ARCSS.  However, similar to many other 
attempts to negotiate peace agreements throughout the world, it left the conditions that 
gave rise to violence largely unaddressed which meant that the threat of genocide 
remained within South Sudan.162 
6.3(iii) A Further Breakdown 
The period after the signing of the ARCSS saw a reduction in levels of violence.  
However this agreement, as the others before it, began to unravel and in July 2016, 
five years on from independence, clashes between Kiir’s and Machar’s forces in Juba 
led to Machar fleeing the city for a second time as violence once again swept across 
the country.163  The breakdown of the transitional government seemed to spark a new 
stage in the violence as there was an increased ethnic dimension to the situation.164  
There were parallels between the violence witnessed in Juba in 2016 and the violence 
in Juba in December 2013 as the SPLA once again deliberately targeted Nuer civilians 
in Juba when conducting checkpoints and house-to-house searches, while they 
allowed those who they believed to be Dinka go free.165 
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Across the country the collapse of the transitional government led to a ‘massive 
increase’ in the number of abuses and violations of international criminal law.166  
Civilians continued to be deliberately targeted on the basis of their ethnicity and their 
real or perceived support for the opposition.167  Ethnic division has been stirred by 
hate speech in public speeches and through the media and on social media, in 
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particular by officials within the SPLM and SPLM-IO after the collapse of the 
government in July 2016, which has called for the targeting of opposing ethnic 
groups.168  Antagonism between the ethnic groups is also being stirred after an 
executive order by Kiir to increase the number of states in South Sudan from ten to 
twenty eight as this decision is perceived by other ethnic groups as a strategy to annex 
land and resources to further advantage the Dinka.169  This plan has led to violence as 
the SPLA have launched operations in non-Dinka areas to force the displacement of 
other ethnic groups to reclaim land for the Dinka.170 
This ethnically-driven rhetoric and violence led the Special Adviser on the Prevention 
of Genocide to warn the UN Security Council that there is a real risk of the ‘political 
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conflict’ developing into an ‘ethnic war.’171  Based on the evidence of ethnically 
motivated violence and rhetoric the UN Security Council agreed with the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide that the situation which ‘began as a political 
conflict could transform into an outright ethnic war’.172  The Secretary-General argues 
South Sudan is ‘on the edge of the abyss’, and unless action is taken to prevent the 
violence there will be a ‘catastrophe.’173  This bleak humanitarian picture and the post-
independence political and social instability combined with South Sudan’s history of 
atrocity crimes means that South Sudan continued to be vulnerable to the commission 
of atrocity crimes, including genocide.174 
The Threat of Genocide 
The collapse of the transitional government in July 2016 led to further warnings of 
genocide, as violence with a significant ethnic dimension engulfed the country.  In 
November 2016, Kate Almquist Knopf, director of the Africa Centre for Strategic 
Studies, reported that ‘nearly all of the warning signs of impending genocide are 
present: extreme tribal polarization fuelling a cycle of revenge, widespread and 
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systematic attacks against civilians, hate speech, atrocities intended to dehumanize 
particular populations, and targeting of community and tribal leaders, among 
others’175  Also in November 2016, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 
warned that due to the violence and inflammatory rhetoric South Sudan is becoming 
increasingly ethnically polarised which means that there is the potential for the 
violence to escalate into genocide.176  In a briefing to the UN Security Council in the 
same month, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide listed a number of 
risk factors in South Sudan which ‘provide an environment ripe for the commission 
of mass atrocities’, including genocide.177  The warning signs of mass violence include 
a political and security crisis; a weak economy; the arming, recruitment, and training 
of the SPLA and SPLA-IO; the impunity of security forces; a lack of accountability, 
the restriction and targeting of civil society and the media; a humanitarian emergency; 
and a rise in hate speech.  In December 2016 the Secretary-General warned that there 
was a real risk that the atrocity crimes being committed, including ethnic cleansing, 
could escalate into genocide.178 
These warnings further highlight the difficulty of predicting genocide that was 
observed with the 2014 warnings, as any situation involving acts of violence and 
repression deliberately directed against a protected group under the Genocide 
Convention could potentially evolve into genocide.  However the difficulty is 
identifying the triggering factor that will push an actor into perpetrating genocide.  
That is why the language used by the observers is once again highly speculative, 
warning about the conditions that give rise to genocide being present in South Sudan 
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rather than definitively state that genocide will be perpetrated.  Furthermore, similar 
to the 2014 warnings, while these warning signs point towards the perpetration of 
genocide, the indicators could also conceivably point towards the commission of other 
atrocity crimes as the atrocity crimes share near identical underlying conditions as 
illustrated in the UN’s ‘Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes’. 
The evidence collected by the Human Rights Division of the UNMISS, the UN Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the UN General Assembly Human 
Rights Council-mandated Commission of Human Rights have led these bodies to 
conclude that there is reasonable grounds to believe that government and opposition 
forces have perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity.179  Furthermore the 
government policy of forced removal of civilians to reclaim land for the Dinka has 
been labelled as ethnic cleansing by the chair of the Commission on Human Rights, 
Yasmin Sooka.180  Sooka argued that acts of killing, rape, sexual violence, abductions, 
looting, and destruction of property were being employed as means of cleansing an 
ethnic group from an area.181  The UNMISS and the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights also agreed that the actions of the SPLA indicated a 
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strategy to forcibly displace civilians, as witnesses stated that the intent underlying the 
violence was to ‘cleanse’ these areas.182  The Secretary-General has also cautioned the 
UN Security Council about the risk of ethnic cleansing being perpetrated.183  Therefore 
the majority of observers and inquiries have not found evidence of a genocidal 
campaign. 
However this does not mean that genocide has not been perpetrated due to the 
difficulties of distinguishing the elements of the crime from other atrocity crimes.  The 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide does note that due to the number of 
actors involved in the violence, either as perpetrators or victims, it is difficult to assess 
the risk of atrocity crimes.184  The difficulties of distinguishing the crimes can be 
highlighted by the Commission on Human Rights who stated in their March 2017 
report that ‘warning signs and enablers for genocide and ethnic cleansing include the 
cover of an ongoing conflict to act as a “smoke screen”, several low-level and isolated 
acts of violence to start the process, the dehumanization of others through hate speech, 
economic volatility and instability, deliberate starvation, the bombardment of and 
attacks against civilians, forced displacement and the burning of villages.’185  This 
highlights that to observers it is a near impossible task to predict if genocide will be 
perpetrated or identify genocide in its early stages, which further illustrates why 
employing the general label atrocity crimes as a preventative term would be 
advantageous rather than seeking to vainly distinguish indicators of crime.  As 
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highlighted during the study under the RtoP protocol, states have the same 
responsibility to protect civilians from genocide as other atrocity crimes.  Therefore a 
warning of genocide should in theory not spark a different response to warnings of 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. 
The international and regional reaction to the 2016 warnings of genocide was not 
radically different to the response to the 2014 warnings, as the international 
community has continued to focus on establishing a functioning government.  
Indicators of genocide and other atrocity crimes continue to be no barrier to peace.  
However the international community has continued to take steps to address 
conditions that give rise to genocide and other atrocity crimes due to the warnings of 
these crimes.  In particular the warning from the Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide prompted action as he emphasised that genocide is a process, and not an 
event which occurs overnight which means that steps can be taken to prevent the crime 
before it is too late.186 
On the foot of this warning representatives of Albania, Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica, 
Germany, Ireland, Macedonia, Mexico, Netherlands (also on behalf of Rwanda), 
Norway, Slovakia (on behalf of the EU), Slovenia, and Uruguay expressed serious 
concern about the presence of warning signs of genocide in South Sudan during a 
special session of the Human Rights Council on the situation in South Sudan in 
December 2016.187  These countries agreed with the Special Adviser on the Prevention 
of Genocide that action needed to be taken to prevent genocide and they called for all 
parties to halt the violence, to work towards the establishment of the transitional 
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government, for government cooperation with regional and international bodies, for 
the government to consent to the deployment of additional peacekeepers, and for the 
setting up of the hybrid court.188  These recommendations were adopted into the 
resolution passed at the conclusion of the special session.189 
Notwithstanding these attempts to respond to the violence, the threat of genocide 
remained present.  A few months later in March 2017 during an interactive dialogue 
with the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan members of the Human Rights 
Council including Albania, Slovakia, and Slovenia continued to express fears of 
genocide being perpetrated alongside other atrocity crimes.190  In fact in the previous 
month Brigadier General Henry Oyay Nyago, a former officer of South Sudan’s 
military court, had accused, in a resignation letter addressed to Kiir, the government 
and Kiir of committing ‘genocidal acts’ alongside war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing against civilians.191 
This claim that ‘genocidal acts’ are occurring is distinct from a claim that genocide is 
occurring, as acts of violence may comprise the actus reus of genocide but lack the 
mens rea of the crime.  However Nyago does not undertake a legal examination of the 
crime, instead Nyago highlights the wide spectrum of crimes perpetrated under the 
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auspices of the government and the failure of the government to investigate these 
crimes.  Therefore the reference to genocide and other atrocity crimes is less about the 
potential legal consequences of a finding of genocide; rather Nyago is relying on the 
rhetorical value of genocide and the other crimes to not only shame Kiir and the 
government but draw attention to the situation.  While Nyago does not explicitly call 
for international attention, in publically releasing the letter and using the genocide 
label ensured that Nyago’s letter received media coverage.  As illustrated throughout 
the study the genocide label is powerful tool for raising awareness of an issue. 
The rhetorical value attached to the genocide label means that activists and victims are 
more willing to label a situation as genocide to not only draw attention to a situation 
but also to capture the suffering of victims.  The significance of a determination of 
genocide for activists and victims can be seen in a statement issued in April 2017 by 
a number of opposition parties in which they called upon the AU, the UN, and the UN 
Secretary-General to ‘recognise and condemn the genocidal actions of Kiir’s 
regime’.192  For these groups if the international community issued a ‘full, frank, and 
just acknowledgement of the unfolding genocide’ it would serve as a ‘necessary first 
step to honour the victims and their families and signal a glimmer of hope for the 
future.’ 
Similar to activists and victims in Darfur, the genocide label was regarded by these 
groups as the only label that would accurately represent the atrocities faced by the 
victimised population and failure to use the word genocide would only prolong the 
suffering of the victims.  This study has shown though that while the symbolic value 
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of international recognition of genocide is important for victims and activists, it does 
not translate into effective action to prevent the crime.  Media coverage and increased 
international attention does not stop atrocities, so while the rhetorical value of the 
genocide label is clear, it is less clear the utility of the genocide label for preventing 
genocide and other atrocities. 
The ineffectiveness of the genocide label as a preventative term can be seen by the 
fact that even when used to label the violence in South Sudan, it did not spark an 
effective response to halt the violence.  In April 2017 after a visit to South Sudan, Priti 
Patel, the then British Secretary of State for International Development, labelled the 
violence as genocide in a media interview.193  Patel said evidence of villages being 
burned, people being displaced, attacks on civilians, sexual violence, and the blocking 
of aid on tribal grounds signifies that genocide is occurring.194  Despite acknowledging 
that genocide was occurring, there was no reference to the UK’s responsibility to 
prevent genocide after a finding of genocide.  There was no call for the UK to mobilise 
under the Genocide Convention or the RtoP protocol.  Instead Patel called upon 
African leaders and governments to do more to resolve the situation by bringing Kiir 
to the negotiating table.195  For Patel a finding of genocide does not dictate a different 
response to the approach that is already being taken by regional and international 
actors.  Therefore it does not seem as if the label applied to the situation matters to the 
response but rather the level of violence dictates the reaction. 
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However the rhetorical value and significance attached to the genocide label is still 
problematic for states.  This can be witnessed by the fact that the UK government did 
not adopt the position that genocide was occurring; furthermore a press release of 
Patel’s visit issued by her department omitted any reference to genocide.196  This 
highlights that states are still wary of the word genocide and the obligations that may 
attach to a declaration of genocide.  There is a fear, containing some elements of a 
hangover from Rwanda, that using the genocide label will require states to take action.  
States are therefore treading the line between recognising the risk of genocide and 
actually taking action to prevent genocide.  John Kerry acknowledged this conundrum 
in 2014, when he said that the indicators of genocide would pose a question for the 
international community.  This illustrates that the rhetorical power possessed by the 
genocide label is far more powerful than its preventative value. 
Since the failure to install the transitional government in July 2016 international and 
regional efforts to implement the ARCSS and mediate between the different parties 
have largely failed.197  However it is a difficult task to rate how effective the measures 
adopted by the UN Security Council and other international actors have been at 
hindering the parties’ ability to commit genocide or other atrocity crimes.  Similar to 
the situation in Burundi, while the attempts to mediate the violence have not stopped 
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the bloodshed it is not clear that it has made the situation worse.  Conceivably the 
presence of the UNMISS and the imposition of sanctions could be preventing the 
parties from committing further acts of mass violence.  In fact the Secretary-General 
did state, in March 2017, that the threat of genocide had diminished due to the political 
interventions of the UN, regional organisations, and neighbouring countries.198  
Notwithstanding this, the measures adopted to date have not halted the capacity of 
actors to perpetrate violence, including genocide. 
Despite the fact that genocide remained a threat in 2018, regional and international 
actors were unlikely to alter their strategy for resolving the situation due to the realities 
of international relations.  The current political climate means that the deployment of 
more soldiers is improbable as the UN’s budget is being stretched to cover an array of 
situations, and South Sudan is one of many missions which are severely underfunded 
and under resourced.  For the UNMISS to receive the money, resources, and troop 
numbers needed to halt the violence it would take a whole culture shift across multiple 
countries for governments to change from the current culture of reaction to a culture 
of prevention.  It would also need a strong coalition of civil society actors pushing for 
action which is improbable as the situation in South Sudan, similar to Burundi, has 
fallen in between the cracks of international attention in comparison to the situations 
in Syria and Myanmar.  Therefore the mission in South Sudan will continue to be 
under resourced and incapable of permanently halting the violence. 
The collapse of the transitional government has also meant that despite the efforts of 
the AU and the UN, the hybrid court has yet to be established as of 2018.199  However 
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it is likely that the pursuit of criminal justice will have to come second to the pursuit 
of peace, in order to establish the hybrid court there needs to be a functioning 
government.  The IGAD did oversee the signing of a ceasefire in December 2017; 
however this was repeatedly breached by the parties.200  The Office for the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was still warning in 2018 of the ethnic division 
in society becoming further ‘entrenched’ which meant that the risk of genocide and 
other crimes remained high.201  After further negotiations, once again overseen by the 
IGAD, the warring parties did agree in August 2018 to a revitalised ARCSS which 
would allow a new transitional government to take power until democratic elections 
are held.202  The repeated failure to implement peace agreements would indicate this 
latest agreement could unravel and the violence that has blighted South Sudan since 
December 2013 could continue into 2019, and South Sudan will continue to be 
deprived of both peace and justice. 
There is no official record of the number of people who have died since the outbreak 
of violence in 2013, however the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs estimates that tens of thousands have been victims of the 
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violence.203  Multiple parties to the situation have perpetrated acts of extrajudicial 
killing, mass killing, enforced disappearance, arbitrary arrests and detentions, 
abductions, beatings, torture, ill-treatment, sexual violence, rape, sexual slavery, 
forced abortion, deliberate shelling of civilian areas, and the looting and destruction 
of property and livestock.204  The violence has led to widespread displacement as since 
                                                 
203 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ‘South Sudan: 2017 
Humanitarian Needs Overview’ (December 2016) 2, 4. 
204 United Nations Mission in South Sudan ‘Interim Report on Human Rights: Crisis in South Sudan 
— Report Coverage 15 December 2013–January 31 2014’ (21 February 2014) 9; Amnesty 
International, ‘Nowhere Safe: Civilians under Attack in South Sudan’ (8 May 2014) 18–36; United 
Nations Mission in South Sudan ‘Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report’ (8 May 2014) 
para. 265–266; Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan’s New War: Abuses by Government and 
Opposition Forces’ (7 August 2014) 18, 22–74; African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 
‘Final Report of The African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’ (15 October 2014) para. 
380; International Crisis Group, ‘Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts’ (29 January 2015) 11; 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan ‘Flash Human Rights Report on the Escalation of Fighting in 
Greater Upper Nile (April/May 2015)’ (29 June 2015) para. 20–22; Human Rights Watch, ‘“They 
Burned it All”: Destruction of Villages, Killings, and Sexual Violence in Unity State, South Sudan’ (22 
July 2015) 17–25, 30–37; United Nations Mission in South Sudan ‘The State of Human Rights in 
Protracted Conflict in South Sudan’ (4 December 2015) para. 1, 12; United Nations Security Council 
‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’ (22 January 2016) UN Doc S/2016/70, para. 
110–123, 128–134; Amnesty International, ‘“Their Voices Stopped”: Mass Killing in a Shipping 
Container in Leer, South Sudan’ (10 March 2016) 10–24; Amnesty International, ‘Denied Protection 
of the Law: National Security Service Detention in Juba, South Sudan’ (7 April 2016) 1–2; United 
Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council ‘Assessment Mission by the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to Improve Human Rights, Accountability, 
Reconciliation and Capacity in South Sudan’ (22 April 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/49, para. 8, 13–39, 
42–51; Amnesty International, ‘“We are still Running”: War Crimes in Leer, South Sudan’ (28 July 
2016) 12–43; Amnesty International, ‘“We did not Believe we would Survive”: Killings, Rape and 
Looting in Juba’ (11 October 2016) 11–22; United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council 
‘Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan’ (6 March 2017) UN Doc A/HRC/34/63, 
para. 25–32, 34–40; United Nations Security Council ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South 
Sudan’ (13 April 2017) UN Doc S/2017/326, para. 61–62; United Nations Mission in South Sudan and 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Human Rights Violations and 
Abuses in Yei July 2016–January 2017’ (19 May 2017) para. 29–67; Amnesty International, ‘“It was 
as if my Village was Swept by a Flood”: South Sudan – Mass Displacement of the Shilluk from the 
West Bank of the White Nile’ (21 June 2017) 6–13; Amnesty International, ‘“If Men are Caught, they 
are Killed, if Women are Caught, they are Raped”: South Sudan – Atrocities in the Equatoria Region 
turn Country’s Breadbasket into a Killing Field’ (4 July 2017) 10–22; Amnesty International, ‘“Do not 
Remain Silent”: Survivors of Sexual Violence in South Sudan Call for Justice and Reparations’ (23 
July 2017) 21–44; Human Rights Watch, ‘“Soldiers Assume We Are Rebels”: Escalating Violence and 
Abuses in South Sudan’s Equatorias’ (1 August 2017) 13–17, 21–45; United Nations Security Council 
‘Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’ (20 November 2017) UN Doc S/2017/979, 
para. 34–47; United Nations Mission in South Sudan and United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Report on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression in South 
Sudan since the July 2016 Crisis’ (22 February 2018) 2; United Nations General Assembly Human 
Rights Council ‘Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan’ (23 February 2018) UN 
Doc A/HRC/37/71, para. 24–28, 35–100; United Nations Security Council ‘Final Report of the Panel 
of Experts on South Sudan’ (12 April 2018) UN Doc S/2018/292, para. 40; United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan and United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Indiscriminate 
Attacks against Civilians in Southern Unity: April-May 2018’ (10 July 2018) para. 21–39. 
379 
the beginning of the violence, more than 4 million people have fled their homes with 
1.9 million people internally displaced within South Sudan while there are over 2 
million people seeking refuge in neighbouring countries.205  The violence has also 
contributed to a large-scale humanitarian crisis with a lack of access to food, water, 
and medical care causing hunger, malnourishment, and the spread of disease amongst 
the population.206  With the dire humanitarian situation and the failure to halt the 
slaughter combined with the threat of genocide being nearly omnipresent in South 
Sudan from 2013 to 2018, would a clear and definitive determination of genocide by 
a state or AU or UN actor/body alter the strategy of international and regional actors 
for resolving the situation? 
6.3(iv) The Benefits of a Determination of Genocide 
A finding of genocide should in theory not change the approach of the international 
community as states have the same responsibility to act to protect civilians from war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing which the investigations have 
already determined may have been committed.  However a determination of genocide 
would provoke a different reaction amongst civil society actors and the general public, 
due to their perception of genocide as the worst crime in existence, which could 
translate into a different stance being adopted by a state or states towards peace 
negotiations.  A greater level of interest in a situation could be beneficial as it may 
lead to significantly more resources being committed to a situation as civilians will 
push for tougher measures to be taken against the perpetrator.  However the 
international reaction to the situation in Darfur and Sinjar highlights that even with a 
finding of genocide and a committed coalition of civil society actors there is no 
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guarantee that this will lead to the resolution of a situation.  The study of past cases of 
the application of the label genocide in the midst of violence illustrates that the use of 
the genocide label severely restricts the options available to a state to bring about a 
peaceful settlement to a situation. 
Failing to employ the term genocide to describe the situation in South Sudan does not 
imply a lack of political will on behalf of states but rather could indicate that a state 
or states believe that pursuing peace negotiations is the best strategy for halting the 
violence.  For instance if the SPLM/A, SPLM/A-IO, and other armed groups were 
accused of committing genocide, they would likely withdraw from negotiations.  
Employing the word genocide could also antagonise regional actors whose 
cooperation is of critical importance in resolving the situation such as in Darfur.  
Furthermore with a declaration of genocide a state would find it difficult if not 
impossible to negotiate a settlement as the public and civil society groups would decry 
holding talks with organisations and people accused of perpetrating genocide.  
Therefore while the genocide label may draw more attention to South Sudan it could 
be counterproductive as it would hinder a state’s or states’ ability to achieve a peaceful 
resolution to the situation which would only prolong the suffering of the civilian 
population. 
However regardless of whether states are fearful of using the word genocide, states 
are aware of the risk of genocide and can adopt measures to prevent the crime even 
without using the word genocide.  Genocide does not need to be spoken for the crime 
to be prevented, in fact it could actually be argued that in pursuing forceful measures 
under Chapter VII of the Charter with the deployment of UNMISS and the imposition 
of sanctions, the members of the UN Security Council are already fulfilling their 
obligation to prevent genocide under the Genocide Convention as they are employing 
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‘all means reasonably available to them’ after learning, through warnings from UN 
actors, of ‘the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.’207  While 
it may be the case that these actors did not take these actions with the expressed 
objective of preventing genocide, these measures aimed at halting war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing will also address the underlying conditions and 
elements which give rise to the perpetration of genocide.  Therefore similar to the 
international response to Burundi, states are potentially meeting their duty under the 
Convention to prevent genocide without utilising the word genocide to label the 
violence. 
Thus, while the situation which has unfolded in South Sudan since December 2013 
bears a number of elements of the crime of genocide (acts of genocide and a targeted 
group), the complexity of distinguishing the perpetration of genocide from the other 
violations of international criminal law combined with the evidence that a 
determination of genocide does not shield civilians from the commission of further 
atrocity crimes indicates that energy and time should not be expended on seeking to 
identify the existence of genocide or labelling the situation as genocide.  This is why 
this thesis has advocated for employing the general term atrocity crimes to characterise 
the violence rather than focus on the flawed label genocide which only provides a 
distraction to effective remedy for preventing and halting violence. 
6.4 Implications for the Study of Genocide 
While there may be deeper levels of violence in South Sudan in comparison to 
Burundi, the study of the respective situations highlight comparable deficiencies 
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within the definition of genocide.  Despite the considerable growth of knowledge in 
predicting and identifying genocide, the two case studies have highlighted the 
difficulties of distinguishing genocide from other atrocity crimes particularly in the 
early stages of a situation.  Before the outbreak of violence in the respective countries 
it was nearly impossible to forecast which crime would be committed as both countries 
were ripe for the perpetration of genocide due to their respective history of violence, 
including the past perpetration of genocide, and conditions that give rise to the 
commission of genocide, including instability in society and a struggle for power.  
However these indicators of genocide can also give rise to the perpetration of atrocity 
crimes.  Until the violence breaks out, and even then, it is nearly impossible to predict 
which crime will be committed, if a crime will even be perpetrated in the first place 
as the examination of the situations in Burundi and South Sudan illustrates that the 
threat of genocide and other atrocity crimes is not constant.  Rather the risk of genocide 
can ebb and flow throughout a situation depending on external factors.  This ‘cyclical 
nature of the way in which risk of genocide fluctuates over time highlights the inherent 
difficulty of attempts to predict genocide.’208 
The outbreak of violence seldom makes the task of distinguishing genocide from the 
other atrocity crimes less onerous with the actus reus of the crime of genocide sharing 
nearly identical elements with crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.  The fact 
that acts such as forcible transfer of the population, torture, sexual violence, acts 
causing mental harm, restriction of access to food, medical services, and other 
essential elements for the survival of a group can be simultaneously acts of genocide 
and acts of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing does mean that it can be hard 
to compare and to apply the lessons of previous cases of genocide to the future study 
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of genocide and the prevention of the crime.  With the similarities between the crimes, 
the identification of the crime being perpetrated is further complicated by the fact that 
multiple crimes can be perpetrated in the same situation.  Furthermore all three crimes 
can be deliberately targeted against a group, which while not an essential ingredient 
of each crime does illustrate the difficulties of pinpointing the perpetration of each 
crime in a situation. 
The difficulties of forecasting the risk of genocide and identifying the crime in the 
midst of violence in Burundi and South Sudan reveal that the characteristics of a 
genocidal campaign cannot be clearly distinguished absent evidence of an intent to 
destroy underlying the actions.  Even if this intent to destroy is evident before or during 
the commission of genocide, the identification of genocide is dependent on the 
political will of individuals and states to label the violence as genocide.  This illustrates 
the indeterminate nature of genocide, as outlined in the previous chapter, as the 
identification of genocide will be highly context specific.  All actors, regardless of 
whether they are a state, the UN, an international court, or a NGO, will be subject to 
this indeterminacy as the determination of genocide will not be a strict application of 
the law, but rather a careful balancing of the interests of these actors in making a 
determination.  This means that there is no definitive objective finding on the question 
of genocide, rather the subjective opinions of those making the determination will 
always impact their approach. 
For instance while the commissions of inquiry and other actors observing the 
situations in Burundi and South Sudan may have found that the violence may not 
amount to genocide in either situation, these situations could arguably be seen as 
genocide depending on the perspective of the individual or group observing the 
violence as there is considerable evidence of acts of genocide and deliberate targeting 
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of groups within the two countries.  Many of the acts that have been perpetrated against 
the Burundian and South Sudanese people have been labelled as genocide previously 
by international courts and commissions of inquiry in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, 
Darfur, and Sinjar.  In particular acts comprising the actus reus of the crime under 
Article II (b)-(e), acts that have not led to the immediate death of a group have been 
identified as constituent parts of the crime of genocide.  This reflects the indeterminacy 
of genocide, as it is not clear what the boundaries of the crime are.  There are no 
conceptual limits, rather the elements of the crime can fall across numerous crimes 
which renders the identification of the crime a complex task. 
Furthermore there is definite proof that these acts are being deliberately targeted 
against a civilian population, in some cases on the basis of their ethnicity in both 
Burundi and South Sudan.  While the parties to the respective situations may not be 
explicit with their intent to destroy a group, with regard to a clear plan or policy to 
destroy a group, in both countries there have been speeches and statements that would 
support evidence of an intent to destroy a group with calls for deliberate and systematic 
attacks on groups.  However due to the indeterminate nature of the definition of 
genocide, there is no precise method of establishing this intent.  The practice of the 
international courts and ad hoc tribunals along with the commissions of inquiry have 
clarified how to infer the intent to destroy, but still the ‘interpretation of what 
constitutes genocidal intent has been inconsistent.’209  Recalling once again how acts 
such as forcible transfer of population and restriction of humanitarian aid can be 
regarded as signifying an intent to destroy in one case, Srebrenica, while in another, 
Central African Republic, it was evidence of crimes against humanity and ethnic 
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cleansing.  Therefore whether these acts amount to evidence of genocide varies from 
case to case or even actor to actor, as seen in Darfur; which means that the 
determination of genocide is dependent on the perspective of those observing the 
violence. 
This does not mean that these observers are wrong about not labelling the violence as 
genocide or finding evidence of genocide, as it is entirely reasonable on the basis of 
the evidence available for states, the commissions of inquiry, and other observers to 
hold the opinion that genocide was not perpetrated in either Burundi or South Sudan.  
This is because genocide is rarely a cut and dried case, rather there will always be a 
level of indeterminacy around whether evidence of acts committed, plans and policies 
enacted, and speeches delivered amounts to genocide.  For instance the reaction to the 
situation in Darfur shows that ‘real differences do exist in defining “genocide”’ and 
these ‘differences will surface in the midst of crises and during situations that are not 
clear-cut cases of extermination.’210  Concluding that genocide is not occurring or 
finding no evidence of genocide in Burundi and South Sudan is not equivalent to 
genocide denial, rather it reflects the difficulties of employing the definition of 
genocide in the midst of violence. 
The indeterminacy of international law does not only affect the identification of the 
crime, but also the prevention of the crime.  As discussed previously, the Genocide 
Convention is vague on the responsibility of states under the Convention to prevent 
genocide.  After the passing of the Genocide Convention, it was unclear whether the 
duty to prevent required a legal determination of genocide, before the Genocide 
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Convention would apply to a given situation?211  And if so under the Convention ‘who 
should make a determination that genocide is to take place, who should prevent it and 
what kind of international approval they would need.’212 
Furthermore it was not certain whether the reference to states undertaking to prevent 
genocide under Article II of the Convention, imposed a legal obligation to prevent 
genocide on states or whether it was simply a moral obligation.  The thinking of states 
at the time of the adoption of the Convention, and the subsequent state practice shows 
that states do not believe that the Genocide Convention imposes an obligation to act 
as ‘[n]o government would have ratified the convention if its intent were to require as 
a legal obligation, that all states parties deploy military forces to foreign territories to 
prevent genocide whenever and wherever it occurs.’213  Imposing a legal obligation 
would have removed a level of indeterminacy within the Genocide Convention that 
can be used by states to justify action or inaction depending on the situation.  States 
purposely imbued the Genocide Convention with a level of indeterminacy to grant 
them control over applying or not applying the provisions of the Convention in a given 
situation if their interests are at stake. 
The jurisprudence of the ICJ in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro did clarify that states have a responsibility to prevent genocide when a 
state is aware of a serious risk of genocide is being perpetrated.214  However there 
remains a level of indeterminacy as the ICJ did not elaborate ‘how such a 
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determination was to be made or which criteria were to be used.’215  This means that 
assessing the ‘serious risk’ of genocide is ‘an essentially political determination’.216  
There is further indeterminacy in the judgment surrounding how to establish the 
geographical and political links between the state who failed to prevent genocide and 
the party who committed genocide.217  Therefore while going someway to clarifying 
the responsibility of states under the Convention to prevent genocide, the case law of 
the ICJ shows that this obligation to prevent will also be subject to a level of 
indeterminacy. 
This indeterminacy in preventing genocide extends to the methods of confronting 
genocide as it is unclear what action should be taken under the Genocide Convention 
to respond to genocide.218  The Convention only lays out that states have recourse to 
call upon the organs of the UN under Article VIII.  It does not set out how the crime 
can be prevented, does it require diplomatic engagements or more coercive efforts, or 
a combination of the two.  However providing discretion to states with regard to means 
of prevention is important as there is no perfect response to genocide, as ‘different 
situations will demand different measures’.219  There will always be a difference of 
opinion on how to respond to a situation of violence.220 
The response of regional and international actors to the respective situations in 
Burundi and South Sudan exemplifies this, as there is no correct approach for 
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confronting claims of genocide and other atrocity crimes.  Military deployment will 
not always will be the right option, while diplomatic efforts can have different 
responses on the level of engagement with a perpetrating state or actor.  The 
involvement of the ICC in Burundi shows how international justice can have a 
negative effect on the prevention of violence, with the Burundian government 
disengaging from international affairs.  Just as genocide and other atrocity crimes do 
not follow a predictable pattern, the response to these crimes is not an exact science.  
There is not one strategy to confront genocide, rather there are a multitude of options 
that can be diplomatic or coercive in nature to reduce the likelihood of genocide.  The 
success of these methods is dependent not on the label applied to the violence, but 
rather the support and backing of powerful and influential states which brings us back 
to the indeterminacy of genocide. 
The difficulties of identifying the elements of the crime and preventing its perpetration 
due to the indeterminate nature of genocide reflect the state of international politics, 
as while the situations in Burundi and South Sudan are multifaceted in nature, they are 
not particularly unique situations in comparison to violent situations occurring across 
the world.  The levels and characteristics of the violence in the two countries are not 
unprecedented, rather the situations merely reflect the latest in another multi-
dimensional ethnic clash which have continually blighted the world and Africa, in 
particular, over the last number of decades.  Therefore the information gained from 
examining the complexities of distinguishing and identifying genocide before and in 
the midst of violence in Burundi and South Sudan can provide valuable knowledge for 
the future of genocide studies.  While the crimes committed in the two situations may 
not amount to genocide, the varied references to genocide illuminate important lessons 
about the utility of the legal label of genocide as a preventative term. 
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The complexities of predicting and identifying genocide, due to its indeterminacy, 
before or during the perpetration of violence raise the utility of seeking to determine 
genocide in the midst of situation particularly when the respective studies have shown 
that measures aimed at the prevention of other atrocity crimes, will also address the 
underlying causes of genocide.  Therefore in the midst of violence is it beneficial for 
actors to be discussing the risks or likelihood of genocide rather than focussing on 
responses to violence? 
The definition of genocide is unworkable in the midst of violence, as discussions of 
genocide at best provide a distraction but at worst stall or provide a cover for inaction.  
Discussions of warning signs or indicators of genocide would lead to actors once again 
getting bogged down in definitional debates.  Even if the definition of genocide was 
extended, it would not lead to a different approach to preventing genocide.  The 
response would still be heavily dependent on political will, and the evidence of 
previous situations indicate that genocide is a distraction from concrete efforts to 
prevent violence.  While genocide’s powerful rhetorical value may draw attention to 
a situation, it does not translate into effective action to prevent a crime.  The Genocide 
Convention may provide that states have a responsibility to prevent genocide, however 
this does not guarantee that states will respond, any more than a finding of crimes 
against humanity will compel states to act, with UN Security Council authorisation, 
under the doctrine of RtoP. 
So while a label of genocide may accurately describe the suffering of a victimised 
population, its use will not ensure that the violence will stop.  The evidence of the 
response to Darfur, along with the response to Rwanda and Sinjar, shows that the 
political will of member states of the UN and regional bodies, not the label applied to 
characterise the violence, will dictate the response of the international community.  
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Therefore the focus of academics and activists should not be on debating the definition 
of genocide or the semantics of genocide, but rather on the prevention of the crime no 
matter the label used to describe it.221  As even with all the academic focus on 
discussing and researching genocide, genocide continues to be perpetrated.222  
Therefore new approaches to confronting the crime of genocide need to be explored 
and assessed. 
This is why this research is advocating the use of the label atrocity crimes to 
characterise violence.  While employing the label atrocity crimes to describe a 
situation does not ensure that action will be taken to prevent the violations of 
international criminal law, it removes the stigma around labels and the potential 
hierarchical treatment of crimes in the minds of diplomats and activists.  Leaving the 
question of genocide to a competent international court or tribunal would remove the 
complexities around employing a flawed definition of genocide in the midst of 
violence. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In examining the various references to genocide in the respective situations in Burundi 
and South Sudan, the three core strands of this thesis and research questions contained 
within each strand have been explored and addressed.  The central aim of this chapter 
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has been to show the complexities of the genocide label by illustrating the flawed 
understanding of the term, the stigma surrounding the word, the value of labels for a 
response, the influence of political will, the difficulties of identifying the elements of 
the crime before or during a situation, and the similarities between the different 
atrocity crimes which means that it can be arduous to distinguish the elements of the 
crime in the midst of violence.  These factors and conditions that are apparent in the 
responses to genocide that we have seen not only in Burundi and South Sudan but also 
in the responses in Darfur, Srebrenica, Central African Republic, and the Sinjar 
Region in Northern Iraq highlight that the complexity of identifying and determining 
genocide will be a factor in every situation rather than being context specific to these 
case studies.  This is because as outlined in this chapter and the preceding chapters, 
the crime of genocide is indeterminate and will remain indeterminate no matter the 
context it is applied in.  Therefore this is why the central argument of this chapter is 
that the indeterminate nature of genocide combined with the complexities of 
identifying genocide and employing the genocide in responding to violence means that 
the genocide label is not a valuable or beneficial term to address emerging or ongoing 
violence, and instead the term atrocity crimes should be employed as a placeholder 
label while the international community concentrates on an effective response to a 
situation. 
To conclude, while the case studies of Burundi and South Sudan may not directly 
concern the perpetration of genocide, the references to genocide throughout the two 
sections of this chapter illustrate the flaws apparent in the Genocide Convention’s 
definition of genocide and the need for a new approach to preventing genocide that 
removes the difficulties around identifying the crime and taking action to prevent 
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genocide.  Employing the label atrocity crimes, while not a perfect solution, is a step 
in the right direction. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE UTILITY OF THE GENOCIDE LABEL 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters of this thesis have developed along the three core strands of this 
research, and have addressed the research questions in a variety of ways which have 
illustrated and illuminated the flaws apparent within the definition and understanding 
of genocide.  In this chapter the aim is to tie together the three core strands of the 
research so as to address the key concern of this thesis, the utility of the legal definition 
of genocide as a preventative term.  Employing the knowledge and information gained 
from the case law and case studies and the various references to genocide by political 
actors, academics, civil society activists, and victims of atrocities, this chapter aims to 
highlight why the genocide definition is unsuitable for the prevention and response to 
ongoing violence.  Essentially, the specific elements of the crime are difficult to 
identify in the midst of violence and the understanding of genocide can limit the 
response of actors to violence. 
With the flaws apparent in employing the genocide label in the midst of violence for 
preventative purposes, this chapter will aim to illustrate, relying on the information 
and evidence gathered throughout this research, that the atrocity crimes label is a more 
advantageous and effective term to be employed in the midst of violence as it 
addresses the complexities of the genocide label while ensuring the focus is on the 
response not the label.  To begin addressing the utility of these two respective labels, 
and how the arguments surrounding these two labels have developed within the key 
core strands of this research, this chapter will commence by highlighting once again 
how the Genocide Convention and the definition of genocide has failed to adequately 
address the perpetration of violence. 
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7.2 A Failed Convention 
The historic adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide by the UN General Assembly in 1948 was intended to be a signal 
to the world that states would no longer stand idly by while the physical existence of 
groups of people was under threat from destruction.  The tragic history of the 
application, or more accurately the non-application, of the provisions of the Genocide 
Convention in numerous situations of violence since 1948 illustrates that this promise 
of prevention under the Convention has sadly all too often languished as states have 
dawdled over questions of definitions and means of prevention while populations of 
people are being deliberately targeted for destruction across the globe.  This is despite 
there being a clear desire amongst politicians, international institutions, academics, 
and activists to prevent genocide.  In the aftermath of a genocide we hear these actors 
proclaiming that genocide will never again be perpetrated, and that the reaction will 
be different the next time the international community faces a claim of genocide.  
However as shown by the catastrophic cases of Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, the 
genocidal violence of ISIS in Sinjar, and recently the crimes of the Myanmar 
government committed against the Rohingya people in Rakhine State, genocide is 
always perpetrated ‘somewhere else, time and again.’1 
This failure to meaningfully respond to these situations and to convert the obligation 
to prevent violence before the outbreak of bloodshed into a reality of international 
affairs is undoubtedly a result of states and international organisations lacking the 
political will to act due to these actors prioritising their interests over the protection of 
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a group.  As discussed throughout this study ‘[r]ealpolitik, a lack of political will, and 
economic interests’ have all proven to be barriers to ‘timely and effective action.’2  
We have seen time and again from Rwanda to Darfur that states are unwilling to 
commit the necessary resources (financial, diplomatic, humanitarian, military, and 
personnel) required to confront the horrors of genocide either in the midst of violence 
or prior to the explosion of violence.  Despite the powerful symbolic nature of the 
genocide label due to its historical connotation with the Holocaust, states have 
frequently not been motivated to match their verbal commitment to prevent genocide 
with effective action to respond to claims of genocide.  The Genocide Convention’s 
promises of prevention and action are meaningless in a world of divergent political 
interests, which means that the application of the Convention will always be subject 
to the whims of states. 
Notwithstanding the impact that political will has on the response to genocide, there 
are distinct issues within the very concept of genocide that affect the determination of 
genocide in the midst of violence.  Overly focussing on the problem of political will 
obscures the complexities with the definition of genocide as set out within the 
Genocide Convention.  While in the seventy years since the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention there have been great strides made in developing the understanding of the 
crime of genocide, there are still significant questions surrounding the identification 
of the elements of the crime in the midst of violence.  Therefore the presence of 
political will to act in a given situation does not automatically mean that genocide is 
suddenly identifiable in the midst of violence, the underlying issues with the definition 
of genocide are constant regardless of whether a state is minded to act or not. 
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The complexities of determining genocide in an ongoing situation are not solely 
connected to issues of identifying the elements of the crime, the complexities are also 
related to the potential political and legal implications of a claim of genocide in an 
ongoing situation.  The symbolic nature of the genocide label, with its connection to 
some of the worst atrocities in history, has proven to be an obstacle to the prevention 
of violence as the focus of the response can far too often get tangled up on what to 
label the violence rather than discussing effective measures to halt violence.  The 
genocide label can also be limiting in the nature of what response international and 
regional actors can pursue due to this perception of genocide as the worst crime in 
existence.  These complexities associated with describing an ongoing situation as 
genocide, combined with the complexity of identifying the crime in the first place are 
apparent in the situations, under review in this study, in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, 
the Central African Republic, Sinjar Region, Burundi, and South Sudan as these 
situations have in a variety of ways illuminated the difficulties of predicting genocide, 
identifying signs of genocide in the midst of violence, preventing and responding to 
genocide, and labelling ongoing violence as genocide. 
In discussing the difficulties of employing the Genocide Convention in the midst of 
violence, this thesis set out to address how these various inherent complexities within 
the concept of genocide impact on the response to genocide, and whether the 
difficulties involved in determining genocide in the midst of violence raise the utility 
of invoking the genocide label in an ongoing situation for the prevention and response 
to violence.  In addressing the utility of the genocide label through a variety of studies 
of case law and situations of genocide and/or suspected cases of genocide, this thesis 
has developed along three core strands: i) defining the crime; ii) identifying and 
determining the crime, in case law and case studies, before and during the outbreak of 
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violence; and iii) how states should undertake to prevent and respond to the crime of 
genocide in the midst of violence, through the use of the label of atrocity crime.  These 
three strands are naturally intertwined as the research has evolved it has highlighted 
the flaws of the genocide label and the need for a new approach to tackling the 
prevention and response to genocide.  A core theme that emerged from the first strand 
of the research and which flowed throughout the study was that a flawed definition of 
genocide as conceptualised under the Genocide Convention rendered the identification 
of genocide in the midst of violence a complex task. 
7.3 A Deficient Definition 
The adoption of the Genocide Convention in the aftermath of the Holocaust was a 
triumph of diplomatic negotiation of the various UN drafting bodies.  In just under 
two years from the first resolution at the UN General Assembly to the eventual passing 
of the Convention by the General Assembly, through a series of negotiations and 
deliberations states had transformed Lemkin’s concept from an academic concept to a 
crime of international law.  Lemkin’s concept of genocide did undergo significant 
revision with elements of the crime added and excluded throughout the drafting 
process as the draftees sought the best possible document to address the crime of 
genocide.  Notwithstanding the success of political compromise in passing the 
Convention, the compromises did create some ambiguity around defining the elements 
of genocide.3  For academics and observers who studied the Convention, it was left 
unclear under the definition contained within Article II as how to establish the 
existence of an intent to destroy a group and how to determine whether a group was 
targeted in whole or in part.  Furthermore it was uncertain whether the lists of acts of 
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genocide and protected groups is exhaustive or could it be expanded to include 
additional elements as proposed by academics and activists. 
While the definition of genocide as conceptualised by the drafters of the Genocide 
Convention in the 1940s is flawed, the understanding of the crime is not static.  From 
the judgment in the case of Akayesu to the decision to issue an arrest warrant for Omar 
Al Bashir to the recent verdict to affirm the sentence of Radovan Karadžić, the 
Convention has been central in ensuring that those who have committed or are 
responsible for some of the worst atrocities over the last number of decades are held 
accountable and brought to justice.  Although the move to justice and realising the 
punishment component of the Convention was slow with case law only emanating 
from international institutions in the late 1990s, when the judgments did arrive the 
interpretation of the crime by the ICTR, ICTY, ICJ, and ICC breathed life into the 
provisions of the Genocide Convention and clarified some of the uncertainties within 
the definition of genocide that had been raised by academics and activists. 
While there has been some inconsistency in interpretation between the various 
institutions, this is generally related to issues related to examining genocide at the level 
of individual accountability; when examining the broader picture of the concept of 
genocide the international courts and ad hoc tribunals have been consistent in 
interpreting the elements of the crime.  The jurisprudence of these institutions has 
highlighted the key elements within the definition of genocide; an act of genocide that 
is targeted against a protected group with the intent to destroy that group.  Establishing 
the existence of each of the elements varies in complexity. 
Evidence of acts of genocide are the most straightforward signs of genocide that can 
be identified in the midst of violence as they are normally visible and widespread.  In 
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the case law of the Rwandan and former Yugoslavian tribunals and the ICC’s 
examination of the situation of Darfur in relation to the accountability of Al Bashir, 
there was extensive evidence of crimes committed which corresponded to acts of 
genocide under Article II (a)-(e).  Although evidence of crimes are evident there is a 
difficulty that the acts of genocide can also correspond to a number of crimes including 
murder, extermination, torture, sexual violence, and other acts that cause physical and 
mental harm under the category of crimes against humanity.  The similarities between 
the underlying acts of the crime do mean that to distinguish the perpetration of 
genocide from other crimes of international law is a complex task, as in a multifaceted 
situation numerous crimes may be committed in the same incident so it is an arduous 
task to identify which crime is being committed in each incident.  The crimes can 
occur at the same time, or a crime can be a precursor to the perpetration of another 
crime.4  Genocide is rarely the only crime committed, the situations in Rwanda, 
Srebrenica, and Darfur were all accompanied by the perpetration of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.  In order to distinguish the crimes, evidence of a group 
targeted for destruction needs to be established. 
This is where the identification of the crime of genocide gets complex, as despite the 
jurisprudence of the international courts, there is still ambiguity surrounding 
ascertaining the elements of the crime, in particular the intent to destroy and the size 
of the targeted group.5  With regard to the latter issue, the courts have held that the 
size of the group targeted for destruction must be substantial which can be established 
from not only the numbers targeted but also the significance of those targeted for the 
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survival of the group.  By not associating genocide with a numerical amount of victims 
has meant that the death of an estimated one million people in Rwanda and the death 
of around eight thousand people in Srebrenica were both considered by international 
courts to constitute the crime of genocide.  Differences between the scale of atrocities 
does make it hard to compare situations, as not every case of mass violence with a 
substantial number of victims is genocide.  For instance despite widespread atrocities 
across the former Yugoslavia, only the situation in Srebrenica was termed genocide 
by the ICTY despite evidence of the establishment of concentration camps and the 
deliberate targeting of civilians across the territory by the parties to the situation.  The 
case law illustrates that a situation can only be identified as genocide if acts of 
genocide were targeted against a recognised protected group with the requisite intent 
to destroy the group. 
This thesis has focussed primarily on the difficulty of determining the intent to destroy 
within the actions of a state or non-state actor, as the international courts and ad hoc 
tribunals have held that the ‘key determinant’ of the crime of genocide is ‘intent and 
not the scale of humanitarian abuse’ and this intent distinguishes the crime of genocide 
from other atrocity crimes.6  The intent to destroy is not only central to the crime of 
genocide, it is also the most onerous ingredient of the crime to identify.7  The intent 
to destroy is a complex element to identify, as it impossible to know what an individual 
is thinking when they pursue a certain action or course of conduct.  As the courts have 
stated, those accused of genocide are rarely explicit with their intent to destroy a group 
rather it requires a court to divine the intent to destroy from the facts and evidence 
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available.  The international courts and tribunals have illustrated that it is possible to 
discern an intent to destroy in the actions of an accused individual or state, by 
examining the conduct of an actor and the wider pattern of violence.  The case law of 
the ICTR, ICTY, ICJ, and ICC has shown the development in recognising the 
indicators of genocidal intent in the actions, conduct, and words of an accused.  
Therefore although it may not be conceivable to know exactly what an individual was 
contemplating when they perpetrated a crime or deliberately targeted a group, courts 
can infer the intent underlying these actions from the evidence and facts available. 
The twenty years of jurisprudence from the international criminal law institutions have 
shown that inferring the intent to destroy in the actions of an accused individual or 
state/non-state body is possible on the basis of evidence available however these 
institutions have had the benefit of time and access to documentary evidence and 
witness testimonies before determining the existence of genocidal intent.  The case 
law of the ICTR, ICTY, ICJ, and ICC were all delivered a number of years, and in the 
case of the ICJ and some of the later cases in the ICTR and ICTY a substantial amount 
of time, after the events under examination.  This allowed the justices more time to 
assess and weigh up the evidence while also being cognisant of the wider context of 
the crimes committed.  Identifying the intent to destroy as violence rages on is a 
substantially different task to the investigation that a court can conduct into a situation 
after it has finished.  In the midst of violence, a state or UN body does not have access 
to the same level of evidence to form a wider picture of the context of the violence.  
This brings us into the second stand of the research, concerning the difficulties of 
identifying the crime of genocide due to the complexities of the label genocide, 
including a flawed definition. 
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As discussed above the definition of the crime, as interpreted by the international 
courts and tribunals, in the midst of violence continues to be clouded in ambiguity 
despite the judicial clarifications.  This uncertainty over the elements compounds the 
task of observers in identifying the crime of genocide in the midst of a situation or 
predicting the perpetration of genocide before the outbreak of violence.  With regard 
to the latter, while there has been a growth over the last few decades in our knowledge 
of predicting the crime of genocide, the conditions that give rise to the perpetration of 
genocide, and the early indicators of genocide in a situation, particularly with the 
creation of the role of Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the 
development of warning signals within the UN’s ‘Framework of Analysis for Atrocity 
Crimes’, the prediction of genocide can never be an exact science.8 
It is almost impossible in the initial stages of monitoring a situation to assess which 
crime is at risk of being perpetrated.9  This is due in part to genocide sharing similar 
indicators of violence with crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes 
but also due to the inherent difficulties of predicting the occurrence of a crime.  There 
is not one single factor which makes a country more vulnerable to genocide than 
another country, rather there is a multitude of factors and conditions that make a 
country susceptible to the perpetration of genocide.10  The fact that a situation can 
either rapidly or gradually develop into genocidal violence hinders the ability of 
observers to predict the likelihood of genocide as situations will not follow some 
predictable pattern.  Furthermore a country may exhibit signs of genocide but may not 
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ever descend into mass violence or if violence does occur it is not assured that 
genocide will be committed.  It is hard to predict how a situation will develop, for 
example both Burundi in 2015 and Rwanda in 1994 were displaying indicators of 
potential genocidal violence as both had a history of atrocity crimes, including 
genocide, between the two same ethnic groups but the situations developed along 
different paths involving widely different levels of violence. 
The complexities involved in ascertaining the likelihood of the perpetration of 
genocide and distinguishing the warning signs of genocide from other atrocity crimes, 
highlight the flaws within the definition of genocide as the elements of the crime 
cannot be identified with any certainty before the outbreak of violence.  This is due to 
the difficulty of predicting whether a state will possess the intent to destroy, as the 
identification of this element is key to a determination of genocide.  This intent to 
destroy is rarely manifest until violence occurs, and even then it is difficult to pinpoint.  
Rarely will actors be explicit with their intent to destroy, as in the case of ISIS, rather 
actors and groups will take steps to mask and reframe their actions and conduct.  The 
examination of the situations in the Central African Republic and Darfur shows the 
difficulty faced by actors in recognising the signs of genocide in an ongoing situation.  
Even in one of the clearest cases of genocide, the contrasting reports and witness 
testimony from the ground in Rwanda illustrate the difficulty of identifying the intent 
to destroy underlying the actions.  The situations in Burundi and South Sudan highlight 
that even in a situation that does not directly concern the perpetration of genocide, 
there will be indicators of genocide present amongst evidence of other crimes which 
adds to the difficulty of distinguishing signs of violence. 
The studies of the situations presented in this research highlight that it is not only the 
intent to destroy that is hard to establish, the other elements of the crime of genocide 
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are difficult to determine.  In particular it is difficult to establish the existence of a 
protected group as there are questions about the scale of atrocities committed against 
a group and the numbers of people targeted for destruction as discussed previously.  
Determining the substantial nature of a targeted segment of a population is a complex 
task to be undertaken in the midst of violence as it requires knowledge of the impact 
of that targeted group on the wider population.  Identifying a targeted group can also 
be complicated by the fact that it can be hard to establish on what basis a group is 
being targeted.  In Burundi and South Sudan members of ethnic groups are the target 
of violence, but it is unclear whether they are being targeted because of their 
membership of an ethnic group or their perceived or actual support for the opposition.  
This requires observers to distinguish between the motives and intent underlying the 
actions, which is a substantially arduous task in the midst of swirling violence where 
perpetrators’ motives and intent can change over time. 
The elements of the crime of genocide do not lend any certainty to identifying the 
crime of genocide, with the complexities of identifying the intent to destroy a targeted 
protected group, with its various aspects to this component of the crime, and the fact 
that the most identifiable ingredient of the crime an act of genocide can also amount 
to a crime against humanity, a war crime, or an act of ethnic cleansing.  Therefore 
notwithstanding the substantial increase of our knowledge of the elements of the crime 
of genocide in the case law of the international criminal law institutions and reports 
presented by commissions of inquiry the difficulty of identifying the crime of genocide 
in the midst of violence remains.  This means that the determination of genocide in 
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the midst of violence cannot in most cases be ‘substantiated in unequivocal way 
without the sad privilege of empirical evidence and hindsight’.11 
The complexity of recognising the intent underlying genocide renders genocide nearly 
impossible to predict or identify in its early stages, which is why it is understandable 
that academics and activists continue to press for a revised definition of genocide.  
However, expanding or reimagining the definition of genocide does not address the 
complexities surrounding identifying genocide before or in the midst of violence.  A 
new definition of genocide would not challenge the unpredictable nature of genocide, 
as this research has shown until violence breaks out it is nearly impossible to predict 
the nature of the crime, even if a situation is displaying indicators of genocide.  The 
difficulty of predicting genocide has long been recognised by academics in the 
development of early warning systems which cover assessing the risk of genocide 
alongside other atrocity crimes as described in Chapter Four.  With the difficulty of 
predicting genocide, any new definition would face the same problems in discerning 
the perpetration of genocide before an eruption of violence. 
Even when violence breaks out there is no guarantee that a new definition of genocide 
will be identified as shown by the complexities faced by actors in recognising signs of 
the legal definition of genocide in ongoing situations.  Currently genocidal violence is 
often indistinguishable in advance or at the time from other atrocity crimes due to the 
similar conditions which give rise to the crimes and the fact that the crimes can all be 
present in the same incident.  A new definition of genocide is unlikely to change this, 
as some of the proposed changes to the definition of genocide outlined in Chapter Two 
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include adding elements to the crime, such as political groups and cultural genocide, 
which are already subsumed under the category of other atrocity crimes.  Expanding 
the notion of genocide to include these additional elements would mean that the 
various atrocity crimes which already share some overlapping elements, would be 
nearly indistinguishable thus making the determination of genocide an even more 
complex task. 
As well as failing to address the complexities of predicting and identifying genocide, 
attempts to redefine or redraft the concept will not solve the complexity of responding 
to genocide.  This is because a new definition of genocide will not automatically lead 
to the prevention of genocide, as previous chapters have highlighted that states are 
slow to react effectively to claims or evidence of a risk or the perpetration of genocide 
due to the contentious nature of the genocide label.12  Notwithstanding the evidence 
in Rwanda and Darfur, and more recently in the Central African Republic, Sinjar, 
Burundi, and South Sudan that claims of genocide do not directly translate into 
effective action to halt violence, activists continue to label situations as genocide as a 
means of drawing attention to a situation and prompting an international response to 
violence.  The focus on the genocide label is because it is seen as important how 
‘[p]oliticians, diplomats, military leaders, NGO activists, jurists, journalists, and 
citizens’ define a situation as the definition employed to characterise the violence can 
condition the response of these actors.13  Genocide has, in the minds of a number of 
academics, activists, and politicians, become equated with intervention on the back of 
a sense of failed responsibilities in Rwanda and Darfur; and a declaration of genocide 
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is now seen by some as a commitment to act.  This is based on a false perception of 
genocide as a determination of genocide will not lead to intervention as illustrated by 
the failure of the US to intervene in Darfur despite a finding of genocide. 
This belief shows that it is not only a flawed definition of genocide that is a barrier to 
preventing genocide, it is also the stigma attached to the genocide label which is 
affecting its application in the midst of violence.  The case studies illustrate that it is 
political will not the label applied to the violence which will condition the response of 
states and international actors to a situation.  In fact the examination of the case studies 
shows that the genocide label can actually be a barrier to action, if it affects the 
interests of states and/or the approach the international community is pursuing to 
resolve a situation.  States have been willing to employ the word genocide to suit their 
own interests, such as when the US referred to the violence in Darfur as genocide as a 
means of pacifying the large scale advocacy campaign and when numerous countries 
labelled the violence against the Yazidi as a means of condemning the actions of ISIS.  
In these cases, a determination of genocide was low risk for these states as it did not 
impede or hinder their response or lack of response.  However in more delicate 
situations than the response to ISIS, where peace treaties and ceasefires are at risk, 
states have been more wary of the genocide label due to the possible repercussions of 
a genocide finding in the midst of violence. 
With the rhetorical significance of a genocide finding, politicians have to be careful 
of the word genocide due to the profound consequences it can have on a situation.  In 
responding to situations of violence the UN and its member states have to balance the 
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interests of sovereignty and protecting the rights of individuals.14  Using the word 
genocide to characterise violence may unsettle or topple this delicate balance.  This 
means that states may not lack the political will to label a situation as genocide, but 
rather view the genocide label as limiting their response to a situation.  Particularly 
when policymakers already, even without using the word genocide, face a delicate 
task when responding to situations as measures such as providing humanitarian 
assistance, diplomatic engagement, pursuing prosecutions, or military intervention can 
have the opposite desired effect by leading to the continuation of violence and 
insecurity of vulnerable populations.15 
Due to the stigma surrounding the genocide label, employing the genocide label in the 
midst of a situation would potentially further reduce the likelihood of a negotiated end 
to a situation as actors accused of perpetrating genocide disengage from the 
international community.  This is why there was such anger towards the arrest warrant 
in Darfur, due to the potential impact on peace negotiations and the humanitarian 
situation.  Genocide remains a serious allegation which states are wary of employing 
to characterise another state’s or non-state actor’s behaviour, so any new definition 
will have to confront the reality that states are hesitant to label situations as genocide 
due to the political and legal ramifications of applying the label to a situation. 
Therefore while genocide’s association with some of the worst atrocities in modern 
history (the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Srebrenica) have endowed the genocide label 
with a powerful rhetorical value, which can be beneficial for drawing attention to a 
situation the genocide label has more often provided a distraction to an effective 
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remedy.  A claim of genocide, rather than generate ‘effective international responses’ 
spawns ‘lengthy legal debate’ as in Rwanda and Darfur where the focus of the 
response became the label to apply to the violence rather than what action was 
appropriate for addressing the violence.16  Darfur, in particular, exemplifies that the 
genocide label is not a ‘decisive step toward action to stop mass killings.’17  The failure 
to respond effectively and consistently to the situations in Rwanda and Darfur, 
amongst others, means that the hope of prevention expressed in the Convention has 
sadly fallen away to be replaced by an acceptance that intervention depends on a state 
weighing up the potential beneficial or disadvantageous rationale for intervening in a 
situation, and genocide identification and prevention has routinely proven to not be 
among the priorities of the major states.18 
Any definition of genocide that is crafted will be placed in the same political realities 
that face the definition of genocide provided under the Genocide Convention.  
However genocide is conceptualised, it will not sufficiently challenge a state which is 
lacking the political will to act to prevent genocide.19  No state will ever accept a 
definition of genocide that will impose a legal obligation on a state to act in all cases 
with diplomatic and military force to prevent genocide.  Rather any new definition 
will be subject to the same limitations which hinder the current definition of genocide, 
in that states will control when and where the definition is applied. 
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The complexities faced by definition of genocide as conceptualised under the 
Convention will not be radically altered by a new definition, whatever the elements 
that comprise the new definition, as issues with predicting, identifying, preventing, 
and responding to the crime will always be present in the current political 
environment.  This political environment while constraining the application of the 
current definition of genocide to situations of violence, also ensures that the likelihood 
of the adoption of a new definition of genocide for a changing world is bleak as there 
is no appetite to rework the definition within the member states of the UN.  Therefore 
while the arguments of an expanded definition of genocide are persuasive due to the 
clear faults within the definition of genocide and the failure of the international 
community to effectively address the crime of genocide, there is the reality to be 
confronted that a new or amended definition is unlikely to be adopted by states. 
Even if there was a desire to revisit the definition, the records of the drafting bodies 
illustrate that genocide is a contentious concept so with the expansion of the number 
of UN member states there is no guarantee that they would create a treaty that is more 
effective at responding to the crime of genocide.  The expansion of member states of 
the UN, comprising members of former colonies and smaller nation states, could 
provide a more representative convention however a significant number of states are 
confronting similar issues which faced them in the 1940s, regarding difficulties with 
including minority groups in their territories which means that any definition would 
be subject to the same compromises that defined the Genocide Convention.  Issues of 
including additional groups such as political and LGBTQ groups, and elements of 
cultural genocide have not become more palatable over the years, so in all likelihood 
any new definition composed by states could again omit these elements.  The 
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compromises would not only affect which elements are included or excluded from 
within the definition, but the substance of the provisions of a new convention. 
A new treaty would be subject to the same ambiguities in interpretation as the current 
legal definition of genocide, as this research has shown that genocide is an 
indeterminate crime and with international law in itself being inherently 
indeterminate, a new definition will be subject to the same indeterminacies that hinder 
the application of the current definition of genocide. 
7.4 An Indeterminate Crime 
After the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948, the President of the UN 
General Assembly, Herbert Vere Evatt of Australia, pronounced that the ‘supremacy 
of international law had been proclaimed and a significant advance had been made in 
the development of international law.’20  While it was undoubtedly a significant 
moment in the history of international law, as the Genocide Convention was one of 
the first human rights treaties endorsed by the members states of the UN, the passing 
of the Convention did not herald the supremacy of international law as the depressing 
history of the application or non-application of the provisions of the Convention 
exemplifies.  Regrettably it is not possible to apply the law of genocide in a vacuum 
without any interference of political interests, instead the Genocide Convention has 
entered the murky world of international politics, where states are king in deciding 
whether to respond to a given situation.  The subjection of the Convention to the will 
of states is no different than the circumstances faced by other crimes of international 
law, as ‘international law is situated within international politics’.21  The influence of 
                                                 
20 United Nations General Assembly (179th Meeting) ‘Draft convention on genocide: reports of the 
Economic and Social Council and of the Sixth Committee (A/760 and A/760/Corr.2)’ (9 December 
1948) UN Doc A/PV.179, 852. 
21 Ian Hurd, ‘The International Rule of Law: Law and the Limit of Politics’ (2014) 28 Ethics & 
International Affairs 39, 40. 
412 
politics means that the response to international crimes is selective at best, as states 
can pick and choose when to intervene.  This selective nature of the application of 
international law can be justified under the very same international law, as law is 
purposely indeterminate. 
As the Genocide Convention is a political creation it is subject to the same 
indeterminacies that affect international law.  The discussion of the case studies within 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six highlighted this indeterminate nature of genocide, in 
that the provisions of the Genocide Convention cannot be determined with precision.  
However this reflects the nature of international law, as the language of international 
law can never be perfectly precise.22  The indeterminacy of the Genocide Convention 
can be seen in the ambiguity within the language of the provisions of the definition of 
genocide within Article II.  This research has shown the difficulty of identifying the 
elements of Article II due to complexities of distinguishing the acts of genocide, 
establishing the existence of a protected group, and recognising the intent to destroy 
in the midst of violence. 
While the provisions within Article II have been clarified by international courts, 
international actors, and commissions of inquiry there is still considerable 
indeterminacy surrounding ascertaining evidence of these elements.  The case studies 
have highlighted that there is a relative indeterminacy regarding the acts of genocide, 
as these acts can encompass a number of different crimes, contingent on the intent 
underlying the act.  For instance the perpetration of acts of murder and extermination 
can be considered as genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing 
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depending on the perspective of the observer making a determination of the violations 
of international law. 
The perspective of these observers is critical in distinguishing the elements of 
genocide as case studies have highlighted how acts such as forcible transfer of a 
population and restrictions on humanitarian access to civilians have been considered 
acts of genocide in certain situations, Darfur and Sinjar, and as acts of crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing in South Sudan.  Therefore the determination of 
genocide is very context specific, which however means that lessons learnt from one 
situation cannot be directly applied to the next situation.  Not every situation involving 
mass violence targeted against a group will comprise genocide, rather it depends on 
identifying elements of a crime that are inherently indeterminate. 
There are inherent ambiguities in defining the elements of the crime, as they remain 
fluid over time due to the interpretations of actors and institutions.23  So while the 
jurisprudence of the international courts and ad hoc tribunals may clarify elements of 
the crime, they may add to the indeterminacy of the crime by outlining how elements 
of the crime are determined.  For instance while there is indeterminacy concerning 
how to establish the ‘in whole or in part’ element of a group, when the courts held that 
the amount targeted should be substantial; this provides those who are making 
determinations on the question of genocide considerable scope to make a conclusion 
on the perpetration of genocide.  Due to the indeterminacy surrounding establishing 
the prominence of the targeted part of the group within the whole group, whether that 
targeted part was emblematic of the group, and if the targeted part of group is essential 
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to the survival of the group.  Assessing the significance of a targeted group for the 
survival of a group is inherently a subjective task. 
Ascertaining that an act targeted against a group was committed with the intent to 
destroy that group will also require a level of subjectivity, as the language of the 
Convention is unclear on how to establish this intent.  The case studies have shown 
the relative difficulties faced by observers in identifying the intent to destroy due to 
the indeterminacies surrounding recognising signs of intent in the midst of violence.  
While there have been judicial clarifications and the interpretations by actors and 
bodies investigating the potential perpetration of genocide on the elements of the crime 
of genocide, there remains uncertainties about the boundaries of the definition as 
elements can blur into other atrocity crimes.  This uncertainty at the fringes of the law 
affects the overall application of the law.24 
This indeterminacy surrounding the language affects the identification of the crime of 
genocide in the midst of violence; furthermore it also affects the response to a 
situation.  Outside of the definition of the crime, other articles within the Convention 
are also vague on the responsibilities of states with regard to genocide such as those 
relating to prevention under Article I and Article VIII.  While providing that states 
undertake to prevent genocide, under Article I, and in meeting this duty states have 
recourse to call upon the organs of the UN to act under the Charter, under Article VII, 
these provisions do not specify what action can be taken.  While in Rwanda, the US 
believed a finding of genocide compelled a state to act with military force, subsequent 
state practice and the judgment of the ICJ shows this view to be inaccurate.  Rather 
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the provisions of the Convention, as interpreted in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v Serbia, provide considerable scope to states in meeting this duty to prevent genocide. 
Therefore it is unclear what response a call for action under the Convention will 
provoke; there is no consistency in response to situations of genocide as shown by the 
US government under Bush only referring the genocidal situation in Darfur to the UN 
Security Council while the Obama administration intervened unilaterally against ISIS 
to conduct air strikes on Mount Sinjar in response to a threat of genocide.  This 
selectivity in response is a hallmark of international relations, and is enshrined in 
international law with the indeterminacy of provisions to respond to violence, 
including the indeterminate articles within the Genocide Convention. 
This indeterminacy of language within the Genocide Convention, reflects the wishes 
of the drafters.  As discussed in the previous chapters, the provisions of the Genocide 
Convention were left deliberately ambiguous and vague to ensure widespread 
acceptance of its principles.  However, it has meant that the Convention’s definition 
of genocide is difficult to predict and identify, which has hindered the preventative 
potential of the Convention.25  The ability of the international community to take 
preventative action is constrained by the indeterminacy in the interpretation of 
international law as the laws are complex and leave ‘open-ended qualifications which 
restrict their scope and relevance.’26  The ‘considerable indeterminacy’ of genocide 
‘in terms of the element of scale and gravity – is such that its application and 
interpretation is highly context specific.’27 
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The indeterminacy of the definition of genocide offers significant scope for actors in 
applying the Genocide Convention in the midst of violence, as there is not one 
meaning of genocide.  As David Moshman contends ‘definitions are social 
conventions, not empirical truths about the world.  Events are not inherently genocidal 
or not genocidal.  It is up to us to determine what we mean by genocide.’28  However 
the indeterminate nature of law does not mean that law is wholly indeterminate, rather 
it means that in applying law there is ‘subjective discretion’ for those applying the law 
in a given situation but this ‘subjective discretion’ has to exist within the limits of the 
law.29 
We can see this in the interpretation of the Convention by the international courts as 
they have expanded upon elements within the crime, justified in relation to the 
wording of the provisions and the wishes of the drafters, while refusing to extend the 
definition to include acts targeted against other groups, such as political groups, and 
to include acts of cultural genocide under the auspices of the Genocide Convention.  
This means that while we may not be certain how an actor will act in applying a law, 
we know the limit of their actions.  While those applying the law are constrained 
within the limit of the law, the indeterminacy surrounding genocide continues to 
provide considerable scope for those applying the definition of genocide to a given 
situation to stretch or narrow the boundaries of the definition, while staying within the 
confines of the law, to suit their interests. 
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The indeterminate nature of law can be used to justify inaction on the part of states or 
bodies unwilling to take action.30  Rather than bolster the pursuit of accountability, 
international law has been used by the major international players to justify inaction.31  
The flawed definition of genocide as conceptualised under the Genocide Convention 
justifies a lack of political will to respond to violence as the ‘deficiencies of the 
Convention intensify this problem’ of political will ‘by allowing and enabling 
politicians to manipulate and exploit the very tool that should encourage action.’32  
Under the Genocide Convention, states or actors can rely on the indeterminacy of the 
definition, as states can claim that the targeted part of a group is not substantial or 
significant, and in particular can claim that there is no evidence of an intent to destroy 
a group, to justify not labelling a situation as genocide and not responding to a 
situation. 
The legal definition provides states with a ‘ready-made legal excuse not to take action’ 
due to the difficulty of identifying the specific intent.33  This can be seen in the case 
of Rwanda, where the US government avoided the use of the word due to the 
complexities of identifying the intent to destroy in the violence.34  The government 
relied on the ambiguities within the definition to support its position of not labelling 
the violence, which buttressed their wider goal of not getting militarily involved in 
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Rwanda.  While international law allows states to defend inaction with regard to a 
particular situation, it can also serve as justification for taking action.35  For example, 
Obama relying upon international law to justify air strikes on Mount Sinjar as a means 
of genocide prevention. 
When states are motivated to act, international law is a tool to wield in international 
relations to support and defend their actions and conduct.  This creates inconsistency 
in the application of international law as states are selective when and where they 
apply the principles of rules.  Why intervene with military force, in the form of air 
strikes, in response to the crimes of ISIS due to the threat of genocide, but not take 
military action to respond to the situations in Burundi and South Sudan which are 
having a devastating humanitarian effect on the civilian population?  It is because in 
situations different principles will be at play, and states will be caught between the 
sovereignty and intervention dilemma.  However it does mean the application of law, 
including the Genocide Convention, will never be consistent but this can be justified 
under international law.  As under international law, due to the issues of 
indeterminacy, it is possible to defend any course of action with respect to the 
provisions of the law.36 
The indeterminate language of the Convention can also justify observers arriving at 
different conclusions on the question of genocide, such as in Darfur.37  In Darfur ‘[t]he 
fact that the US and UN arrived at such divergent conclusions, while possibly 
influenced by differences in methodology, rigor, and thoroughness in their respective 
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investigations’ was ‘a result of the definitional ambiguities in the Genocide 
Convention.’38  The findings on the question of genocide were split on the question of 
genocidal intent, due to the complexities of identifying this element in violence.  
However this reflects the nature of international law as there will always be 
‘competing judgments about the facts of the case (for example, about the cause, 
existence, and scale of mass atrocities)’.39  Notwithstanding this the complexities of 
identifying the intent to destroy in the midst of violence do provide states, international 
actors, international courts, and commissions of inquiry with a readily available 
excuse for not applying the genocide label to a potentially politically contentious or 
sensitive case.40 
The lack of clarity surrounding the definition can excuse a state or body not having 
the political will to act or label the violence as genocide, as in Darfur while the 
Commission of Inquiry may have been biased, as claimed by a number of actors, 
towards not finding evidence of genocide, the ‘ambiguities of the Convention certainly 
assisted its manipulation of the definition of genocide so as to arrive at the desirable 
conclusion.’41  The lack of conceptual clarity surrounding genocide means that the 
situations in Burundi and South Sudan, while displaying signs of genocide, can be 
justifiably regarded as not involving the perpetration of genocide due to the difficulties 
of establishing the elements of the crime due to their indeterminate nature. 
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However even if the language of the Genocide Convention, related to defining and 
preventing the crime, was determinate the legal system itself would remain 
indeterminate.42  Martti Koskenniemi presented the idea that law is not just 
indeterminate because of the language of law but the very nature of law.  Koskenniemi 
argues that the ‘problems of treaty interpretation lie deeper than in the unclear 
character of treaty language.  They lie in the contradiction between the legal principles 
available to arrive at an interpretation.’43  This means that it is the very notions which 
underpin the language that are also indeterminate.  For example, Koskenniemi argues 
that there is no ‘determinate extent to sovereignty at all’ as ‘[a]nything can be 
explained as in accordance with or contrary to sovereignty’.44 
The indeterminate nature of sovereignty and how states have perceived their 
responsibilities in respecting sovereignty – to respect in some cases but in others to 
disregard – highlight that there can be no ‘coherent justification’ under the law with 
regard to questions of intervention and sovereignty.45  State sovereignty becomes a 
‘formidable barrier’ to action when states are not motivated to act.46  There will be 
always conflicting demands in international law, between different rules and 
principles.  This can be seen in the conflict between the UN’s role in preventing 
genocide and its role in upholding the sovereignty of states.47  Koskenniemi contends 
that law can never be determinate, in that we never know how states will act in the 
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future in responding to these different rules and principles.48  There will always be a 
‘choice’ under international law for actors in the application of laws to a given 
situation.49 
The indeterminate nature of the wider body of international law and rights, and in 
particular the indeterminacies within the definitional and preventative provisions 
within the Genocide Convention, does mean that the response to genocide is very 
much dependent on the political will of states to act in a given situation.  Generating 
political will is the ‘most important dimension’ of prevention.50  Law will, by itself, 
be unable to ‘consistently stimulate timely, coordinated and effective international 
responses to mass atrocities.’51  Unless ‘measures of enforcement and reparation are 
inscribed in law, the extraterritorial protection of populations from mass atrocities will 
continue to be dependent, as it has long been, on the vagaries of the political will of 
states.’52  As the case studies have illuminated the ‘decisions about prevention or 
intervention’ in a given situation ‘have more to do with policy and/or moral choices 
than with the law.’53  Genocide cannot be divorced from law, as politics ‘permeates’ 
the understanding and interpretation of genocide.54 
The discussion of the response to genocide throughout this study has shown that while 
‘[t]he personalities, ideologies, and geopolitical constraints’ of states ‘have shifted 
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with time … the major powers have consistently refused to take risks to suppress 
genocide.’55  The history of the international measures to confront the perpetration of 
genocide highlights that despite the existence of the Genocide Convention, the first 
international efforts to institute prevention were only in 2004 with the creation of the 
role of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.56  Despite the verbal 
commitment to take action to prevent and respond to genocide, states will continue to 
weigh up the benefits of getting involved.57  The term genocide is ‘a stumbling block 
to genocide prevention.’58 
The indeterminacy of the genocide label due to the differing meanings does render 
‘genocide a difficult term around which to mobilise an international coalition for 
intervention.’59  The ‘analysis’ of the Genocide Convention has shown that it has its 
‘flaws and is an impediment to the prevention and halting of genocide in terms of its 
failure to clarify what the obligation to prevent entails, including what actions might 
be required and legitimate, its definitional ambiguities which cause debilitating 
debates over whether a situation is in fact genocide, and its punitive focus which draws 
attention away from prevention and intervention.’60 
While the Genocide Convention has proven to be ineffective at times of crisis, this 
does not mean that a new definition or concept of genocide is needed or required.  
Regardless of how genocide is defined, the indeterminate nature of law will impact 
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the identification of genocide and the prevention and response to genocide.  
Consistency in the response to genocide will always be a problem, no matter if the 
definition was expanded.61  This is because the prevention of genocide is not ‘a legal 
question’ rather it is a ‘political question’ which means that the definition of genocide 
is unsuited to it as ‘predicating political action on satisfaction of a legal definition is a 
recipe for inaction.’62 
Definitional ‘debates typically distract from difficult, but more important, questions 
over what could and should be done to prevent or halt genocide.’63  This is why the 
focus should not be on redefining the concept of genocide, but rather on finding or 
employing new and different approaches to confronting the crime of genocide.  With 
the evidence that the interpretation and understanding of genocide may potentially be 
providing an obstacle to prevention, should we persist with the label of genocide when 
a more appropriate label from a pragmatic point of view may be available.  This thesis 
has advanced the concept of atrocity crimes as a means of removing the complexities 
surrounding determining genocide due to its indeterminate nature and its potential 
thorny political impact in the midst of violence. 
7.5 Preventing ‘Atrocity Crimes’ 
The adoption of the Genocide Convention was meant to be a watershed moment in the 
history of the UN, however the definition of genocide has caused more difficulties 
than it has offered solutions.  The various complexities associated with the definition 
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of genocide have contributed to the international community failing to meaningfully 
convert the Genocide Convention’s promise to prevent the crime of genocide into a 
reality, as violence continues to rage across the world with UN member states silent 
not only on intervention but also on taking diplomatic and peaceful measures to protect 
populations.64  Notwithstanding the faults apparent in the Convention states have 
shown no appetite to revisit the definition, and therefore it will be the definition which 
will continue to apply to situations of violence.  As a consequence, those interested in 
genocide prevention have to find some way of using the definition of genocide to fulfil 
the goals of preventing and punishing the crime of genocide. 
This thesis has advocated delaying determining the perpetration of genocide until an 
international court or tribunal can assess the evidence, and instead adopt the umbrella 
term ‘atrocity crimes’ (composing the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
ethnic cleansing, and war crimes), to characterise violence in the midst of a situation.  
Utilising the term atrocity crimes is not a straightforward solution as obviously 
genocide retains a strong moral weight, particularly amongst the victims of atrocities.  
Genocide is seen as an important word to characterise the experience of a victimised 
population, therefore any attempt to lessen its significance could be seen as 
diminishing the suffering of victims.  This thesis is seeking not to minimise or 
marginalise the trauma of victims, rather it is seeking to maximise the preventative 
potential of the Genocide Convention and other sources of international law. 
Removing the focus off the genocide label does not demean the victims; rather, 
refusing to act in response to violence, regardless the label, demeans victims.  As 
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Payam Akhavan asks, is it better to claim genocide is occurring and do nothing or not 
use the genocide label and still do nothing.65  They are both equally cruel scenarios, 
as in either case they leave populations to confront horrific atrocities without the hope 
of action.  This is why the focus should not be on labels as debates about whether an 
atrocity constitutes genocide or a crime against humanity or ethnic cleansing distract 
us from the real issue, which is the fact that violence no matter its label is being 
perpetrated against a population.66 
Utilising the word genocide should not be seen as important for the prevention of 
genocide, the crime can be prevented without a determination of genocide or even 
using the word genocide.  The evidence of the AU-UN diplomatic mission in Kenya 
shows that the crime of genocide can be addressed without the word genocide being 
spoken.  Furthermore it could be argued that the threat and risk of genocide is being 
confronted in Burundi and South Sudan without the word genocide being used by UN 
or AU states in responding to the violence.  The word, while rhetorically significant, 
is not central to the prevention of the crime.  Employing the more general atrocity 
crimes label, crucially, should not lead to a fundamentally different response being 
advocated, as the measures aimed at preventing and responding to the atrocity crimes 
of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing will also address the 
perpetration of genocide where it occurs.  There is not some special mechanism or 
measure available to international actors that will only address the prevention of 
genocide. 
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Prioritising the term atrocity crimes would not require a substantial change in outlook 
as the prevention of genocide is already intertwined with the prevention of atrocity 
crimes, as the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has assumed 
responsibility for addressing the perpetration of atrocity crimes as shown by the 
Special Adviser’s involvement in Burundi and South Sudan.  Furthermore states are 
cognisant of the risk of all atrocity crimes, and the coordinated prevention of atrocity 
crimes is increasingly becoming part of the response of the international community 
to violations of international law.  Countries across the world including the US, 
Switzerland, Germany, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Argentina, Costa Rica, Paraguay 
have initiated mechanisms to identify elements of atrocity crimes and to prevent these 
crimes.67 
Utilising the term atrocity crimes should in theory not impact on the response to 
genocide as the international community already has the responsibility to protect 
civilians from crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes under the 
RtoP doctrine.  The adoption of the principles of RtoP by states means that the 
prevention of genocide is now ‘intimately interwoven’ with the Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine.68  While the responsibility to protect civilians from genocide may, in 
comparison to crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, extend beyond the RtoP 
with the existence of the Genocide Convention.  In fact the obligations to prevent 
genocide under the Convention are comparable to the RtoP doctrine as the 
responsibility lies with the UN to respond or authorise a response from its member 
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states.  Therefore there is no downgrading of the crime of genocide by incorporating 
it in the wider category of atrocity crimes. 
While there has been a rise in prominence in the responsibility to prevent and respond 
to atrocity crimes, this does not mean that atrocity crimes are more likely to be 
addressed by international actors than the crime of genocide.  The brief history of the 
acceptance of the RtoP doctrine in state practice shows that it is subject to some of the 
same indeterminacies that surround the Genocide Convention.  The language of the 
Outcome Document setting out the doctrine of RtoP does not specify what action, if 
any, should be taken to respond to violence.69  This vagueness in language is ‘produced 
by a combination of uncertainty about what is expected, disagreements about what 
ought to be expected, and an interest in preserving flexibility for the future.’70  The 
language was purposely indeterminate, as it provides a wide scope for states to pursue 
their own course of action or justify inaction on their part.  In accepting that states had 
a responsibility to protect civilians outside their borders, states did not want to be 
bound by a legal obligation to act in a particular way. 
However irrespective of whether the Genocide Convention or the RtoP doctrine 
impose a legal obligation to act does not really matter at the end of the day; what is 
important to prevention and intervention is the political will of states and international 
institutions.71  The inconsistent and selective application of the RtoP shows that the 
doctrine has not changed the ‘existing structure of international law regarding 
sovereign responsibility, the authority to use force, or the thresholds for 
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intervention’.72  When states want to act, they will act, and when they want to do 
nothing, they will take no action.  This means that, like the Genocide Convention, the 
RtoP is ‘a political rather than a legal concept.’73  The RtoP ‘carries little, if indeed 
any, legal weight’ rather it is ‘the latest in a long line of grandiose declarations made 
by states that have had little influence on actual international relations.’74  Therefore 
utilising the label atrocity crimes and relying on the doctrine of RtoP does not address 
the difficulties of political will which impact on the prevention and response to 
violations of international criminal law. 
However this does not mean that the use of the label of atrocity crimes is futile, rather 
it reveals the nature of international law.  Atrocity crimes, such as genocide, cannot 
exist in a vacuum as consistency and selectivity will always blight the response to 
situations of violence due to the indeterminate nature of law.  Law simply cannot be 
separated from the operation of realpolitik, therefore methods of maximising the 
application of international criminal law to a given situation need to be explored so as 
to support the prevention and response to these crimes.  Utilising the term atrocity 
crimes to characterise violence will never be a perfect solution to preventing and 
responding to crimes of international law, similar to how the word genocide has 
proven ineffective at times in confronting genocidal violence.  The drawbacks of the 
label atrocity crimes are not a strong enough argument to override the utility of the 
label in preference to the genocide label as the flaws of the genocide label as a tool for 
prevention have been apparent since the adoption of the Genocide Convention.  This 
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thesis is contending that utilising the label atrocity crimes rather than the genocide 
label in the midst of a situation would bolster these attempts to fulfil the preventative 
potential of the Convention. 
This is because the current approach to fulfilling the Convention’s promise of 
prevention has been impeded by the understanding of genocide, as while the symbolic 
and moral standing of the genocide label is one of the greatest strengths of the term 
genocide, it has also proved to be a significant weakness with the rhetorical value of 
the genocide label leading to states avoiding employing the term.  This is why my 
thesis has argued for removing the focus off labels, as genocide constrains not only 
the thinking of politicians but also their response to a situation.  While genocide may 
be the appropriate label to apply to the violence in a given situation, the label will 
mean nothing in terms of prevention if no action is taken.  The focus should be on the 
response to a situation and not the label to be applied to a given situation as ‘regardless 
of what such atrocities are called, they remain atrocities, and must be stopped and 
punished.’75 
Utilising the term atrocity crimes to characterise ongoing violence, while removing 
the focus off specific labels, would also address some of the deficiencies and 
indeterminacies which affect employing the definition of genocide in the midst of 
violence.  Deficiencies such as the overlap between the conditions that give rise to the 
crimes and the acts underlying the crimes which hinder the prediction and 
identification of the crime.  While there are distinct differences between the elements 
of the atrocity crimes, in terms of the provisions of the crimes in statute and case law, 
the conceptual boundaries of the crimes do overlap which means that the crimes are 
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nearly indistinguishable depending on which acts are perpetrated.  For instance the 
evidence of the case law and case studies of genocide show that ‘it seems impossible 
to conceive of a case of genocide that would not also respond to the definition of 
crimes against humanity.’76 
With the difficulties therefore of distinguishing the crimes before or in the midst of 
violence, it is beneficial to delay the determination of which crime was committed, 
particularly when evidence of mental intent underlying the acts can be critical for 
establishing the existence of which law of international criminal law has been violated.  
Therefore using the umbrella category of atrocity crimes would allow time to gather 
evidence of which crime was committed, rather than be rushed into a determination 
so as build international support to respond to that particular crime.  The label to apply 
to the violence should not matter rather the focus should be on the response to the 
situation as it is an onerous burden for the UN to not only have to establish evidence 
of a state or organisation led genocidal campaign but also to have the responsibility to 
motivate states to respond to a finding of genocide.  The deficient definition of 
genocide complicates this approach, with the complexities of identifying the crime in 
the midst of violence as states have used the difficulties of identifying the crime to 
abrogate their duties to prevent and respond to violations of international criminal law.  
This signals the need for the label of atrocity crimes to address these complexities.  
Employing the term atrocity crimes to characterise ongoing violence would ensure 
that time was not spent on applying a deficient definition of genocide to a situation of 
violence rather than actors focussing on the methods that would best respond to and 
ameliorate the violence. 
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Utilising this term would not only remove the difficulties of identifying an 
indeterminable definition of genocide in the midst of violence, it would also negate 
the impact of a flawed understanding of genocide on the response to a situation as has 
been illustrated throughout the chapters in this study.  As discussed, the association of 
genocide with the worst crimes in existence has given the term a powerful moral 
standing which while advantageous for bringing greater awareness to a situation, can 
complicate the response to the violence as states are fearful of the genocide label and 
its implications.  The term genocide can have a tremendous impact on the response to 
a situation as its use can be counterproductive by hindering the ability of states to 
address violence due to limiting the possibility of conducting peaceful negotiations as 
individuals will be wary of future prosecutions.  The use of the word genocide can 
also imply action on behalf of states to respond to a situation, which means states 
concentrate on avoiding labelling the violence as genocide rather than concrete plans 
to confront the violence.  The term atrocity crimes does not bear the same levels of 
stigma as held by the genocide label currently, which means that its use in a given 
situation may pose less complexities than the genocide label due to people not 
associating atrocity crimes with action and intervention. 
Utilising the term atrocity crimes as a tool for prevention is not a perfect solution to 
confronting violations of international criminal law, as the term will not directly 
translate into action to prevent genocide and other crimes of international criminal 
law.  It is debatable whether, if the label of atrocity crimes was applied in the situations 
in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, the Central African Republic, Sinjar, Burundi, and 
South Sudan rather than the labels of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and ethnic cleansing that there would have been a response or more effective action 
taken to address the respective situations. 
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However there will never be a faultless label to apply to situations of complex violence 
due to the nature of international law and its relationship with international politics, 
and the reality of a divided world with competing and divergent interests.  The 
prevention of genocide has also floundered in this world of realpolitik and political 
will; however, the deficiencies of the genocide label as a preventative tool have 
contributed to this ineffectiveness in the midst of violence by providing justification 
for a lack of action due to the complexities of identifying the elements of the crime.  
These complexities which are restricting the realisation of the preventative potential 
under the Genocide Convention signal that a different approach is needed, not a new 
definition as since the creation of the concept of genocide ‘[m]uch has been written 
about genocide’ and redefining the crime but ‘[l]ittle has been done to prevent it.’77 
7.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the above discussion in this chapter and the research presented 
throughout this study illustrates why atrocity crimes is a useful and effective category 
to be applied in the midst of violence to remedy the flaws and indeterminacy of the 
Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide which often adversely impacts on the 
prevention and response to violence.  This is a central argument of this thesis, in that 
the deficient and indeterminate nature of the definition of genocide has rendered the 
Genocide Convention ineffective in times of violence which means that the genocide 
label should not be employed in the midst of violence as a preventative term.  This 
argument has developed across the three core strands of this thesis and the research 
questions contained within these strands, the answers to which have illuminated the 
various faults within the concept of genocide and its utility as a preventative term.  The 
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knowledge gained from an examination and analysis of the rules and practices of the 
law genocide permit this research to come to some conclusions about the utility of the 
law of genocide and allows this thesis to present scope for future research and 
recommendations for the use and practice of the law of genocide by actors. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters the thesis has engaged with the research questions through 
an examination of the Genocide Convention and its application in case law and case 
studies.  In tackling these research questions key themes and arguments have emerged 
on the state of the law of genocide and the utility of the definition of genocide as a 
preventative measure.  In this final chapter, the thesis will present the core findings 
and conclusions, which have become evident through the research process, on the 
utility of employing the genocide definition in the midst of violence.  On the basis of 
these findings and conclusions this chapter will address the implications of this thesis 
for the study of genocide, how the research fits into the wider literature of genocide 
studies and the scope for future research in this area.  Alongside recommending a 
potential future direction of genocide studies, this chapter will also present a series of 
recommendations to those actors who potentially engage with and make 
determinations of the crime of genocide in the midst of violence.  Therefore the aim 
of this chapter, in engaging with the various concerns and matters outlined above, is 
to highlight what this research says about the future direction of genocide studies and 
prevention and to neatly encapsulate what this research set out to address, by 
presenting and evaluating the key evidence that has emerged to answer these 
questions. 
8.2 Answering the Research Questions 
The motivation for undertaking this thesis was to address why states fail to take 
meaningful action to prevent and/or prosecute genocide or to characterise particular 
acts and atrocities as genocide.  Relying on the substantial body of literature on 
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genocide, this thesis set out to investigate whether the premise that a state’s failure to 
respond is due to a lack of political will could fully explain this lack of response or 
could this lack of response be due to complexities related to defining, identifying, 
interpreting, and determining the crime.  The focal point of this research was therefore 
the question of whether genocide was identifiable in the midst of violence due to the 
impact and effect of these potential complexities.  This central research question of 
this thesis was conceived within three core strands of research which each contained 
a number of research questions which dealt with the various elements of identifying 
the crime of genocide. 
The first strand of this research was concerned with the preliminary issue of how to 
define genocide, whether to employ the definition as adopted within the Genocide 
Convention or to use one of the many definitions crafted by academics and activists 
to address the crime of genocide.  Included within this strand was the question of 
whether there has been a divide between the legal understanding of genocide as 
contained within the Genocide Convention and the social understanding of genocide 
held by members of the general public due to the academic and activist attempts to 
rework the definition of genocide.  The second strand of this research, which 
comprised the core focus of this thesis, was concerned with how the limitations of the 
legal and social understandings of genocide affect the identification of genocide in the 
midst of violence.  This strand explored the legal, societal, political, and historical 
contexts that can impact on the identification of the elements of genocide and the 
characterising of a situation as genocide by an actor.  In examining the complexities 
inherent in applying the label of genocide to an ongoing situation, at the core of this 
research was an overarching question of the utility of the genocide label as a 
preventative term to be employed in the midst of violence as a means of response.  The 
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third strand of this research follows on from this question, by examining how genocide 
could be prevented and confronted, through the use of the concept of atrocity crimes, 
if the definition of genocide is too complex to identify and determine in the midst of 
violence. 
These research questions and research strands were explored through a combination 
of doctrinal research and critical and contextual analysis of the law of genocide and 
the use of the term genocide in practice.  In conducting this research approach this 
thesis engaged with primary and secondary sources relating to the Genocide 
Convention, case law of the international courts and tribunals, and the situations in 
Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, Central African Republic, the Sinjar region in Iraq, South 
Sudan, and Burundi to illustrate the difficulties of identifying the crime of genocide in 
practice.  The analysis of these sources and case studies highlight key difficulties in 
applying the current internationally accepted definition of genocide in the midst of 
violence, which have led to this thesis to propose a number of core findings on the 
concept of genocide and how it is defined and understood and on the utility of the 
genocide label as a preventative term to be employed in the midst of violence. 
The first key finding which emerged from the research is that the only definition that 
should be applied to characterise ongoing violence is the definition contained within 
the Genocide Convention as it is the sole definition of genocide that has been accepted 
by states and recognised in international courts and tribunals.  This means when 
examining the complexities of identifying genocide and the utility of the term 
genocide for preventative purposes, it is the Convention’s definition of genocide that 
needs to be assessed.  However the discussion of the academic and activist 
reinterpretations of genocide in Chapter Two was important for highlighting 
ambiguities and complexities in the legal definition which impact on the identification 
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of genocide.  These complexities within the definition which were pinpointed in 
research studies were explored and teased out in the research that followed on the case 
law and case studies. 
The research has illustrated that there are three key elements that have to be identified 
so as to make a determination or conclusion on the question of the perpetration of 
genocide.  The three elements are an act of genocide, a protected group, and an intent 
to destroy.  A core finding of this thesis is that while the levels of complexity may 
vary it is a complex task to identify all three elements in the midst of violence.  This 
is due to the difficulties of distinguishing acts of genocide in the midst of violence, 
recognising on what basis a group is being targeted, and establishing evidence of an 
intent to destroy.  The complexities associated with establishing the existence of 
genocide illustrated throughout the thesis render genocide an unsuitable term to 
employ in the midst of violence as the complexities reflect the nature of international 
law and politics. 
The examination of genocide has shown that there can never be a precise definition of 
genocide as elements of the crime are inherently indeterminate, and the specific intent 
element is notoriously difficult to ascertain in most contexts.  The indeterminate nature 
of genocide is a key theme that emerged from the research of the Genocide 
Convention, the case law, and the case studies of this thesis.  Indeterminacy affects 
the identification of the elements of genocide and the prevention of the crime as it 
provides considerable scope for actors in interpreting the provisions of the Genocide 
Convention as there is no precise answer to whether an act is genocide and there is no 
direct obligation on a state to respond effectively to claims and/or evidence of 
genocide.  While the examination of genocide in case law, reports by commissions of 
inquiry, and statements by UN and state officials provides us with a much clearer idea 
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of the elements of genocide, the elements of the crime will always be subject to a level 
of indeterminacy no matter the context.  The indeterminate nature of genocide does 
not mean genocide can never be identified or responded to as it quite clearly can be as 
shown by the research on the response to the crimes of ISIS, however the identification 
and prevention of genocide is dependent on the subjective whims of actors which 
renders genocide an unsuitable label to promote as a term that will result in an effective 
response to a situation of violence. 
The research has shown that the identification of genocide is affected not only by a 
level of indeterminacy but also by the stigma surrounding the genocide label due to 
the legal and social understandings of genocide.  The study highlighted how states 
have been reluctant to employ the word genocide to characterise a situation due to the 
perceived stigma of labelling a situation as genocide and how it may impact on a 
state’s interests.  This shows the key role that political will plays in the response to 
genocide, however this research has illustrated that political will alone cannot explain 
the lack of response, rather there are complexities inherent within the genocide label 
which have negatively affected its applicability in the midst of violence.  This thesis 
has shown through an examination of the case studies how these complexities can 
explain why states have been reluctant to take action to respond to claims of genocide 
and often failed to label ongoing violence as genocide.  These various complexities 
faced by actors in employing the genocide label have limited the utility of the 
Genocide Convention to identify, prosecute, and prevent genocide.  This is the major 
finding from this thesis, that the definition of genocide as contained within the 
Genocide Convention is unsuitable for the prevention and response to genocide in the 
midst of violence, therefore a new approach is needed to ensure that genocide is 
prevented in the future. 
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This finding led the thesis to contend that for the purposes of prevention, the broader 
category of atrocity crimes should be used to characterise ongoing violence rather than 
needing to drill into the specific elements of the definition of genocide.  The research 
on the concept of atrocity crimes highlighted the advantages of this label, as this thesis 
has shown the considerable difficulty of distinguishing some of the elements and 
warning signs of genocide from other crimes of international criminal law.  Employing 
the atrocity crimes label should not change the obligation to respond to a situation as 
this research has shown that states have a responsibility to protect populations from 
all forms of atrocity crimes.  A central finding in favour of the atrocity crimes concept 
is that the discussion of the various situations under review illustrate that the level of 
violence dictates the response, not the label applied to characterise the 
violence.  Therefore a major conclusion of this research was that the focus should be 
on preventing all forms of mass atrocity violence through employing the general 
atrocity crimes label rather than seeking to distinguish the elements of crimes so as to 
apply a specific label to the violence as political will not the label applied to the 
situation will dictate the response. 
In the seventy years since Raphael Lemkin first proposed the word and the United 
Nations enshrined the concept in law, the research presented within this thesis lays out 
that the prevention of the crime may sometimes be best served by not making 
contentious accusations of genocide.  Utilising the concept of atrocity crimes offers a 
way forward to realising the preventative potential under the Convention that Lemkin 
and the drafters conceived of back in the 1940s, by removing the focus on applying an 
indeterminate definition and a potentially problematic label in the midst of a 
situation.  If the present approach to confronting and preventing the crime of genocide 
by applying the flawed definition of genocide continues, it indicates that the crime 
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will not be adequately addressed which means that genocide and other atrocity crimes 
may be more likely to recur. 
To conclude, in undertaking to understand why states have often failed to respond to 
claims/evidence of genocide and failed to label situations as genocide, this thesis has 
shown that these failings are not solely due to a lack of political will.  In presenting 
evidence from documents and case studies this thesis has shown that the failure can 
be traced to faults within the very concept and definition of genocide which cannot be 
remedied or addressed due to the nature of the politics of international relations as it 
currently stands.  This means that the identification of genocide in the midst of 
violence will always be constrained by the inherent complexities within the definition 
of genocide.  This has led the thesis to conclude that the answer to the key overarching 
question of the research strands on the utility of the definition of genocide is that the 
genocide definition is unsuitable and not beneficial for the prevention of 
violence.  Instead the final conclusion of this thesis is that the overarching category of 
atrocity crimes should be employed to characterise ongoing mass atrocity violence as 
a means of prevention, while reserving questions on the perpetration of genocide until 
an international court and criminal tribunals can consider the evidence and 
testimonies. 
The findings and conclusions put forward in this thesis have relied and built upon 
arguments and research contained within the substantial body of literature on the 
subject of genocide.  Obviously it was not possible within the scope of this research 
to discuss every theme and topic within genocide studies, however this researched 
touched upon key research areas that deal with the application of the genocide 
definition in the midst of violence and the prevention of genocide.  Therefore in 
presenting research and conclusions within this thesis on these areas means that the 
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findings of this thesis have direct implications for the study and approach to the topic 
of genocide studies, and specifically the prevention of genocide.  The findings and 
conclusions also permit this thesis to offer some recommendations for the future study 
of genocide and potential policy changes to the practice of genocide prevention in the 
work of states, intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations, and 
civil society groups. 
8.3 Contributions of this Thesis to the Area of Genocide Studies and 
Genocide Prevention 
8.3(i) Implications of this Research for the Future Study of Genocide, Atrocity Crimes, 
and the Responsibility to Protect 
The findings and conclusions presented within this thesis are broadly consistent with 
the findings contained in previous research on the topic of genocide.  As discussed, 
since the inception of the Genocide Convention criticism has been aimed at the 
definition of genocide and its applicability to characterise a particular situation or 
situations.  Therefore research into how the elements of genocide are unidentifiable in 
the midst of violence and how states lack the political will to react does not present 
original ground breaking research.  However this research was necessary so as to 
provide a foundation and basis for this thesis to examine the key concern of this thesis, 
the utility of the genocide definition.  The fact that the findings of this research were 
consistent with the substantial body of literature on genocide with regard to the 
complexities of identifying genocide is a strength of this thesis as it signifies that there 
is a need to investigate the continued utility of the genocide label. 
This research has shown that there needs to be a greater focus on the utility of the 
genocide label as the theory that the failure of genocide prevention is due to a lack of 
political will has been challenged by the findings of this thesis.  These findings support 
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the argument, advanced by Leo Kuper and those that followed him in the study of 
genocide, that the focus should be on the very concept of genocide and its applicability 
in the midst of violence.  In distinction to those early researchers in the field of 
genocide studies this thesis has contended that academic focus needs to be removed 
off redefining genocide, as there is only one accepted definition of genocide, and 
overly focusing on defining genocide brings the goal of prevention under the Genocide 
Convention no closer to reality.  While it is beneficial that this previous academic 
research identifies flaws within the definition of genocide and its application and 
practice, this type of research is often lacking in that it fails to address how the very 
concept of genocide contributes to a lack of prevention.  A key implication of this 
thesis is that genocide itself as a term and concept inhibits the response to violence. 
Therefore a central recommendation of this thesis is that academic research should 
instead focus on how the ambiguities and deficiencies, that have been identified 
consistently in literature, which impact on effectively employing the genocide 
definition as a preventative term to respond to violence raise the utility of the 
continued use of the genocide label.  In particular examining an ongoing situation, 
where there is question marks over the perpetration of genocide or there is a lack of 
international acceptance of genocide, provides considerable scope for future research 
on the utility of the genocide label in the midst of violence.  This is because the 
research of an ongoing situation, as shown with the examination of the situations of 
Burundi and South Sudan, allows researchers to explore various elements involved in 
the identification and prevention of genocide, such as distinguishing warning signals 
and signs of genocide, how different actors use or do not use the genocide label, and 
evaluating the measures adopted to respond to the situation.  Clearly research on these 
topics already takes place, however this research points towards the potential for these 
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topics to be studied as a means of assessing the utility of the genocide label in the 
midst of violence. 
While this thesis has relied and built upon previous research to address the continued 
utility of the genocide label and the findings presented in this thesis are largely similar 
to what has been previously argued within the genocide studies community, there are 
some areas that differ and provide scope for future research.  In particular the 
discussion and findings in relation to how the indeterminate nature of genocide 
impacts on the identification and prevention of genocide is one theme that is lacking 
in the majority of studies of genocide.  This thesis has stressed the importance of the 
indeterminacy theory to the study of genocide by highlighting how the indeterminate 
nature of law underlies the application of the Genocide Convention not only in times 
of violence but also in applying the law of genocide in international courts and 
tribunals.  The indeterminacy theory has been critical to this thesis in explaining 
through an examination of case law and case studies why there may be issues within 
defining, interpreting, identifying, determining, preventing, and responding to 
genocide.  This is because there is no exact definition and interpretation of genocide, 
rather there is a level of subjectivity with the application of the Genocide Convention 
and the genocide label in every context and situation.  Employing the indeterminacy 
theory to examine the utility of the genocide label has allowed this thesis to make a 
significant contribution to the study of genocide as it has identified some of the flaws 
in the assumptions and theories underlying genocide studies. 
The indeterminacy theory challenges the assumption in genocide studies that a new 
definition of genocide would solve the problems of applying the definition of genocide 
to characterise a situation.  This research has implied that the issue of indeterminacy 
is critical for academics to address if they are proposing a new definition of genocide 
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as they have to reconcile their new preferred definition with the fact that this new 
definition would be subject to the same indeterminacies that affect the current legal 
definition.  Furthermore an implication of this research’s reliance on the 
indeterminacy theory is that a lack of effective response to genocide is not solely due 
to lack of political will, rather states can face real difficulty in identifying the elements 
of genocide and deciding what action to pursue in response to genocide.  This means 
for the purposes of the study of genocide that it may be hard to criticise a state’s failure 
to respond or label violence as genocide as there will always be a level of subjectivity 
around the elements of genocide which will affect their choice or decision whether to 
characterise ongoing violence as genocide.  Therefore this research recommends that 
researchers be cognisant of the role that indeterminacy plays in the application of the 
genocide label in a particular situation, as the identification and prevention of genocide 
will be dependent on the political, economic, social, and historical context of the 
situation rather than a strict application of the law of genocide.  While genocide is an 
inherently indeterminate crime, the indeterminate nature of genocide does provide 
considerable scope for researchers to examine the different effects of indeterminacy 
on the application of the genocide label to a particular situation.  This research has 
identified some of these effects, however further research could examine the 
indeterminacy of genocide in more detail in specific case law or case studies, and to 
highlight how the theory of indeterminacy is universal to the application of the 
Genocide Convention by examining the use of the genocide label in different contexts. 
The theory of indeterminacy is central to this thesis in contributing further knowledge 
to the study of genocide, as it is the basis for the contention that genocide is an 
unsuitable and ineffective label to be employed in the midst of violence.  The findings 
in relation to the presence of indeterminacy in the application of the Genocide 
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Convention support this thesis in advocating for a new approach to genocide 
prevention, in the form of utilising the label atrocity crimes.  Therefore the 
indeterminacy theory is critical for laying the foundation for the conclusion of this 
research, that for the purposes of prevention the label atrocity crimes should be 
employed by actors to characterise ongoing violence. 
Assessing the utility of the atrocity crimes concept throughout this study permits this 
research to contribute to the growing body of research on the advantages of employing 
the atrocity crimes label in response to violence.  The findings of this thesis support 
the proposal of Scheffer and others for a change in how genocide is responded to by 
employing the label atrocity crimes.  This research builds upon this contention by 
presenting evidence from an analysis of case law and case studies to strengthen the 
argument for utilising this label.  While atrocity crimes is being increasingly referred 
to in academic research and policy discussion, there has been a lack of analytical 
studies of the utility of the label and an absence of evidence presented for why atrocity 
crimes should be employed as a label rather than genocide as a means of response.  
This research has presented some arguments for why atrocity crimes is a more 
effective label to respond to ongoing violence, which provide a potential avenue for 
future research into the topic of atrocity crimes.  The implication of this research, is 
that the findings and conclusions in relation to the respective utility of the genocide 
and atrocity crimes labels are universal and will apply to any situation of violence 
under review so it is potentially interesting for future research to build upon this 
conclusion and to assess whether the atrocity crimes label is more suitable and 
effective than the genocide label for the purposes of prevention.  Once again the study 
of ongoing situations, similar to the analysis of the situations in Burundi, the Central 
African Republic, the Sinjar region, and South Sudan, provides ample evidence and 
446 
information to build an argument around the utility of atrocity crimes in terms of 
prevention by conducting policy analysis of the potential impact of the genocide label 
on the response in a particular context. 
The research presented in this thesis on the utility of the label atrocity crimes does not 
only have implications for the study of genocide, it is also relevant to the study of the 
RtoP doctrine.  This thesis has contended that when actors use the atrocity crimes label 
as a means of response the RtoP should be the basis for the response to ongoing 
violence.  This research has supported this argument by focusing on the failings of the 
genocide label to respond to violence however future research can also focus on how 
the atrocity crimes label may remedy the faults and deficiencies that may be apparent 
in identifying and preventing the three other atrocity crimes, that fall under the RtoP, 
in times of violence.  Further research into the topic of the RtoP could potentially 
explore this contention in more detail and focus on how the atrocity crimes label may 
strengthen the application and use of the RtoP doctrine in response to violence.  This 
is a key contribution to genocide studies as the research is not simply providing 
criticism of the current state of the law of genocide and genocide prevention.  The 
research is offering a solution to the prevention of genocide and other forms in 
violence in terms of presenting a different label to employ to characterise violence, 
pinpointing the basis for states to act under in response to violence, and indicating a 
doctrine that actors who are seeking a response can refer to and rely upon. 
This last point is key because in advocating the concept of atrocity crimes, this thesis 
and the research findings on the respective utility of the genocide and atrocity crimes 
labels are not only directed at genocide researchers alone, it is also directed towards 
the wide variety of actors who are involved in the response to ongoing violence and 
actors who seek a response to violence. 
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8.3(ii) Recommendations for Policy and Practice 
The key recommendation of this thesis for policy and practical approaches to genocide 
prevention is that for the purposes of responding to violence actors should employ the 
atrocity crimes label rather than the genocide label to characterise ongoing violence.  
Recommending the adoption of the term atrocity crimes as a preventative term to be 
employed in the midst of violence will obviously have policy implications for how 
states and actors (no matter if they are a state, intergovernmental, or nongovernmental 
organisation or official, member of the media, academic, researcher, civil society 
member, victims, survivors, or any member of the general public) engage with the 
prevention and response to genocide.  This research is calling upon these actors to 
completely abandon employing the genocide label in the midst of violence when they 
advocate for action in response to a situation in violence.  Instead the research has 
recommended that these actors refer to the general term atrocity crimes, while leaving 
the question of genocide until after a situation has ended and an international court or 
tribunal can make a determination on the basis of evidence. 
This research has submitted that the term atrocity crimes would only be employed in 
the midst of violence; there would not be a legal definition of atrocity crimes nor 
would it be recognised in statute, rather the crimes that comprise the term atrocity 
crimes would remain crimes of international law that would continue to be punished 
in international courts and tribunals.  This thesis recommends that actors would adopt 
the atrocity crimes label as part of a policy discussion around responses to ongoing 
violence, rather than actors spending time discussing whether elements of the crime 
meet the requirements of the specific crime.  In particular this recommendation is 
directed towards academics, civil society groups, and nongovernmental organisations 
who focus on the genocide label as a means for prompting and compelling states to 
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take action.  The implication of this research for policy discussions around genocide 
prevention is that the focus should be on prevention and response, rather than which 
label to apply to a situation as this research has illustrated that the level of the violence 
and the political interests of a state not the label applied to a situation will condition 
the response of a state to a particular situation. 
The recommendation to employ the atrocity crimes label is not a drastic change as this 
research has shown that states and the UN have already incorporated mechanisms for 
identifying warning signs of atrocity crimes and have adopted strategies aimed at 
preventing and responding to atrocity crimes.  This research is just going one step 
forward in arguing that these efforts mean that these states and the UN should no 
longer need to use and rely on the genocide definition to respond to violence as the 
measures adopted to address atrocity crimes will also address the perpetration of 
genocide.  This thesis has recommend that in utilising the term atrocity crimes as a 
means of prevention, actors should refer to the responsibility that states have to protect 
populations from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes 
under the doctrine of RtoP.  This research is not arguing for a new framework of 
prevention, rather it is relying on the existing framework for prevention within the 
RtoP doctrine and ensuring that the focus of actors is on fulfilling the aims under this 
doctrine to protect populations from atrocity crimes.  The implication of this research 
is that the RtoP doctrine is more effective and useful for the purposes of prevention 
than the Genocide Convention as there is less indeterminacy surrounding the 
application of the RtoP doctrine as it covers all four atrocity crimes.  Therefore the 
main recommendation of this thesis for policy and practice is that actors, regardless of 
whether they are a public or private individuals, in responding to or seeking a response 
to situations potentially involving genocidal violence should utilise the atrocity crimes 
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label to characterise the violence and refer to a state’s responsibility to protect 
populations from atrocity crimes under the RtoP doctrine. 
8.4 Conclusion 
In this final chapter, the main findings and conclusions of this research have been 
presented and the chapter has addressed and discussed the implications of these 
findings for the study of genocide and the practice of genocide prevention.  This 
chapter has shown that the main finding for this thesis is that it is often not useful to 
apply and determine the crime of genocide in the immediate response to mass 
violence, as the complexities of the definition render it difficult to identify and prevent.  
On that basis this thesis has advocated the application of the atrocity crimes category 
in the midst of violence.  This approach to genocide prevention has key implications 
for the study of genocide, and provides several avenues for further research to deepen 
the argument and enrich the already existing body of work on the utility of the concept 
of atrocity crimes.  This concluding chapter has also shown evidently how the findings 
presented throughout this research will impact on the approach of states and other 
actors to the prevention of genocide.  This chapter has included some key 
recommendations for these actors so as to convert the obligation to prevent into a 
reality of international affairs.  To conclude, the world can and should do better in 
preventing these crimes; utilising the category of atrocity crimes, while a small shift 
in the behaviour and practice of states and international actors, can be a step in the 
right direction into converting the promise of ‘Never Again’ into reality.  
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